Indonesia —
The Presence of the Past

A *festschrift* in honour of Ingrid Wessel

**Edited by Eva Streifeneder
and Antje Missbach**

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Tilman Schiel

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Vedi R. Hadiz

Vincent J. H. Houben

**Watch Indonesia! (Alex Flor, Marianne Klute,
Petra Stockmann)**

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In Appreciation of Ingrid Wessel

Adnan Buyung Nasution

If someone wants to understand contemporary politics in Indonesia, he or she first has to look back and to develop a certain understanding of from where modern developments actually derived. Only if someone is acquainted with Indonesia's historical heritage, can one *really* see and assess what is happening in this huge country that is characterised by its enormous diversity and even ambiguities. Not many scholars, nowadays, have such an all-round conception that enables them to observe and critically evaluate continuity and change. Since I have got to know Ingrid Wessel, I have always had the impression that she represents exactly this type of scholar who possesses a framework for analysing Indonesia.

Beyond Ingrid Wessel's academic contributions she has been actively involved in supporting the Indonesian human rights movement before and after the fall of Soeharto in 1998. Many critics from Indonesia visited the Humboldt-University in Berlin and were invited by her to present their ideas to a German audience. I am strongly convinced that Ingrid Wessel has made an important contribution to raising Germany's political awareness of Indonesia.

Traces

Uta Gärtner

The moment of retirement is an excellent opportunity for looking back, for taking stock of a person's life. Whilst one stage of playing an active part in the world's course is closing, the door to the next one is opening. Reviewing the times passed by one can see the traces that remain. This moment is like a crossroads between two different eras of one life, both creative in their own way.

About 45 years ago Ingrid Wessel announced her decision to take up Indonesian studies in Moscow, and she earned the sceptical admiration of her matriculation class mates with whom she had spent one year of practical work in a village near Halle/Saale. Would it work out for a girl to learn a language as foreign as this via another foreign language in a foreign place? It did. If there were hardships she overcame them in her own inherent way of never giving up, which has been characteristic of her to this day. Even when after her return family affairs demanded much of her energy she still managed to pursue her own academic career successfully. The time when she joined the then Department of Asian Studies was a period of considerable consolidation and expansion of Southeast Asian studies at the Humboldt University. She contributed essentially to raising the profile not only of her own special subject, Indonesian studies, but of the department as a whole.

One remarkable trait of Ingrid Wessel's academic work has been her ability to create an all-encompassing link between her own research work and teaching students. From the very beginning, she devoted much of her time and energy to finding the best ways of conveying as much knowledge as possible to the students. Unlike other colleagues, teaching for her has never been an irksome task preventing the scholar from rewarding research but rather an integral part of her activities, a field where she applied scientific findings and gained fresh motivation for further research issues. This basic attitude is reflected in all facets of her work.

A great number of articles bear witness to her own involvement with the modern history of Indonesia, in particular with processes relating to state building and social development. Most telling, however, are the books she has written and edited, for instance, on the history of Indonesia (*Geschichte Indonesiens: Vom Altertum bis zur Gegenwart*), which was written in cooperation with Hans-Dieter Kubitscheck in 1981. Other publications attest to her extensive cooperation with scholars and academics from all over the world, who share similar academic interests and political concerns.

Since the early 1990s, five conferences and workshops have been organised by Ingrid Wessel and her staff: *Nationalism and ethnicity in Southeast Asia* (1993), *Indonesia at the end of*

the 20th century (1995), *10th European Colloquium on Indonesian and Malay Studies* (1996), the *International Conference on Violence in Indonesia* (2000) and finally the *Workshop on Democratisation in Indonesia after the fall of Suharto* (2004). Besides a heavy workload this involved providing young scholars with opportunities to acquire experience in presenting their own research results and in sharing academic knowledge with colleagues from other institutions in Germany and abroad. The same positive attitudes apply to the publications Ingrid Wessel edited. The most recent ones have been *Violence in Indonesia* (2001, Hamburg, Abera) and *Democratisation in Indonesia after the fall of Suharto* (2005, Berlin, Logos). Editing a book is often less valued although it may be more rewarding for the readership. Moreover, the academic scene at the Department benefited from the monthly colloquia Ingrid Wessel and others initiated, to which she invited guest speakers from all over the world, particularly from Indonesia. The visitors included not only academics, but also human rights advocates, political activists and dissidents.

Surveying the traces of Ingrid Wessel work during the last several decades reveals three things: firstly, her broad knowledge and deep interest in social processes in Southeast Asia, secondly, her critical approach in dealing with historical discourses and contemporary developments, and thirdly, the high standard of performance she set herself. Although a specialist in Indonesian history and appointed to teach this subject, in her lectures she has covered a broad range of themes and taught about topics such as democratisation, decolonisation, and civil society throughout the whole region. In doing so she has responded to the need to assist her students to observe, assess and compare developments in various countries of Southeast Asia.

Last but not least, a good number of under-graduate and post-graduate students have benefited directly from the thorough guidance Ingrid Wessel has given and still gives to them while they compile their final theses. Rarely does a professor dedicate so much attention to improving their students' skills to deal independently with scientific issues and to produce results of a high academic standard. This blending of research and instruction within her own work has qualified Ingrid Wessel to be a highly effective university teacher. Moreover, besides these two facets of academic work she has been involved in the community affairs of the Institute for Asian and African Studies and the Department of Southeast Asian Studies. As the Head of the Institute's budgetary committee she managed to utilise the scarce financial resources in an unbiased way that benefited the Institute as a whole. From 1999 to 2002 she took on the responsibility of acting Director of the Department of Southeast Asian Studies, and currently she is an active member of the examination committee of the Institute.

Looking back over past times we have found distinctive traces of Ingrid Wessel's work, which will remain vivid even after she has retired.

Introduction

Antje Missbach and Eva Streifeneder

> The past is never dead. It's not even past.
> (William Faulkner)

The past must be taken into account when studying the present. This might sound like a banal truth; however, although nobody will deny the enormous complexity of how the past influences the present, the variety of interconnections may not always instantly be obvious. This compilation of essays, which has been collected from a range of academic disciplines, offers diverse perspectives on interconnectedness between Indonesia's past and present. It reflects the enormous spectrum of interest representative of Ingrid Wessel's work, to whom this *Festschrift* is dedicated. We have invited her colleagues, friends and former students to write on interconnections between Indonesia's present and past from their individual academic perspectives. Most of the authors decided to pay tribute to some of the major questions Indonesia currently confronts.

The reception to our call for papers was very enthusiastic, and we received many contributions. The enthusiasm of the response from contributors is testimony to the great respect that such a diverse group of scholars have for Ingrid Wessel's work. From the broad range of essay topics, we recognised some shared interests and common themes. Therefore, we have subdivided this volume into five major sections; each deals with major topics and research fields in Indonesian Studies: *Indonesia's Exposure to its Past*, *The State – its Supporters and Opponents*, *Current Tendencies in Indonesian Islam*, followed by a section on *Dance, Literature and the Past* and, last but not least a section labelled *Beyond Indonesia*.

The first section, *Indonesia's Exposure to its Past*, starts with a very programmatic article on Indonesian historiography, which serves as an introduction for the whole compilation followed by four essays that concentrate mainly on the violent transmission of power from President Soekarno to Soeharto and the impacts of Soeharto's New Order regime on Indonesia's current dealing with its past. **Vincent Houben**'s article is an evaluation on how historians tend to analysis Indonesian history. He defines three clusters of approaching Indonesia's history that pre-shape the examination of events and processes. His main criticism is that ideological prepossession by universal analytical patterns will leads to blank spots in Indonesian historiography. We are very grateful to the late **Dan Lev** who wrote an insightful article on the collapse of the Parliamentary Order and the rise of Guided Democracy. **Robert Cribb**'s contribution deals with the 1965 mass killings and their consequences for today. He reminds us how many legal

issues from the past remain still unresolved. By focusing on the victims of 1965-66, **Eva Streifeneder** stresses the legal and social difficulties they are facing until today. The victims' claim for reparations has not been fulfilled although taking responsibility for the past would be an essential step for a democratic government.

The responsibility for the most violent events in Indonesian history is also the focus of **Asvi Warman Adam**'s contribution. He critically analyses several new books published in the post-Soeharto era that try to (re)direct public opinion by making Soekarno bear the main responsibility for the 1965-66 killings.

The second section of the book, *The State – its Supporters and Opponents,* deals with selected topics related to internal developments in Indonesia. The articles use macro- as well as micro-analytical approaches for analysing Indonesian politics. Special attention is directed to some outer provinces where there have been frequent political protests and high levels of violence. **Tilman Schiel** introduces approaches for analysing modern states and conceptualisations of states in Southeast Asia. He specifically refers to Indonesia and the persistence of some 'pre-modern' features of the state. Complex relations of power – particularly between international development organisations and local power holders – are discussed in **Vedi R. Hadiz**'s contribution. He examines tensions and contradictions between economic globalisation and the localisation of power in relation to contests over decentralisation policy in Indonesia. **Ingo Wandelt** draws attention to the 'hidden' history of modern Indonesian unconventional warfare in East Timor. He introduces new materials on General Prabowo, who served in many hotspots in Indonesia. Wandelt writes about how key aspects of Prabowo's way of thinking and his approach were revealed by his early writings during his training at the Army Staff and Command School in Bandung. Current regional power-struggles, shortcomings in the decentralisation process and the lack of political will to deal legally with human rights violations, are the topics of two further contributions. **Bob Sugeng Hadiwinata** provides an in-depth analysis of the latest developments in Aceh, Indonesia's westernmost province, where a separatist movement fought a war for independence from the Indonesian state since 1976. He discusses the post-conflict situation after the Helsinki peace settlement, noting both the chances for sustainable peace and reconciliation, and also the risks that might create new conflicts. The article by **Alex Flor, Marianne Klute** and **Petra Stockmann** concentrates on the latest developments in Papua. By analysing political and economic processes since 1998, the authors demonstrate a variety of problems which the Indonesian state will need to solve if it is to be successful in bringing peace and prosperity to its easternmost province.

The third section of the book, *Current Tendencies in Indonesian Islam,* contains four essays by specialists all of whom are known for their expertise on Indonesian Islam and societal transformation. Both **Bernhard Dahm** and **Franz Magnis-Suseno** bring attention to the radicalisation occurring within Indonesia's broad spectrum of Muslim belief. None

of the two authors make their judgements solely on the basis of recent events, but also apply an historical approach to understanding radicalisation. **Kees van Dijk** broadens the perspective by comparing recent and current religious developments in Indonesian and Malaysian Islam and looking at the reactions from the West in 'the era of terrorism'. He especially highlights the labelling of Islamic groups and tendencies by scholars in the West, the mental constructions behind such labels and their capacity to reflect reality. Qur'anic hermeneutics and discourse on gender equality in Indonesia are the topics of **Nadja Jacubowski**'s article. She provides insight into contemporary discourse on Islam and gender equality in Indonesia, with special regard to the phenomenon of Islamic feminism.

The fourth section of this compilation, *Dance, Literature and the Past,* contains three contributions on the arts in Indonesia. **Sri Kuhnt-Saptodewo** highlights the strong interrelations between history and culture by emphasising non-verbal representations of historic events such as victory in war. In her contribution she refers to the famous *bedhaya*-dance performances of the *kraton* in Solo that were developed in the eighteenth century. **Mary Somers Heidhues** explores the richness of Sino-Malay literature which has recently been re-discovered in Indonesia. Between about 1870 and 1960, the Indonesian Chinese developed a rich corpus of both fiction and non-fiction, which has since gradually disappeared from public attention and memory. Somers Heidhues discusses in her article several new and old works by Sino-Malay authors, such as Nio Joe Lan, Gouw Peng Liang or Yapi Tambayong. **Doris Jedamski** also focuses on Indonesian literature. She sheds light on the dispute between *ulama* and intellectuals about Islam and popular culture in the late colonial Netherlands East Indies. By introducing the writings of Haji Abdul Malik Karim Amrullah and his ideas regarding that dispute, she describes a moderate religious point of view on how novels could be deployed for the process of modernising Islam.

The final section, *Beyond Indonesia*, contains two contributions that go beyond a strict territorial focus on Indonesia, by either comparing it with other countries or pointing to the boundary-crossing affiliations and activities of diasporans. **Frederik Holst** discusses the history of relations between Indonesia and Malaysia, which have gone through a number of stages. At times, the two countries have shared feelings of belonging and cooperated with one another; at other times there has been outright hostility or indifference. He focuses on key events in the Indonesia-Malaysia relationship that defined the development of these two countries and shows how and why political actors frequently took actions that alienated both populations. In her essay on the Acehnese diaspora **Antje Missbach** provides an anthropological reflection on community activities among Acehnese who reside in Sydney. She emphasises the increasing importance of diasporas and their trans-national relations within global politics.

As editors we did not intend to impose uniformity, either regarding the language used in the articles or the approaches the individual authors took in choosing their particular topics. We also did not interfere with the contents of the contributions; all viewpoints expressed are solely those of the authors. We hope that this book will stimulate new debates and contribute to ongoing discussions in the study of Indonesia.

Acknowledgements

I

Indonesia's Exposure to its Past

Representations of Indonesian History

A Critical Reassessment

Vincent J. H. Houben

Indonesia is the most densely studied country within Southeast Asia. The thousands of islands positioned in a half-circle string around Kalimantan have attracted the interest of western scientists of almost all progenies, ranging from marine biologists and volcanists to Austronesian linguists and old Javanese philologists, with social and cultural scientists situated somewhere in the middle. Generations of these have produced a vast knowledge base laid down in tens of thousands of books, articles, images and official reports. Besides this outcome of curiosity from the West, indigenous systems of local knowledge and collective memory have also created an extensive set of data on *Nusantara*. Indigenous knowledge has been primarily vested in persons of local repute, be it shamans, storytellers or wise men or women, and transmitted orally, whereas the written form has been elitist and perishable. However, there has been an asymmetry in the impact of both knowledge systems. Western approaches share a common basis of thinking and describing reality, reflecting the development of modern science, the results of which are shared through a global system of publishing and a network of library collections. Indigenous forms of knowledge are, on the contrary, highly local in content and dispersed in nature and often lack a distributive system that transcends a small circle of onlookers and listeners.

Dutch colonialism brought not only external control of the natural and human resources of the Archipelago but also entailed the superimposition of western knowledge, which, because of its generalising nature, made it easier to come to grips with the bewildering social and cultural variety of the area. Orientalism, a set of ideas to denominate and simultaneously subdue the 'other', infused an additional hierarchy into the production and dissemination of knowledge. At the same time, there were only a few Indonesians who were given access to western education, which had the effect of further strengthening the western bias in the production of learned representations of Indonesia. Until today this legacy is still felt, which means that most new theoretical knowledge is gained by researchers affiliated to western universities, whereas local scholars are strong in describing local phenomena but often restricted in theoretical basis and outreach. Ariel Heryanto critically reflected upon the current role of non-indigenous scholars, externally constructing their area and again putting Southeast Asian

scholars in second place.[1] But this does not change the realities of knowledge production on Indonesia being still asymmetrical in nature and of a particular kind.

The immense diversity of Indonesia, itself a nation born out of an external political construction, is captured through a range of central historical representations that are scholarly in origin but have made a deep impact in the public domain. These representations are not only mental images of various forms of reality but also determine the perceptions of agents that help to shape reality. Therefore the study of representations offers a key to understand better how things are known about Indonesia and how these have been used to construct a social order that is officially summarised under the motto of 'Unity in Diversity'.

In the scope of this brief essay, I assume that scholarly representations of Indonesia, of Indonesian history in particular, have been relevant in the construction of the current socio-political order and its development towards the future. The prevalent 'cultures' of representation are essentially a result of transfers from without and from within Indonesia, therefore entangled in character and simultaneously the outcome of transformation that occurred during the process of interchange. Although history-as-representation can be read as a metaphor of the future, it is necessarily embedded in a past, which needs to be recreated through the construction of collective memories. It involves agency, and mediation as well as mediatisation. Agency entails the capability to act by using cultural codes and in this way generate a particular 'habitus', which Bourdieu circumscribed as a set of predispositions that generate social practice. Mediation involves negotiation and transfer of ideas, thus enabling interaction that results in the coming-together of diverse meanings that ultimately are constitutive in the construction of social reality. Mediatisation covers the ways in which ideas or messages are socially transported. Narratives that produce modern identity can be found, not only in books and images but also in material objects, oral testimonies and even in public performances.

The historical figurations of Indonesian realities, although often unquestioned and assumed to be authoritative, ought to be reassessed in order to challenge some basic assumptions that have emerged both within Indonesian studies and Indonesian society. My line of argument is based upon three central representations of Indonesian history, which through their development over time have become constituents of the current socio-political order: firstly, modernity, development and democracy; secondly, centredness, nationalism and struggle; and thirdly, the stable diversity of culture, religion and ethnicity. These central tropes have become discursively entangled, which makes their disaggregation artificial but also necessary for reasons of proper analysis. History is

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[1] Ariel Heryanto (2002) Can there be Southeast Asians in Southeast Asian Studies? In: *Moussons* 5, 2002, 3-30.

done in reverse, starting with an assessment of the present-day situation and then look-
ing for historical analogies or roots.

Developments in Indonesia since the fall of Suharto have been exceptionally volatile,
especially if we compare them to the long experience of the *Orde Baru* (New Order,
Orba) as having possessed a 'frozen' quality, a stasis that could only be fractured by the
Krismon event (financial and economic crisis). Five years ago a team of Australian ex-
perts surveyed the current challenges of history as part of the Indonesia Update Con-
ference at the Australian National University. Its aim was "to resurrect particular as-
pects of the past – certain events, images, protests, beliefs, correlations and practices all
of which impact on perceptions of the present and expectations for the future […] If
there is a *benang merah*, one underlying current, then it is Indonesia's struggle with the
concept of being a truly inclusive nation, and its inability to invest real meaning in the
slogan 'Unity in Diversity' (Bhinneka Tunggal Ika)"[2]

While rethinking Indonesian history from the perspective of current rapid transforma-
tion, prominent experts have formulated certain conceptual and topical agendas for
political, economic and social history. With regard to politics, Bob Elson has lamented
that there are only a few historians who contribute to this terrain, the subject matter be-
ing confused which makes interpretation problematic and a number of myths cause
distortion but at the same time dominate historical consciousness. A basic problem has
been the depreciation of the modern in Indonesian history by both Indonesian and
foreign historians.[3] In a similar vein, Howard Dick argued that economic history has
long been neglected, leading to either too pessimistic or too optimistic assessments of
the Indonesian economy. The diminishing welfare of the Javanese around 1900, the
Depression of the 1930s and the chaos of the late 1950s/early 1960s gave rise to the
idea that Indonesia's under-development is structural, whereas rapid economic growth
during the New Order was expected to become self-sustaining until it succumbed un-
der the impact of the Asian crisis.[4]

Commenting upon Indonesian social history, Robert Cribb explained that the predom-
inant view of Indonesian history as one of transition to modernity has been subjected
to criticism from postmodernism on the one hand, and by the awareness that social and
cultural change was an integral aspect of the country's history for much longer on the
other. He proposed to locate Indonesia's social history along three axes: mobility-im-

[2] Lloyd, Grayson and S. Smith, eds. (2001) *Indonesia Today. The Challenges of History*. Singapore, ISEAS, 3.

[3] Elson, R. E. (2001) Brief Reflections on Indonesian Political History. In: Lloyd and Smith, 69-71.

[4] Dick, Howard (2001) Brief Reflections on Indonesian Economic History. In: Lloyd and Smith, 161-162. A
more profound historical assessment has been brought up in two key publications: Booth, Anne (1998) *The
Indonesian Economy in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries: A History of missed Opportunities*. London, Macmillan;
Dick, Howard, V. Houben, Thomas Lindblad and Thee Kian Wie, eds. (2002) *The Emergence of a National Eco-
nomy: An Economic History of Indonesia, 1800-2000*. Crows Nest, Allen & Unwin.

mobility; rigidity-flux; isolation-cosmopolitanism. Migration, social mobility in a status-driven society, and adoption or rejection of outside influences have, according to Cribb, consequently been leading themes.[5] Taking them together, it seems that Indonesian history is full of contradiction and ambiguity, not only because of the complex nature of the country itself but also because of biased categories of interpretation produced by historians preoccupied by current affairs. Whether the appreciation of the modern in politics, the non-structural nature of economic development and movement within a semi-open social system offer the essential tools for capturing the essence of Indonesia, needs to be discussed further.

Modernity, Development and Democracy

There exists indeed a meta-narrative that has been basic with regard to much of history-writing on modern Indonesia. It has essentially been written in the form of figurations (in Norbert Elias' sense) that display the rise of modernity.[6] Indonesian modernity could be defined as a program of transformation that encompasses both the colonial and post-colonial eras and that strives towards development and progress. There are many definitions of modernity but most agree that the content of modernisation consists of change in a particular direction, associated with increasing functional and structural differentiation, leading to the rise of a centralised state, an industrialised economy and a society marked by social mobility and increasing individuality. Modernisation started in Europe but was contagious and spread to other parts of the world, multiplicating and transforming itself during the process of transfer. Eisenstadt defined the outcome as "multiple modernities" and wrote: "The idea of multiple modernities presumes that the best way to understand the contemporary world – indeed to explain the history of modernity – is to see it as a story of continual constitution and reconstitution of a multiplicity of cultural programs. [...] Western patterns of modernity are not the only 'authentic' modernities, though they enjoy historical precedence and continue to be a basic reference point for others".[7]

Modernity as a cultural program specifically for Indonesia could be divorced from its content side and interpreted as a practice of representation, in order to give meaning to a large number of phenomena in the political, social and economic spheres. History as the representation of Indonesian modernity is closely linked to modern state-formation, which started in the colonial period and was inherited by the independent state of

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[5] Cribb, Robert (2001) Brief Reflections on Indonesian Social History. In: Lloyd and Smith, 231-233.

[6] Thoughts presented here are based on the workshop *Configurations of Modernity. Global and Local Representations of socio-cultural Change in Comparative Perspective*, held on 7.-8.4.2006 at Humboldt University as part of collaborative work within Sonderforschungsbereich 640. See for more information: www.repraesentationen.de.

[7] Eisenstadt, Shmuel, ed. (2002) *Multiple Modernities*. New Brunswick, London, Transaction Publications, 2-3.

Indonesia. It assumes that with the creation of institutions like the modern bureaucracy and army Indonesian society was drastically reconfigured. The late colonial transfer of the modern state from Holland to Indonesia was incomplete, since equality before the law and civic freedom were not implemented and social order was upheld by a rigid classification of population groups along racial lines. In themselves these representations of history make a lot of sense but tend to underline the state as the central actor, thus offering a top-down view of history. Timothy Mitchell's study of colonial Egypt has already showed how policy universals, that are represented as rational abstractions separate from the social order they govern, are historically grounded and produced through contingent actions.[8]

Within the political sciences a state-centred view of society, positing the bifurcation of state and society, has long been prevalent and influenced those working on Indonesian politics. The repeated succession of democracy (in the 1950s and after 1998) and authoritarian rule (in colonial times and during the New Order) was related to the relative strength of state and society.[9] The New Order has provoked a flurry of studies on the workings of the state, with William Liddle, Donald Emmerson, Jeffrey Winters, Adam Schwarz and others as prime and primarily American proponents of 'Orba-logy'. Challenges to this state-centred view, be it from proponents of the subaltern (initiated by James Scott) or post-modernism (Tony Day) have not reversed the dominant focus of research, although an increasing amount of work is now being done on aspects of civil society.[10]

A recent, more sophisticated turn within political science has been that of John Migdal, arguing for a 'state-in-society' approach based on a definition of the state that characterises it as a processional and fragmented entity, blending a hitherto largely ignored culturalist perspective with the still prevalent institutionalist approach. He refers to Geertz' study on Bali, when instilling the idea that the complexity of the state is hold together by 'cultural glue', to be defined as a common understanding of what the agenda should be and consensus on the way to disagree. More important, however, is his conclusive contention that "the mutual transformation of state and society has led to contending coalitions that have cut across both and blurred the lines between them. It is within these dynamic institutional arrangements that one must now approach the

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[8] Mitchell, Timothy (2002) *Rule of Experts: Egypt, Techno-politics, Modernity*. Berkeley, University of Berkeley Press. For an example on India: Mosse, David (2006) Rule and Representation: Transformations in the Governance of Waters Commons in British South India. In: *Journal of Asian Studies* 65, 1, 61-90.

[9] Anderson, Benedict R. O'G (1983) Old State, New Society: Indonesia's New Order in Comparative Historical Perspective. In: *Journal of Asian Studies* 42, 3, 477-496.

[10] Scott, James (1976) *The Moral Economy of the Peasant. Rebellion and Resistance in Southeast Asia*. New Haven, Yale University Press; Day, Tony (2002) *Fluid Iron. State Formation in Southeast Asia*. Honolulu, University of Hawaii Press; Burnahuddin, ed. (2003) *Mencari akar cultural civil society di Indonesia*. Ciputat, INCIS.

study of the state – an organisation divided and limited in the sorts of obedience it can demand".[11]

The idea of state-formation as the central representation of modern Indonesian history has a close correlation with development. During the New Order the rhetoric of '*pembangunan*' (development) was overwhelming. Development as a state-led enterprise, which is in need of planning and central coordination, had its origins in the ethical policy of the early 20th century colonial state. The improvement of living-standards before 1998 provided the administration with performance legitimacy, whereas the Asian crisis undermined an already fragile political order, just like declining welfare and the crisis of the 1930s signalled the end of colonialism. The developmentalist agenda is furthered through the intervention of foreign development aid agencies, whose programmes have become a circular business in themselves. Gilbert Rist has pointed out how 'development' consists of a conflation of the real (development as outcome of economic growth) and the imagined (social justice in the form of a welfare society) or, to put it more poignantly, an epistemological misunderstanding between description and normativity that has already been outdone by the forces of globalisation.[12]

The road to democracy has been a sub-field of modernisation theory and also heavily influenced by western liberal ideology. An industry of studies on political transitions, that are now believed to have entered the fifth wave, presupposes that democracy will in the end prevail everywhere. Histories of Indonesia written during the early Cold War days dealt with the question of why democracy failed in the 1950s, at a time when American politicians feared a possible drift towards communism.[13] This fear was overturned by Suharto's takeover in 1966, which meant that Indonesia was officially neutral but in practice was associated with the West and staunchly anti-communist. In line with Huntington's revised theory on democratisation, arguing that developing nations need an authoritarian phase in order to get the state to create a stable social order, most political studies of the New Order were focussing on the inner workings and apparent stability of the system.

Assessments of the political development of Indonesia after 1998 are a mirror of earlier debates between optimists and pessimists on the democratic potential of the country. The successful parliamentary elections of 2004 led many observers to conclude that, finally, democracy had acquired a firm foothold in society thus having become consolidated. Aris Ananta, Evi Nurvidya Arifin and Leo Surydinata in the recent book *Emerging*

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[11] Migdal, Joel S. (2001) *State in Society. Studying how States and Societies transform and constitute one another*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 263-264.

[12] Rist, Gilbert (2002) *The History of Development. From Western Origins to Global Faith*. London, Zed.

[13] The famous study of Feith, Herbert (1962) The *Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia*. Ithaca, Cornell University Press, became the object of intense debate not repeated since then.

Democracy in Indonesia, hailed the 2004 elections as "democracy at work" and a success of the country in strengthening democracy. Richard Robison and Vedi Hadiz, on the contrary, argued that the pre-1998 oligarchy has reconstituted itself within the institutions of newly democratic Indonesia.[14] These kinds of discussions seem to have been influenced by ideological assumptions, but hardly take the actual dynamics into account, nor do they reflect an awareness of earlier discussions on the 1950s. In the meanwhile, interesting work is being done on the current situation but not much advertised. To take just one example, Bima Sugiarto has just finished a Ph.D. thesis at the Australian National University on factionalism within political parties in post-authoritarian Indonesia, which shows that informal dynamics and shifting power constellations surrounding influential individuals capture the dynamics of current politics much better than the analysis of institutions, parties and elections.[15] Instead of looking at formal institutions and highlighting deficiencies when compared to an idealised western model, Indonesian politics can be best captured through a study of actors, their clientele and a political culture that has been influenced by experiences from the past.

Centredness, Nationalism and Struggle

Has the motto 'Unity in Diversity' no real meaning? I think it represents a symbolic system in which many parts are bound together, embodying commonness among particularity or separateness between that which is politically united. The idea of *persatuan* (the union of various parts) and the historical representation of *kesatuan* (unity) have been a historical representation of central importance to the present nation-state that is still in the making. The central representations in Indonesian history have been produced through essentialising a historiography that was started in nineteenth century Holland and continued from an anti-colonial point-of-view since independence. The scholarly historiography and Indonesian nationalism are linked since both are centred in character, and stress nationalism as a unifying force and the ongoing struggle of Indonesia against outside forces that are imagined to possibly undermine independence.

The current state of Indonesia is portrayed as emanating from a string of centres located on the island of Java. In the 14th century Mojopahit was the centre, in the 17th century there were two competing centres, Mataram and Batavia, and since 1946 the capital of Jakarta has been the undisputed centre of power. The centredness of Indonesian history is built upon the following historical myths: the unity of the insular world of

[14] Ananta, Aris, Evi Nurvidya Arifin and Leo Suryadinata (2005) *Emerging Democracy in Indonesia*. Singapore, ISEAS; Robison, Richard and Vedi R. Hadiz (2004) *Reorganizing Power in Indonesia. The Politics of Oligarchy in an Age of Markets*. London, New York, Routledge.

[15] Sugiarto, Bima (2006) *Beyond formal politics: party factionalism and leadership in post-authoritarian Indonesia*. Unpubl. Ph.D.-thesis, Canberra, ANU.

Nusantara since the golden age of Majapahit in the 14th century; the history of nationalism as an inclusive movement, which after a heroic struggle (*perjuangan*) for independence finally achieved its realisation in the unitary republic of Indonesia. The anti-colonial struggle of the Indonesian revolution (1945-49) was preceded by resistance movements of an earlier date, in which national heroes played a decisive role. In this way Indonesia illustrates the linear growth of a *mandala* structure, in which the centre has been contested but has not succumbed. Scholars from both the West and Indonesia have been busy producing histories that match this basic format.

The dominant thread of historical representation has repressed alternative versions of Indonesian history from being developed. The history of Outer Island Indonesia has been relegated to the realm of regional history, not being part of the wider Asia Pacific but preordained to become part of a Java-centric state. The history of nationalism as a process of internal discord and competition between emancipating and associational movements has not yet been explored. The iconoclastic role of youngsters at crucial moments in history beyond the *sumpah pemuda* (oath of the youth) in 1928, during the hot months of the Indonesian revolution, in the form of student protests in 1965 and 1998, has received only limited appreciation. The portrayal of the democratic period of the 1950s as a time of opportunity instead of chaos has not yet been forthcoming. The history of Chinese, Eurasian and other ethnic or religious minorities has not been integrated into national history. The historical record of the New Order has still to be written, including alternative versions of the 1965 coup, the mass killings, developments in Aceh, Papua and East Timor, and set within a much longer history.

Most importantly, however, is to decentre and recontextualise Indonesian history by moving in two directions simultaneously. One direction is the drive towards local histories of people who live on the margins instead of close to the centre. The other drive is to look at Indonesian history in a comparative way, ignoring present-day boundaries, 'jumping geographies of scale' and taking in the forces of globalisation as something that has already existed for a long time.[16] The combination of both could be labelled as 'writing history at the interstices', and includes oral history methods, text criticism and critique from the anthropology of borders field of study.[17]

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[16] Schendel, Willem van (2002) Geographies of Knowing, Geographies of Ignorance: Jumping Scale in Southeast Asia. In: Kratoska, Paul, Remco Raben and H. Schulte Nordholt, eds. (2005) *Locating Southeast Asia: geographies of Knowledge and Politics of Space*. Leiden, KITLV, 275-307; Houben, Vincent (2004) Globalization in Southeast Asia – a Historical Analysis. In: Heinrich Böll-Stiftung, ed., *Asian Modernity – Globalization Processes and Their Cultural and Political Localization*. Berlin, Heinrich Böll-Stiftung, 27-33.

[17] Writing at the interstices was a term used by Thongchai Winichakul (2003) Writing at the Interstices: Southeast Asian Historians and Postcolonial Histories. In: Abu Talib bin Ahmad and Tan Liok Ee, eds., *New Terrains in Southeast Asian History*. Athen, Ohio University Press and Singapore, Singapore University Press, 3-29. See also: Chou, Cynthia and Vincent Houben, eds. (2006) *Southeast Asian Studies: Debates and New Directions*. Singapore, ISEAS.

Culture, Religion and Ethnicity

A third central historical representation of Indonesia has been focused on the issue of tradition. In the meanwhile most scholars have become wary of using the label tradition in opposition to modernity as a way to explain why Indonesia is so different. A variant of this has been to take culture as an essential, static category in order to rationalise events and strategies that would make no sense from a purely western perspective. Nowadays tradition has been replaced by culture but in an updated version, springing from the awareness that culture is manifold, internally contested and constantly changing.

An introduction to contemporary traditions of Indonesia has been offered recently by Ian Chalmers, attempting to find the forces behind Indonesian social and political change since a number of 'conceptual landmarks' have been washed away by the crisis of the late 1990s. He distinguishes seven traditions that involve the interaction between political elites and societal forces: the Javanese concept of power, state welfarism, statist developmentalism, state vigilance, feminist-cum-nationalist modernism, populist nationalism, and political Islam.[18] Of these the Javanese concepts of power and Islam qualify as being cultural in the restricted sense since these are embedded in existing belief and value systems. Anderson and Geertz could still be characterised as the central architects of historical representations that are supposed to grasp the essence of Indonesian culture and in this manner explain what is typically Indonesian about Indonesia. Geertz' study on the religion of Java and Anderson's seminal essay on the idea of power in Javanese culture belong to the most often cited publications in the modern historiography on Indonesia.[19]

Since Anderson introduced his concept of Javanese power, it has been put to use extensively in order to capture the dynamics of modern Indonesian political history. It explained how someone that possesses *wahyu* (literally 'ray of light') has the right to rule, power being of a very concrete, finite quality instead of being an abstract category. This cultural idea of power was then taken to explain the tendency of power to be invested in and monopolised by certain rulers, be it Hayam Wuruk, Sukarno or Suharto. It is striking how, after the fall of the New Order, this idea has been dropped from the scholarly vocabulary, since apparently the rapid turnover of political leaders did no longer fit the cultural model. Another related idea, proposed by Geertz for Bali, was that of the theatre state, in which power was argued to serve pomp and not the other

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[18] Chalmers, Ian (2006) *Indonesia. An Introduction to Contemporary Traditions.* Oxford, Oxford University Press, xii, passim.

[19] Anderson, Benedict (1972) The Idea of Power in Javanese Culture. In: Holt, Claire, ed., *Culture and Politics in Indonesia.* Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1-69; Geertz, Clifford (1960) *The Religion of Java.* Chicago, University of Chicago and Free Press.

way around. To see pomp as the essence of the struggle for power has been contested and in the meanwhile historians see the term as fitting for France under Louis XIV, while there are many history-related state rituals in contemporary Europe as well.

Indonesian Islam is portrayed as being of a localised, more moderate character than Islam in the Middle East. Mysticism remains strong not only on Java but even in a region like Aceh. This image of moderate Islam has historical roots in the specific character of the process of conversion in the Archipelago. But it also mirrors cultural representations, created by colonial architects of Islam policy, such as Snouck Hurgronje, in which there was an attempt to split moderate and orthodox Islam and suppress the latter. The rise of political Islam, sometimes seen as part of a broader process of *santrinisation* (re-Islamisation), is not new. The panislamist or modernist Islam of the early 20th century led anti-colonial resistance to be framed in religious terms and led to struggles within communities between the *kaum muda* (young generation) and *kaum tua* (old generation). Various regional revolts in the 1950s, in West Java and South Sulawesi, took on the garb of a Darul Islam movement. But even with radical Islam having resurfaced today, the major trend is said to be towards so-called civil Islam.[20] Religious 'revivalism' has not been solely restricted to Islam nor has religion during elections proven to be the prime mover of voters' behaviour during the elections of 1999 and 2004.

Ethnic plurality, with each ethnic group having its own cultural identity, is another issue central to the image of Indonesian uniqueness. On the bright side, it underscores the representation of Indonesia as a harmonious archipelago in which many *suku* (ethnic groups) live happily together as members of one nation. Inland tribal groups are said to have had long-term exchanges with coastal peoples along the *hulu-hilir* axis, whereas Malays, Buginese and others commanded the inner seas and Javanese cultivated their rice-fields, each constituting their own cultural ecology.

That Indonesia is particular in its cultural variety and peaceful accommodation of outside influences has been a central element in the scholarly and public image of the country. However, the fall of the New Order brought with it a series of outbursts of ethnic violence that shattered the image of ethnic harmony, not so much a consequence of a revival of primordial identities but an outcome of transmigration, Javanisation politics on the Outer Island and installing an informal racial hierarchy in which the Javanese were put at the top and the Chinese alongside with the *orang asli* (original inhabitants) at the bottom.[21] When surveying other sites of ethnic violence in Asia or Africa, Indonesia and its ethnic politics do not look so special anymore. A thrust on be-

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[20] Hefner, Robert (2000) *Civil Islam. Muslims and Democratization in Indonesia*. Princeton, Princeton University Press.

[21] Among the studies on communal violence, see Wessel, Ingrid and Georgia Wimhöfer, eds. (2001) *Violence in Indonesia*. Hamburg, Abera.

half of nation-states to civilise the margins and integrate minorities into mainstream culture and society can be observed almost everywhere.[22] At present new cultural formations in the form of an urban youth culture and a consumptive life-style are emerging that reflect 'glocalisation', on the one hand being a global phenomenon but also modified by local particularities, such as a strong correlation between status and the purchase of international product brands.[23] Traditional and modern values are transported simultaneously through TV soaps appearing on commercial television. From this viewpoint, Indonesia, Asia and the global arena have once again become utterly intertwined.

Some Concluding Statements

The landscape of Indonesian studies is changing, since a number of the central tropes and historical representations seemed no longer valid in the era after Suharto and the Bali bombings. Modernity, development and democracy have lost much of their appeal, not because Indonesia has no right to human progress but because assessments on the basis of western linear models of development do not seem to capture the current dynamics of the country satisfactorily. The inclusive boundaries of the centralised nation-state are challenged as are standardised centred versions of national history. Culturally exclusive characteristics of Indonesia have been transformed in the wake of current globalisation and have therefore become partly obsolete. This does not mean, however, that the study of modern Indonesian history, politics and culture is at a dead end. On the contrary, being aware of how dominant representations of modern history have shaped our understanding of current social practice in Indonesia offers a way to rethink some of the unspoken assumptions that underscore Indonesian studies. Also being aware of how these representations, that are scholarly in origin, can create social practice, are essential for future research. A fresh look, based on detailed and decentred local histories in combination with a comparative perspective, might be the best way to go forward.

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[22] Duncan, Christopher R., ed. (2004) *Civilizing the Margins. Southeast Asian Government Policies for the Development of Minorities.* Ithaca, Cornell University Press.

[23] Gerke, Solvay (2000) Global Lifestyles under Local conditions: the New Indonesian Middle Class. In: Huat, Chua Beng, ed., *Consumption in Asia. Lifestyles and Identities.* London, New York, Routledge, 135-158.

In Search of a Complex Past

On the Collapse of the Parliamentary Order and the Rise of Guided Democracy in Indonesia

Daniel S. Lev

It took only a few years after 1998 for Indonesian thinkers and scholars, young and old, to begin to ask the questions in public that the New Order regime had dismissed or shut down since 1965. The process has been difficult, in part because little enough information is available, but also because so much of the history essential to understanding what happened over the last forty years and more has been smothered, deleted, or buried with those who had lived through it. Thus far the most compelling target of query has been the brutal massacre of late 1965, when the Communist Party (PKI) was obliterated and many others were thrown into prison compounds and camps without trial, marking the onset of what became the thirty-three year reign of General Soeharto's New Order. Hard questions are asked, various analyses suggested of what exactly happened and who made decisions and what the motives and intentions were. Given how few people made decisions then, and how many of them are dead, it may well be that conjecture is about all that can be hoped for.

For any who want to reach into a farther past, as I do in this short piece, conjecture may be all we can hope for, or in any case until deeper research reveals more useful information. For the time being, there is not much of the past in the present as we know it. The 1950s were a critical time in Indonesian history, but Herbert Feith's major study and a few shorter works are about all we have.[1]

My primary concern in this brief essay is President Sukarno, whose role in the dramatic changes of regime from 1957 through the early 1960s deserves serious reconsideration. What set off this renewed interest in Sukarno, however, were three essays: one written by M. Thorik and Hafis Azhari based on Joesoef Isak's introduction to a book celebrating the hundredth anniversary of Sukarno, in which Isak distinguishes Sukarno's guided democracy from the army's; a second by the journalist Goenawan Mohamad on Sukarno's understanding of the Panca Sila as essential to the complexity of Indonesia; and a third by Baskara T. Wardaya SJ entitled "Bung Karno Accuses".[2]

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[1] I have dealt with this problem of the disappearing past in *Memory, Knowledge and Reform* in Zurbuchen, Mary S., ed. (2005) *Beginning to Remember: The Past in the Indonesian Present*. Singapore, Singapore University Press.

[2] The Joesoef Isak piece "Demokrasi Terpimpin Bung Karno Versus Angkatan Darat" can be found online from *Gema Nusa* 14.2.2006 Goenawan's thoughtful essay, "Menggali Panca Sila Kembali" (Re-excavating the

At about the same time, as political tensions rose over religious and other political issues, many others began to speak out and write, often referring to the long frozen Panca Sila, Sukarno's 1945 conception of a state ideology, rendered all but meaningless by military leadership during the New Order.[3] It wasn't only the Panca Sila that suddenly reappeared, however, but the beginning of a reassessed Sukarno.

At least two problems make reassessing Sukarno fairly difficult, to put it mildly. One is that not much is remembered about the period during which he played a particularly significant political role, and what is remembered is often either wrong or may be so. The other is that he was hardly a simple man with purist habits. He was not a Hatta, his virtuous and upstanding Vice-President until late 1956, and many found his womanising, multiple wives, and the like hard to take, even now, more than thirty-five years after his death. On this account, then, it is helpful to forget about Sukarno's quirks and to focus on his political ideas and efforts.

To begin briefly with the Panca Sila, recent interpreters have discovered (or rediscovered) in it basically a recognition of Indonesia's complexity and Sukarno's insistence that compromise and negotiation had to determine. No single perspective or set of interests – not Islam, not Java, not this or that narrow priority – could dominate. In the preparatory meetings of 1945, Sukarno is constantly on guard to avoid imbalances, not least his own decision to move "Believe in the One God" from last to first among the five principles as a concession to Islamic interests. Moreover, his insistence on recognising and assuring political and social space for minority religious groups was nothing less than an appeal for the equality of citizenship.

The picture of Sukarno as a self-absorbed leader eager for power is not convincing. Early in the revolution he was evidently convinced that Indonesia needed a single state party, perhaps to ensure the unity he and others feared was doubtful. The 1945 Constitution provided for a strong president, but early on it was set aside in favour of a parliamentary system in which the president, while widely influential was nevertheless distinctly limited. As Joesoef Isak points out, Sukarno did not protest the demotion or argue the case for his centrality or insist on the 1945 Constitution.

Similarly but more to the point, if Sukarno were as self concerned as many thought, the October 1952 affair in which the officer corps pressed the President to dismiss Parliament and take command, the outcome might well have been different. But Sukarno

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Panca Sila) is online under *pantau-komunitas*, 17.09.2005. For Baskara's (2006) discussion see his book *Bung Karno Menggugat!* (Bung Karno Accuses) Yogyakarta, Percetakan Galang Press.

[3] The five principles of the Panca Sila are nationalism, internationalism (or humanitarianism) democracy (agreement or consent), and belief in the One God. For a more elaborate discussion of the principles as Sukarno developed them, see J. D. Legge (1972) *Sukarno: A Political Biography*. New York, Praeger, 184ff.

rejected the demand, sent the officers home, eventually fired Colonel Abdul Haris Nasution, and made clear that the parliamentary system would remain in place.

If anything, Sukarno evidently believed that parliamentarism made sense for Indonesia. But the October 1952 affair most likely made him aware that the chief threat to the parliamentary order, and to the Indonesian state, was the army. As if to make the point clear, when he later tried to appoint a new commander of the army, his choice was rejected by the officer corps and the President had to re-appoint Nasution in 1956.

From then on, from 1956 through 1959, the parliamentary system slowly collapsed. In most of the literature on the period, Sukarno is blamed for what happened. In my own dissertation I argue that the march towards guided democracy was largely led not by Sukarno but by General Nasution, whose office produced the basic ideas – functional groups, the Middle Way of the army (*dwifungsi*), the restoration of 1945 Constitution – that defined the principal version of guided democracy.[4] But I hedged by suggesting that Sukarno was somehow complicit in destroying the post-revolutionary state, which in many respects worked rather well despite the extraordinary difficulties, local and international, of the times. More likely, however, he was not so at all, but rather fighting a rear guard action against hopeless odds.

What exactly was he up against? To protect the parliamentary system, members of parliament had to defend their institution, and this ultimately they would not do. In the election of 1955, the Communist Party (PKI) came in fourth, more than a minor shock to the other major parties – the Nationalists (PNI), Masjumi (modernist Islam), and the Nahdlatul Ulama (traditionalist Islam) – let alone most of the smaller groups. At about the same time, the United States began to pay more attention to the PKI problem, generating a good deal of heat over the issue.

By mid to late 1956 Sukarno began to make public his own response to the tensions that followed upon the 1955 elections, not least regional economic demands, but also accusations about PKI influence, and regional army commands speaking out. The elections had not resolved but rather seemed to deepen cleavages in society, and left to a new Constituent Assembly, whose make up echoed the Parliament, the demanding job of replacing the progressive provisional constitution of 1950. As political and social tensions emerged, Sukarno began to speak out, not as a weak constitutional president but as Indonesia's most popular and compelling figure. It is hard to know just how much he meant to be taken seriously or to shock the political class.[5] In late October

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[4] See Lev (1966) *The Transition to Guided Democracy: Indonesian Politics, 1957-1959*. Ithaca, Modern Indonesia Project, particularly chapter II.

[5] One of a few inside sources available for this period, from 1956 through 1960, is a set of four lectures by the late Roeslan Abdulgani in 1973 at the Centre of Southeast Asian Studies, Monash University. 1973. Two of the lectures deal with the evolution of Guided Democracy. I am grateful to Loren Ryter for finding them for me in the Cornell University collection.

1956, soon after a trip to China, Sukarno proposed that all the political parties be dissolved, which all of them, including the PKI, opposed explicitly. According to Roeslan Abdulgani, the next year in a meeting of the new National Council, Sukarno said of the earlier proposal: "I collided with conditions. My head was nearly broken. So sharp and strong was the wall of resistance from the parties I wanted to dissolve that I was forced to give up that idea."[6] Sukarno may well have been a romantic in some respects, but he was not a naïf at politics, he knew exactly who his audience was, and it is hard to believe he was shocked at all.

In late 1956 Hatta resigned the vice-presidency, arguing that Sukarno was endangering the country with wild propositions, by which he meant not only dissolving all parties but also moving left. Next, however, in February 1957, on the verge of the collapse of the Ali Sastroamidjojo Cabinet, Sukarno announced his *konsepsi* that Indonesia needed a four-horsed cabinet, one that included the PKI as well as the PNI, Masjumi, and the NU. It was a sensible idea, one that might socialise the PKI, impose restraints, and compel compromises. It fitted into his notion of how a country as complex and diverse as Indonesia had to govern itself. Sukarno was well aware that Communists were in the parliaments of Italy, France, Holland; why not Indonesia?

The parties – particularly Masjumi, Nahdlatul Ulama, even the PNI, close as it was to the President – opposed the idea, often enough in extreme terms. If anything their position hardened during the rest of 1957 and 1958, and Sukarno dropped the issue, hoping perhaps to raise it again at a more advantageous time that never came.

During much of 1957 Sukarno played an increasingly outspoken role, which his popularity allowed him to do, but it was also more subtly a role defined by his own understanding of the demands of an Indonesia governed by the principles of the Panca Sila, not least inclusiveness and compromise. When the other parties rejected inclusion of the PKI in the cabinet, however, Sukarno had little choice but to push ahead in search of political solutions. He created an inclusive National Council, with both party and 'functional group' representation (most likely suggested by University of Indonesia law school dean Djokosoetono), which made the army a legitimate participant.[7] He also became Prime Minister at a time, from mid-1957 when tensions rose with the year end attack on major Dutch firms (nationalised in mid-1958 and absorbed by the army), the

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[6] Roeslan 1973: 38-39.

[7] Since Nasution's reappointment as commander of the army, it is worth considering that he now began to see the army as a political party of sorts, having failed to make much of the party IPKI that he created before the 1955 elections. Roeslan delicately notes that by late 1956: "In the meantime, some elements of the Army continued their activities and ambitions in the political field. Furthermore conditions were such that sectors of the economy began to fall within the sphere of military activity, a fact which also tended to increase the thirst for personal power in certain military circles" (Roeslan 1973: 38). He might well have had in mind tensions then in Semarang that had begun to develop around Colonel Suharto's command.

breakout of open (PRRI) rebellion in West and North Sumatra and Sulawesi (Permesta) in February 1958. Thereafter tensions grew within the National Council and Cabinet as Sukarno evidently tried to keep control. Nasution, in charge of putting down the rebellion, at a time moreover when local military coups were becoming *de rigueur* in South and Southeast Asia, the Middle-East, and South America. Nasution demanded for the army recognition of its right to serve the country both as its defence corps and as social-political participant.[8] Members of the National Council evidently understood the understated threat and approved.

Nasution also took the opportunity for the second time since October 1952, now without cannon trained on the Presidential Palace, to press for restoration of the 1945 Constitution without amendment of any kind.[9]

Here, however, there is much historical confusion not only over the 1945 Constitution, but the possible versions of Guided Democracy and how it was to be achieved. The most common view, accepted by most who have written about it, is that Sukarno wanted the 1945 Constitution as it was and sought its approval by the Constituent Assembly, which would surrender its own work on a new constitution and prorogue itself.

In fact, it was Nasution, not Sukarno, who both proposed and pressed hard for the 1945 Constitution. According to Roeslan Abdulgani, the National Council sought "a firm constitutional basis on which the radical reforms could be initiated. On the initiative of the armed forces, in particular of General Nasution, the National Council decided to urge the Constituent Assembly, which was sunk in futile debates, to return to the 1945 Constitution…"[10].

Sukarno was trapped. The initiative belonged to Nasution and the army, but in addition all the major political parties except for the PKI were so worried about PKI prospects in the next, 1959, elections that in mid-1958 they voted to cancel them, surgically removing their parliamentary legitimacy. The meanings of Guided Democracy, still unclear during much of 1958, now began to narrow towards the kind of authority

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[8] The original term was the "army's middle way", which eventually evolved into *dwifungsi*, or the double function.

[9] The reasons for avoiding amendment were, on the one hand, to bypass Islamic efforts to restore the *Piagam Jakarta* (Jakarta Charter) meant to apply Islamic law to Muslims, and on the other, most likely, to avoid reducing the powers of the presidency or the symbolic integrity of the original document. For Nasution and other officers, the 1945 Constitution evidently carried strong revolutionary meanings, but Nasution, by many accounts, also wanted a strong disciplinary state, not one of the sort Sukarno had in mind via the Panca Sila.

[10] Abdulgani 1983: 11. The PNI leader Hardi, in his memoirs, reports that Sukarno did not want to be president under the 1945 Constitution, but that Hardi brought him around. Hardi (1983) *Api Nasionalisme Cuplikan Pengalaman*. Jakarta, Gunung Agung, 99ff. Sukarno, according to Hardi, did not want to assume full authority as President under the 1945 Constitution because, he feared, he was simply not prepared to understand complex economic issues and the like. The statement rings true. Hardi claims, however, to have brought Sukarno around.

Sukarno himself probably did not want and may well have feared. It was not Sukarno, however, who was responsible for the fall of the parliamentary order, but the parties themselves and army leadership.

In April 1959 the Constituent Assembly debates began over the 1945 Constitution and ended in May. Sukarno had left on a visit to several other countries – an odd decision at such a critical time – and oversight was left to acting president Sartono, the Speaker of Parliament, and in effect Nasution. The vote failed to produce a two-thirds majority, setting off a crisis that Nasution quickly ended with a news black-out and curfew. He then sent a courier to meet with Sukarno and recommended that the 1945 Constitution be decreed into effect. Nasution also called a conference of military commanders for the 29 June, when Sukarno was to arrive, in effect confronting the President with un-mistakable power.

When Sukarno finally arrived at Kemayoran Airport, he had much to say in very few words. He would make an announcement in a few days, he said, implying a decree, but he also said he did not intend to be a dictator: that he had proved that in October 1952, when Nasution and the officer corps had tried to force him to dismiss parliament.[11] Yet, it must have been clear to both men that Nasution, and more significantly the officer corps, had finally won that battle.

Yet, it was not entirely obvious to most Indonesians. Sukarno was President, after all, had seemed to be in command, made hard decisions, spoke out confidently, dismissed and replaced Parliament, set up new institutions, and had the attention of the popula-tion. He had authority, popularity, respect, all of which he could call upon at times, but not enough power to count consistently. Power belonged to the army, which most of the reduced number of political parties hoped would keep the Communists in check, as it did, leaving Sukarno little alternative but to rely on the PKI, which he could not en-tirely trust or control.

The tensions of the period 1959 through 1965 are nicely interpreted by Joesoef Isak in his analysis mentioned earlier. There was not one but two guided democracies: the army's and Sukarno's. Where he could, and as much as he could, Sukarno tried to save the state as he had tried long ago to define it, countering the officer corps, avoiding its excesses to the extent possible, challenging its simple anti-Communism and (often bit-terly) that of the United States as well. Finally, however, he could do relatively little against the army's version of guided democracy.

Interesting in a quite different way is the revival of the Panca Sila, which the New Or-der regime had reduced to little more than a hypocritical cliché. In response to religious tensions, among other matters, the ideas behind the Panca Sila, as Sukarno conceived it

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[11] Lev 1966: 277.

in 1945, have emerged once more in serious efforts to define the conditions by which this extraordinarily complex country can live with itself.

The 1965 Massacres in Indonesia

Issues still unresolved

Robert Cribb

Since the fall of the Indonesian president Suharto in 1998, it has become possible, though still not easy, to conduct research on the events which marked the beginning of Suharto's long rule. Suharto came to power by a rather slow process in the aftermath of an apparent coup on 1 October 1965 in which a number of senior generals, including the army commander, General Achmad Yani, were kidnapped and killed and in which a Lieutenant-Colonel Untung, commander of the presidential guard, sought to seize power in the name of a Revolutionary Council. Although Suharto, then commander of the army's strategic reserve, KOSTRAD, quickly crushed the coup, his accession to political power as Indonesia's president was much slower. He did not extract a formal mandate from President Sukarno to 'restore security and order' until March 1966 and did not become acting President until 1967. Although some observers attributed this gradual assumption of power to a characteristic Javanese civility, in fact the transition from Sukarno's Guided Democracy to Suharto's New Order was amongst the bloodiest political events of the twentieth century. It is now most unlikely that we will ever know just how many people perished. In Western scholarship there has developed something of a convention to say that around half a million people died, while estimates within Indonesia have gone as high as three million. Amongst those who have examined these events closely, however, there is a clear consensus about the identity of the victims. They were members and associates of Partai Komunis Indonesia (Indonesian Communist Party, PKI), which had been regarded before the killings as the largest communist party in the non-communist world and which had itself claimed three million members.

The fall of Suharto removed the police state atmosphere that made most people reluctant to talk at all about the events of 1965 and after, but Indonesian anti-communism remains remarkably strong. Still in place is a repertoire of laws and regulations that discriminate against any person regarded as *terlibat* ('involved'), directly or indirectly in the 1965 coup. This flexible term refers to any kind of engagement or public endorsement of leftist activity from that time. In addition, under a regulation known as *bersih lingkungan* ('environmentally clean'), family members of those who were *terlibat* face a range of discriminatory practices, including exclusion from government employment. It has been estimated, probably extravagantly, that 22 million people, 10 percent of Indonesia's cur-

rent population have experienced such discrimination. The hostility to communism does not lie only in government circles. Radical Muslim groups, in particular, have publicly and repeatedly urged vigilance against a possible resurgence of communism and in 2000 bookshops in Jakarta and Central Java experienced 'sweeping' by Muslim vigilantes in which supposedly leftist books were taken from the shelves and burnt in the street. Both Indonesian researchers working on aspects of the killing and activists trying to bring the issue of the killings on to the public agenda have faced harassment from the authorities and from private vigilantes. Nonetheless, there has been a determination on the part of many survivors to tell their story and several organisations have been involved in the systematic gathering of information about the killings. We lack the abundant memoir literature of the Cambodian genocide, and there is still no Truth and Reconciliation Commission in Indonesia. Nonetheless, at very least, our understanding of the Indonesian massacres rests now on a steadily expanding empirical base.

This empirical base increasingly points to the central role of the Indonesian army in the killings. A conclusion of this kind probably seems unremarkable; particularly we are familiar with the case of East Timor where, even if the number of victims may be disputed, there is no shadow of doubt that the perpetrators were overwhelmingly members of the Indonesian Armed Forces. In the case of the 1965-66 massacres, however, many reports have indicated a high degree of non-military engagement in the killings. There are powerful reasons why this should have been so.

One of the strongest traditional features shared by Indonesia's many societies was a tension between hierarchy and fluidity. Leaders rose and fell according to ability and fortune and Indonesians have traditionally been strongly conscious of the fluidity of power. Neither states, nor cities, nor institutions show any pronounced longevity; rather Indonesian history has been a dynamic process in which established elites have been toppled and old institutions bypassed by new ones. Of course Indonesian elites have employed ideologies of stratification to protect their position, but there has always been a powerful appeal amongst the Indonesian people for ideologies emphasising justice and opportunity.

In 1965, the Indonesian Communist Party stood for groups who felt excluded and oppressed by the ruling elites. These elites were not for the most part remote oligarchies of the kind found, for instance, in the Philippines. Rather, they were a multitude of local elites, partly based on the old, quasi-aristocratic elites who had been the lynchpin of Dutch colonial rule, partly consisting of parvenus, men who had come to local power and fortune out of the turmoil of the Japanese occupation (1942-45) and the Indonesian Revolution (1945-49). Although the PKI had, of course, an ideology of radical social change, the vast bulk of its followers had no real Marxist revolutionary consciousness. They wanted an end, rather, to the abuse of power by local officials, an end to the

monopolization of official positions, to corruption, to arbitrary confiscation of prop-
erty, to compulsory labour services and to enforced respectfulness to officials. They
wanted justice – in the sense of fair treatment – and opportunity to seek prosperity and
power themselves without encountering unfair and restrictive practices that kept elites
in power. For these reasons, the PKI was not just a party of the very poor, but also a
party of aspiring power holders, men and women who saw it as the vehicle which
would open opportunities for them in independent Indonesia. This fact, of course,
made the party vulnerable to accusations of hypocrisy and opportunism: it was not a ri-
gidly class-based party and its campaign strategy in each region tended to reflect the
character of local tensions between established and aspiring elites. This perception of
opportunism and hypocrisy emerged perhaps most strongly in the party's campaign in
the early 1960s to implement land reform laws which had been passed by parliament
but which were being thwarted by local elite interests. The party's 'direct action' (*aksi
sepihak*) to implement the land reform laws conspicuously failed to target landowners
affiliated with the party. Their numbers were small, of course, but their presence was a
standing rebuke to the class-based claims of the party. Nonetheless, it was the only or-
ganization which regarded the post-revolutionary stratification of Indonesian society as
a problem and it accordingly attracted extensive support. In the 1955 national elections,
the party won 16 percent of the national vote and was one of the four main parties in
parliament, though it was excluded from the coalition government by the hostility of
the Muslim party Masjumi. In regional elections in Java in 1957, the party won a third
of the vote.[1] If such a result had been repeated or exceeded in the national elections
scheduled for 1959, the PKI would have been too large to exclude from government.
Fear of such an outcome was perhaps the most important reason why conservative
forces supported Sukarno's suspension of the parliamentary system in 1957 and the
transition to what he called 'Guided Democracy'. Under Sukarno's new system, three
ideological streams – nationalism, religion and communism – were to be represented in
the state (though not necessarily in government) with approximately equal standing and
no further attempt was to be made to test levels of public support by means of elec-
tions. Guided Democracy deprived the PKI of a likely election victory, but opened the
opportunity for promoting its ideology. Sometime before the emergence of so-called
'Euro-communism', the Indonesian Communist Party had developed a doctrine of the
dual nature of the state, arguing that the state was not necessarily just a tool of the rul-
ing class, but rather could be captured gradually from within without any form of
armed revolution.[2] The party's activities at the centre, therefore, had two strong charac-

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[1] Donald Hindley (1964) *The Communist Party of Indonesia 1951-1963*. University of California Press, Berkeley,
222-229.

[2] See Robert Cribb (1985) The Indonesian Marxist tradition. In: C.P. Mackerras and N.J. Knight, ed., *Mar-
xism in Asia*. Croom Helm, London, 251-272.

teristics. Firstly, it undertook a sustained programme to recruit communists and other leftists into the state apparatus and to win the ideological backing of those already there. This campaign of course was an aspect of the PKI's position as a vehicle for those who felt excluded from power by the existing social order. Secondly, the party sought to establish the dominance of its own ways of thinking in public discourse. In this respect, it was greatly assisted by President Sukarno, who had a deep intellectual interest in Marxism and in shaping its ideas for application to the Indonesian situation, and who needed the PKI to balance the institutional power of the army. The result, however, was a political environment of exaggerated political correctness, in which revolutionary ideology fell with transparent insincerity from the lips of all political figures.

In 1965, thus, the PKI was both hated and feared by a large number of Indonesians. Violent clashes had broken out over the land reform attempts in East Java, and both contemporary accounts and the unreliable memories of people still alive tell of an atmosphere of enormous tension and antagonism.[3] In the centre, at least, this tension was made all the more acute by the fact that President Sukarno seemed to be ailing. Although it was possible to identify potential successors who would have tried to sustain the forms of Guided Democracy, there was apparently a common elite perception that the departure of Sukarno would lead either to communist rule or to an army takeover.

In this strained environment, the coup of 1 October 1965 took place. In addition to the kidnapping and killing of six generals in Jakarta, the coup had involved the accidental killing of the daughter of the Defence Minister, A H Nasution, who had been on the list for kidnapping but who had escaped, and a parallel coup in Central Java. There was no immediate evidence that the coup had been the work of the PKI. The coup leader, Lieutenant-Colonel Untung, described it as a limited attempt to safeguard President Sukarno and the continuing Indonesian Revolution by forestalling a coup by the generals, which was widely rumoured to be planned for Armed Forces Day, 5 October.[4] Very quickly, however, army sources began to link the coup with the PKI. The Revolutionary Council which Untung had declared was seen as a front for a seizure of power by the communists and Untung himself was portrayed as a communist dupe (though culpable enough to be subsequently tried and executed). In several ways, moreover, the Suharto group sought to invest the coup with an aura of unprecedented evil. Firstly, they described it with the word *pengkhianatan* ('treachery'). Whereas this word has lost a great

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[3] See Walkin, Jacob (1969) The Moslem-Communist confrontation in East Java, 1964-65. In: *Orbis* 13, 3, 822-847; Rex Mortimer (1972) *The Indonesian Communist Party and Land Reform, 1959-1965*. Clayton, Centre of Southeast Asian Studies, Monash University.

[4] One of the best summaries of the state of knowledge of the coup is Crouch, Harold (1973) Another Look at the Indonesian 'Coup'. In: *Indonesia* 15 (April), 1-20. Nonetheless recent material has emerged which may lead to some modification of Crouch's conclusions.

deal of its emotional power in the West, in Indonesia it remains one of the most damaging accusations which can be made against an enemy. The name which Untung had given to his movement – *Gerakan September Tigapuluh* (September 30th Movement) – was transformed into an acronym, Gestapu, clearly meant to conjure up images of Nazi Germany. The accidental death of Nasution's daughter was portrayed as an act of cold-hearted brutality by the kidnappers. And above all, a story was composed about the events following the kidnapping of the generals. Three generals had been killed in the course of the kidnapping, but three more, together with Nasution's aide, were taken to Halim air force base south of Jakarta, where they were killed. The bodies of all seven were then thrown into a well. Quickly, however, this outline was embellished with stories that the generals had first been tortured and mutilated – their genitals cut off, amongst other barbarities – by women members of the Pemuda Rakyat (People's Youth), the PKI's youth wing.[5] These young women were also said to have danced naked for assembled PKI leaders and air force officers ('the dance of the fragrant flowers') and to have abandoned themselves to an orgy with the audience.[6] Finally, the army issued information that the PKI had been planning a much more extensive range of actions as part of its plan to seize power and that the party had planned extensive massacres of its enemies. Party members were alleged to have lists of victims, to have undergone training in methods of slaughter and to have dug holes in advance to receive the bodies of their victims.

These false reports, in the context of deep social conflict and the extremely tense environment of October 1965, have been described as kindling a wave of revulsion against the PKI which led to a massacre in which civilian militias played a major role. The essence of this account is that even if circumstances were extreme and even if public opinion was seriously manipulated by the army, the Indonesian people in general bear a moral responsibility for the slaughter comparable to that of the Hutus in Rwanda and possibly comparable to that which Goldhagen attributed to the Germans.[7]

This interpretation played an important role in the political construction of Suharto's New Order. The mass killing of communists was unusual amongst the world's genocides for never having been denied. Although it was seldom spoken of publicly, there was never any attempt by the Indonesian government or its apologists to deny that the killings had taken place or even to play down the numbers involved.[8] Indeed, to the ex-

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[5] Anderson, Ben (1987) How did the generals die? In: *Indonesia* 43 (April), 109-134.

[6] Drakeley, Steven (2000) *Lubang Buaya: Myth, misogyny and massacre*. Clayton, Monash Asia Institute; Leclerc, Jacques (1997) Girls, Girls, Girls, and Crocodiles. In: Henk Schulte Nordholt, ed., *Outward Appearances: Dressing state and society in Indonesia*. Leiden, KITLV Press, 291-305.

[7] Goldhagen, Daniel J. (1996) *Hitler's Willing Executioners: Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust*. New York, Knopf.

[8] Heryanto, Ariel (2005) *State Terrorism and Political Identity In Indonesia: Fatally Belonging*. London, Routledge.

tent that there was an official figure for the number of victims, it was one million, based on a never-released report by the security agency KOPKAMTIB. The reason for this absence of official denial was that it suited the political interests of the New Order to blame the killings on the Indonesian people in general. One of the central pillars of New Order legitimacy was the regime's claim to have brought order to a fractious society, to have ended the internecine strife which culminated in the 1965-66 massacres. Although this message was never expressed in quite such explicit terms with reference to the killings, the contrast between current order and past disorder were a central element in the public telling of history. The story contributed powerfully to the argument that the Indonesian people were not fit for freedom or democracy because they turned it against each other. Rather they needed strong rule to keep the peace.

The power of this account was demonstrated at the time of Suharto's fall in 1998. Suharto was brought down by a multitude of factors. In the first instance he was a victim of the Asian economic crisis of 1997-98, which demonstrated the hollowness of the economic development which had been another major pillar of the New Order regime. He was also brought down by his own age and evident frailty. Indonesian politics had in a sense been waiting for several years for Suharto's departure and it was clear that, even if he survived the 1997-98 crisis, he would not be around long enough to reward and protect those who backed him. In that respect, any significant crisis would have meant the end. There was also, however, a vast and pent-up impatience with the New Order, with its corruption, its arrogance, its repression, its abuse of power. To a remarkable extent, however, this indignation was constrained by the memory of 1965-66. Major opposition leaders were deeply reluctant to contemplate mass action against the crumbling regime because they feared an outbreak of apocalyptic violence like that of 1965-66, and they said so in public. The result was a relatively orderly transfer of power to Suharto's deputy, B J Habibie, and a widespread feeling that Indonesia had missed an opportunity to purge itself more thoroughly of the legacies of the New Order.

It is futile to speculate, of course, on whether Indonesians would have been better off with a more radical changing of the guard in 1998. Nonetheless, the fear of mass violence remains a poison in the veins of the Indonesian body politic. First, it helps to legitimise a drift back to authoritarianism. Violence has indeed been widespread in Indonesia since 1998, including virtual sectarian civil war in the provinces of Maluku, North Maluku and Central Sulawesi and pogroms against Madurese in the provinces of West and Central Kalimantan. Even though there has been serious speculation that the Maluku violence was deliberately provoked or at least exacerbated by sections of the armed forces, this violence contributes to a sense of nostalgia for the order of the

Suharto era, described wryly by observers as SARS (*sindrom amat rindu Suharto*, nostalgic-for-Suharto syndrome).[9]

The memory of 1965-66 also feeds a dangerous sense of insecurity amongst Indonesians of Chinese descent. This effect is paradoxical, even perverse, because Chinese Indonesians were not conspicuous amongst the victims of those killings. Despite a widespread perception outside Indonesia that Chinese were targeted, most evidence indicates that Chinese Indonesians suffered proportionately less than many other population groups.[10] My own research suggests that there were killings of Chinese in the Javanese district of Bagelen and on the islands of Lombok and Roti in 1965-66. Chinese were also the main victims of the suppression of the Paraku-PGRS movement in West Kalimantan in 1969.[11] In some parts of Sumatra, Chinese shops were plundered and Chinese fled to the larger towns, but there were few if any deaths. Members of the Chinese Indonesian organisation BAPERKI, which was considered left wing and sympathetic to the PKI, were purged from government employment and from private companies and associations, but in this respect they suffered no more than members of other organisations with a left-wing taint.

Because, however, Chinese Indonesians have suffered mass violence on other occasions in recent Indonesian history, there has been a powerful tendency, even amongst those who recognise that the Chinese were not victimised in 1965-66, to see those killings as a chilling sign of what Indonesians are capable of. This tendency is pernicious both because it drives Chinese Indonesians, whose education and business expertise is an important part of Indonesia's human capital, to flee the country and to make a new future in other lands, and because it places a huge barrier of apprehension between Chinese Indonesians and their indigenous counterparts which stands in the way of national integration.

All this, then, built on a perception that the Indonesian people have blood on their hands for the massacres of 1965-66. But what if this picture were mistaken? As I interview people in Indonesia and abroad and as I examine both recent memoirs and newspapers of the time, I come to the provisional but strong conclusion that the Indonesian army played a central, determining role in the killings. There appear to have been several patterns to the killing. In a few regions, the suppression of the PKI took on the character of full-scale military operations. This was so in parts of Central Java, where whole villages were affiliated with the party and attempted futile resistance with bamboo palis-

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[9] A play on the disease known as SARS, Sudden Acute Respiratory Syndrome, which first appeared in Guangdong, China, in November 2002.

[10] Coppel, Charles (1983) *Indonesian Chinese in crisis*. Kuala Lumpur, Oxford University Press, 58-61.

[11] The Paraku-PGRS had been established during Indonesia's confrontation with Malaysia as a militia force to conduct raids across the border into Sarawak. It was considered a left-wing organisation and was crushed in military operations during 1969.

ades and the like. It was also the case in South Blitar in East Java, where elements of the part attempted to set up a 'liberated zone' in 1967-69. In some regions, army units arrived in a district, obtained lists of alleged PKI members from local authorities, and then arrested and killed those on the lists, before moving on to another district where the actions were repeated. This was the pattern especially in more isolated parts of eastern Indonesia, where alleged affiliation with the PKI was sometimes based on nothing more than signing a petition for relief from some local form of oppression. In other regions, local military garrisons summoned or hunted down members of the PKI and detained them for periods ranging from days to months. Gradually, often at irregular intervals, a selection of the detainees were then taken away from the detention centres to be killed, often at a great distance from both their homes and their places of incarceration. This was the pattern in Sumatra and Sulawesi, and the process is grippingly portrayed in Garin Nugroho's film 'The Poet'. In still other regions, village communities were told to put their own affairs into order and were required either to hand communists over to the army for killing or to provide evidence that they had killed their own. This pattern has been reported especially from Bali. Elsewhere again – Timor, East Java, and North Sumatra – the army recruited the support of civilian killing teams. These teams were sometimes drawn from existing village militias, sometimes from the youth organisations of anti-communist political parties, notably the Muslim youth organisation Ansor. They were given rudimentary training and were lent weapons that they used to kill communists. Sometimes these militias took direct part in raids and military operations against communists, but often they simply killed people who were presented to them by the army as communists. There are many anecdotes that tell of people who were forced to take part in the killings to show that they were not sympathetic to the communists.

The 1965-66 killings were a complex event. Some victims were innocent (in the New Order's flexible sense of the word), and were killed because of mistaken identity or because of private jealousies. Some virulent anti-communists acted without significant prompting from the army, though they were emboldened by the clear promise of impunity which the army made to killers. Blood ended up indeed on the hands of many Indonesians, but it seems that in a large number of cases it was smeared on those hands by the Indonesian army.

If this conclusion is true, it has three implications. Firstly, it suggests that the military personnel who took part in the killings are much more vulnerable to legal prosecution than we have previously imagined. In fact many of the commanding officers who bear greatest responsibility for the killings, notably Sarwo Edhie, who commanded the elite RPKAD para-commando unit which spearheaded the killings in Central Java, East Java and Bali, are now deceased. Political circumstances make it improbable that any of the surviving soldiers – especially former President Suharto – will actually be tried. Indeed,

recent revisions to Indonesia's constitution intended to strengthen the rule of law by prohibiting retrospective legislation have made prosecution technically more difficult. The consequence is that a resolution of the sense of historical grievance left by the killings is unlikely to be resolved, even if the Indonesian Truth and Reconciliation Commission does begin its work.

Secondly, it suggests that there may be a stronger connection than has previously been possible to suggest between the mass killings in 1965-66 and the killings a decade later in East Timor. Although the scale of direct killing in East Timor has been seriously exaggerated[12], it is clear that the Indonesian army brought to East Timor habits of general brutality and of retaliation with extraordinary violence which they probably learnt in 1965-66.

Thirdly, it points to a distinctive military *modus operandi* involving the coordination of violence by others. There is a strong general tendency in scholarship to take mass violence at face value, that is as the work of the masses. Depending on the attitude of individual scholars, this assumption may be either frightening (the state presides over a volatile society ready to turn upon itself) or encouraging (mass violence as a rare case of people's agency against an oppressive system). The role of elites has been seen either as exacerbating mass violence or as exploiting it after the fact. Careful studies by Brass of communal violence in India, however, have indicated the existence of an elaborate, elite-controlled structure of influence for creating communal violence in order to achieve particular outcomes in election politics.[13] Until the beginning of the 21st century, election politics were not especially significant in Indonesian power politics, but there is a significant body of evidence that persistent violence against Indonesia's Chinese minority was less the outcome of deep-seated popular prejudice against Chinese Indonesians or of pent-up mass rage against them, than of a carefully calculated pattern of intimidation designed to keep Chinese separate from the rest of society and to intimidate them into making extra-legal payments to police and military for their own security. Anti-Chinese violence under these circumstances becomes a kind of periodic reminder to Chinese Indonesians of the continuing need to pay. Ironically the fact that Chinese were not major victims of the 1965-66 violence, when the military had a different political point to make, provides support to this hypothesis.

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[12] For an attempt to calculate the number of casualties, see Cribb, Robert (2001) How many deaths? Problems in the statistics of massacre in Indonesia (1965-1966) and East Timor (1975-1980). In: Ingrid Wessel and Georgia Wimhöfer, eds., *Violence in Indonesia*. Hamburg, Abera, 82-98. The conclusions here with respect to the number of killings were broadly confirmed by the report of the CAVR, Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation in East Timor, available at http://www.easttimor-reconciliation.org/. This report, however, convincingly demonstrated a very high death rate as a result of poor conditions in Indonesian-controlled settlement camps.

[13] Brass, Paul (2003) *The Production of Hindu-Muslim Violence in Contemporary India*. New Delhi, Oxford University Press.

Resolving the sense of unfinished business that arises from the killings of 1965-66 remains an immensely important issue on the agenda for contemporary Indonesians. To attribute a large part of the blame for the killings to the army is attractive to many Indonesians, because it relieves the rest of society from the consequences of having taken part in mass killing. For historians, however, this shifting of blame also shifts the question of analysis to the sources of military brutality. Paradoxically, this new question has still deeper implications for Indonesian society. To the significant degree that the killings implicated broad sections of Indonesian society, they were a consequence of tensions specific to circumstances of late Guided Democracy; they were part of a time of madness which might be dismissed as historically unique. The deeper their roots in Indonesian history, however, the more they raise serious questions about the nature of the Indonesian state and Indonesian society. Were there features of the Indonesian project that made some form of political genocide likely or even inevitable? Did the forces which turned the Indonesian army into the perpetrators of massacre leave an imprint on other sections of society? The killings continue to cast a dark shadow over Indonesian history.

The Long Road to Restorative Justice

On the 1965-66 victims' struggle for reparations in Post-Suharto Indonesia[1]

Eva Streifeneder

Following an aborted coup attempt in October 1965, one of the most horrifying mass killings of the twentieth century occurred in Indonesia. Probably more than half a million people were killed while hundreds of thousands were detained for years in prison camps throughout the country. This bloody origin of the New Order became one of the state's ideological foundations, which helped Suharto's authoritarian regime to exist for more than three decades and was the starting point of a systematic violation of human rights by the state.[2]

Within Indonesia, a singular official version of the 1965-66 events has been promoted without deviation: the Partai Komunis Indonesia (Indonesian Communist Party, PKI) was accused of masterminding the coup attempt in the early morning of 1 October and was, therefore, solely responsible for the murder of six leading generals. Although there is no agreement among scholars concerning the *Gerakan 30 September* (30 September Movement, G30S),[3] Indonesian citizens have been taught through penetrating rhetoric and symbolism that the PKI's members and sympathisers were a traitorous force that needed to be totally eliminated.

When Suharto stepped down in 1998 media restrictions were swept away by *reformasi* (reform movement) and the tightly controlled discourse about 1965 seemed to get demystified.[4] Indonesia became a nation filled with great hopes for its newly claimed democratic future. The official version of the coup has been challenged more and more and yet the country was already struggling to identify how it should best deal with the burden of the past. In the course of breaking the taboo of 1965-66, for the first time several victims of the 1965-66 violence who had experienced torture, detainment and

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[1] I would like to thank David Bourchier for reading the draft and giving constructive comments while he stayed as a guest Professor at the Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin in 2006.

[2] On the systematic use of state violence during the New Order see among others Wessel and Wimhöfer 2001.

[3] There are five different scenarios which can be extracted from literature: first, the killing of the generals was carried out by the PKI and its sympathisers; second, the coup was the result of an internal struggle within the armed forces; third, General Suharto instigated the coup; fourth, President Sukarno wanted to eliminate officers acting against him; and fifth, western secret services were initiating the coup to avert the 'communist danger'. For more on the different scenarios see further the comparative study of Landmann 1987.

[4] For more on the variety of new published books within Indonesia concerning the events of 1965-66 see van Klinken 2001.

imprisonment without trial and suffered stigmatisation, harassment, ostracism and abrogation of civil rights, raised their voices: They started to demand from post-Suharto governments their rightful place within Indonesian society as equal citizens. The victims do not only demand truth and justice but connected their demands to claims for reparations for the harm they have suffered since the late-1960s because of discriminatory regulations.

The term reparation, according to Priscilla Hayner, generally includes measures of restitution, compensation, rehabilitation, satisfaction and the guarantee of non-repetition.[5] Awarding reparations to victims is meaningful in two ways: on the one hand, from the standpoint of the victims, reparations mean the acknowledgment of their suffering. Furthermore, reparative approaches aim to help victims to move beyond anger and a sense of powerlessness. Thus, Pablo de Greiff stresses that "[f]or some victims reparations are the most tangible manifestation of the efforts of the state to remedy the harms they have suffered."[6] On the other hand, reparations represent a public recognition by the state of its responsibility. The provision of reparations can also symbolically condemn the old regime and strengthen the now democratic structures.

Generally, the position of victims is not paid as much attention as great reforms. Hence, in this paper I intend to focus on the situation of the 1965-66 victims who survived in post-Suharto Indonesia. After briefly retracing the victimisation of millions during the New Order, I will discuss the official myth-making surrounding the events of 1965-66 and how it helped to legitimate power. Both of these aspects are essential to comprehend the contemporary space for the 1965-66 victims. The political transition since 1998 strengthened the situation of 1965-66 victims in that they are now able to openly claim to be given back their civic rights. However, several examples show the difficulties they still face if they attempt to use legal methods. Finally, in concentrating on the victims' position, the objective of this article is to give an insight into aspects of the contemporary discourse dealing with the legacy of 1965-66.

Naming the 1965-66 Victims

Between October 1965 and March 1966 one of the worst mass killings of the 20th century occurred in Indonesia. The number of people killed is estimated at 500,000 to two million but, even more than 40 years later, the estimates vary widely.[7] The killings were preceded by an alleged coup attempt and the killing of six senior generals on 1 October, 1965, by a group said to be part of the PKI. Despite weak evidence, the Indonesian

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[5] Hayner 2002: 171.

[6] Greiff 2006: 2.

[7] For the divergence of the amount of victims see Cribb 1991.

army and associated civilian and religious militia groups began a witch hunt for members and sympathisers of the PKI and its associated organisations, resulting in a bloody and brutal massacre throughout the country, but mainly in Central and East Java, as well as in Bali. While most of the international academic interest is concerned with who may have masterminded the alleged coup on 1 October, which gave General Suharto a reason to overthrow President Sukarno, the anatomy, dimensions and the causes of the killings and the stigmatisation of millions did not attract the same attention.

Along with the killings more than one million assumed communists were arrested.[8] In the absence of legal procedures and under bad conditions most of the *tapol* (*tahanan politik*, political prisoners) were not released before the late-1970s.[9] Even so, the official release of the *tapol* did not imply freedom and a return to their earlier lives. The release meant rather the privation of most of their civil rights, including those of family members.

Beginning in the mid-1970s, a multitude of government laws and regulations against those regarded as *terlibat* (involved) were issued which discriminated against the former political prisoners in nearly all political and social spheres. Those regulations – just to mentioning a few – prohibited them from returning to or taking up employment in the civil service, including employment in the army, in the police, as public servants or as teachers. They were excluded from all influential professions, for example, as journalists, lawyers or even as *dalang* (puppeteers). *Tapol* were denied both the active and the passive right to vote, as well as the freedom of assembly and the freedom of opinion by outlawing them from assemblies of more than five people and banning them from expressing their opinions in newspapers via letters to the editor.[10] Not all regulations were applied consistently, but the existence of the regulations gave officials a great deal of discretionary powers at least.

But the repressions did not hit only the *tapol* themselves but also their families and relatives. Through the term *bersih lingkungan* (clean environment), those discriminatory regulations affected even children and grandchildren. The 'communist guilt' was handed down from generation to generation, whereby the number of 1965-66 victims affected by stigmatisation increased to several millions of victims. The often mentioned figure of 20 million[11] – a figure which would represent almost ten percent of the Indonesia population – is perhaps overestimated, but demonstrates doubtlessly the urgency of re-

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[8] Siregar 1993: 241-242.

[9] For the detainment conditions see Amnesty International 1977. A study by Krisnadi (2001), for instance, focuses on the imprisonment of more than 10,000 people on the prison island of Buru.

[10] A detailed summary of the measures faced by *tapol* was listed by *Kompas* 01.03.2004 and *Tempo* 01.-07.03.2004.

[11] The figure of 20 million is often mentioned in several internet newsgroups as well as in a class action which will be discussed below.

thinking the position of the victims who were marginalised in political and social, as well as economical fields for decades.

1965 – The Legitimisation of Power

Despite the hundreds of thousands killed between October 1965 and March 1966, the illegitimate imprisonment of another million and the later stigmatisation of them and their families, the New Order declared only the murdering of the army generals as a 'national tragedy'. To substantiate the official version, the Suharto regime emotionalised and polarised the people by using monuments, films, textbooks, national holidays, commemorative rituals or even street names to rehearse the official version, the PKI was accused of masterminding the coup in a collective way.

History textbooks taught generations of pupils about the 'barbarity' of the PKI. The propagandistic film *Pengkhianatan G30S/PKI* (the betrayal of the G30S/PKI) was broadcasted in the evening every 30 September. And the killed generals – now appointed as 'heroes of the revolution' – were commemorated in public ceremonies. The place in Lubang Buaya (Crocodile Hole) where the murdered army officers were found became sacred ground. In 1973, the regime erected a monument with seven life-size bronze statues representing the six generals and the one lieutenant standing in front of a colossal 17 meter sculpture of the mythical bird Garuda. Across the monument the regime installed a bronze relief giving a description of the 'vicious' PKI and how Suharto and his regime saved the nation from its danger.[12] To borrow from John Roosa, these and other methods of state propaganda were "psychological warfare fabrications"[13] used to legitimise the New Order's existence. He argues:

> The claim that the PKI organized the movement was, for the Suharto regime, not any ordinary fact; it was *the* supreme fact of history from which the very legitimacy of the regime derived.[14]

The New Order's construction of the alleged coup in 1965 tended to equate the PKI with brutality and chaos, in contrast the authoritarian regime of the New Order which stood for order, regularity and progress. To emphasise this, the regime elevated anticommunism to a crucial element of state ideology. Until 1998, anticommunism remained one of the most important pillars to legitimise the military around Suharto coming to power. Beside that, anticommunism was useful as "an instrument of general so-

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[12] For more information see Leclerc 1997 as well as the propagandistic account of the Centre for Indonesian National Military History on http://www.sejarahtni.mil.id/index.php?cid=298.

[13] Roosa 2006: 8.

[14] Ibid: 7.

cial control"[15] and the regime defined itself in dialectical relation to it.[16] As Ariel Heryanto remarks:

> Indonesia's New Order authoritarianism would not have existed nor survived so well without the magical power of the discursive phantom of the 'Communist threat'. That powerful discourse was, in turn, only possible because of the devastating 1965 mass killings […].[17]

The mass killings, the torture and terror generated a deep trauma within Indonesian society within a few months which resulted in profound silence and a kind of forced amnesia. Although the killings were not negated officially, the victims were covered up under a wide ideological blanket of myths and legends. Neither names and personal fates nor the number of killed people were taken into historical or humanitarian consideration.[18]

With freedoms that came in the wake of 1998 it might have been expected that the myth-making for legitimating power would become less important. However, as Robert Cribb argues in this volume, a failure to confront the past of 1965-66 originated from the kind of transition which took place in Indonesia. Despite small concessions in the course of *reformasi* there have been no fundamental changes to the commemorative rituals, history textbooks and monuments used in the time of the New Order. Although 1965-66 victims broke with the forced silence of the past after 1998, the struggle turns out to be complicated by the lack of fundamental changes.

Victims Raise their Voices in a Time of *Reformasi*

Comparing the 1965-66 victims with those of other state-guided atrocities during the New Order, Anthony Reid sees only little interest of the 1965-66 victims in raising their voices against the injustice they have been exposed to for decades. Hence, he argues:

> [F]ew have spoken up for the victims of 1965. The destruction of the left was so total and so devastating that those survivors with a personal interest in rehabilitation have themselves scarcely dared to raise the issue, as other interested parties have done for less portentous crimes. Reducing the hold of government and army on power, moreover, leaves minorities prey to even more frightening intimidation.[19]

The destruction of the left was so traumatising that even decades later the 1965-66 violence remains a sensitive issue in Indonesian politics and society. But even so, the polit-

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[15] Goodfellow 1995: 53.

[16] For the discourse of anticommunism see Heryanto 2006.

[17] Heryanto 1999: 151.

[18] For example, history textbooks until today illustrate the mass killings as a kind of extraordinary disorder which the army finally cleaned up. See for example the in senior high school common textbook of Badrika 2000: 42-46.

[19] Reid 2005: 82.

ical changes in 1998 have made it possible, if not always easy, to debate openly what happened in 1965 and after. A new historical discourse has become an important aspect of the post-Suharto era but was carried on, as Gerry van Klinken stresses, by "the loss of faith" in what was broadly believed[20]. Publications and investigations released on the 1965-66 incident became popular precisely because they challenged the state's version.

In this regard, it was also broadly welcomed that long-silenced victims were suddenly telling their own stories, all of which disagreed with the version approved by the New Order regime. The list of books on 1965-66 from a victims' perspective now (more than eight years later) runs into the dozens, too many to list here.[21] Former military officers and politicians who had been accused by Suharto of masterminding the coup also spoke out, some blaming Suharto himself of complicity in murdering the generals. Budiawan concludes that most of these testimonies tend to defend their authors rather than to give a historical account.[22] Nevertheless, those testimonies have broken the silence of the past by providing a broader view of what happened. Other publications, however, describe more intensively what the individual victims experienced while imprisoned without knowing anything concerning the murder of the generals. Thus, they provide an insight of issues which had never been mentioned.

Those collectively branded as victimisers now publicly represented themselves as victims. In order to seek public recognition that they were the victims and not the perpetrators, some victim-based organisation were set up. While during the New Order, those associated with G30S were not allowed to organise, the Habibie interregnum tolerated the official formation of the Yayasan Penelitian Korban Pembunuhan 1965-66 (YPKP, Research Foundation for the Victims of the 1965-66 Killings) in April 1999. This foundation was initiated and organised by several prominent former political prisoners including the former Secretary General of Gerwani (Gerakan Wanita Indonesia, Indonesian Women Movement), Ibu Sulami, and the well known writer, Pramoedya Ananta Toer. Soon afterwards it set up its networks in district towns, mostly in Central and East Java.

The main objective of the foundation is to collect further data regarding the number of victims of 1965-66, to demand rehabilitation of the victims and their families, and to call for an official acknowledgement of what happened in 1965-66.[23] Recognising the

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[20] Klinken 2001: 324.

[21] To give a few examples of testimonies and eye-witness accounts: Latief, Abdul (2000) *Pledoi Kolonel A Latief: Soeharto terlibat G30S*. Jakarta, ISAI; Soebandrio, H. (2001) *Kesaksianku tentang G-30-S*. Jakarta, Forum Pendukung Reformasi Total; Sulami (1999) *Perempuan – Kebenaran dan Sejarah*. Jakarta, Cipta Lestari; Raid, Hasan (2001) *Pergulatan Muslim Komunis: Otobiografi Hasan Raid*. Yogyakarta, LKPSM and Syarikat; Atmodjo, Heru (2004) *Gerakan 30 September 1965*. Jakarta, Tride, PEC and Hasta Mitra.

[22] Budiawan 2004: 30.

[23] YPKP 2001.

need for documentation – which would be needed in the case of any legal action against directly and indirectly involved perpetrators – the foundation accomplished in 2000 the exhumation of a mass grave near Wonosobo (Central Java) where they were accompanied by forensic experts and supported by non-governmental organisations. Beyond fact-finding (especially regarding the military's involvement into the killings), the purpose of the exhumation was to re-bury the mortal remains in a dignified way.[24]

YPKP and a handful of other victim-based organisations[25] are involved in a surprisingly large number of projects established since 1998 dealing with the country's long legacy of abuse. Hilmar Farid and Rikardo Simarmatra have made a comprehensive effort to map the civil society organisations working on transitional justice initiatives in Indonesia. They surveyed a total of 178 organisations in 22 cities between August 2002 to May 2003. All of these groups are engaged in transitional justice activities including truth-seeking, institutional reforms, victim reparations and rehabilitation, and reconciliation.[26]

First Steps towards Rehabilitation?

A promising wind already started blowing with the advent of new rulings during the initial formation of *reformasi*. The last PKI-detainees were released and the first democratic law on general elections in 1999 gave the persecuted group back their right to vote. But *reformasi* did not automatically restore all the political rights of the 1965-66 victims. Although it was now possible to organise and speak out, former *tapol* were still marginalised. The ongoing democratisation seemed to have set the course of restoring the 1965-66 victims' rights, but the ban on communism from 1966 – Tap XXV/MPRS/1966[27] – was still in force and justified the lack of rehabilitation and restitution.[28]

After more than three decades of anticommunism, it was not easy to officially challenge the ban on communism. Discussing the communism ban in 2000 as undemocratic and arbitrary, President Abdurrahman Wahid took up the demand to revoke the 1966 People's Consultative Assembly's decision. He argued:

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[24] These religious reburials, as well as other meetings, were threatened by so-called anticommunist alliances. Arguing that they belong to Islamic groups, most of those alliances are linked to the military.

[25] Among others there are the Institute for Research on Victims of 1965-66 Killings (LPKP 65), the Institute for the Struggle of Victims of the New Order Regime (LP-KROB) and the Association of Victims of the New Order (PAKORBA).

[26] Farid and Simarmatra 2004.

[27] The decision to ban communism was taken by the Interim People's Consultative Assembly one day after Sukarno handed over his executive power to General Suharto in unclear circumstances. For the entire decision see Bourchier and Hadiz 2003: 33-34.

[28] For example, a failed revision of history textbooks was justified by the ban on communism too. See *Tempointeraktif* 23.06.2005.

> […] This decision blurs the difference between a party and ideology. Of course we can revoke a party, but were are not able to ban an ideology.[29]

Protests, however, arose immediately. With his action he provoked a heap of abuse and anger: The parliament was outraged by his push and the majority of commentators rendered the president's approach problematically.[30] The People's Consultative Assembly refused Wahid's approach and confirmed its decision of 2003, leaving Tap XXV/MPRS/1966 intact.

Nevertheless, the campaign to rehabilitate the 1965-66 victims did not ebb away. Former political prisoners were discriminated against further by even newer legislation, as Law 12/2003 on General Elections demonstrated. In New Order style, Article 60 (g) of the 2003 law prohibited former members of the PKI and any of its auxiliary organisations from becoming candidates of the House of Representatives, the Regional Representatives Council, or provincial, regency or city legislative councils.[31]

This prompted a coalition of former political prisoners, a group of New Order dissidents and the legal aid organisations LBH and PBHI to request a judicial review from the newly established Constitutional Court. Based on the second constitutional amendment in 2000, the petitioners argued that the Law on General Election conflicted with Article 28 of the 1945 Constitution, which declares that every citizen is entitled to freedom from discrimination on any grounds and is also entitled to protection against such discriminatory treatment.[32]

On 24 February 2004, the Constitutional Court finally decided in favour of the petitioners. Although one member of the court, Lt. Gen. Achmad Roestandi, entered a dissenting opinion, eight of the nine judges agreed that Article 60 (g) was no longer appropriate. Underlining the unconstitutionality of this article the Court Chair Jimly Asshiddiqie justified the decision:

> Considering that the constitutional civic right to vote and to be elected is a right which is guaranteed by the Constitution, laws and international conventions, every restriction, divergence, withholding and withdrawal of this right means the violation of civil rights.[33]

The decision was so surprising that not even the petitioners suspected an application to restore the rights of former PKI members would meet with success. The 74 year old

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[29] "Tap tersebut mengaburkan perbedaan antara partai dan ideologi. Kita bisa saja mencabut sebuah partai, tetapi kita tak bisa melarang sebuah ideologi." *Kompas* 22.04.2000.

[30] On comments and polemics regarding Wahid's approach see Kasemin 2004.

[31] Republik Indonesia 2003.

[32] Republik Indonesia 2000.

[33] "Menimbang, bahwa hak konstitusional warga negara untuk memilih dan dipilih (right to vote and right to be candidate) adalah hak yang dijamin oleh konstitusi, undang-undang maupun konvensi internasional, maka pembatasan penyimpangan, peniadaan dan penghapusan akan hak dimaksud merupakan pelanggaran terhadap hak asasi dari warga negara." Mahkamah Konstitusi 2004: 85.

Mudjayin – who spent 10 years on the prison island of Buru – responded sanguinely to the decision:

> We see […] that the court has given us an opening we can use to continue our fight for the return of our rights as citizens [and] not subject to discrimination.[34]

The Class Action against Five Presidents

More spectacular has been another step taken by a group of former political prisoners: filing a class action on 9 March 2005 to claim material compensation. Previous requests regarding the restoration of their rights had come to nought. Failing to achieve anything to rectify the legitimate grievance of the '1965 victims', they filed the class action with the assistance of the Legal Aid Institute (LBH) Jakarta against former Presidents Suharto, J.B. Habibie, Abdurrahman Wahid and Megawati Sukarnoputri and the current President, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. Accusing those five presidents of failing to show any goodwill by restoring the victims' rights, the appellants stressed the economic, social, cultural and political impact of the discriminatory laws and regulations.

The appellants, acting on behalf of all the men and women who have borne the stigma of being alleged members of the banned PKI since 1965, comprised seven groups:

> 1. People who were forced to resign or were dismissed from employment without any formalities and thus received no wages or allowances.
>
> 2. People who were deprived of their pension rights as civil servants or members of the armed forces or the police.
>
> 3. Victims of special investigation who were said to have had an unclean environment, being accused of being PKI, with the result that they were dismissed from their jobs and were unable to find work.
>
> 4. People whose allowances as veterans were withdrawn.
>
> 5. People whose land, buildings or other possessions were seized, destroyed, burnt or commandeered.
>
> 6. People who were expelled from school and were unable to continue their education because they were accused of being involved in the G30S or of having had an unclean environment.
>
> 7. People whose creative works were hindered and who were obstructed from publishing their works and staging performances.

They argued that their right to employment, to ownership of personal possessions, to education and their cultural rights had been violated for almost four decades, although these rights are guaranteed under the Indonesian Constitution and under Law 39/1999 on Basic Human Rights, as well as under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.[35]

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[34] *Tempo* 02.-08.03.2004.

[35] LBH 2005.

The class action was aimed at material compensation. By calculating per day and for a period of 25 years, the appellants specified the amount which they demand for every person of the mentioned 20 million victims: material losses in amounts to be specified later and 10 billion Rupiah (US$ 1.07 million) in non-material losses.[36] Furthermore, the action urged the five presidents to apologise officially via nationwide broadcasts and newspapers for not restoring the victim's rights by acknowledging they acted deliberately without respecting their economic, social and cultural rights.

If the step of filing this class action was surprising, the final result was not. After some hearings at the Central Jakarta District Court, on 14 September 2005 the court finally dismissed the action on the grounds that the action would be outside the court's jurisdiction and should be brought to an administrative court because the presidents had acted as "administrative guardians of the state".[37]

Although the class action against the five presidents did not succeed at a judicial stage, the case implicates a special significance. The action indicates once more the awaking of the 1965-66 victims claiming justice and filling a new place in Indonesian society.

Criticism of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission

In the next legal step defending them against the injustice, a group of victims rejected parts of the 2004 law concerning an Indonesian truth and reconciliation commission. Most of the 1965-66 victims do not refuse an extra-judicial body as represented in a truth and reconciliation commission at all, but rather do not accept this body as a substitute for some legal punishment. Thus, they mostly disagree with the objectives of Law 27/2004 concerning the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC).

With the fall of Suharto, the question arose how to face the human rights abuses of the past, including the 1965-66 incident. Due to internal and external pressure on the one hand, and political circumstances on the other, an extra-judicial commission seeking truth and reconciling the nation seemed to be the political middle way. In the beginning, there were three arguments which seemed to militate in favour of a truth and reconciliation commission: firstly, the assumption that such a commission would be able to bring justice as well as functioning as a healing process; secondly, that it would foster democratic consolidation in Indonesia; and thirdly, that it would build a new social agreement among Indonesians.[38] Compared with the possibility of individual legal prosecution case by case, there was also the consensus that a TRC would deal with more

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[36] Ibid.

[37] *HUKUMonline* 14.09.2005.

[38] Gorjão 2001: 284.

cases and be able to map a picture of the systematic use of state violence during the New Order.[39]

But in practice, few of these noble aims have been realised. While maintaining a rhetorical commitment to the commission, the post-Suharto political elites have not given any political priority to the issue dealing with the past. Although the law was passed in 2004, the commission did not work and was not even staffed after almost two years.

Beside the delayed realisation, the composition of Law 27/2004 indicates crucial failings, particularly regarding the victims' position. Although issues of rehabilitation and compensation are mentioned on the one hand, restoring the victims' rights is hampered on the other. An amnesty measure for perpetrators is combined with telling the 'truth' and apologising for what they have done to their victims. Although the commission objects to dealing with gross human rights violations, it includes extensive amnesty: Article 1 (9) of Law 27/2004 refers to "[…] the clemency bestowed by the President as Head of State upon the perpetrator of gross violations of human rights, taking into consideration the opinion of the People's Legislative Assembly"[40]. Beside leaving the amnesty process with the DPR and the President, thereby opening the door to political bargaining and corruption, this amnesty measure contravenes the Indonesian Constitution as well as the International Convention of Human Rights.

More crucial and against international standards of victims' rights is a linking of the victims' forgiving their abusers with eligibility for compensation and rehabilitation. Article 27 states that rehabilitation and compensation "may be awarded when a request for amnesty is granted"[41]. This implies that a victim is not authorised to receive compensation and rehabilitation if firstly, the perpetrator is not identified, secondly, the perpetrator has died, thirdly, the victim does not pardon his abuser, or even fourthly, the perpetrator will not by given amnesty by the President and the People's Legislative Assembly. Thus, the state shirks its duties to provide reparations and therewith disclaims the victims.

In the same way, the victims' rights are curtailed by Article 44, which mentions that "a case of gross violation of human rights that has been resolved by the commission cannot be brought before The Ad Hoc Court of Human Rights"[42]. By law, the truth and reconciliation commission has to be established as an extra-judicial body resolving

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[39] Agung Putri 2003.

[40] "[A]mnesti adalah pengampunan yang diberikan oleh presiden kepada pelaku pelanggaran hak asasi manusia yang berat dengan memperhatikan pertimbangan dewan perwakilan rakyat." Republik Indonesia 2004.

[41] "Kompensasi dan rehabilitasi […] dapat diberikan apabila permohonan amnesti dikabulkan." Republik Indonesia 2004.

[42] "Pelanggaran hak asasi manusia yang berat telah diungkapkan dan diselesaikan oleh komisi, perkaranya tidak dapat diajukan lagi kepada pengadilan hak asasi manusia ad hoc." Republik Indonesia 2004.

gross human rights abuses before 1999. To all intents and purposes, the term extra-judicial means outside the ordinary course of law. Thus, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission is mandated to act as a complementary body to the Ad Hoc Court of Human Rights. Article 44, however, substitutes any proceedings in court. Moreover, it seems like the post-Suharto governments have eluded their responsibility to guarantee the rule of law in passing this crucial law.

Although partly engaged in the discussion process before passing the law, ultimately the position of victims and their critics has not been taken into account. For this reason an alliance of 1965-66 victims-based organisations and the Advocating Team for Truth and Justice[43] petitioned the Constitutional Court for a judicial review in April 2006.

Conclusion

On 7 December 2006, the Constitutional Court declared Article 27 of Law 27/2004 unconstitutional and for this reason scrapped the entire law mandating the establishment of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. Nobody expected the Court's annulment of the whole law. The Court justified its decision by stressing the *rechtsonzekerheid* (legal uncertainty) and accruing the unconstitutionality of Article 27 which could not achieve the formulated objectives and principles of the law.

Although victims criticised the law and petitioned the Constitutional Court for a judicial review concerning three articles, a truth and reconciliation commission was the only apparent way to receive any reparations in the near future. Victims of the 1965-66 incident have waited for years and now they will have to wait much longer. Moreover, it is now feared that the Constitutional Court's decision could imply the final closure of past human rights violations in general and the case of 1965-66 in particular.[44] Addressing this hazard, the presiding judge Jimly Asshidiqque recommended the creation of new legislation in line with the Constitution and international law as well as other reconciliation mechanisms that rehabilitate the concerned victims.[45]

Looking retrospectively at the lack of political commitment in dealing with human rights atrocities of the past, on the one hand, the Court's decision definitely holds the risk that the process will not be continued. Despite the political transition since 1998, post-Suharto governments have not confronted the burden of 1965-66. The 1965-66 incident, by means of legitimisation of powers, especially of the military, has been too useful for so long. But the engrained anticommunism indoctrinated for decades

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[43] The Advocating Team for Truth and Justice is an alliance of legal aid and human rights non-governmental organisations including LBH Jakarta, ELSAM, Solidaritas Nusa Bangsa, KontraS, Imparsial and YAPHI.

[44] See several opinions in *Kompas* 09.12.2006 and 12.12.2006.

[45] *The Jakarta Post* 08.12.2006.

hampers every examination of the past and has a bearing on the victims' position as well.

On the other hand, the annulment of the law mandating the establishment of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission – also if unlikely due to political circumstances – may have a positive impact in the long run: There is still the chance for a fundamental re-thinking on how to deal with 1965-66. A Truth and Reconciliation Commission certainly marks a starting point, but Law 27/2004 was legislated to fulfil national as well as international pressures within a framework which protects perpetrators more. As long as monuments, textbooks and commemorative rituals – just to mention a few – back the official version, victims will be labelled more as 'perpetrators' than as 'victims'.

Reformasi has given victims an opening to fight for the return of their civil rights. By telling their own stories, claiming the truth about the events of 1965-66, organising the victims' interests and requiring rehabilitation and compensation, the 1965-66 victims attract a great deal of attention. Several examples provided in this paper have demonstrated how victims have tried to get back a place in Indonesian society as equal citizens.

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Die Verleumdung von Bung Karno[1]

Asvi Warman Adam

Einige in letzter Zeit erschienene Publikationen sind der Versuch einer erneuten De-Sukarno-isierung: Die Autoren dieser Publikationen behaupten, der erste indonesische Präsident sei der Drahtzieher der Bewegung des 30. Septembers [1965] (*Gerakan 30 September*, G30S) gewesen und sei verantwortlich für alle Folgen des blutigen *coup d'état* einschließlich der Ermordung der sechs Generäle sowie der darauf folgenden Massenmorde. Diese Aussage wird insbesondere deutlich bei Antonie C. A. Dake, *Sukarno File, Berkas-Berkas Sukarno 1965-1967, Kronologi Suatu Keruntuhan*[2] (Die Akte Sukarno, Dokumente zu Sukarno 1965-1967, die Chronologie eines Untergangs). Weitere Bücher, die in diesem Zusammenhang erschienen, sind die von Lambert Giebels, *Pembantaian yang Ditutup-tutupi, Peristiwa Fatal di Sekitar Kejatuhan Bung Karno*[3] (Die vertuschten Massaker, fatale Geschehnisse im Zusammenhang mit dem Sturz von Bung Karno) und Victor Miroslav Fic, *Kudeta 1 Oktober 1965, Sebuah studi tentang konspirasi*[4] (Der *coup d'état* vom 1. Oktober 1965, eine Studie zur Verschwörung).

Diese Publikationen erwecken den Eindruck das zu wiederholen, was mit Bung Karno bereits in den 1970er Jahren versucht wurde: eine De-Sukarno-isierung. Diese De-Sukarno-isierung zeigte sich in einem Pamphlet des Militärhistorikers Nugroho Notosusanto, in dem er behauptete, dass nicht Bung Karno als erster die Rede [zur Entstehung der Pancasila] sondern M Yamin und Supomo gehalten habe.[5] Zeitgleich dazu wurde Suhartos ‚außerordentliche' Rolle im Generalangriff am 1. März 1949 [auf Yogyakarta] mittels der Errichtung zweier Gedenkstätten hervorgehoben. Darüber hinaus rückten auch Spielfilme Suhartos ‚ehrenhaftes' Handeln in den Vordergrund – so auch der Film *Pengkhianatan G30S/PKI* (Verrat der Bewegung des 30. Septembers), der jährlich am Abend vor dem 1. Oktober zum Pflichtprogramm des staatlichen Fernsehens gehörte.

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[1] Dieser Artikel ist eine Überarbeitung des Vorwortes zu Yayasan Bung Karno (2006) *Menyingkap Kebohongan Sukarno File* Jakarta, Yayasan Bung Karno.

[2] Dake, Antonie C. A. (2005) *Sukarno File, Berkas-Berkas Sukarno 1965-1967, Kronologi Suatu Keruntuhan*. Jakarta, Aksara Karunia.

[3] Giebels, Lambert (2005) *Pembantaian yang Ditutup-tutupi, Peristiwa Fatal di Sekitar Kejatuhan Bung Karno*. Jakarta, Grasindo.

[4] Fic, Victor Miroslav (2005) *Kudeta 1 Oktober 1965, Sebuah studi tentang konspirasi*. Jakarta, Yayasan Obor Indonesia.

[5] Notosusanto, Nugroho (1971) *Naskah Proklamasi jang otentik dan Rumusan Pancasila jang otentik*. Jakarta, Pusat Sejarah ABRI.

Der französische Historiker Jacques Leclerc argumentierte, Sukarno sei im Jahr 1970 gleich zwei Mal umgebracht worden: Am 21. Juni jenes Jahres verstarb er nach langer Krankheit, ohne zuvor medizinisch angemessen behandelt worden zu sein. Zuvor wurde der 1. Juni 1970 als Jahrestag zur Entstehung der Pancasila vom Kopkamtib (Komando Pemulihan Keamanan dan Ketertiban, Kommando für Wiederherstellung für Ruhe und Ordnung) verboten. In Zuge dessen überprüfte die Volksversammlung auch Sukarnos Schriften und Reden. Daher resümierte Leclerc, dass Bung Karno im Grunde zweimal getötet wurde, sein Körper und sein Schaffen.[6] Die im Jahr 2005 erschienen Publikationen lassen sich nun als eine dritte Ermordung Bung Karnos verstehen.

Es ist wichtig zu betonen, dass die gegenwärtigen Bemühungen einer De-Sukarno-isierung offensichtlich in enger Verbindung mit einer Suharto-isierung stehen, nämlich der Wiederherstellung Suhartos Ansehens. Beispielsweise verlieh ihm die ehemalige Regierungspartei Golkar Ende 2005 einen Orden für besondere Verdienste.

Interessant ist auch der ‚Rollenwechsel‘ in den Grundschullehrplänen. Während im Lehrplan für 2004 eine Aufgabenstellung „beschreibe die Rolle verschiedener Persönlichkeiten im Kampf um die Erlangung der Unabhängigkeit wie Sukarno, Hatta, Sultan Hamengkubuwono IX, Sudirman und Bung Tomo" lautete, wurde in der revidierten Version (vom 1. November 2005) den oben erwähnten Persönlichkeiten Suharto hinzugefügt. Das verschärfte die vorhandene Kontroverse darüber, ob Suharto als Nationalheld gelte. In der erneuten Revision 2006 nahmen die Verantworlichen in einer Grundlagenüberprüfung dann aber Abstand davon, indem zwar den Grundschülern nach wie vor eine „Bewertung der Kämpfer, die sich im Kampf um die Unabhängigkeit verdient gemacht haben" abverlangt, aber auf die explizite Benennung der Personen verzichtet wird.

Als Reaktion auf die gegenwärtigen Verleumdungskampagnen gegen Sukarno wurde auf Initiative der Bung Karno Foundation 2006 eine Publikation mit dem Titel *Menyingkap Kebohongan Sukarno File* (Die Lügen um die Akte Sukarno lüften) herausgegeben. Der erste Teil dieses Buches zeigt Sukarnos Sicht zur Bewegung des 30. Septembers 1965, wie sie aus den *Nawaksara*[7]-Reden hervorgeht. Laut Sukarno ereignete sich das Ereignis infolge drei zusammenhängender Gründe: der Verblendung der PKI-Spitze (Partai Komunis Indonesia, Kommunistische Partei Indonesiens), der Einflussnahme neokolonialer Kräfte und der verantwortungslosen Machenschaften diverser Personen. Es gäbe keinen alleinigen Drahtzieher, sondern sei eine Synthese von inn- und ausländischen Kräften. Zu dem Verdacht über die Verwicklung ausländischer Kräfte machte

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[6] Siehe Leclerc, Jacques (1997) Girls, girls, girls, and crocodiles. In: Henk Schulte Nordholt, ed., *Outward Appearances*. Leiden, KITLV Press, 291-305.

[7] Präsident Sukarno nannte seine am 22.06.1966 vor der Volksversammlung gehaltene Rede Nawaksara (Sanskrit: nawa=neun, aksara=Buchstabe).

Sukarno frühzeitig aufmerksam. In seiner Rede vor den ranghöchsten Offizieren in Jakarta warnte er bereits am 28. Mai 1965 davor:

> Anwesende, […] wir wissen in der Tat von anderen Plänen, die dazu dienen sollen, die indonesische Revolution zugrunde zu richten. Einer dieser Pläne sieht vor, einige indonesische Führer, wie mich selbst, Yani und Subandrio zu liquidieren und zwar noch vor der Aldjazair-Konferenz.

Der zweite Teil von *Menyingkap Kebohongan Sukarno File* befasst sich mit den öffentlichen Reaktionen auf die Sukarno diskreditierenden Bücher von Antonie C. A. Dake, Lambert Giebels und Victor Miroslav Fic in Indonesien und dem Ausland.

Öffentliche Reaktionen

Sukmawati Sukarnoputri, die am 17. November 2005 an der Buchpräsentation von Antonie Dake teilnahm, protestierte augenblicklich. Einige Tage darauf äußerte auch Megawati zornig, dass Dake und Autoren wie Giebels und Fic mit ihren Büchern ein Attentat auf den Staatsgründer verüben würden. Im Gegensatz dazu betrachten Angehörige Suhartos, wie der ehemalige Zollgeneraldirektor Soehardjo, Dakes Buch über Sukarno als „objektiv, informativ und angemessen"[8]. Als Reaktion auf diese Kontroverse führte das Onlinemagazin *Tempointeraktif* Ende 2005 eine Umfrage unter den Internet-Lesern durch, bei der die Mehrheit (66,35 Prozent von 960 Teilnehmern) anzweifelt, dass Sukarno in die Bewegung des 30. Septembers 1965 verwickelt gewesen sei.

In Gegenden wie Medan und Yogyakarta kam es zu Protesten hinsichtlich der Veröffentlichung von Dakes Buch. In der Provinzhauptstadt von Nordsumatra suchte eine Gruppe der Front Marhaenis das niederländische Generalkonsulat auf und verurteilte das Buch, welches Bung Karno diskreditiert, und forderte die Regierung auf, ernste Schritte dagegen einzuleiten. Ähnliche Reaktionen gaben verschiedene Leserbriefe in der Presse wieder.

Die Reaktionen unter Kommentatoren in den Massenmedien waren sehr vielseitig, einige reagierten mit Gleichgültigkeit, die Mehrheit kritisierte die besagten Bücher nachdrücklich. Die Hauptkritik bezog sich darauf, dass diese Publikationen auf unglaubwürdige Quellen und die Aussagen einzelner Personen zurückgreifen. Burhan Azis und A. Supardi Adiwijaya verfassten einen mehrteiligen Artikel für die Tageszeitung *Rakyat Merdeka,* in dem sie Antonie Dake angreifen und die Rolle Bambang Widjanarkos hinterfragen. John Roosa kritisierte die Haltung der indonesischen Verleger, die sich zu wenig um ihre Glaubwürdigkeit kümmern. Er schreibt „Die Verleger dieser […] Bücher sollten sich eigentlich bewusst darüber sein, welchen Schaden die Autoren für die Geschichtsstudien zu Indonesien anrichten. Sie veröffentlichen Analysen zu den Ereignissen von 1965, die unverantwortlich sind, weil sie nicht der Wahrheit entsprechen.

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[8] *Tempo* 28.11.-4.12.2005.

Falls die Verleger sich um ihren eigenen Ruf sorgen würden, müssten sie jedes Manuskript, das bei ihnen eingeht, genau überprüfen."

Lambert Giebels

Lambert Giebels wurde 1935 geboren. Mit seinen 71 Jahren ist er der jüngste der drei ‚altersschwachen' Autoren, die für dieses Aufsehen sorgten. Antonie Dake ist 78 Jahre, während Victor Fic bereits im Jahr 2004 im Alter von 82 Jahren verstarb.

Giebels war Abgeordneter der *Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal* (Zweite Kammer der Generalstände). Nach seiner Promotion der Geschichtswissenschaft verfasste er die Bibliographie von Dr. L. J. M. Beel, dem letzten Generalgouverneur von Niederländisch-Indien. In den 1970er und 1980er Jahren war er Berater des Generaldirektors für Arbeitsbeschaffung im Ministerium für Arbeit, das für die Planung des Großraumprojekts Jabotabek (Jakarta, Bogor, Tanggerang und Bekasi) verantwortlich war. Im Jahr 1999 veröffentlichte er eine Biographie über Sukarno, deren indonesische Ausgabe 2001 zeitlich mit dem 100-jährigen Gedenken an Bung Karno zusammenfiel. Zeitgleich veröffentlichte er den zweiten Teil der Biographie Bung Karnos in den Niederlanden. Sein Buch *Pembantaian yang Ditutup-tutupi* stellt den dritten und letzten Teil dieser Reihe dar.

Das erste Buch wurde in einer zweiseitigen *Tempo*-Kolumne von A. B. Kusuma auf das Äußerste kritisiert.[9] Laut Kusuma ist Giebels der Auffassung, dass alle Indonesier – auch Sukarno – bis 1950 Bürger der Niederlande waren. Deshalb, so Giebels, hätte Sukarno die Verantwortung für das Schicksal der von den Japanern internierten Niederländer nach 1942 tragen müssen. Nur zur Verdeutlichung von Giebels ‚historische Genauigkeit': Allein die fünf Seiten über die Jakarta-Charta enthalten zehn Fehler, zum Beispiel Agus Salim, Vertreter der islamischen Fraktion, sei ein Vertreter der Nationalisten gewesen und die NU-Persönlichkeit Wahid Hasyim hätte die Muhammadiyah repräsentiert.

Absurd ist auch Giebels Beschreibung des Kampfes um Surabaya am 10. November 1945. Sukarno wurde von den Niederlanden aufgefordert, in die Ereignisse um die Schlacht zu intervenieren, um diese zu beenden. In diesem Zusammenhang sollen Sukarnos Anhänger Rechenschaft von Mustopo verlangt haben, der sich in Surabaya selbst zum Befehlshaber des indonesischen Militärs ernannt hatte. Sukarno soll daraufhin äußerst clever gehandelt haben: Zuerst ernannte er Mustopo zum General und am selben Abend setzte er ihn gleich wieder ab. Dabei ist nicht ersichtlich, von wem oder aus welchem Werk Giebels diese Anekdote übernommen hat.

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[9] Kusuma, A. B. (2001) Giebels, Nederlandsch Onderdaan, Sebuah Gugatan. In: *Tempo* 24.06.2001.

Noch viel gravierender sind die Zitate von Bob Koke, einem vermeintlichen Geheimoffizier des OAS (Organisation Amerikanischer Staaten) und Mitinitiator des CIA. Dieser Informationsquelle zufolge hatte sich Sukarno bereiterklärt, die Position des Generalgouverneurs von Niederländisch-Indien wiederherzustellen, unter der Bedingung, er würde zum Premierminister ernannt. Diese angebliche Absprache fand nach November 1945 statt, also nachdem „Sukarno mit hoher Wahrscheinlichkeit seinen Standpunkt aufgegeben hatte". Das könnte eine neue historische Quelle darstellen, vorausgesetzt, die Angaben sind nicht komplett Giebels Fantasie entsprungen.

Obwohl die Reaktionen aus den Reihen der Historiker ausgesprochen kritisch waren, schreckten Giebels indonesische Verleger nicht vor der Herausgabe weiterer Publikationen dieses Autors zurück. Das Buch *Pembantaian yang Ditutup-tutupi* ist in seiner Schädlichkeit kaum zu überbieten. Fatal ist schon der Titel, der nicht dem Inhalt des Buches entspricht. Das Buch geht in keiner Weise auf die Massaker infolge des 30. Septembers ein, die schließlich mehr als 500.000 Menschenleben forderten. Das Buch beinhaltet darüber hinaus eine Reihe von Falschangaben: Giebels behauptet, dass Aidit am 1. Oktober 1965 nach Semarang flog. Richtig muss es heißen, dass er nach Yogyakarta aufbrach. Giebels schreibt, dass er auch Johanna Nasution interviewte. Der Aussage der Ehefrau von General A. H. Nasution zufolge, wurde sie von Sukarno bezichtigt, Geld für den von den Generälen geplanten Coup gesammelt zu haben.[10] Ist es denkbar, dass Bung Karno so eine Beschuldigung verlautbaren ließ, wo er doch gewöhnlicherweise nur die *nekolim*[11]-Kräfte und nicht die Ehefrauen eines Generals angriff? Ist es außerdem nachweisbar, dass Nasutions Frau das jemals gesagt hat?

Giebels zufolge ist ein weiteres Anzeichen über eine Verwicklung Sukarnos in die Ereignisse darin zu finden, dass er seinen Staatsbesuch nach Mexiko im September 1965 absagte. Ein Staatsbesuch kann aber aus vielerlei Gründen und von beiden Seiten verschoben werden, daher ist Giebels Einwand irrelevant.

Victor Miroslav Fic

Victor M. Fic war Professor Emeritus der Politikwissenschaften an der kanadischen Brock University. 1922 im heutigen Tschechien geboren, emigrierte er nach Kanada, wobei die Gründe dafür unklar sind. Seine Werke behandeln den Kommunismus in der Sowjetunion, der Tschechoslowakei, China und Indien. Die Dokumente aus dem Besitz von Victor Fic über die Geschichte des Kommunismus, die Menschenrechtsverletzungen in der Tschechoslowakei sowie die Kopien aus dem Archiv des US-amerikanischen

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[10] Es ging das Gerücht um, dass ein angeblicher ‚Rat der Generäle' plane, am 5.10.1965 gegen Präsident Sukarno zu putschen.

[11] *Neo Kolonialism dan Imperialisme* (Neokolonialismus und Imperialismus).

Außenministeriums mit Geheimberichten über Russland/Sibirien 1918-19 werden in den Open Society Archives an der Central European University aufbewahrt. Neben Büchern über den Kommunismus schrieb er auch über Tantra und indische Mystik.

Fic war zwei Mal auf Einladung von Nugroho Notosusanto in Indonesien, 1968 und 1971. Er erhielt viele Dokumente, unter anderem von Oberstleutnant Djiwo Soegondo vom Untersuchungsteam, das zur Aufklärung der Ereignisse von 1965-66 gegründet worden war. Von 1996-1997 war er *visiting fellow* am CSIS (Center for Strategic and International Studies) in Jakarta, um das Buch, das er vor 30 Jahren begonnen hatte, fertig zu stellen. Das Buch verfolgt das Ziel, das Gefahrenpotential der PKI zu erklären, die beabsichtigte, den Pluralismus, der sich seit langem in *Nusantara* gefestigt hatte, zu zerstören. In dem Buch werden der Aufbau des Coups, die Psychologie der Täter und ihre Interaktionen auf einer Art und Weise erklärt, als wäre es eine Inszenierung aus dem Repertoire des *wayang kulit*.

John O. Sutter verfasste zu dem Buch das Vorwort. Groteskerweise schreibt er in der englischen Version über „the two chief conspirators behind G30S, Sukarno and Aidit", wohingegen in der indonesischen Version von „drei Hauptverschwörern hinter G30S, Aidit, Mao und Präsident Sukarno" die Rede ist.

Als ich bei Präsentation von Victor Fics Buch diese Unstimmigkeit anmerkte, antwortete der Herausgeber – was an Absurdität kaum zu überbieten ist – dass er selbst Mao hinzugefügt hat. Nachdem er das Buch gelesen hätte, war er mehr als je zuvor davon überzeugt, dass Mao [in die Bewegung des 30. Septembers 1965] verwickelt gewesen wäre. Ich erwiderte, dass es sich hier um eine Übersetzung handle, die mit dem Quelltext identisch sein müsse. Falls er als Herausgeber eine andere Meinung vertrete, müsste er ein redaktionelles Vorwort hinzufügen.

In seinem Vorwort betont John O. Sutter die Außergewöhnlichkeit von Fics Buch und hebt hervor: „Debunking myths about probably Indonesia's greatest crisis, this well-researched, definitive work examines what actually occurred". Hierbei vertritt Sutter grundsätzlich eine andere Meinung als das Cornell-Paper von Ben Anderson und Ruth McVey. Dabei beleuchtet er Anderson und McVey viel zu einseitig. Aber vielleicht wird diese Meinungsverschiedenheit über die Struktur eines *coup d'état* in Indonesien auch überbetont und dahinter stehen eigentlich ‚interne Konflikte' unter amerikanischen Akademikern.

Fics Buch versucht, die Verschwörung vom 30. September 1965 im Rahmen von mehreren Begegnungen auf dem Luftwaffenstützpunkt Halim Perdanakusuma zwischen Sukarno, Supardjo und anderen Persönlichkeiten zu analysieren. Darüber hinaus beleuchtet das Buch besonders die Rolle Aidits, wie im Index zu sehen ist: Aidit wird mehr als 75 Mal erwähnt, Untung und Sjam beide jeweils um die 40 Mal und Suhrto und Latief jeweils um die 20 Mal. Außer einem Dokument von Supardjo bietet Fic keine neuen

Fakten. Allerdings zeugt Fics Buch von mehr Einfallsreichtum als die, die während des Suharto-Regimes erschienen.

Fic vertritt folgende Standpunkte: Erstens, Mao soll Aidit am 5. August [1965] in Bejing den Befehl gegeben haben, einen Putsch durchzuführen. Zweitens, Aidit soll am 8. August 1965 mit Sukarno im Präsidentenpalast von Bogor über Maos Anweisung gesprochen haben. Und drittens, Sukarno soll Aidits Vorschlag zugestimmt haben, wobei der PKI die Staatsgewalt übertragen worden wäre. Sobald Aidit zum Premierminister ernannt und ein neues Kabinett mit PKI-Mehrheit gebildet worden wäre, hätte sich Sukarno zur Ruhe gesetzt.

Bei seinen Ausführungen zu Beginn des Buches schwankt Fic selbst zwischen Unschlüssigkeit und Gewissheit. Auf Seite 77 schreibt er:

> Sehr wahrscheinlich hat Aidit zu Mao gesagt, dass die PKI ein gehorsamer Schüler gegenüber seinen Lehren wäre, da Mao der größte, noch lebende Ideengeber für die Theorie und Praxis des Marxismus-Leninismus seit Lenin sei.

Jedoch nimmt Fics Gewissheit auf den folgenden Seiten zu, so auf Seite 78:

> Es kann davon ausgegangen werden, dass Aidit darüberhinaus zu Mao sagte, dass die Nachrichten aus Jakarta als Aufforderungen an die Partei zu verstehen sind, unverzügliche Maßnahmen zu ergreifen, um anderweitiges Aufbegehren zu unterdrücken. Also steht fest, dass Aidit Mao um Rat bat, welche Maßnahmen von der PKI ergriffen werden sollten. Mao antwortete kurz und bündig.

Trotzdem ist die Authenzitität der Quelle für den folgenden Dialog zwischen Mao und Aidit zweifelhaft.

> Mao: Du musst schnell handeln.
>
> Aidit: Ich befürchte, das Heer könnte ein Hindernis darstellen.
>
> Mao: Gut, dann mache das, was ich Dir geraten habe; töte alle Generäle und reaktionären Offiziere auf einen Schlag. Danach wird das Heer wie eine kopflose Schlange sein und Dir folgen.
>
> Aidit: Das würde bedeuten, mehrere Hundert Offiziere zu ermorden.
>
> Mao: In Nord-Shensi habe ich 20.000 Kader auf einen Schlag töten lassen.

Die Quelle stammt aus „Indon. Coup Planned by Aidit and Mao: Army Newspaper Reveals What Took Place Between the Two", erschienen in *The Straits Times*, Singapore, am 26. April 1966. Der Artikel beruft sich auf die Ausgabe der *Angkatan Bersenjata* vom 25. April 1966 und zitiert wiederum eine anonyme Aussage.

Abgesehen davon, inwieweit Mao in der Lage war, Aidit Befehle zu erteilen, fällt es schwer zu glauben, dass ein Unabhängigkeitskämpfer wie Sukarno freiwillig den Präsidentenstuhl abgetreten hätte, um sich im Ausland zur Ruhe zu setzen.

Die andere von Fic verwendete Quelle beruht auf Marsma Tranggono. „Ich habe für Sukarno schon einen ruhigen Ort am Angsa-See (in der Volksrepublik China) vorbereitet" – lautete ein von Marsma Tranggono mitgehörter Dialog zwischen dem chinesischen Außenminister Chen Yi und Dr. Subandrio. In welchem Zusammenhang dieser

Satz geäußert wurde, bleibt unklar. Eine mögliche Erklärung dafür könnte sein, dass Bung Karno aufgrund seines gesundheitlichen Zustands Ruhe benötigte und ihm eine Reise in die Volksrepublik China vorgeschlagen wurde.[12] Auch wenn diese Unterhaltung zwischen Subandrio und Chen Yi wirklich stattfand, steht sie nicht unmittelbar in Verbindung mit der Verschwörung und dem Putsch von 1965.

Interessant ist auch ein anderes sich im Anhang befindendes Dokument. Der Verfasser dieses Dokumentes verwendet einen Kode, z.B. Sosro = Sukarno, Tjeweng = Subandrio, Tetangga = China, Mbah = Mao, Gatotkatja = Omar Dani, grasshopper = Helikopter. Das Dokument besagt, dass Aidit mit dem von Omar Dani bereitgestellten Helikopter nach China aufbrechen würde. Dabei stellt sich die Frage, ob es überhaupt möglich ist, mit dem Helikopter bis auf das chinesische Festland zu fliegen. Darüber hinaus soll Aidit vor seiner Abreise zu Mbah alias Mao Sukarno und Subandrio bedroht haben.

Fics Analyse zur Struktur des *coup d'état* erschien 2004 in Indien bei einem unbekannten Verleger, Abhinav Publications. Im Folgejahr wurde das Buch vom indonesischen Verlagshaus Obor sowohl auf Englisch als auch Indonesisch verlegt. Das Buch benötigte bis zu seiner Vollendung fast ebensoviel Zeit, wie das Ereignis mittlerweile zurückliegt. Einige Institutionen und Einzelpersonen wie Nugroho Notosusanto und das CSIS spielten eine wichtige Rolle. Bedauerlich ist jedoch, dass der Historiker Fic keine Quellenkritik vornahm. Dokumente des Außerordentlichen Militärgerichts und andere Materialien gab er direkt wieder, ohne sie vorerst zu überprüfen.

Abgesehen von diesem oben erwähnten fatalen Problem, kommen in Fics Buch einige umstrittene – wenn nicht sogar beleidigende – Bemerkungen vor:

> 1) „Präsident Sukarno stand unter dem Einfluss von Njoto" (10).

> 2) „Bung Karno konzipierte den Revolutionsrat, außerdem fügte er den Namen des Menpangak (Menteri Muda Panglima Angkatan Kepolisian, Staatsminister für Polizeiangelegenheiten) Sutjipto hinzu. Bung Karno und Aidit handelten die Liste des Revolutionsrats zusammen aus" (21).

> 3) Der Präsident geriet in Panik. Leimena „führte den Präsidenten an der Hand wie ein kleines Kind" (24).

> 4) „Einige Beobachter äußerten ihr Misstrauen gegenüber Präsidentin Megawati, deren Suche nach Wahrheit allein von ihrem Wunsch nach Vergeltung wegen der ‚Entthronung' ihres Vaters 1966 motiviert gewesen wäre, und sie sich damit an dem Soeharto-Regime rächen wollte" (47).

> 5) Fic schreibt über Supardjos ‚Selbstkritik'. Allerdings benutzte Generalbrigadier Supardjo diesen Begriff selbst nicht, sondern nur Sudisman.

> 6) „Omar Dani unterstützt Aidit aus vollen Kräften" (101). Wenngleich er ein großer Unterstützer von Präsident Sukarno war, so hatte Omar Dani jedoch keine Beziehung zum Vorsitzenden der PKI.

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[12] Katoppo, Aristides, Hrsg. (2000) *Menyingkap Kabut Halim 1965*. Jakarta, Pustaka Sinar Harapan, 48.

> 7) Fic ist der Überzeugung, dass „Aidit die eigentliche Verantwortung für das Scheitern von *Gestapu*[13] vor allem dem Präsidenten zuschob. Der Präsident hatte sein Versprechen gebrochen, ein Kabinett gemäß dem *gotong-royong*-Prinzip zu bilden (Dokument No. 2) und änderte seine Haltung zu seinen Plänen, sich am Angsa-See in China zur Ruhe zu setzen. Warum der Präsident so handelte, kann nur vermutet werden. Dieses Geheimnis nahm er 1970 mit ins Grab nach Blitar" (289).

Das Schlusswort von Victor Miroslav Fic lautet folgendermaßen:

> Diese Recherche drückt Hochachtung gegenüber General Suharto aus, der zur richtigen Zeit intervenierte und die Möglichkeit einer Allianz zwischen Sukarno und Aidit unterband, da sie vorhatten, Indonesien in eine Volksdemokratie umzuwandeln (299).

Antonie C. A. Dake

Nicht allein, dass Dake behauptet, dass Bung Karno „der eigentliche Anführer" von G30S war. Dake beschuldigt den Staatsgründer auch, „direkt die Verantwortung für die Ermordung der sechs Generäle und indirekt für die Massaker unter den Kommunisten und Nichtkommunisten im Anschluss zu tragen". Dakes Anschuldigungen beruhen auf den Untersuchungen von Bambang Widjanarko, Sukarnos Adjutanten, die vom Teperpu (Team Pemeriksa Pusat, dem Zentralen Untersuchungsteam) des Kopkamtib durchgeführt worden waren. Bambang Widjanarko gab bei seiner Vernehmung an, dass Bung Karno den Generalbrigadier Sabur sowie den Oberstleutnant Untung am 4. August 1965 in sein Schlafzimmer orderte. Dort fragte er beide, ob sie bereit wären, „einen Befehl auszuführen, um Schritte gegen illoyale Generäle einzuleiten. Untung erklärte seine Bereitschaft dazu". Dakes Schlussfolgerung, dass Sukarno die direkte Verantwortung für die Ermordung der sechs Generäle tragen würde, beruht einzig und allein auf dieser Erklärung von Bambang Widjanarko. Das Geständnis Widjanarkos erschien 1974 in zwei Sprachen (Indonesisch und Englisch) unter dem Titel *The Devious Dalang* zusammen mit einem Vorwort von Dake.

Das Buch *Sukarno File* ist im Grunde genommen ein ‚altes Lied mit neuem Arrangement'. Bereits 1973 hatte Antonie Dake *In the spirit of the red banteng, Indonesian communists between Moscow and Peking* veröffentlicht. Dieses Buch war seine Dissertation an der Freien Universität in Berlin. Der niederländische Autor erhielt die Sondergenehmigung, seine Doktorarbeit auf Englisch zu verfassen. Diese Tatsache ist nur im Kontext des Kalten Krieges begreifbar, als dass jenseits der Mauer alle Bücher, die den Kommunismus verunglimpften, für gut befunden wurden.

Im Jahr 2002 erschien bei dem in Jakarta ansässigen Verlag Aksara Karunia erneut Dakes vor dreißig Jahren verfasste Dissertation. Jetzt brachte derselbe Verlag Dakes 549-seitiges Buch *Sukarno File* heraus, wobei der Anhang mit ungefähr 300 Seiten

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[13] Die Bezeichnung *Gestapu* (*Gerakan September Tigapuluh*, Bewegung des 30. Septembers) wurde unter Suharto als Synonym für G30S verwendet.

umfassender ist als der Inhalt selbst. Im Appendix ist der vollständige indonesische Text von Bambang Widjanarkos Zeugenaussage, die auch im Buch *The Devious Dalang* veröffentlicht wurde, zu finden.

Die Quelle über Widjanarko ist aus quellenkritischer Sicht sehr schwach. Denn einige Jahre danach, bei einer Diskussion zum Buch *Sewindu Bersama Bung Karno* (Die Jahre mit Bung Karno), räumte Widjanarko ein, dass seine Aussage erzwungen worden war.

Dake zitiert auch Materialien aus den Prozessen des Außerordentlichen Militärgerichts, dessen Inhalte hauptsächlich Ergebnisse militärischer Verhöre waren. Das Buch *Siapa Menabur Angin Akan Menuai Badai* (Wer Wind sät wird einen Sturm ernten)*,* das angeblich von einem Geheimdienstoffizier geschrieben wurde, stellt Dakes Hauptquelle dar; nicht zu vergessen, dass er auch Dokumente vom CIA verwendete. Bedauerlicherweise benennt er diese CIA-Quelle nicht genauer sondern schreibt nur „CIA Seite so und so".

In einer Quelle wird erwähnt, dass Dake das Verhörmaterial von Widjanarko mit der Post zugeschickt bekam, als er sich in einem Hotel in Jakarta Anfang der 1970er Jahre aufhielt. Anfang 2005, als ich zu Forschungszwecken an der KITLV Leiden war, fand ich neun Prozessakten des Außerordentlichen Militärgerichts (Subandrio, Untung, Sjam, u.a.). Auf einigen Aktenumschlägen war Antonie Dakes Name, seine Adresse und Telefonnummer in Holland notiert. Demzufolge gehe ich davon aus, dass die Dokumente wirklich Dake gehörten, und er sie dem Archiv KITLV Leiden vermachte.

Im Buch *Sukarno File* ist auch erwähnt, dass Sukarno bereits einen Brief unterschrieben hätte, in dem stand, dass General Yani am 1. Oktober 1965 von Generalmajor Mursid abgelöst werden sollte. Unglücklicherweise jedoch blieb dieses Dokument bis heute unauffindbar – vorausgesetzt, es hat überhaupt jemals existiert.

Abgesehen von seiner Schwäche in Bezug auf Quellen, fehlt es Dake in seiner Schlussfolgerung an Überzeugungskraft. Falls Sukarno wirklich vorgehabt hätte, General Yani oder einen anderen General abzusetzen, hätte er das jederzeit tun können. Weshalb hätte es so einer komplizierten Art und Weise bedurft? Weshalb hätte Sukarno, der selbst an der Macht war, ein Komplott schmieden sollen, das ihn selbst zu Fall bringen könnte? In anderen Worten würde das bedeuten, dass Sukarno gegen sich selbst geputscht hätte.

Momentan erleben wir in Indonesien eine Phase der Demokratisierung. Eine andere Meinung zu haben, ist das Recht eines jeden Bürgers, Bürger anderer Nationalität inbegriffen. Es gibt immer verschiedene Interpretationen von historischen Ereignissen, so auch im Fall der Ereignisse von 1965. Wenn jemand behauptet, dass Sukarno in G30S verwickelt war, ist das sein Recht. Dann dürfen andere aber genauso behaupten, dass Suharto zwischen 1965 und 1967 einen ‚schleichenden Putsch' durchführte. Es ist aber unangemessen, wenn der Staatsgründer beschuldigt wird, er sei auf direkte Art und

Weise an der Ermordung der sechs Generäle und indirekt an den darauf folgenden Massenmorden, die mindestens 500.000 Opfer kosteten, beteiligt gewesen zu sein.

Dakes Freispruch für Suharto und die CIA

Die Dokumente in Appendix V von *Sukarno File* versuchen explizit, eine mögliche Verwicklung Suhartos in die Bewegung des 30. Septembers zu widerlegen. Der Grund, weshalb Suharto nicht entführt werden sollte, so Dake, bedeute nicht, dass er unweigerlich der Bewegung des 30. Septembers angehörte. Suhartos Name hätte nicht auf der Liste gestanden, weil er Yani nicht sonderlich nahe stand.

Suharto wird nachgesagt, er hätte im Vorfeld von Latief von der geplanten Entführung der Generäle erfahren. Dennoch lastet Dake Suharto dessen Haltung nicht an. Hätte Suharto aber nicht eigentlich seinen Vorgesetzten, nämlich General A. Yani, von den ihm bekannten Plänen in Kenntnis setzen müssen? Oder war die Ermordung der bedeutendsten Generäle in seinem eigenen Interesse, da diese für ihn ein kaum zu überwindendes Hindernis darstellten, die Karriereleiter noch weiter emporzusteigen?

In seinem Buch erwähnt Dake mit keinem Wort den ‚schleichenden Putsch‘ und auch nicht, dass es Suharto war, der am meisten von diesem missglückten *coup d'état* profitierte. Stattdessen ist Dake voller Lob für General Suharto:

> […] Der Oberbefehlshaber von Kostrad trat den Problemen an diesem Tag mit Geschicklichkeit und einem kühlen Kopf entgegen. Während alle Seiten, gleichwohl Freund oder Feind, von einem Gefühl von Verwirrung und Panik heimgesucht wurden, und Unsicherheit die Atmosphäre in Jakarta dominierte, trat Suharto in Erscheinung und beherrschte die Situation souverän. Binnen weniger Stunden gelang es ihm, die Situation unter Kontrolle zu bekommen und den Putsch sicher zu beenden (336).

Dake fasst zusammen, dass es an der Zeit sei, verschiedene Gerüchte aus der Welt zu schaffen, die eine mögliche Verwicklung Suhartos in die Ereignisse vom 1. Oktober beinhalten und zu einem standhaften Mythos geworden seien. Es wäre nun angebracht, diesen Mythos als etwas einzuordnen, das nicht der Wahrheit entspräche (337). In Dakes Worten, „[…] hat Suharto verblüffende Genauigkeit und Effektivität bewiesen, sich dem Coup entgegenzustellen. Ihm gelang es, eine sehr gefährliche Krise zu verhindern, die zu einer kommunistischen Machtübernahme oder zu einem sehr blutigen Bürgerkrieg hätte führen können“ (340). Es ist wirklich erstaunlich, dass Dake nicht zu wissen scheint, dass die blutigen Massenmorde infolge des Putsches 1965 mindestens eine halbe Million Opfer kosteten.

Dake entbindet nicht nur Suharto von seiner Verantwortung sondern ebenso die CIA. Dake zufolge gibt es keine ausreichenden Beweise dafür, dass die US-amerikanische Botschaft in den frühen Morgenstunden des 1. Oktobers wusste, was in Jakarta vor sich ging. Ihm zufolge ‚vernachlässigte‘ der US-amerikanische Geheimdienst Indonesien, so dass keine effektive Einmischung in den ersten Oktobertagen möglich gewesen wäre.

Daraus resultiere, dass weder die CIA noch irgendein anderer US-amerikanischen Geheimdienst in der Lage war, den Coup oder den Counter-Coup am 1. Oktober zu beeinflussen.

Dake erklärt in diesem Zusammenhang nicht, was er unter Counter-Coup versteht oder ob er gar die Bewegung Suhartos als Counter-Coup sieht. Er geht ebenso wenig auf den Botschaftsmitarbeiter Robert Martens ein, der mit Hilfe von Kim Adhyatman, Adam Maliks Sekretär, dem Militär eine Liste von bedeutenden PKI-Mitgliedern zukommen ließ. Es fällt auch kein Wort über die US-amerikanische Hilfslieferung von ‚Kommunikationsmitteln', bei denen es sich tatsächlich um Waffen handelte.

The Devious Dalang

The Devious Dalang, Sukarno and the so called Untung-putch, Eye-witness report by Bambang S. Widjanarko erschien bei Interdoc Publishing Houses. Das Erscheinungsjahr fehlt vollkommen, obwohl Dake (ebenso Rahadi S. Karni) in seinem Vorwort den April 1974 benennt. Das Buch besteht aus einem 227-seitigen indonesischen Text, im Anschluss folgt die englische Übersetzung. Der indonesische findet sich dann auch im Anhang des Buches *Sukarno File* wieder.

In dem Buch *The Devious Dalang* wird Rahadi S. Karni als Herausgeber genannt, seine eigentliche Aufgabe an der Publikation ist aber nicht ersichtlich. Bestand sein Beitrag darin, den Untersuchungsbericht zu editieren oder auch an der englischen Übersetzung mitzuwirken? Rahadi Karni schreibt in seiner Einleitung, dass das Manuskript offensichtlich in Indonesien auf einer gewöhnlichen, nicht etwa einer elektronischen Schreibmaschine getippt wurde, und dass es sich um keine Fotokopie handle. Diese Tatsache überrascht nicht wirklich, weil es zu dieser Zeit (in den 1970er Jahren) in Indonesien nur sehr wenige Fotokopierer gab. Karni überprüfte weder die Art des Papiers, den verwendeten Briefkopf noch die Unterschrift, die der Bericht trägt, sondern lediglich den Sprachstil sowie die Vollständigkeit des Schriftstückes. Hinsichtlich der Sprache verwendet der Bericht Fragen, die in mehr oder weniger Standardsprache formuliert sind. Die erwiderten Antworten enthalten viele Abkürzungen, was für einen indonesischen Muttersprachler typisch ist. Karni stellt fest, dass die Art der Sprache in der Tat den Verhören des Mahmilub (Mahkamah Militer Luar Biasa, Außerordentliches Militärgericht) entspricht.

Nach Ansicht Karnis ergaben die von Bambang Widjanarko erwiderten Antworten Sinn, der seine Antworten modifizierte, wenn ihm die Fragen des Militärgerichts zu suggestiv erschienen, zum Beispiel was die Beziehung zwischen dem ehemaligen Präsidenten und der PKI angeht, wie es aus Frage No. 6 vom 21. Oktober 1970 hervorgeht:

> Facts which were noticeable and could be supposed show that the activities of the PKI greatly increased in 1965, to the extent that these activities of the PKI overshad-

owed everything in all fields. Please tell us why ex-President SUKARNO at that time greatly favoured the PKI, to the extent that one could say that the political ends of the PKI were completely accepted by ex-President SUKARNO? (38)

Es sieht so aus, als ob es sich um allgemeine Fragen handeln würde, und als ob Bambang Widjanarko Spielraum für seine Antworten gehabt hätte, selbst wenn diese nicht den Erwartungen der Verhörenden entsprachen. Wohingegen auf Fragen, die mit einem Ja oder Nein beantwortet werden mussten, Bambang Widjanarko kaum ausweichen konnte.

Die viel zitierte Erklärung, dass Untung und Sabur am 4. August 1965 in Bung Karnos Schlafgemächer kamen, ist eigentlich eine Frage, die eine Aussage von jemandem anderen bestätigen soll. Sie lautete wie folgt:

The witnesses SURATNI, SUKARTI and AMANDA JACOBS told the investigators that, on August 4th, 1965, ex-Lt.-Col. UNTUNG called at the Palace for an audience of Bung KARNO. Please comment on: […] Are the statements by the witnesses correct? (19).

In diesem Zusammenhang bleibt unklar, wer Suratni, Sukarti und Amanda Jacobs sind und ob sie eventuell im Präsidentenpalast angestellt waren.

Karni argumentiert in seinem Vorwort, dass das Verhör von Bambang Widjanarko überhaupt erst zustande kam, nachdem Bung Karno im Juni 1970 verstorben war. Aus diesem Grunde wich seine Aussage nun von der seiner Kollegen ab. Er begründete dies am 4. November 1970 folgendermaßen:

The fact that some or many of the collaborators of Bung KARNO have so far maintained silence is, in my opinion due to the following facts:

1. Worship for Bung KARNO personally, which thickly wrapped their minds from 1945 and ever since to the present day.

2. The existence of a moral obligation to Bung KARNO whom they consider to have been always good to them.

3. Lack of understanding by them for the duty of all of us to obey the law (210).

Nach Karni ist es nachvollziehbar, dass Bambang Widjanarko erst nach Sukarnos Tod den Mut fand zu sprechen. Genau das wirft jedoch weitere Fragen auf. Bung Karno war bereits nicht mehr am Leben, wozu also eine Untersuchung, die dazu dient, Sukarnos mögliche Fehler oder Verwicklung in die Bewegung des 30. Septembers nachzuweisen?

Aus einem anderem Blickwinkel betrachtet, wurden diese Untersuchungen im Hinblick auf die Wahlen 1971 forciert. Dem Wiedererstarken nationalistischer Kräfte, die sich eventuell des großen Namen Bung Karnos bedient hätten, sollte entgegengetreten werden, indem versucht wurde, den ehemaligen Präsidenten mit der PKI und der Bewegung des 30. Septembers in Verbindung zu bringen. Vor den Wahlen 1971 wurden nicht nur die nationalistischen Kräfte an den Rand gedrängt, sondern auch die islamischen Gruppierungen. Banser (Barisan Serba Guna, Sicherheitskräfte der NU-

Jugendorganisation), die 1965 eine Allianz mit dem Militär zur Vernichtung von PKI-Anhängern geschlossen hatte, fiel vor der Wahl 1971 ebenso dem Regime zum Opfer. Währenddessen wurden um die 10.000 politische Gefangene der Kategorie B – nämlich diejenigen, denen zwar eine Verwicklung angelastet wurde – aber die Beweisgrundlagen nicht für eine Strafverhandlung ausreichten, ohne juristischen Prozess auf die Gefangeneninsel Buru verschifft. Demzufolge wurden restlos alle Kräfte, die als gefährlich eingestuft wurden, aus der Mitte der Gesellschaft gerissen, so dass die Wahlen ruhig von statten gingen und ihr Ergebnis entsprechend der Erwartungen der Machthaber ausfiel.

John Roosa äußerte in einem Brief an mich sein Erstaunen darüber, dass zwischen dem Erscheinen von *The Devious Dalang* (1974) und dem Tod von Bambang Widjanarko (1996) viel Zeit verstrich. Dake selbst besuchte mehrere Male Indonesien. Weshalb nutzte er in diesen 22 Jahren nicht die Gelegenheit, Bambang Widjanarko zu interviewen. Es scheint, als wenn Dake eher dem Kopkamtib als Bambang Widjanarko Glauben geschenkt hätte.

Bambang Widjanarko

Bambang Widjanarko schrieb 1988 selbst ein Buch, nämlich *Sewindu Dekat Bung Karno*. Von diesem Buch gab es bereits im Erscheinungsjahr drei Auflagen. Keiner dachte aber mehr daran, dass Bambang Widjanarko selbst in *Devious Dalang* als Zeuge zitiert wurde. Man erinnerte sich seiner vor allem als ehemaligen Adjutanten von Präsident Sukarno (1960-1967) und als späteres Parlamentsmitglied für die PDI Fraktion. Im Jahr 1996 starb er im Alter von 67 Jahren und wurde auf dem Heldenfriedhof in Kalibata beerdigt.

Bambang Widjanarko, mit vollem Namen Geraldus R. Bambang Setyono Widjanarko, wurde am 9. September 1929 in Karanganyar Kebumen (Zentraljava) geboren. Seine militärische Karriere begann 1943, als er sich der Armee zur Verteidigung des Vaterlands (PETA, Pembela Tanah Air) in Gombong (Zentraljava) anschloss. Er war einer der Gründer der Organisation für Volkssicherheit und der Volkssicherheitsarmee nach dem 17. August 1945. Der spätere Absolvent der Militärakademie in Bandung ging im November 1945 zu den Seestreitkräften AL CA-IV in Tegal und arbeitete da als Militärinstrukteur und Kompaniekommandant.

Während der Revolution von 1945-50 war er weiterhin in der genannten Einheit aktiv, führte Operationen in Karesidenan Pekalongan und im Gebiet von Temanggung durch. Von 1950-60 hatte er seine Basis in Surabaya. Der Autor des Buches *Sewindu Dekat Bung Karno* übte die verschiedenste Aufgaben aus, u.a. als Detachmentkommandant, Ausbilder, Stabsoffizier und darüber hinaus Kommandant der Einheit, die für die Befriedung von Unruhen in ganz Indonesien verantwortlich war.

Nach seiner Pensionierung fungierte der Offizier als einer der Leiter von KONI (Komitee Olah Raga Nasional Indonesia, Nationales Sportkomitee Indonesiens) und als stellvertretender Vorsitzender von PERPANI (Persatuan Panahan Indonesia, Vereinigung indonesischer Bogenschützen).

Der Bericht von Bambang Widjanarko und *The Devious Dalang*

Es ist sehr aufschlussreich, den Anhang des Buches *Sukarno File* mit den Verhörprotokollen von Bambang Widjanarko mit *Devious Dalang*, zu vergleichen. Die Manuskripte aus Dakes Besitz enthalten eine Reihe handgeschriebener Korrekturen. In *Devious Dalang* sind diese dann bereits verarbeitet. Nun stellt sich die Frage, wer diese Korrekturen vorgenommen hat.

In der Bibliothek von General Nasution, die sich im militärischen Hauptquartier in Cilangkap befindet, steht auch das Buch *40 Hari Kegagalan „G30S"* (40 Tage nach dem Scheitern von G30S), das ebenfalls mit handschriftlichen Korrekturen versehen ist. Viele dieser Korrekturen sind sprachliche Verbesserungen. Mein Eindruck ist, dass diese Handschrift mit der der Korrekturen in Bambang Widjanarkos Verhörprotokollen identisch ist. Um wen handelt es sich hier?

In Giebels Buch wird gesagt, dass die Person, die das Manuskript an Dake schickte, jemand war, dem Nasution nahe stand. Wer nun hat dieses Manuskript korrigiert? General Nasution etwa? Oder Mula Marbun, ein Historiker aus der UI, der in der Tat Nasution viel bei der Korrektur von Manuskripten zur Hand gegangen ist? Oder Uyeng Suwargana (Oey Eng Soe), der Nasution ebenfalls nahe stand. Im Buch von Dake gibt es auch einen Ausschnitt des Berichts Uyeng Suwargana an den indonesischen Botschafter Sudjamoko. Dieser Brief wurde aus Washington geschickt und ist auf den 27. Juni 1971 datiert.

Nasution kannte Uyeng Suwargana bereits seit 1940, als dieser seine Militärausbildung in Bandung absolvierte. 1953 gründete Nasution die Partei IPKI (Ikatan Pendukung Kemerdekaan Indonesia, Zusammenschluss der Unabhängigkeitsunterstützer Indonesiens) zusammen mit mehreren militärischen Führern und Unternehmern, wie auch Uyeng Suwargana. In einem Artikel von Penders wird Uyeng Suwargana als Geheimoffizier bezeichnet. Uyengs Status bleibt unklar und ebenso, ob er tatsächlich für den Geheimdienst arbeitete. Fest steht zumindest, dass er Nasution nahe stand.

Dakes Haltung

Die Art und Weise wie Antonie Dake schreibt, ähnelt dem Jargon der Kolonialzeit, wie zwischen Kolonialherren und ihren Untertanen. Abgesehen davon, dass viele Angaben nicht korrekt sind, verhöhnt er indonesische Persönlichkeiten. Beispielsweise bezeich-

net er den Befehlshaber der Luftstreitkräfte Omar Dani als „Playboy" und General Mursyid als „Judas". Von Bung Karno behauptet er, dass er „größenwahnsinnig" und „erbarmungslos" gewesen sei, mit der Zeit wäre der Präsident immer „starrköpfiger und überheblicher" geworden und außerdem gab es Vorfälle, bei denen er die „Kontrolle über seinen Jähzorn" verloren hätte. Doch in dem Moment, wo es darauf ankam, hätte er sich auf Halim „einfach schlafen gelegt". Präsident Sukarno sei, so Dake, auch ein Mensch gewesen, der „nie seine Versprechen eingehalten" und „sein Einverständnis zu dem G30S-Komplott geleugnet" habe. Das für den 1. Oktober 1965 anberaumte Treffen zwischen Präsident Sukarno und General Yani wäre nicht mehr als ein „zynisches Schauspiel" geworden. Sukarno spielte ein „listiges und doppelzüngiges" Spiel in der Politik. Am 1. Oktober 1965 sei Sukarno einfach „von der Bildfläche verschwunden". Am 11. März [1966] „flüchtete Präsident Sukarno aus dem Palast". Das Staatsoberhaupt „bat" auch Amir Machmud, Subandrio nicht umzubringen. Dake geht von einem tief greifenden Konflikt zwischen Sukarno und den Oberbefehlshaber des Heeres, General Yani, aus und behauptete „Sukarno wurde es beim Gedanken an Yani übel". Darüber hinaus hätte „der Präsident zwei Offiziere aufgewiegelt, sich gegen die Oberen zu verschwören". Gemeint sind dabei Generalbrigadier Sabur und Oberstleutnant Untung, die laut *Sukarno File* Sukarno am 4. August 1965 in seinen Privatgemächern aufsuchten. Die allergrößte Verleumdung jedoch ist, dass Bung Karno „der eigentliche Drahtzieher" von all dem, was sich in der zweiten Hälfte des Jahres 1965 abspielte, gewesen sei. Letztendlich macht Dake Präsident Sukarno zum Sündenbock für alle Probleme von 1965: Er bezichtigt den Staatsgründer „direkt die Verantwortung für die Ermordung der sechs Generäle und indirekt für die darauf folgenden Massaker zwischen Kommunisten und ihren Gegnern zu tragen".

Aus dem Indonesischen

II

The State – its Supporters and Opponents

Approaches to Analyse the State(s) in Southeast Asia

With Special Reference to Indonesia[1]

Tilman Schiel

When one analyses the state in Southeast Asia the past, of course, is always present, at least as an invocation, or as a staged performance (the "theatre state" of Geertz is not at all past!), sometimes as a spectre. But I want to look also at the other side; the modernity of the state in Southeast Asia despite the persistence or rather "transcontinuity" (Chesneaux, see below) of some rather 'pre-modern' features. In my analysis I will consider three aspects to get a full picture of the characteristics of Southeast Asian states. I will look first at the aspect which can be considered as 'universal' or, more modestly, 'general' for every state, or, to be even more modest, for every 'modern' state. I will look then at the aspect which can be marked as 'specific', not necessarily specific 'Asian', but specific when compared to 'Western' states. After that I will have a look at an aspect which maybe is 'unique': but unique also not in an absolute sense, rather in relation to other Southeast Asian states.

The Gardening State

The "gardening state" (Bauman 1992: 178) is a state, in which the government acts like a 'gardener' and treats the whole national territory, with the help of the state apparatuses, as its garden. This 'garden' is ordered rationally by the gardener to yield maximum utility by applying the most up-to-date scientific methods. Unwanted 'wild growth', 'alien plants' will be either weeded out or – if seen as potentially useful – domesticated (or, in Bauman's analysis of aliens, assimilated). By such a rational order the whole of the garden is optimised in a way which – from the view of the gardener – brings eventually the greatest possible benefits for every useful plant. Because the gardener, guided by rational-scientific insights, is sure to know best what is good or bad for his subjects and

wants to order his garden unhindered by simpletons and amateurs, he has the more or less strong tendency to restrict democracy. This is the 'general' aspect found in every modern state to a greater or lesser degree, as rationality, rational order, the belief in scientific solutions are the universal characteristics of modernity. Thus it is, again in differing degrees, also clearly visible in the states of Southeast Asia, although veiled by 'traditional' or 'Asian' disguises.

This must not be confused with a strongman state as it was (and still is) found in Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa: these states are rather to be called "predatory states" (Fatton 1992), governed by kleptocracies. Whereas the government of a gardening state aims at the improvement of the whole polity by a meritocratic elite, the predatory state dominated by a kleptocracy 'privatises' the state, makes the state a *res privata* (literally a robbed matter) instead of a *res publica*. But although it is necessary to discriminate between authoritarian gardening states and despotic predatory states this does not mean that elements of the latter, mixed with elements of the former, cannot be found in Southeast Asia (this was shown by Syed Farid Alatas 1994). But this is connected to the 'specific' condition in Southeast Asia compared to Europe which will be considered later: the condition that economy and polity are not yet sufficiently disembedded in Southeast Asia to allow a clear-cut distinction between private and public.

Culture and especially the creation of a 'cultural nation' (in the restorative romantic German meaning of *Kulturnation* which is tightly connected to the equally restorative romantic organic – or in Soepomo's words "integralist" – *Staatsidee*) are important tasks of state planning (or of creating the state like a well-ordered garden) for several reasons.

Universalistic Aims

Reduction of ambivalence is a central aim of 'modernity' (Bauman 1990): modernity is haunted by fear of ambivalence, as something utterly incompatible with modern concepts of rationality and science. Rationality aims at unambiguity, at clear-cut answers of 'yes' or 'no', 'right' or 'wrong', to create a matrix for universally valid order. Ambivalence is both 'yes' and 'no', can be 'right' and 'wrong' (at least you cannot see whether it is the one or the other, and therefore you can make no rational decision on how to cope with it), ambivalence is therefore irrational disorder. Having embraced rationality modern 'national culture' fights against ambivalence and pushes for at least nationally mandatory (and in its view even universal) unambiguous values. This is also important for nation-building, for the formation of a unified 'cultural nation'.

Formation of a 'cultural nation' means the creation of national cohesion/formation of 'national' society: it is the process of unifying, or rather uniforming, cultural diversity, substituting/assimilating regional particularisms by/into 'national' culture, i.e. the hallowed values of the 'cultural nation'. Its great, unique culture is constituting the nation,

which can therefore exist even before there is a unified political entity or a nation state (this was the romantic German answer to the French concept of a political nation, because Germany on the one hand consisted of a great number of independent political units, had no 'national territory' in those days, and on the other hand the rulers of these political units rejected the idea of the nation as the voluntary community of free and equal citizens). But claiming to be a 'cultural nation' means claiming also to be entitled to be(come) a free and sovereign nation-state, an equal partner in the international community of states. Since in this concept the nation is 'made' by culture, not by people, the cultural nation is seen as higher than the people. The latter are subjects of the sovereign nation rather than sovereign citizens voluntarily forming a political community.

Modern 'national culture' means also the creation of a 'rational' cultural environment good for modernisation: national culture embraces rationality, scientific achievements, and universal modern values as core values. These nationally mandatory values shape the syllabus of schools and universities to make all people 'fit' for modernity.

Particularistic Aims

The concept of an 'own' unique national culture ironically is ambivalent in itself: besides its claim to enshrine the true universal values it claims also to be particularistic, because it is unique and unmistakably 'own'. The claim of one's own national culture therefore often includes the claim to have the 'right to cultural difference' as a national right. Paradoxically this can be used to enforce universalisation in the abovementioned sense against resistance within the 'own' population, e.g. when it is used as justification against criticism (e.g. of violations of human rights) by arguing that the own culture does not accommodate the idea of individual rights, which is alien and therefore destructive to 'our own culture'. Thus the dark sides of the strategy of rapid modernisation (and this means nothing else than universalisation!) can be immunised against critics, e.g. by emasculation or suppression (or, in the view of the 'gardener', the domestication or weeding out of 'wild growth') of labour unions. Likewise paradoxically it can justify the suppression of cultural particularism on the sub-national level, which is denied the 'right to cultural difference' as an offence against the 'cultural nation' etc. Why are the repressive usages of 'culture' by 'gardening states' – albeit not 'alien' to us 'Westerners', especially if one looks into our not so distant history – so visible in recent Southeast Asia? One answer can be found in some properties which are today *specific* for non-western states although one can detect them also in our history. And both in 'Western' history and in present-day 'Asia' these properties seem to yield easily to authoritarian, even absolutist, attempts to form a 'gardening state'.

The Two Sides of Disembeddedness

I would like to discuss the relevance of Polanyi's concept of "embeddedness – disembeddedness", but with a broadened meaning. In my analysis it does not only refer to the economy, but also to the state/administration. The process of disembedding the economy had another side not seen clearly by Polanyi, i.e. disembedding the state/administration: the emergence of the private economy was only one side, one result of this process; the other was the emergence of public administration, i.e. an administration whose positions were no longer the personal possessions of feudal noblemen.

I will illustrate embeddedness vs. disembeddedness by a – necessarily short – look at the keystone of the European feudal society-cum-economy: the fief. This institution was meant to give the overarching 'higher interest', into which the economy was embedded, i.e. the maintenance of 'God's sacred order in this worldly life', stability and firmness. The fief was indeed exemplary for the embeddedness of economy and policy. On the one hand the fief had important economic functions, since it was used for the production of a considerable range of goods, both basic agrarian and artisanal ones. Small wonder this was so, because it was originally given by the suzerain to a vassal, who had won merits in the service of his lord, to allow him a 'stately life' (Max Weber therefore emphasised the connexion between *Standesorganisation* and *standesgemäßem Leben,* see below).

But the word 'stately' refers already to something beyond the economic function. The fief was given to enable the recipient a lifestyle which matched his (I use the male form here because as a rule I refer to males) exalted status as the backbone of feudal rule. In other words, the fief was meant to provide the means for demonstrative consumption according to status, it was definitely not meant for maximising production *per se.* This brings to mind the distinction Max Weber has made between "order" (or "estate" in the meaning of the "Third Estate" in absolutist France) and "class": order/estate is based on consumption, i.e. is deriving status from stately consumption, whereas class is based on the position in production or, in my words, on strictly economic functions. We will see that this distinction still has some relevance in Southeast Asia. The fief, although producing goods, was primarily geared to consumption which allowed the recipient to maintain his status.

But the fief offered also a range of 'services'. Again the character of these services shows that they were not simply economic. Quite often they had similarities to services offered nowadays as public services by modern public administration, like jurisdiction enclosed in the basic rights, like welfare for the 'deserving poor', like (sometimes) the maintenance of the local church etc.. Most important were military services to the suzerain. The fief as a rule was given in return for military services, and it had to be the material base for further support to the suzerain, irrespective of economic calculus. In

short, the fief was meant to enable the recipient to fulfil also political, administrative tasks, etc., which were his personal duties and prerogatives. What was mentioned above is now evident: the economic function obviously was embedded in the ultimate goal to maintain the feudal system as 'God's sacred order'.

This comprehensive burden was in the long run unbearable: the fief was increasingly unable to bear this system of governance, administration, armed force etc. imposed on it. The "great transformation" (Polanyi) therefore saw the conversion of the fief into a private landholding, the one and only function of which was to be economically productive. In other words: instead of being embedded in a 'higher' social order demanding disbursements in kind and money from the fief it became disembedded into simply an economic asset producing for the market to realise profit.

But in this process the feudal system of governance lost its material base. The latter had to be 'reconstructed' in a decisively different way: the state emerging from the process of disembedding was no longer based on property, the administration no longer on the assets of the holder of an office. The new state was "dispossessed", to use an expression of the financial sociologist Rudolf Goldscheid. Most of the former assets from which the government and the administrative apparatuses once had lived had become (as long as they were potentially profitable) purely economic assets of private owners. The state – government, administration, armed forces etc. – had to be financed now by taxation: no longer stocks but flows became the foundation of state finances. But these were since the very beginnings of taxation subject to a certain degree of control by the taxpayers: already quite early in the Middle Ages there was the principle of *auxilium et consilium*, i.e. whoever gives support has also the right of consultation as to how this support is to be used. By this right of control – extended gradually until it became the right of the parliament to vote the state budget – the state and its finances became a public affair, a *res publica*.

The staff of the administration was also changing: salaried, qualified civil servants were taking over most of the positions and functions formerly held by noblemen who had 'owned' the office as a prerogative (I leave aside the question of the upper echelons of administration and the army, which remained the prerogative of the nobility until quite recently, as Arno Mayer has argued, although the respective noblemen, too, had to be qualified and received a monetary and revocable income). Whereas the 'classic' feudal nobleman acted rather autocratically and could not be held responsible except by his suzerain (but even this was rather nominal) the new civil servants had to obey rules and procedures and could be dismissed in cases of misconduct. The new civil servant was answerable to his superior, and his superior was in turn responsible – in the last instance – to a political body. The complete administration came thus eventually under public control, so becoming a body of public institutions.

The "great transformation" thus led not only to a private economy with the market as the base for self-organisation of the *bourgeois*, but also to the public state, which enabled in the long run the formation of democratic institutions as the base for the self-organisation of the *citoyen*/citizen. In my analysis civil society gets a rather literal signification: it is the society of the *civis*/*citoyen*/citizen, i.e. a (contrary to Gramsci) public sphere created first of all by the double process of disembedding the private economy (sphere of the *bourgeois*) as well as the public sphere of political institutions giving the *civis* or *citoyen*/*ne* his/her realm of freedom. But contrary to its appearance in this idealised sketch this was neither an inevitable nor an irreversible development. The fear of Karl Polanyi that the disembedded economic system might dominate the whole of society and become a danger for the cohesion of the latter was not unfounded, and a weakening of civil society can lead to such dominance of the economic system with disintegrative consequences (as experienced under Reagan and Thatcher).

Both processes were progressing in a markedly a-synchronous way. The disembedding of the economy showed much faster decisive changes whereas the disembedding of the state/administration was 'distorted' by the attempt of the nobility to keep political power as a 'collective asset' even after the realm of the economy was surrendered to the *bourgeois*. According to Arno Mayer (1981) the collective power of the nobility was only partly destroyed by the First World War as the collective suicide of the European nobility (as Mayer sees it). Even in the years from 1914 to 1945 (called by Mayer the Thirty Years War of the nobility against democracy) the nobility used its still considerable influence in the bureaucracies and especially in the armies in its attempts to regain political power, by supporting fascist movements which the nobility hoped to use as tools for its aims. Only after the defeat of Fascism did there emerge a period in the western industrial world (in competition with the socialist world) of synchronisation of economy and polity, a synchronisation of the "Fordist regime of accumulation" (so called by the French Regulation School) and the regulating welfare state (both now in the doldrums).

Let us sum up the results of the "great transformation" as outlined above: on the one hand there emerged the private economy freed from non-economic ballast, which gained thus considerable efficiency. But the economy did also 'lose' something: it was now dependent on public services and institutions, not least from an independent judiciary or on the rule of law. On the other hand we see a 'loser', the dispossessed state subject to public control. But this 'loss' can also be seen as a liberation from economic ballast, from the necessities of the economy, a liberation which gave sovereignty vis-à-vis the economy. It was only by this twofold process of disembedding the economy and the political institutions that an 'economic' use of administrative positions or 'economisation' of good relations with powerful politicians to get favourable conditions were seen as corruption. In an embedded situation such an 'economisation' of political positions and good relations was inevitable because the two were inseparable. Wealth which

was not used also for 'political' aims (e.g. to equip the people with weaponry to serve their liege-lord) was illegitimate, and an office had 'naturally' an economic aspect to be serviceable (e.g. to be connected to the fief which 'financed' it). The separation of these intricate connections between the 'political' and the 'economic' by the twofold process of disembedding both was the way the development in Europe went.

But as mentioned above, this process is not irreversible. There are even some scholars who see a reversion by re-embedding the economy at least partly as a remedy for all the social ills seen by Polanyi (for a short overview see Schrader 1994). Readers of the analysis presented here should already be cautioned: the more comprehensive view proposed here shows that, as we will soon see, or the contrary re-embedding the economy caused serious troubles. There was indeed already a grandiose experiment attempting to re-embed the whole of an economy – and this broke down rather pathetically just recently: the Soviet empire. The attempt to subordinate the economy to higher general interests did not really result in the socialisation of the economy. Instead of creating public property, or an economy in the public interest, it led to the comprehensive privatisation of the state. Rather than creating an economy which was the property of the state, the state itself became 'economised': administrative positions became an important means, by which to allocate goods and could therefore be used 'economically'. Public economic assets were used like fiefs which allowed their holders a stately life and could 'buy' political influence. We can detect similar patterns in Southeast Asia in connection with 'crony capitalism'.

All the successful and impressive results of modernisation in Southeast Asia should not deceive us: the development there went in a direction somewhat different from the European course outlined. The pre-colonial embedded systems were not disembedded by the colonial polities. On the contrary, the colonial system everywhere favoured processes to embed economy and administration even more, at least at the level of the 'native' administration: to accommodate – as the colonisers thought – the 'natives' and save the money necessary for a new administrative system in which the indigenous population should be kept within the 'traditional' systems of government. The colonial masters 'preserved' therefore the 'native rulers' as they saw them: as princes and little kings (for Netherlands India see Schiel 1989, Braun 1995), or even created 'traditional' polities (again for Netherlands India see Schrauwers 1998). Under these preconditions there was also in post-colonial times no real separation of the public sphere of the polity and the private sphere of the economy (leaving aside the exceptional, rather 'synthetic' case of Singapore and focussing rather on Indonesia and Malaysia). There emerged as 'own' "Market Cultures" (the title of a highly recommendable reader edited by Hefner 1998) which differed from the 'purely economic' market as it had emerged in Europe due to the process of disembedding the economy.

The embeddedness of economy and polity has considerable advantages for the leaders of a 'gardening state'. The embedded situation gives the 'gardener' the possibility to impose 'higher goals' on the economy. These modern 'higher goals' are clearly visible in Malaysia. They are enshrined in a great vision, *wawasan 2020*, i.e. the vision to become an in every respect a fully developed nation by the year 2020. 'Fully developed' means not only economic progress, rather the latter is subordinated to serve technological, cultural, social and even moral development (for a partisan view on *wawasan 2020* in Malaysia see Ahmad Sarji 1997). This subordination to 'higher goals' enabled by a still embedded economy explains why the 'gardener' could opt, at least before the crisis, for projects which were not feasibly judged by strictly economic rationality. Taking the point of view of the 'gardener' who wants to impose optimal order on the whole 'garden' one can nevertheless detect a more comprehensive rationality: these projects often aimed primarily at the acquisition or appropriation of full technological competence, i.e. not only appropriation of know-how, but also of 'know-why'. Historically this can be compared with similar strategies of earlier European 'gardening states', e.g. the support of manufactories in many 'enlightened despotisms' although their economic superiority was dubitable, as already seen in the entry on 'manufactory' by Boucher d'Argis in the original *Encyclopédie* (see Enzyklopädie 1972: 789).

Embeddedness gives the 'gardener' two options to impose his will upon the economy: he can command an enterprise to implement a certain 'uneconomical' project because the state or government-controlled holdings are often the decisive shareholders. Or he can 'persuade' or 'convince' a so-called 'politically well-connected' entrepreneur (who in a still embedded economy has also to wield political clout) that he should act in the 'higher national interest'. In the latter case such economically questionable projects were combined with 'sweet deals' in favour of such an entrepreneur. Such combinations were meant to compensate the economic risks connected with a politically motivated project (the crisis revealed that the risks often were too great to be sufficiently compensated so the entrepreneurs had to be bailed out). These combinations of projects demanded by the 'gardener' using 'sweet deals' have during and after the crisis come under suspicion of being crony capitalism: from the viewpoint of a disembedded economy (complemented by a disembedded state and administration) this is now internationally judged as 'corruption', although this strategy was for quite a time remarkably successful.

Indeed, corruption is the other side of the coin of this strategy of 'gardening states' based on embedded economies-*cum*-polities (there are again historical precedents in Europe showing the ambiguity of combined political and economic aims in the service of 'higher goals', e.g. the entanglement of the Dutch *Regenten* and the *Vereenigde Oostindische Compagnie* (see Boxer 1973, Steensgaard 1974: 128 ff.) where the latter has minted the term "constitutional corruption" for the inevitable consequences of such an

entanglement of economy-*cum*-politics). This intricate connection favours corruption in every case. Only a very efficient 'gardening state' can keep corruption at a 'normal' level, i.e. within the boundaries of statistically average deviance from an ethical norm. But when the 'gardener' is, or becomes, less efficient (e.g. when the leadership is no longer beyond doubt or becomes less rational than greedy) the 'higher goal' falls into disregard and personal enrichment prevails. Then the whole project of comprehensive national development can be put at risk by corruption (always present to a certain degree), i.e. the simple use of political connections by entrepreneurs to get access to 'sweet deals' on the one hand, and the use of an official position to get access to economic advantages on the other hand.

Indonesia during the rule of Suharto showed such a deterioration from a 'gardening state' into a 'predatory state': as did the ASEAN as a whole Indonesia also had a "Vision 2020" to become a fully developed nation in the foreseeable future. The person of Habibie symbolised a development strategy which aimed primarily at scientific-technological progress and only secondarily at economic development, quite often even openly violating economic rationality. The technological achievements (e.g. in the fields of aviation aircraft development, shipbuilding etc.) were considerable indeed. But in Indonesia the lure of personal enrichment prevailed over the 'higher goal' of nation-building to a degree that the former impeded the latter. In general, such a development is possible as long as enrichment by the use of one's position is seen by the majority of the population as legitimate, provided that this enrichment respects the limits of 'traditional' concepts of *kerajaan* (matters concerning the king) i.e. the customary way of ruling a Malay realm (for the latter see Milner 1982, for African parallels of statehood see Bayart 1993). Enrichment by position is – as seen in the outline of the fief in Europe – typical for every embedded economy-*cum*-polity, and therefore not seen as corruptive in itself; it has to be kept within customary boundaries. But when these boundaries are transgressed, and even more when the customary culture is changing rapidly, corruption is detected as a dangerous deviation from the (ethical) norm (although it remains in every society part of the statistical norm). One sees this problem clearly when one looks at the former USSR: as a re-embedded system of economy-*cum*-polity it simply could not escape the corruptive tendency. But as a state which prided itself in having broken with all 'feudal' or 'pre-modern' customs, and therefore being left with no legitimation for enrichment by office, it could not conceal the tendencies toward kleptocracy. In the case of Indonesia the development towards kleptocracy was to a considerable degree concealed by its invocation of 'traditional' rule. The runaway forms of kleptocracy in Indonesia were made easier by a feature which was until recently rather associated with 'stateless African tradition', and appears therefore to be quite singular in Southeast Asia: the transcontinuity of segmentary processes. This will be analysed below.

To sum up the discussion above: behind apparent similarities there are significant differences between recent Southeast Asian and European economies. The same can be said for the respective forms of social stratification (I see convergence only in the case of the 'new' middle strata of professionals and other similarly qualified specialists down to skilled workers who all tend to define themselves through their formal qualification). In Europe, social stratification is still largely defined by the position of people within the sphere of the disembedded economy: capitalists and managers, the self-employed, professionals, employees and workers are still macro-indicators for stratification. The situation in Southeast Asia is – especially at the upper levels of society – more complex. Therefore it is more appropriate to apply the concept of "strategic groups" (for an early version see Evers 1973, also Evers and Schiel 1988 and 1990). In contrast to normal interest groups, pressure groups etc. which usually represent clearly defined special interests, strategic groups have the very broad, comprehensive aim to secure by a great variety of measures as many sources of revenues and chances for appropriation as possible. Their modes and aims of appropriation can be called 'strategic', because the respective activities aim – to use a militaristic expression – at the "whole theatre of war" (Clausewitz).

The reason for that can be found exactly in the still embedded situation there. To concentrate one's efforts fully on economic success presupposes a disembedded situation, and this situation similarly allows concentration on only one of the other disembedded spheres and on articulating clearly defined interests there. Under disembedded conditions it is as a rule advisable, often even necessary, to concentrate one's interest on one clearly defined target, because doing so means to focus one's energy and prevent one's resources from being squandered on matters of secondary importance. It was this result of disembedding the economy, the polity etc. that enabled rationalisation in all these spheres, which allowed better allocation of means and generally an enhancement of efficiency. Under still (at least partly) embedded conditions the situation is quite different. Focussing one's interests and efforts in only one sphere is not possible. If one concentrates on purely economic success without paying tribute to 'superior interests' one takes the risk of being accused as a selfish, greedy egotist who disregards the higher interests of the community (and thus 'Asian values'). Whoever thinks s/he could concentrate fully on political success without economic means or regards for economic interests will soon find his/her influence impaired.

In short, under embedded conditions not only individuals but also groups can be successful in the long run in their claim to power only if they opt, for the whole of the embedded system even if they have only a few or only a single core target. To use again militaristic jargon: they have to be present every time at all battlefields (although, depending on their core targets, not everywhere with the same strength), i.e. they have to act strategically in the literal sense. The result is a distinctly hybrid character of these

groups, which makes the exact determination of such a group rather difficult. To match the embedded conditions every single one of these strategic groups simply has to combine economic, political, religious and a range of other elements. Maybe – and this is an important field of further research – the 'Asian' crisis has certain consequences which will set in motion processes of disembedding economy and polity. This in turn could lead to the transformation of strategic groups and eventually to the formation of classes as defined neatly by Weber (and, of course, already by Marx), according to their position in the economy.

But as long as embedded (or insufficiently disembedded) conditions prevail, these strategic groups will, precisely because they have to act strategically in the abovementioned sense in the whole of the embedded society, remain rather diffuse hybrid groups with blurred contours. Similar to Weber's procedure in defining the orders/estates in pre-modern/early modern Europe it is easier to focus on them by observing their styles of consumption, because demonstrative consumption, the demonstration of a stately life, is used by them as a strategy for "social closure" (originally a concept of Max Weber, revitalised in the 1970s and 1980s by Murphy 1988). This does not imply that strategic groups are 'neo'-traditional and can be associated with 'neo-patrimonialism' or other 'neo-Weberian' concepts: the similarities are simply the consequence of embedded systems in both cases, but since the specific forms of embeddedness are very different the parallels end very soon.

I hope I could convince the readers of this text that this view of the double process of disembedding the economy and the state as a markedly a-synchronous one is very useful to shed light on many processes which cannot be fully explained simply by 'capital interests' and '*bourgeois* strategies'. To sum up my view on Southeast Asian developments: here the process of disembedding has started, but is far from completed. Embeddedness still leaves its marks on both economy and polity: administration and economy are still entangled, and the economy is neither already really private, nor is the administration really public. This can in my view be the starting point for an analysis of both pre-crisis development (which was not simply 'crony-capitalism') and of crisis-management in the mentioned countries. But it is also useful to analyse the state of civil society: the society of the *civis, citoyen,* citizen needs a public political sphere distinct from the private economic sphere of the *bourgeois*. Therefore civil society cannot exist as long as economy and polity are not sufficiently disembedded, because only a disembedded polity enables the emergence of this public sphere.

Transcontinuity of Segmentary Elements in Indonesia

During the last two decades scholars doing research on the pre-colonial state in Indonesia have as a rule dropped concepts like "Oriental Despotism" and similar ones to characterise the Hindu-Buddhist kingdoms and the following Islamised sultanates. Since a few years ago they seem to have discovered instead Aidan Southall's concept of the "segmentary state" (Southall 1965 and Schulte Nordholt 1996 for its application to pre-colonial Bali). As far as I know, I have been one of the first to have done so (most explicitly in Schiel 1989; an earlier attempt can be found in Schiel 1985). In my view the Indonesian segmentary states were rather loosely held together by an "exemplary centre" (Geertz), which was the strongest, most favourably situated and most capably led segment within such a state. This was the place where the greatness and splendour, brought by the wise rule of this segment's leader to the whole realm, was put on centre stage. In short, the "exemplary centre" was the stage of the "theatre state" (Geertz 1968: 36 ff., Geertz 1980).

Segmentary tendencies worked as feedback mechanisms: when the main 'actor' (the ruler) proved to be too weak and to be incapable of acting strategically towards the aim to keep his realm in a relatively steady state, the other segments would no longer orient themselves towards the declining old "exemplary centre". The old state would eventually disintegrate into its single segments; a realm would thus revert to a number of chiefdoms or petty states. But the idea that one strong, successful, splendid "exemplary centre" should exist to bring order to the world survived even the deepest decline of Southeast Asian segmentary realms. Therefore the segments would either struggle to become a new "exemplary centre" or look for another emerging one which promised to pursue successfully such strategies of forming a renewed realm in the interest of all segments involved. Therefore, prior to the interference of the VOC (or other European actors elsewhere), a new vigorous "exemplary centre" would replace an older decayed one, and the whole segmentary system, was so to speak, rejuvenated. To put it more scientifically: a new steady state was achieved.

European thinking in these times was marked by the equation of political stability with dynastic continuity. It could not tolerate 'stateless anarchy' – indicated by changes seen from a European point-of-view as dynastic discontinuity – and this provoked the intervention of the European actors into this 'conjunctural cycle' of segmentary state systems. As a consequence the feedback mechanisms by which the system rejuvenated itself were put out of order, and the system exploded eventually as 'legalised' in the Treaty of Giyanti (1755) which divided the Javanese system finally so that it could never be restored by a new constellation of segments with a new "exemplary centre". Since the Dutch feared the misunderstood segmentary features they tried later to suppress them by every means as 'breakaway', 'separatist' forms threatening statehood, as seen

through European eyes. But hidden from European eyes, segmentary tendencies managed to survive.

Of course there is no continuous tradition – on the contrary, as just mentioned – from these segmentary realms to the modern state of Indonesia, but one can find quite strong transcontinuities (the concept of "transcontinuity" was coined by Jean Chesneaux to analyse modern Vietnam, see Chesneaux 1968: 65). This means that behind deep, even revolutionary, changes one can nevertheless find some old elements, although in much changed forms. I will look at these transcontinuities and the respective modern appearance later after a short detour to modern African states.

Juridical vs. Empirical States

Concerned with the persistence – despite serious weaknesses – of states in Africa, two scholars developed the concept of "juridical" vs. "empirical statehood" (Jackson and Rosberg 1982 and 1986). Most European states can be characterised as 'empirical': they had to give proof of their ability to sustain a continuous existence against all kinds of adversities (often including wars with hostile powers) before they were accepted by the other states as 'equals'. Only after the empirical proof of their existence was convincing were they given diplomatic recognition as members of the international community of states, by which they got also juridical statehood. It is not difficult to see that the primacy of empirical statehood in Europe went hand-in-hand with the process of disembedding the state, administration (and, not least, jurisdiction), i.e. with the process which resulted in the formation of a strong independent state.

As a rule the formation of the modern African states was exactly the contrary: when four decades ago the colonial powers gave way to international pressure to decolonise, the respective territories were simply recognised by the United Nations as sovereign states. They were given juridical statehood without regard to empirical evidence. The former colonial territories were not changed and redesigned; no proof was demanded that these new states were viable entities capable of surviving without help. They were – against arguments e.g. of Kwame Nkrumah that this would lead to the 'Balkanisation of Africa' – simply recognised legally in their existing form.

Generally it was and is not necessary for a government to prove that it effectively governs the whole territory, and that it is respected as the government in the whole territory before it is recognised internationally as the legitimate government. It was sufficient to govern the capital. The latter then became the stage of a truly modern "theatre state": the play performed on this stage has been basically 'modernisation' and 'modernity' (not without sideshows on 'Authenticity as the Mandatory Base for Development' featuring stars like Mobutu, the 'Rooster who impregnates all Hens', to quote his self-given 'authentic' name). As a modern "exemplary centre" it has to display all the

paraphernalia of the modern state: government palace, ministries, houses of parliament, supreme court, military headquarters, not to forget a national museum, down to the national flag and anthem. As long as a government could prove effective control over all this it could – at least during the Cold War years – be quite sure to be recognised as legitimate and worthy to receive development aid and other benefits.

But one can see already a big difference to the 'old' theatre state as depicted by Geertz: the old one had mostly internal functions to keep the segmentary state together, to demonstrate by its splendour that it benefited all segments of this realm. It was meant to impress peripheral segments and signal them that it was better not to be disloyal and break away from this alliance of segments. However, when it failed to convince these peripheral (or rival) segments, the old "exemplary centre's" attempt to prevent fission of the state into smaller units or even into single segments by force often failed in the long run.

The new theatre state instead is marked by "extraversion" (Bayart 1993: 20). It is performing less for the internal than for an external audience. This extraversion is the warranty for the survival of the weak African state and its governments: the international community of states will not recognise a 'secessionist' cluster of segments (or only occasionally after a long suffering as an empirical state without international recognition under dire conditions, like in the case of Eritrea). Thus the process of 'fusion-fission-fusion again' of segments characterising the old segmentary states is no longer possible. The international community will support the legitimate government (the one which commands the capital) to maintain 'national integrity and sovereignty'.

This does not mean that segmentary mechanisms are no longer effective at all: they have also modernised. Segments no longer try to break away (this is now the exception) but they challenge 'from within' the segment in power in the capital, either by threat to expel the old segment and take over the capital to form a new legitimate government, or by proclaiming a 'revolutionary government' with its own provisional capital. The segment in power will therefore have to maintain (not entirely unlike the old segmentary state) a precarious balance by favouring some segments in order to keep others at bay, but with always changing and wilfully changed alliances (Zaire-Congo is a model case). Segmentary transcontinuities can also be seen in the reaction to all this from 'below', in the way the 'ordinary people' try to cope with a mostly unpleasant situation.

From Empirical to Juridical State: The Role of Disengagement

The concept of "disengagement" was also used in the debate about the weakness of the state in Africa (Azarya and Chazan 1987, Azarya 1988). After the initial wave of sympathy and (too) great expectations of the people for the new post-colonial states ebbed, painful reality-checks were necessary: the state did not deliver the expected services and

support. The new leaders soon were seen exploiting their offices and squandering both 'own' state-funds and those borrowed abroad. Rule became more and more visibly the rule against the people and not for the people.

Disillusioned, the people reacted willy-nilly by withdrawing their original engagement from the state. Usually, this did not result in attempts to topple corrupt governments (this was unlikely for a popular movement in those years of the Cold War, because it would have triggered external intervention fearing 'communist uprisings'). Disengagement rather took the shape of an internal withdrawal into spheres where the government had no interests or where the state could be avoided by obscuring its view: black and grey markets, retreat to 'traditional' forms to organise an economy and society outside the 'official' economy, 'informal sectors' etc., often using ethnicity as a resource to create the necessary solidarity and coherence. Segmentary elements with their potential for self-organisation were strengthened. The people, so to speak, simply ducked away: they did not fight the state directly, but avoided as much as possible the disappointing state (for a historical parallel in Southeast Asia see Adas 1981), and thus weakened it (which was tentatively countered by the formation of strongman-governments).

Of course, there are significant differences between (Sub-Saharan) Africa and Indonesia. The African states, formed as juridical states, were weak from their beginnings. The Indonesian state instead had more of an empirical start: it had to prove its real existence against the Dutch colonisers and later against separatist movements (in this case supported by external forces). Later, under the *Orde Baru*, the combination of suppression of 'communist activities' with economic success prevented (or contained) broad popular dissatisfaction: disengagement (although I am sure that it existed to a considerable degree also in the Suharto-era) did not reach a degree that could have eroded state power.

Now this all has changed deeply and rapidly. Disengagement has become a necessity for many people both because they no longer can, nor want, to fulfil the demands of the state, and because they realise now, in a situation of need, that they cannot rely on the support and the services of the state. Supposing that a near-miraculous economic u-turn in the near future does not happen, disengagement as an expression of disappointment with the state will become even more widespread and will grow deeper roots: besides visible segmentary tendencies in some provinces one will find rather invisible everyday segmentation by self-organisation, by forming 'own' parallel networks and structures to manage everyday life without (or in spite of) the state. Real or invented tradition – from ethnicity to *gotong royong* – can be appropriated as means for such self-organisation. The resulting weakening of the state will probably in turn strengthen the segmentary (not secessionist!) tendencies of the provinces: without breaking away from Indonesia every province (quite probably even a number of districts) will struggle on its

own to cope with the respective problems, or to make better use of its specific advantages, staving off as much as possible the interference and claims of the central government. (East Timor and Irian Jaya are exceptions: they were, against their will, 'added' later to the 'original' Indonesia, and moreover they can mobilise international support for juridical statehood). Provided the instability and weakness continue, Indonesia could 'revert' by-and-large to juridical statehood only.

Will there Emerge a Modern Theatre State in Indonesia?

Despite the rather empirical origin of the Indonesian state, elements of a "theatre state" were revived in the representation of the independent state: the invocation of the great, unique cultural tradition in the exemplary super-centre (Java), mirroring the reality of a segmentary past, especially by allusions to Majapahit and the greatness of this empire. The 're-born' Majapahit will bring back the splendour of this mighty and rich realm; it will bring culture, civilisation, peace, welfare – in short, a good life – to everyone, even the most 'benighted primitives' in the jungles of Irian Jaya and Kalimantan (by sending 'cultivated' Javanese to these 'backward' areas). I am sure that during the heyday of the 'Asian miracle' the *Orde Baru*-government saw itself as the "exemplary centre" for the whole of ASEAN. Future developments which could lead to a loss of empirical statehood could in turn lead also to the rise of the 'theatrical' element of the central government.

Regionalism – i.e. provinces looking after their own affairs only, or possibly even resource-rich areas occupied by regional warlords – is a rather realistic assumption provided a) that the economic weakness is not overcome, and b) that the government is neither strong enough to keep the 'vested interests' at bay nor weak enough for an unspectacular *coup de grâce* by a strong enough section of the military (Wallerstein would call this a "violent equilibrium"). The result of such a state of regional segmentation would be that the new central government would more heavily rely upon the success as a "theatre state", i.e. play the still 'modern and efficient state' to the external auditorium to demonstrate its necessity to facilitate 'development', as well as playing the old part of the magnificent "exemplary centre" to the regional segments to give them the impression that it would still be worthwhile to cooperate with the central government. There might be a tendency towards the situation for Africa sketched above (I will tentatively call it "Nigerianisation").

The elected government still has a chance to counter such tendencies, albeit an awfully difficult one: it has to stop the tendency towards disengagement. If the government can prove that it really cares for the people and not only for some bankrupt enterprises, if it can prove that it is willing to build services, infrastructures and facilities to support the endeavours of the *orang kecil* to strive for good life, in short, if the central government

offers a tangible social contract, then it may in turn be able to mobilise mass support against excessive segmentation. But even if the elected government should be replaced by a military regime, a new strong-armed government would have great difficulties in stopping these segmentary tendencies.

A military regime could of course go back to the (threat of) use of sheer violence as a special variant of the "theatre state": it could play the 'tragedy of bloody revenge', a drama in which unconcealed cruelty and open violation of human rights are important elements. Everybody ought to see that the revenge against those who dare to revolt against the "exemplary centre" would be merciless (*Petrus* in the early 1980s was one such demonstrative small-scale 'revenge'). The success of this tragedy is dubitable, as both the historical examples in pre-colonial times and very recent cases demonstrate: the attempt to suppress segmentation in Aceh by sheer violence resulted in the transformation of segmentation into attempted secession. But segmentary developments are the exception in Southeast Asia, aren't they? I will come back to this question in my review of Southeast Asian statehood.

Is there a Typical Southeast Asian State?

The considerable differences in the formation of post-colonial statehood in Southeast Asia raises doubts: Indonesia was the result of a war of liberation against the colonial power; Malaysia was patched together from quite different colonial territories and defended by the colonial power against contestants; Singapore became a nation by default. Also my discussion of some characteristics of states in Southeast Asia rather hints to the contrary.

Elements of the "gardening state" (sometimes stronger, sometimes weaker) are universal for every modern state. Although many Southeast Asian states today have very marked characteristics of the "gardening state", this is or was also true elsewhere, including Europe, with several peaks during absolutism, communism and fascism. Some 'gardening' elements in 'softer' forms are present in Europe until today, most visible in immigration laws (selecting new 'cultivars') and politics of 'integration' (assimilation of 'alien' elements into the 'leading culture').

The process of disembedding the economy and polity is typical for every market-oriented modernisation. Therefore one can also find stages of not yet sufficiently disembedded economies and polities in every country that has started on this way to modernity but has not yet finished it. The survival of more or less substantial degrees of embeddedness therefore can be found not only in Southeast Asia but also in other countries where modernisation of both the economy and the polity are a-synchronic or

blocked, or where experiments with non-market, state-dominated variants of modernisation (by this re-embedding of the economy and society) were made.

With the view on Southeast Asia, transcontinuity of segmentary characteristics seems to be restricted, but not only to Indonesia: I see segmentary mechanisms also behind the situation in Burma, thinly veiled by an ethno-nationalist surface. The Philippines also have features which suggest segmentary structures. Although I can just speculate about that, I see the specific form of federalism in Malaysia as a successful attempt to accommodate a former segmentary system: every main segment is now assured of becoming periodically the leading one, because it will see its leader (as the Yang Dipertuan Agong temporarily elected by his peers) as the ceremoniously leading actor in a permanent "exemplary centre" excelling in 'modern' symbols of splendour and greatness. But the transcontinuity of segmentary statehood is also not singular to Southeast Asia. It can be found elsewhere, too: in Afghanistan (Sigrist 1994), in Somalia (Schlee 1995) and in many states of Sub-Saharan Africa.

What, then, does remain as 'typical' Southeast Asian? I think there is a specific combination of a still embedded state-cum-economy with a state which has to a high degree the characteristics to a "gardening state". But even here one can find some historical precedents in the 'classical' gardening states of the 'enlightened despots' in European Absolutism. This gives us the hint that such a combination may be characteristic for a stage of precipitated 'revolutionary' modernisation (the view of the European absolutist states as simply reactionary is wrong: already de Tocqueville has shown that the modernising zeal of the ancien régime in France was a revolutionising agent): a still at least partly embedded state trying to push the economy very hard to modernise may become self-destructive if it does not simultaneously transform itself into a disembedded one.

One can see that the only way for Southeast Asian governments to demonstrate the peculiarity of Southeast Asian states is to distinguish themselves by 'their own culture' as 'typical', i.e. of Southeast Asian states to become 'cultural nations'. That this is done by invocation of 'Asian values' cannot completely hide the fact that this also follows a European precedent of the 19th Century, which exactly saw the formation of 'cultural nations' with their obligatory 'national cultures' and 'national values'. This is most visible in Singapore where 'Asian values' have great similarities to British Victorian values (Wee 1999, Backman 2000: 32). Maybe Lee Kuan Yew should have looked not so much to Confucius than to Plato to find his ideal model of a meritocratic state based on 'Asian values'. Even better: maybe he should abandon his myopic view of Confucius and look also at the 'democratic side' of this philosopher (Lee Eun Yeung 1996). Be that as it may, I cannot but accept that the problem of shared values is not solved with some ironic one-liners. The Asian Crisis has shown that economic success alone is a rather rickety base for the cohesion of Southeast Asian states. Shared values could help

create more coherence. But one question is not yet answered convincingly: which values?

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International Development Organisations and the Local Power[1]

Vedi R. Hadiz

Two simultaneously occurring processes currently feature prominently in policy debates as they pertain to late developing countries: economic globalisation on the one hand, and the localisation of power, on the other. The first is about pressures for ever-closer integration of national economies to that of the international capitalist economy; the other is about rising demands within nation-states for increased local autonomy in the social, political, economic and cultural fields – in the face of economic globalising impulses. But the relationship between economic globalisation and the localisation of power is not as tension-free as may be implied in such faddish (and simplistic) terms as 'glocalisation'. Some of the tensions and contradictions between the two are examined in this paper in relation to contests over decentralisation policy in Indonesia and elsewhere.

An ambitious and wide-ranging policy of decentralisation has been implemented in Indonesia since early 2001, with the support and advice of international development organisations like the World Bank, USAID, the ADB, GTZ, the Ford Foundation and others. For such organisations, administrative and fiscal decentralisation had become a major pillar of the concept of 'good governance' propagated in the development literature since the 1980s, and especially the 1990s, when it became the conventional wisdom that markets needed to be underpinned by appropriate institutional and regulatory frameworks in order to flourish.

However, the institutions of "decentralised democracy" (Crook and Manor 1998) have not 'behaved' in the way that they are supposed to. Rather than advancing market rationality, transparency and the like, decentralisation in Indonesia has resulted in the kind of unpredictability that has led to great discomfort among international investors and only very ambiguously resulted in any greater empowerment of local communities. As decentralised patterns of corruption increasingly become the norm while local governments grow in power, threats have been posed as well to the principles of financial responsibility and fiscal management. This is because decentralisation has also opened up new profit-seeking opportunities for local elites who seek a greater measure of

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autonomy from Jakarta-based coalitions of power.[2] Ironically, therefore, insofar as decentralisation has become an integral part of the package of neo-liberal, market-facilitating, 'good governance' reforms, it has in fact provided a new avenue for the growth and consolidation of illiberal, predatory interests in Indonesia.

It is on the basis of such arguments that this paper explores the kinds of interests that have promoted decentralisation in Indonesia as part of a broader package of neo-liberal reforms, and the contradictions and dilemmas the reforms face when decentralisation fails to produce the envisaged outcomes. This paper pays particular attention to the position of influential international development organisations and provides some comparisons with the experiences of other societies, especially in the Southeast Asian region, where the decentralisation project has also been advanced as a major pivot of 'good governance'. Thailand and the Philippines are the two most notable cases in Southeast Asia where post-authoritarian governance reforms have involved the push for decentralisation policies.

In the case of Indonesia, decentralisation became an especially prominent issue after the fall of the highly centralised, authoritarian and predatory Soeharto-regime. The adoption of decentralisation policies also appeared to be a matter of great urgency given growing regional demands for local autonomy, and in the context of waning central state authority following the unravelling of Soeharto's New Order – which fuelled domestic and international fears about the possible balkanisation of Indonesia (e.g. Bertrand 2003; Kingsbury and Aveling 2003). Communal conflict in places like Maluku and Kalimantan, as well as the existence of long-standing separatist movements in Aceh and Papua – along with East Timor's successful attainment of independence in 1999 – only served to emphasise for some the danger of Indonesia's descent into chaos and anarchy. Adding to the apprehension, calls for independence were heard too in resource-rich places like Riau – where dissatisfaction had previously been brewing but expressed in only muted fashion – about the unequally distributed benefits of national economic development.

Thus post-authoritarian Indonesia has been placed at the heart of much of the recent academic and policy debates on decentralisation, development, and good governance. Nevertheless, Indonesia's relatively new emphasis on decentralisation is by no means extraordinary. For some observers, in "opting for a decentralised model of government", Indonesia appeared only to be sensibly "following a global trend" (Turner and Podger 2003: 2). Understood as "the transfer of political, fiscal and administrative powers to sub-national governments", the World Bank has commented that decentral-

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[2] This is reflected in the lucrative mining and resource industries, for example – where representatives of local governments have imposed levies (Gellert 2005: 154-155) and have often been engaged in protracted conflicts with Jakarta regarding their 'right' to a 'cut' of these industries.

isation is "a global and regional phenomenon" and that "most developing and transitional countries have experimented with it to varying degrees" (World Bank n.d.). Bardhan (n.d.: 3) is correct as well when he announces that, "[a]ll around the world in matters of governance decentralization is the rage", and that decentralisation "[…] has been at the center stage of policy experiments in the last two decades in a large number of developing and transition economies in Latin America, Africa and Asia".

It is apparent that international development organisations have by now invested significant resources to promote and support decentralisation initiatives globally. According to one estimate, twelve percent of World Bank projects completed between 1993 and 1997 involved decentralising responsibilities to the lower levels of government – including through the direct provision of loans to sub-national governments (Litvack *et al*. 1998: 1). There appears to have been much investment particularly in establishing the 'correct' institutional policy frameworks for decentralisation. A UNDP report in 2002 estimates that 50 percent of the organisation's financial allocation in the area of 'decentralisation and local governance' has been to the programme 'sub-area' of 'decentralisation policies', compared to just three percent for "alliances by the poor" (UNDP 2002: 10). Clearly, international development organisations have developed strong institutional vested interests in the success of decentralisation policies.

Still, what is the actual appeal of decentralisation for international development organisations? It is further argued here that it is ultimately necessary to understand the decentralisation thrust in relation to the broader neo-liberal project of reconfiguring the role of the state, its powers and capacities, in the context of opening markets and facilitating international capital mobility. For neo-liberals, such as those ensconced in international development organisations, 'the centralized state everywhere has lost a great deal of legitimacy' and decentralisation is believed to promise a range of benefits, as "a way of reducing the role of the state in general, by fragmenting central authority and introducing more intergovernmental competition and checks and balances". Technological developments are also now seen to make possible the better provision of public services by lower levels of government. As a bonus, "[i]n a world of rampant ethnic conflicts and separatist movements, decentralization is also regarded as a way of diffusing social and political tensions and ensuring local cultural and political autonomy" (Bhardan n.d.).

As I have suggested elsewhere (Hadiz 2004a), a major problem with this point of view is that it underplays vital issues of power and interests in favour of a technocratic, almost technical, process of 'engineering' the state and its institutions. What gets lost in the process is the fact that institutional design is hardly ever mostly a matter of conscious, technical policy choices. It is important to realise, for example, that certain constellations of power and interests may embody deep-seated, material bases of resistance

to some of the objectives of 'good governance', even as others may be more support-
ive. Elements of predatory coalitions of power, for instance, may be able to ride suc-
cessfully the good governance bandwagon – for example local elites who would benefit
much from decentralisation – while ultimately hijacking the institutions of state power
and administration that are supposed to facilitate the ascendance of market rationality,
transparency and accountability. These kinds of interests will help to shape the way
these institutions are forged and determine the way they actually work in practice and
the sorts of agendas they serve. What is important therefore is not decentralisation as a
matter of principle but the constellation of power within which it takes place.

Decentralisation: The Technocratic View and its Contradictions

It has been noted that the major role played by international development organisations
in promoting decentralisation has had the effect of creating and sustaining particular
kinds of "political and discursive frames for thinking and acting". These frames are
"strongly influenced by a technocratic and apolitical approach that is itself rooted in the
most powerful global institution of all – the market" (Harriss, Stokke and Tornquist
2004: 2-3). A major characteristic of these 'discursive frames' is the way that they priv-
ilege technocratic knowledge and choice over material, concrete struggles over power
and resources.

In many ways this is hardly surprising. In ensuring the success of decentralisation pro-
grammes, international development organisations, like the World Bank, have few op-
tions but to work with an array of entrenched elites, both national and local – in other
words within existing domestic power structures. The unacknowledged consequence is
an intrinsic inclination to advance a perspective on decentralisation that tacitly endorses
the non-disturbance of the existing social order, insofar as some of the desired gov-
ernance reforms are still regarded as being possible to negotiate. The preference is thus
to encourage piecemeal and technical solutions to institutional problems that are essen-
tially political in nature. The difficulty of course is that even technical adjustments have
to be made in the context of certain power relationships. Given the intrinsically politic-
al nature and consequences of decentralisation – in terms of the modes of allocating
and distributing power and resources – the most fundamental problems of decentral-
isation will hardly be technical in nature. They are more likely to arise from the kinds of
interests that actually preside over and contest the process of decentralisation.

It is important to emphasise that the absence of politics in the discourse of interna-
tional development organisations is not just a concession to entrenched elites. The
omission is essentially equally self-serving (Hadiz 2004a). The experts ensconced in
these organisations benefit considerably from the notion that a global corps of well-

trained technocrats exists, who are able to discover the 'common good' in any specific societal context through the use of 'rational' and 'objective' procedures usually related to the discipline of economics. In this, 'international technocrats' – whose policy inclinations will likely correspond with the interests of broad sections of internationally mobile capital – are no different from the 'domestic technocrats' that helped to prop up the authoritarian New Order rule for three decades. Both rely on the claim of being above the petty self-interest that drives mere social pressure groups like distributional coalitions.

Technocrats, whether or not 'rational' and 'objective', however, do not control the real workings of Indonesia's decentralisation. Like Indonesia's new democracy, Indonesia's institutions of decentralised governance have now been largely appropriated by new alliances of old predatory interests mostly nurtured during the long Soeharto era. Local executive bodies and parliaments are infested with many of the New Order's petty apparatchiks, political operators and entrepreneurs, and enforcers, who scramble for control over local resources and institutions for newly emerging rent-seeking opportunities made possible by decentralisation. In this local party branches are no different from national party vehicles (Robison and Hadiz 2004; Hadiz 2004b). When they surface, even reformers are placed under pressure to adhere to the logic of predatory power in order to survive in a democracy run by money politics and, to an extent, on political thuggery. Though providing leeway for reformers to emerge, even new innovations, like Indonesia's first direct local elections, have arguably not broken the stranglehold over local governance of those incubated under the old authoritarian regime but who have now reinvented themselves as reformers and democrats. Thus, the Indonesian experience poses serious questions about theoretical premises that assume a more or less direct relationship between decentralisation and good governance based on notions of participation, transparency and accountability.

Nor is the Indonesian case unique in terms of the 'unintended' consequences of decentralisation, as we shall also see. All over the world, there have been experiences which cast serious doubts on many of the basic assumptions of the neo-liberal world view insofar as the inherent virtue of rolling back the central state is concerned. In post-Soviet Russia, IMF-supported privatisation policies facilitated the rise of powerful groups of political gangsters, especially in local governance, and in several other post-Soviet Republics, where predatory and criminal elements have transformed the state itself into a vast criminal enterprise (Harris 2003: 59). In such contexts, the market is driven by corruption, which not only thrives in an unbridled fashion, but also in a form that is likely to be highly decentralised and unpredictable.

Rather than some natural logic of the marketplace, it is more useful to understand the forging and outcomes of decentralisation policy and practices in relation to broader

and more fundamental constellations of social and political power. As Rodan, Hewison and Robison (2006: 7) point out, existing regimes anywhere "cannot be dismantled at will because they embody a specific arrangement of economic, social, and political power". Furthermore, "Institutions that might appear dysfunctional for growth and investment often persist because elites are prepared to sacrifice efficiency where their social and political ascendancy is threatened" (ibid). Importantly, however, governance reforms, including those that take the form of decentralisation, may be advanced so that already dominant forces might "further their control or weaken their opponents in broad struggles over social, political, and economic ascendancy".

In contrast, the literature that emerges out of the prolific intellectual production lines of international development organisations continues to treat decentralisation largely as a matter of 'technique' rather than politics. The world-view that informs this literature inhibits the questioning of certain fundamental assumptions, for instance, about post-Cold War global tendencies for societies to move in the direction of democratisation and free markets on the one hand, and decentralisation of governance on the other. In somewhat triumphalist fashion, we are reminded that "[f]ailure of economic performance within an increasingly globalised economy can be considered the most general underlying cause behind the demise of authoritarian regimes around 1989" (Simonsen 1999: 399), and thus the relationship between market capitalism and democratic governance is conceptually established.

But there is more to this argument. As mentioned earlier, decentralisation then becomes part and parcel of a project to roll back the pervasive role of central states that are viewed to be inherently inefficient. What this constitutes is no less than an exercise in redefining the parameters of a more effective state role in facilitating the operations of the market. The economist Bardhan (n.d.: 3-4), for example, notes that "free-market economists tend to emphasize the benefits of reducing the power of the overextended or predatory state". He further adds that, due to the prevalence of 'market failure', many have turned "for their resolution to the government at the local level, where the transaction costs are relatively low and the information problems that can contribute to central government failures are less acute". In other words, the localisation of power is required for the successful globalisation of market economies.

In truth, the emphasis on local power has produced some strange political and intellectual fellows. Neo-liberals, and assorted populists and leftist critics of globalisation, at least outwardly espousing very different agendas, have coalesced lately around the virtues of local, grassroots politics. Thus, "intellectuals and policy actors whose ideas are rooted in very different values and theoretical assumptions" now "converge around the view that there is a 'new politics' grounded in local political spaces and practices". Many such intellectuals and policy actors also view "local identities and identity politics" as being "constructed anew in a context of global transformations". These transforma-

tions are reflected "in development theories and practices, which have increasingly turned to the 'local' as a prime site of development in the context of globalisation" (Harris, Stokke and Tornquist 2004: 1). Consequently, in spite of disagreements about the nature and effects of economic globalisation and marketisation, analysts and activists from a wide spectrum of ideologies and political positions now champion local communities as sites from which societal change can be directed in a 'positive' direction.

Bhardan as well notes the incongruity of free marketeers joining together with "a diverse array of social thinkers: post-modernists, multicultural advocates, grassroots environmental activists and supporters of the cause of indigenous peoples and technologies" in espousing the cause of strengthening local-level governance. Though he suggests that the latter group "are usually both anti-market and anti-centralized state", they "energetically support assignment of control to local self-governing communities", much like mainstream economists who view central states as a cumbersome obstacle to local initiative and to development (Bardhan n.d.: 4). In Indonesia, as in many parts of the developing world, including Southeast Asia, NGO activists have therefore been drawn to the World Bank-sponsored discourse on 'good governance' that has come to emphasise local community participation in development. The irony of course is that many of the same NGO activists have pushed for localism as a rallying point against the perceived economic exploitation and cultural homogenisation associated with neoliberal globalisation (on Thailand, see Hewison 2000).

It has been already pointed out that, with regard to Indonesia specifically, there is one clear reason for the concern that developed among international development organisations in relation to successful decentralisation: the perception held by many that Indonesia was in imminent danger of disintegrating as a nation-state once the highly centralised and authoritarian Soeharto regime had unravelled (Tadjoeddin, Suharyo and Mishra 2003: 5).[3] According to the World Bank-led Consultative Group on Indonesia (CGI), decentralisation "continues to be one of Indonesia's most significant reform initiatives" after the end of the New Order, and its successful implementation is "crucial for Indonesia as a nation" and will have "profound implications for the economic prospects of the country and for poverty alleviation" (CGI 2003: 1). Moreover, it would not be an exaggeration to place concerns about the break-up of Indonesia in the context of the international security environment that developed following the promulgation of the American 'War on Terror', for which the political disintegration of Indonesia constitutes a major source of worry. If Indonesia turns out to be a "failed state" (Mallaby 2002), then there could be profound consequences for American and Western security and economic interests in the Southeast Asian region – now dubbed by some

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[3] The authors are staff of the United Nations Support Facility for Indonesian Recovery (UNSFIR), in Jakarta.

as the 'second front' in the 'War on Terror'. One former US Ambassador to Jakarta once observed that "the security of most of Southeast Asia rests on a stable Indonesia" and that this would be seriously under threat "if a number of mini-states emerged from a political collapse" in that country (Gelbard 2001).

In the same vein, USAID (2005) declared that:

> As the world's largest Muslim-majority country, Indonesia is too important to fail. The outcome of Indonesia's democratic transition has profound implications for U.S. strategic interests in fighting terrorism; preserving regional stability in Asia; strengthening democratic principles, the rule of law and respect for human rights; and expanding access for U.S. exports and investment in the fourth largest country in the world. Indonesia's importance also stems from its substantial natural resources, rich biodiversity, and strategic location across key shipping lanes linking Europe, the Middle East, and Asia.

In this connection, some of the World Bank literature, instructively, suggests that decentralisation can enhance political stability as well as strengthen national unity (World Bank 2000a: 108)

Of course decentralisation was not just a project of foreign donors and interests. For a range of domestic actors, it seemed a matter of common sense that decentralisation was "well suited to the particular geography of Indonesia" (Turner and Podger 2003: 1). Decentralisation also appeared to be the convenient political compromise between the idea of a highly centralistic, unitary republic as existed under Soeharto's rule and the contending idea of a much looser federal republic of Indonesia – which had won supporters among sections of the intelligentsia by the late 1990s. It was in this context that a 'team of experts' led by bureaucrat-academic Ryaas Rasyid was charged by the Habibie government – which immediately took over following Soeharto's resignation on 21 May 1998 – with developing a blueprint for decentralisation. The product of the team's work were Laws 22/1999 on Regional Governance and 25/1999 on the Financial Balance between Central and Regional Government[4] – which have been characterised as 'radical' by some observers (Betts 2003; Rohdewohld 2004).

 Not surprisingly, local elites were also among the most vigorous supporters of decentralisation, and this is to be discussed further. Also receptive to the decentralisation project, as mentioned earlier, were a range of NGOs that saw the promise of substantive democratisation as being tied up with successful decentralisation.

Of course such actors had good reasons to be receptive. As Turner and Podger note, in the preamble to Law No. 22 it is stated that the law "is deemed to be necessary to emphasise more the principles of democracy, community participation, equitable distribution and justice, as well as to take into account the Regions' potential and diversity". Also, in keeping with the now-accepted parlance of the good governance literature, the

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[4] Though in practice aspects of the law were also the result of work of another team based at the Ministry of Home Affairs as well as one in the Ministry of Finance. See Turner and Podger 2003: 14-15.

"importance of popular participation" is reiterated in Article 1 of the law, which also declares the aspirations of the people "as the guides for official action". These sentiments would accord well with the kinds of agendas traditionally supported by Indonesian NGOs.

Moreover, like NGOs elsewhere around the world, Indonesian NGOs had become heartened by World Bank overtures to them, which have been part and parcel of an emphasis on promoting civil society development and cooperation with civil society (World Bank 2000b). According to the World Bank (2003: 1):

> It is now increasingly recognized that, alongside the state and the market, civil society is a critical factor in determining the level, pace and equity of a country's economic, social and political development. Civic engagement is the participation of private actors in the public sphere, conducted through direct and indirect interactions of civil society organizations and citizens-at-large with government, multilateral institutions and business establishments to influence decision-making or pursue common goals.

Furthermore, that (World Bank 2003: 3):

> Civil society organizations (CSOs) are important actors in building necessary social consensus for economic reforms and long-term development, in promoting effective governance by fostering transparency and accountability of public institutions […].

It is in this same spirit that another international development organisation of great prominence, USAID, proclaims that its decentralisation programme in Indonesia will include increasing emphasis "on the ability of non-governmental organizations to advocate for increased transparency, accountability, and public services at the local level" (USAID n.d.)

It is clear that international development organisations enjoy much clout in defining – at least at the intellectual level – the decentralisation agenda. Indeed, the World Bank and development agencies like USAID, the ADB, and the German GTZ, as well as such private grant-making institutions as the Ford Foundation, have a significant presence in much of the developing world. Because of their financial as well as intellectual resources, they profoundly affect development planning and internal policy debates in many countries, including those that involve non-state actors. This influence, it should be noted, is not just exercised by proxy, through social agents influenced directly or indirectly by the technocratic world view espoused by international development organisations. Turner and Podger (2003: 15), among others, have noted how various advisers and consultants from such organisation as GTZ and USAID provided direct and vital input to the design of Indonesia's decentralisation framework at the beginning of the post-Soeharto era.

It has been increasingly clear, however, that the realities of decentralisation in Indonesia have diverged considerably from the outcomes envisaged by international neo-liberal technocrats and their allies. It has become obvious as well that the growing ambitions and aspirations of local officials – who feel newly empowered after emerging from

three decades of Jakarta-centric rule – can cause new problems both for local business and for foreign investors who were supposed to thrive in more dynamic and entrepreneurial local communities. The propensity of local officials for instituting new levies on businesses as a means of producing new sources of local revenue, but also to provide the material base for new political projects, has been a particular thorn in the side of advocates of decentralisation as good-governance (Hadiz 2004a). Exacerbating the problem is a lack of clarity about investment procedures in the context of decentralisation. Typically, officials at all levels of government claim ultimate authority over many kinds of investment activity, resulting in nothing less than a very disorderly and unwieldy system of corruption.[5] What has actually transpired, therefore, is no less than the hi-jacking of the technocratic agenda by dominant predatory interests.

In spite of all these issues, the 'technocratic' view of decentralisation has proved to be remarkably resilient. The response, therefore, to politically complex and multi-faceted problems arising from Indonesian decentralisation has constituted little more than further institutional adjustments and tinkering – almost in a supposed political vacuum.

The Decentralisation Contest

The most observable and dramatic change in Indonesia since the fall of Soeharto has undoubtedly been the prominence of electoral politics, which has been so energised and animated after decades in which they were all but 'frozen' due to stringent and rigid controls. This change has involved the rise of political parties and parliaments, national and local, to which much power has now shifted in the post-authoritarian period. Thus, few analysts will dispute that while elections and political parties merely provided a façade for an essentially predatory, authoritarian regime during Soeharto's rule, they are now genuine vehicles of political contestation. The importance of political parties and national and regional parliaments today is reflected in the often intense competition among elites to wield control over them (Hadiz 2004b), and the increasingly vast resources expended in the process. It is no coincidence that laws on political reforms produced in 1999 were quickly followed by laws on decentralisation that would stipulate new roles and powers for local officials.

The two umbrella laws on decentralisation passed in 1999 (Law No. 22 and 25) – both implemented in January 2001 – caused great excitement. Among those who responded with most eagerness were already established local elites who expected to benefit from the new, more diffuse, political and economic circumstances. For them, the prospect that Jakarta's reach and control over them would be severely circumscribed constituted no less than a minor revolution. It meant at least the possibility of much more sub-

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[5] Interview with Rinto Andriyono, Institute of Economic and Development Analysis, Yogyakarta, 17.12.2002.

stantive independence and autonomy as decentralisation would limit the ability of the government in Jakarta to exercise the power over local officials that it had enjoyed for decades.

Some of the major institutional changes introduced by the 1999 set of legislation – implemented in 2001 – are as follows:

- The scrapping of a regional hierarchy in which provinces supervise *kabupaten* (regencies) and cities. Provincial governors, as a result, are henceforth relegated to the position of mere 'representatives' of the centre, with little authority over the city mayors or *bupati*, who are now to preside over the focal points of development.

- The awarding to the *kabupaten* and the city of jurisdiction over a large number of administrative and financial functions, but not over such matters as foreign policy, the judicial system, monetary/fiscal policy, religion, and defence and security, which continue to be the domain of the central state.

- The election of members of local parliaments (DPRD) from candidates offered by authorised political parties. The DPRD, in turn, were to elect the local *bupati* or mayor (and in the case of the provincial-level DPRD, the governor).

- The establishment of the mayor/*bupati* as being accountable to the DPRD or local parliament. The mayor or *bupati* must present periodic accountability reports to the relevant local parliament, which has the power to reject them.

- The vesting of the DPRD with an array of broad powers. For example, members of the DPRD are to be involved, together with their respective *bupati* or mayors, in the formulation of the local budget and other legislation.

- The simplification of the local-level administrative structure. The array of nationally and provincially-affiliated offices that existed at the local level under the New Order are to be amalgamated and integrated under a single structure headed by the mayor of a city/town or *bupati* in the case of a *kabupaten*.

- The transfer of an array of personnel functions to the local level of government, including those dealing with the appointment, transfer or dismissal of officials, as well as those dealing with their remuneration.

- The provision by the central government to the regions of a General Allocation Grant (DAU) 'which is to be 'at least' 25 percent of domestic revenue. Ninety percent of this fund goes to regencies and cities and ten percent to provinces. Distribution to individual sub-national territories is done according to a special formula' (Turner and Podger 2003:26).

- The introduction of revenue-sharing between central and regional governments in areas such as land and building tax, forestry, fisheries, mining and the important oil and gas sectors. According to the legislation on the fiscal balance between central and regional governments (Law No. 25/1999), 85 percent of oil revenues (after tax) are to be taken by the central government. The remaining 15 percent are to be taken by the region from which the oil is extracted.

- The stipulation of a Special Allocation Grant (DAK) through which special regional initiatives could be funded. Significantly local governments are also given the opportunity to secure loans – including from overseas sources.

Because of the material basis of much of the debate about dividing up authority between local, provincial and central governments, it is significant that, according to Indonesian official data, the main source of revenue of 92 percent of local governments

in Indonesia is actually the DAU, "with half the regions depending on it for 90 per cent or more of their revenues" (e.g. Turner and Podger 2003: 40). In spite of decentralisation, therefore, most local governments remain financially dependent on the allocation of DAU by the central government – the main exceptions are those that are especially richly endowed with natural resources. One consequence of this situation is that local governments, as mentioned, have controversially enacted all kinds of edicts and levies designed to bolster local revenue which, given the power relations that prevail, also allow for increasingly untrammelled predatory activity among local elites.

In this connection, the Indonesian situation resembles that of Thailand at the point at which decentralisation principles were enshrined in the 1997 Constitution. As one document described the situation there: "local government in Thailand is subjected to strong control by the central government […] most resources and revenues generated are drawn into the centre […]" (UNESCAP n.d.). Thus, like in Indonesia, local governments relied much on central government subsidies, as taxation powers largely still resided in Bangkok (e.g. ADB 1999). A different situation, though, according to Rocamora (2004) has developed in the Philippines, where Local Government Code 1991 mandated an automatic transfer of 40 percent of internal revenue collections as well as enhanced the powers of taxation of local governments. He suggests that this has resulted in a considerable increase in the revenue that local governments are able to receive. Nevertheless, even in the Philippines case central 'dole outs' to local governments remain very significant, displaying the limitations of local revenue bases and the continuing financial dependence of local governments on the centre (UNESCAP n.d.-b: 16)

It should be noted that some of the stipulations of the 1999 set of legislation were revised as a result of Law 32/2004 that replaced Law 22/1999. Rather than the product of mere institutional tinkering, this change itself was reflective of ongoing conflict between elites based at the local and provincial levels as well as in Jakarta in terms of access and control over institutions and resources at the local level. Because of the increasingly blatant predatory tendencies of local elites, the status and power of provincial level elites, for example, was partially restored. Technocrats in Jakarta, for example, have become increasingly alarmed at the rapacity of many local elites. To date, it remains unclear whether this change will result in better governance or simply another relocation of some 'bad governance' practices.

Furthermore, the 2004 legislative changes also established that mayors and *bupati* would be, for the first time in Indonesian history, popularly elected. Thus, while *bupati* and mayors lost some of their standing *vis-à-vis* the provinces, they are now effectively extricated from their previously high level of dependence on support from the local legis-

lative bodies that used to elect them.[6] Theoretically, this could produce more local governments that are more accountable to local citizenries. However, it is at least equally likely that this change will only result in the shift of money politics from local parliament houses to a broader cross-section of society – village heads, religious leaders, and other local notables. Recent fieldwork this author conducted in North Sumatra during the period of local electoral campaigning in June 2005 suggests that the new system of local direct elections has multiplied the cost of winning public office, thereby providing an advantage to those with access to financial resources – and to corrupt local party machineries. There are at least two consequences for the future: first, that local officials use their time in office to recoup their investment to win elections through intensified corrupt practices; second, that local ruling classes may consolidate more quickly as those without access to financial resources effectively become more and more excluded from political contests.[7]

Such developments could also have consequences for the social profile of Indonesia's local elites. As Sidel notes, the heavily centralised and bureaucratic New Order provided comparatively little fertile ground for the emergence of local 'strongmen' or 'bosses' in the modes found in Thailand or he Philippines. Insofar as they existed, they were very much part of a broader, nation-wide system of political patronage based on Soeharto himself – and also more distinctly based within the heavily centralised state and its local apparatus. According to Sidel, the fall of the New Order made it possible for bureaucratically-rooted 'local mafias' and 'networks' to rise in prominence "around the country in tandem with the shift to competitive elections and the devolution of considerable state powers to elected regency-level, municipal and provincial assemblies". Thus, local bossism in post-Soeharto Indonesia is not dominated by 'individual strongmen' or 'dynasties' as in Thailand and the Philippines, but by more fluid clusters and cliques of businessmen, politicians, and officials (see Sidel 2004: 68-69). In other words, the Indonesian divergence is a legacy of having had to emerge 'out of' a more 'successfully' centralised authoritarian regime. The tantalising question that arises, however, is whether local bossism in Indonesia will develop features that are more 'solid' and give rise to more coherent, entrenched interests and alliances dominated by local notables of various sorts, or even nascent political dynasties, as decentralisation proceeds along with

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[6] In Sidoarjo, East Java, the *bupati* was derisive about the intellectual capacities of members of the legislature, many of whom, he said, did not have good educational background. Interview 13.02.2003. The same argument is put forward by numerous local heads of government, including Marin Purba, then mayor of Pematang Siantar, North Sumatra, 07.09.2001.

[7] For a somewhat contrasting view, see Mietzner, who argues that while oligarchic elites have been able to consolidate their position in Indonesia's democracy, voters have tended to reject those who are the most blatantly corrupt (Mietzner 2005). However, he also notes that money politics and access to abundant material resources remain a key aspect of local contests for political office.

local direct elections that are more conducive to the emergence of Thai or Philippine-style local bossism.

As mentioned earlier, predominant among Indonesia's local elites whose fortunes have been on the rise since decentralisation are politico-bureaucrats, entrepreneurs, military officers, and gangsters – many cultivated within a range of youth and paramilitary organisations. They also include actors, old and new, whose social base lies within the corporatist and social organisations from which the New Order regularly recruited new apparatchik and local functionaries for decades. This same observation was basically made by Shiraishi (n.d.) soon after Indonesia's first free post-Soeharto elections were held in 1999, and there is nothing to suggest that the situation has changed more recently. In other words, the sorts of interests that were nurtured under the formerly vast New Order system of patronage are the ones that have been best-positioned to thrive in the post-authoritarian environment, albeit necessarily through the use of new political tactics and via new alliances. This much is clear no matter how these evolve further in the future.

Local elites, moreover, have easily latched on to xenophobic, religious and ultra-nationalist rhetoric to carve a role for themselves as protectors of the genuine interests of the people against the ravages of international capitalism (see Hewison 2000, on Thailand, for some parallels). Nevertheless, the same local interests would clearly benefit from the forging of alliances with international investors, who now understand the importance of local-level constellations of power. In fact a forum was organised in Jakarta less than one year-and-a-half after the implementation of the decentralisation policy by no less than two leading international firms operating in Indonesia, PT Harvest International and PT Microsoft Indonesia, in which newly powerful Indonesian district heads could meet with representatives of international business. During the forum, the CEO of Harvest International proclaimed that as most business activity takes place outside Jakarta, doing business in the regions required "a firm and committed relationship" with district heads (Guerin 2002).

Given the above developments, many questions remain unanswered about the link between decentralisation and 'good governance'. Among the most important of these: where are the technocrats and liberal reformers upon which the technocratic, neo-liberal scenario – that logically connects decentralisation and 'good governance' – hinges? In their conspicuous absence, from where is the internal challenge to old and new predatory interests supposed to emerge?

Conclusion

Unfortunately for international development organisations, the social base for the emergence of strong coalitions of neo-liberal reformers does not exist in Indonesia. This is partly a legacy of New Order authoritarian rule. Insofar as reformers in the neo-liberal vein exist, they are largely restricted to a handful of intellectuals, academics, and consultants, mostly based in Jakarta, and also officials of a few government departments and agencies, again mostly based in the capital city. Thus there is only a very negligible domestic social support base for decentralisation in the neo-liberal vein.

The agendas of NGOs struggling for more substantive democracy and for social justice issues will also likely be frustrated. Freed from the fetters of centralised state authoritarianism, NGOs and other pro-social justice actors have become more active, but their influence on policy-making remains severely constrained (Rosser *et al.* 2005). Scattered discussions here and there to build NGO-based local political party vehicles – perhaps partly inspired by the experience of Akbayan in the Philippines – have not produced concrete results.[8] Today, we see that some sections of the NGO community have, therefore, entered into deals with local predatory interests in the hope that their brand of social reformism finds some kind of political conduit in this way. A good example is seen in Serdang Bedagai, North Sumatra, where the new district head or *bupati* is a contractor/businessman with links to the military, and his deputy is a highly regarded local NGO figure. In this case the combination of money and networks the former possessed combined very well with the populist appeal of the latter, so that the team won the local direct elections held in June 2005 – against candidates that included the head of the local branch of a renowned New Order-era youth/gangster organisation.[9]

In spite of such efforts, the main beneficiaries of decentralisation to date, therefore, appear to be local interests that had been nurtured under the New Order, but are now struggling to break free of some of the shackles imposed from Jakarta on their predatory activities. This poses problems for international development technocrats who are ideologically inclined to view the problems of decentralisation as basically technical in nature. However, the forging of any institutional framework – whether or not for the purposes of 'good governance' – is much better explained as a matter of frequently bitter struggles between competing interests that have a concrete and material basis, and therefore, cannot be separated from fundamental issues pertaining to the prevailing constellation of power.

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[8] In any case, local political parties remain un-accommodated by Indonesian election laws that reflect a concern for the integrity of the nation-state.

[9] Interviews with Tengku Erry Nuradi and Soekirman, Serdang Bedagai, 14.06.2005.

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Prabowo, Kopassus and East Timor

On the Hidden History of Modern Indonesian Unconventional Warfare

Ingo Wandelt

Militia violence at the time of the referendum for independence of East Timor in August 1999 was envisaged by the Indonesian Armed Forces even earlier than April of that year, when groups of organised hoodlums first appeared in the international media. Efforts at tracing the origins of their organisations point to 1998, well before the referendum idea was put forward by President Jusuf Habibie in January 1999. The recent forms of militia, as they are commonly known, date back to the early 1990s; they are connected with the name of Prabowo Subianto Djojohadikusumo, General Commander of the Indonesian Army Special Forces, Kopassus, son-in-law of President-dictator and uncontested ruler of his New Order (*Orde Baru*), the former General Suharto. But when did Prabowo first introduce his ideas about this specific form of militia to a larger audience?

A former classmate of his recently revealed that Prabowo referred to militias in 1986/87 as a student officer (*perwira siswa*) at the Army Staff and Command School (*Sekolah Staf dan Komando TNI-Angkatan Darat,* Seskoad) in Bandung, West Java. The classmate must, of course, remain unidentified, and there is no material proof to substantiate his claim. Also his memory of the event is no longer clear after twenty years and lacks some important details.

But the event itself, in which Prabowo for the first time presented his infant concept of a new type of militia for East Timor, has been incorporated into military study and is probably still kept in the archives of the school.

Militias

The employment of militias and other forms of proxy forces is a regular feature in the modern history of the Indonesian military, summed up perfectly by Geoffrey Robinson:

> Militias have been a central element of Indonesian counter-insurgency and counter-intelligence strategy at least since the 1950s, and they have been mobilized in every counter-insurgency operation the Indonesian army has ever undertaken. Although justified in terms of the military doctrine of 'total peoples' defence', the main reason they are used is that they are cheap and effective, they help to establish bonds of loy-

alty with occupying forces, and they provide plausible deniability for acts of violence committed by soldiers.[1]

Militias as an element of counter-insurgency (CI) warfare are not restricted to the Indonesian army, but are an element of a sub-sector conventionally known as unconventional warfare (UW), for which the United States Army has set standards. The Indonesian military came under the influence of the US Army from the early 1960s onwards, when US instructors made the Seskoad the centre for turning the Indonesian armed forces into a counter-insurgency force to fight the internal Communist threat at that time. The US Army Field Manual FM 100 became the standard for Indonesian army operations, which included CI operations.

Young Prabowo Subianto and East Timor

In mid-1986, following a stint with the Army Special Forces in East Timor, Prabowo Subianto Djojohadikusumo, was assigned to attend the regular Officers' Advanced Course (Suslapa) at the Seskoad in Bandung. During the course duration of nine months he was often freed from attending classes in order to work on a study for the Seskoad which, in his words, would end the East Timor problem once and for all.[2] His study probably never left the confines of the school, and its specific relevance for Indonesian UW is unclear. But it was definitely an important step in Prabowo's approach to militias in the framework of UW and counter-insurgency.

When he attended the Staff and Command School young Lieutenant-Colonel (Letkol) Prabowo Subianto, 34 years of age, had spent the first twelve years of his military career with Kopassandha[3], the Army Special Forces, which in December 1986 were renamed Kopassus[4]: There he had gained extensive experience in combat duty in East Timor, where he had served four times, for the first time in March 1976 "some three months after the half-island had been abandoned by Portugal and invaded by Indonesia"[5].

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[1] Geoffrey Robinson (2003) *East Timor 1999, Crimes against Humanity*. A Report Commissioned by the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), 82.

[2] According to the regulations at the staff and command school, his work on the study had to be part of the regular course and to be done in a small work group (*kelompok kerja* or Pokja) of three or four student officers. That was also the case with Prabowo's study, but my source remembers well that it was Prabowo alone who worked out more or less the complete study.

[3] *Komando Pasukan Sandhi Yudha* (Covert or Secret Warfare Command) was the name for the Army Special Forces between 17.02.1971 and 23.05.1985.

[4] *Komando Pasukan Khusus TNI-Angkatan Darat* (Indonesian Army Special Forces Command).

[5] Tesoro, Jose Manuel (2000) Image of Evil. Prabowo's refracted reputation for ruthlessness in East Timor. In: *Asiaweek* 26, 8, 3.3.2000.

As a young officer quickly rising through the ranks, Prabowo had several advantages: he came from a family of diplomats, grew up in Europe, received a Western education, and was the son of one of the most important businessmen in Indonesia. However, he also received international recognition, even beyond military circles, in his own right. He became regarded as a prodigy of a new generation of highly professional Indonesian military officers with a broad vision, and was considered to have a promising future in the Indonesian military, even as a future Armed Forces Commander-in-Chief.

Back home in Indonesia, after spending his youth in Europe and despite his upbringing, Prabowo decided to embark on a military officer's career path. He entered the Military Academy in Magelang, Central Java, in 1969, where his personality – totally different from the collective mind-set of his comrades and commanders – his broad worldview and command of several languages stood out and caused him to rebel against the academy's strict discipline. He graduated from the academy in 1974, one year late, having been set back a year for disciplinary infringements[6]. Thus, he joined the officer career path a year later than most of his comrades. But despite being a late starter, he had overtaken all of his former class comrades by the time he entered the Seskoad. He had proved to be an ambitious, fierce and even brutal commander who dwelled on the violence that Kopassandha, his army special force, reportedly displayed in the first decade of Indonesian military rule in East Timor. His superiors had obviously already noticed his progress and arranged for him to join Kostrad, the powerful Army Strategic Reserve Command and a necessary stepping stone for any young officer's career trajectory to the very top ranks of military command. When he joined the Seskoad, Prabowo had just finished a three-year stint as Deputy Commander of the Army Reserve Command's Infantry Battalion 328 Kujang, with which he had done combat duty in East Timor, stationed in Cikajang, West Java. Well aware of the situation in East Timor and having experienced the numerous problems his army faced in the province fighting the armed resistance movement *Fretelin*, he worked to offer a solution in the form of a new concept of militias based on the idea that 'it takes East Timorese to fight East Timorese'. The concept was neither new nor revolutionary, but it offered twists on the theme of militias that the army was accustomed to and his conservative superiors could accept.

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[6] The causes of his disciplinary infringements are unclear. Some say he slapped superiors in the face, others refer to frequent weekend trips back home, which were strictly forbidden for the academy cadets.

The US model of Unconventional Warfare

Prabowo entered the Seskoad at a time when the importance of Special Forces were gaining importance in US warfare strategy, after having been neglected for almost a decade.

Under President Reagan the position of Special Forces in the US Army was resurrected and the importance of counter-insurgency against conventional warfare was re-established. The terms of the Nunn-Cohen Amendment in 1987 created the SOCOM, the US Special Operations Command, "which controlled all of the special operations of the Army"[7] and "established a de facto fifth branch of the United States armed services – one able to stand shoulder to shoulder with the other unified commands and worthy of the same funding considerations"[8]. The 1st Special Operations Command at Fort Bragg was activated in the same year, and the first test of the new, improved Special Forces as the spearhead of a military intervention was 'Operation Just Cause' in Panama in December 1989, which successfully toppled the regime of dictator Manuel Noriega.[9]

The central duties of the Special Forces in the 1980s involved the covert backing of insurgencies in Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, and in Nicaragua, where "the Central Intelligence Agency with select involvement in special operations personnel directed most of these efforts […] Reagan used covert aid and US advisors from the Central Intelligence Agency and other organisations to increase the effectiveness of the Contras. With covert aid, the Contras were able to draw more recruits to confront the Sandinista armed forces in prolonged operations"[10]. Covert support was effective in swinging the military balance in favour of the US-backed insurgents. It included a whole range of support, besides the supply of small arms and ammunition, as well as military training to the Contras, delivered by US Special Forces. For this their members needed 'indirect skills' such as 'cross-cultural communication and the ability to speak a foreign language'.

> The Contras employed were largely uneducated and few spoke English. The need to understand the Contra psyche was also an invaluable asset.[11]

The military category for this type of covert warfare, Unconventional Warfare (UW), was not new at that time but had developed from counter-insurgency strategies of the

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[7] Cerasini, Marc (2002) *The Complete Idiot's Guide to The US Specials Ops Forces*. Alpha, Person Education Company, 115.

[8] Cerasini 2002: 126.

[9] Cerasini 2002: 115f; and Clancy, Tom and John Gresham (2002) *Special Forces. Die Spezialeinheiten der US Army*. München, Wilhelm Heyne Verlag, 210f.

[10] Greg E. Metzgar (2000) *Unconventional Warfare: A Mission Metamorphosis for the 21st Century?*. Thesis submitted to the School of Advanced Airpower Studies Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, 65f.

[11] Metzgar 2000: 70

1960s, based on the US Army Field Manual FM 100. The US Army had already formulated strategies 'to win the hearts and minds' of enemy guerrillas by psychological operations (Psyops) and passed them on to the Indonesian Army as early as 1961, when the Seskoad became the centre for US Army training support for the Indonesian forces. Prabowo in 1986 must have had knowledge of the US Army's CI and UW approaches on the Contras and certainly utilised them in his study.

Unconventional Warfare (UW) is defined by the Oxford Essential Dictionary of the US Military as "the military, paramilitary, political, psychological, and civil actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency"[12]. It was created as a military reaction of states toward hostile guerrilla warfare in the contexts of decolonisation in the Cold War era after the Second World War. In military terms UW is an essential tactical and strategic element of counter-guerrilla and counter-insurgency (CI) warfare and in the West became popular as a form of counter-revolutionary war. The first counter-guerrilla war which employed CI was the Malayan Emergency directed against the Malayan Communist Party (MCP), commencing in 1948. A later conflict, which saw a more refined form of CI warfare, was developed and conducted by the French colonial army in Indochina from 1949 onwards. Recognising the futility of combating the Communist guerrilla forces in conventional battles, they trained and educated members of minority tribes, religious communities and even criminals and pirates in the Gulf of Tonkin to become secret agents, saboteurs and radio technicians in the units of so-called *maquis*, which were given the task of infiltrating Communist-controlled areas as counter-guerrillas. The *maquis* were a mirror image of Communist commando units and employed the same tactics as the enemy.[13] The French answer to communist guerrillas in Indochina became known as counter-insurgency, the new concept of political warfare to combat insurgency, resistance and subversion.[14] Since then Unconventional Warfare (UW) has grown to become the most distinctive task of Special Forces worldwide. It is defined in NATO terminology of that time as:

> A broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations conducted in enemy-held, enemy-controlled, or politically sensitive territory. UW includes guerrilla warfare, evasion and escape (E&E), subversion, sabotage, direct action missions, and other operations of a low visibility, covert or clandestine nature. These interrelated aspects of UW may be prosecuted singly or collectively by predominantly indigenous personnel, usually supported and directed in varying degrees by an external source during all conditions of war or peace.[15]

A public definition for the US Air Force Special Forces:

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[12] Cerasini 2002: 61

[13] Napoleoni, Loretta (2005) *Modern Jihad. Tracing the Dollars behind the Terror Networks*. Verlag Zweitausendeins, 45f.

[14] Napoleoni 2005: 47.

[15] JCS Pub 1-02, NATO.

> During wartime, AFSOC (Air Force Special Operations Command) may be tasked with directly supporting any resistance or guerrilla force from the air or on the ground. This may be accomplished by infiltration operational units such as the Rangers, US Army ODA teams (Operational Detachment Alpha or 'Alpha Team'), or SEAL (Sea-Air-Land) teams into the combat area for the purposes of training, equipping, and advising or directing indigenous forces. AFSOC will also undertake a number of direct-offensive, low-visibility, covert operations on or above hostile territory.[16]

The Indonesian Army developed its own counter-insurgency warfare immediately after Indonesia became independent by combating numerous separatist movements all over the Indonesian archipelago in the 1950s. Having successfully fought the Dutch colonial forces during four years of guerrilla warfare, the new mission of the guerrilla-turned state-army was fighting separatist movements, which turned it into a counter-guerrilla and counter-insurgency force. This complete turnabout in mission was formulated by one of the army's early strategic thinkers, General Abdul Haris Nasution in his book *The Fundamentals of Guerrilla Warfare*[17], in which guerrilla warfare and its counterpart anti-guerrilla warfare are seen as essentially one and the same military approach. In the early 1960s the Indonesian Army came under the influence of the United States Army and their counter-insurgency strategy, as defined in US Army Field Manual FM 100. Under US tuition the Indonesian army created their own Green Berets in the form of the Strategic Army Reserve Command (*Komando Cadangan Strategis Angkatan Darat*, Kostrad) in 1961, but it was the Red Berets RPKAD that were finally chosen to become the Special Forces designed for counter-insurgency warfare. Their training centre (now Pusdiklat, Centre for Education and Training) at Batujajar near Bandung specifically trains Special Forces members in tactics and techniques of CI and UW.

Prabowo and the Indonesian Special Forces

Prabowo's military identity was that of a full-fledged officer of the Special Forces, and at the time he attended the Seskoad, Special Forces had become *de rigueur* in international military circles. This was reason enough for him to put his stamp on the course and to outshine his comrades.

After graduating from the Military Academy in 1974, Prabowo joined Kopassandha's Special Forces Group I (*Grup I*), a paratrooper unit which conducted special warfare duties in East Timor. He was selected to become a member of one of the Group's special CI-units, Nanggala 28 and stayed there for three years (1977-80). The unit's main task was the assassination of Fretelin's president and foreign minister Nicolao Dos Reis Lobato, but in this the unit ultimately failed. After that first stint Prabowo joined a se-

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[16] Cerasini 2002: 202.

[17] Nasution, Abdul Haris (1955) *The Fundamentals of Guerrilla Warfare and the Indonesian defence System, Past and Future*. Jakarta, Puspen AD.

lect group of some twenty, young Indonesian Kopassandha officers[18], who were invited to attend a six-week anti-terrorism course at Germany's prestigious GSG 9 Police Special Force as the very first Indonesian participants. As the curriculum of the GSG 9 courses is kept secret it is not clear to what extent German training contributed to Prabowo's later missions in the Special Forces in East Timor. As a police force rather than a military force, the GSG 9 is specifically trained to counter-terrorist threats by means of anti-terrorist operations either inside German society or in order to protect German citizens and interests abroad from terrorist attacks on a limited scale. It is not a force which is intended for warfare operations.[19] But the training in Germany was essential for the creation of Detasemen-81 (Detachment 81), abbreviated Den-81, established on June 30, 1982, with Major Luhut B. Panjaitan as its first commander and Captain Prabowo Subianto as its first deputy commander, who both had enjoyed German anti-terror training at the GSG 9.[20]

Prabowo's pioneering participation in the course made him a celebrity in German and Indonesian military circles and raised his standing in the army. The practical knowledge he gained in Germany was surely of help for his studies, but on the more military-oriented level of the Seskoad, it was probably his broad interest in recent developments in the US military that helped him to complete his project, adapting the latest US approach on UW to his branch, the Indonesian Special Forces.[21]

Prabowo's attendance at the Seskoad was not just a matter of his formal career development, in which every officer had to visit the Seskoad to receive the formal preparation to become a full staff officer and rise to the rank of Colonel and General. It was also related to fractional disputes inside the army command.

The great Army reformation of 1983-85 had seen the Special Forces thoroughly overhauled by the Armed Forces Commander-in-Chief, General Benjamin Leonardus

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[18] It is kept confidential who Prabowo's comrades at the course were, but it has become known that two were later Kopassus General Commander Muchdi Purwo Pranyoto, recently implicated in the murder of human rights lawyer Munir in 2004 in his position as Deputy of the Indonesian Intelligence Agency BIN, and Major-General Hotmangaraja Panjaitan, later Indonesian Defence Attaché to Germany 1997-2000, Commander of Kopassus' Special Warfare Group IV from 2001-02, and Bali military commander when the first Bali bomb exploded in October 2002.

[19] It is also unclear how the GSG 9 could have provided counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare tactics and methods – if it ever did – or knowledge and capabilities useful for such purposes. However, the GSG 9 also has a strong intelligence pedigree. As a force below the German Police's Federal Department (Bundeskriminalamt), the GSG 9 can rely on the department's police intelligence network and even has two specific intelligence units, the 1st and 4th Mission Units (Einsatzeinheit), specialised in observation and raids. See Reinhard Scholzen und Kerstin Froese (2001) *GSG 9: Innenansichten eines Spezialverbandes des Bundesgrenzschutzes*. Stuttgart, Motorbuch Verlag.

[20] Indonesia's Elite Forces: SAT-81 GULTOR, http://indonesiaeliteforces.tripod.com/id12.html.

[21] For a historical overview of US military developments in the field see Marquis, Susan L. (1997) *Unconventional Warfare: Rebuilding US Special Operations Forces*. Washington, D.C., Brookings Institution Press.

('Benny') Murdani (1983-88), himself a former Special Forces officer. The force's personnel strength was reduced from 6,500 to 2,600 members, and its five combat groups were trimmed down to just two, Group I and II, both made up of army paratroopers. Revamped on the model of the British Special Air Services (SAS), the Army Special Forces, renamed Kopassus on 26 December 1986,[22] were to become a leaner, better trained and more capable force. What was lost in numbers was to be compensated by the versatility and qualifications of their members. As a consequence, former Group IV, Sandhi Yudha ('Covert Warfare'), which had specialised in Unconventional Warfare, was abolished and its functions integrated into the Kopassus training centre at Batujajar near Bandung, West Java.[23]

Kopassus' overhaul had placed Murdani-loyalists at the helm of the Special Forces, a move which ran counter to Prabowo's interests. His shift to Kostrad in 1985 was both a move by his superiors to get him out of Murdani's way, and Murdani's move to detach him from his personal power base, Kopassandha. Only in March 1993, when Murdani was finally removed from all positions of influence in the armed forces after having lost the president's trust, did Prabowo re-enter Kopassus again as commander of the Batujajar training centre. He certainly had his personal grudges when he entered Sesko-ad, and his motivation to prove that Murdani's neglect of unconventional warfare was wrong surely encouraged him further.

The Army Special Forces and Unconventional Warfare in East Timor

Kopassus and unconventional warfare are two sides of the same coin, and the history of East Timor's military occupation was always closely intertwined with the Special Forces. Prabowo emerged as one of the key players and put his personal stamp on the Indonesian military's history of warfare in East Timor.

The military assault on East Timor in 1974/75 was conducted as an intelligence and Special Forces mission. The Military Strategic Intelligence Centre at the Ministry of Defense (Pusintelstrat Hankam), led in 1974 by General Murdani, employed means of covert intelligence and UW to execute and cover up the intended military annexation of East Timor: "In his [Murdani's, I. W.] opinion, the best course of action was to infiltrate a small number of volunteers into East Timor to stimulate local resistance. On his own initiative, he summoned Colonel Dading Kalbuadi and outlined his plan to dispatch a team of volunteers to cross the border to assist those Timorese wishing to in-

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[22] Kopassus was given the new name on 23.5.1985, but the restructuring process took 19 months.

[23] Conboy, Ken (2003) *Kopassus. Inside Indonesia's Special Forces.* Jakarta, Singapore, 305-308; Kingsbury, Damien (2003) *Power Politics and the Indonesian Military.* London, New York, RoutledgeCurzon.

tegrate with Indonesia."[24] The mission was entrusted to Kopassandha, which initiated an operation code named *Operasi Poincana*, involving Sandhi Yudha commandos, who were given the mission to occupy potential Fretelin bases south of Dili. Meanwhile, a small number of Timorese volunteers were divided into three teams: Susi, Tuti and Umi, all common Indonesian female names, each led by Indonesian commanders.[25]

Two newly-established East Timorese political parties, UDT and Apodeti, were also successfully made tools of Indonesian intelligence for combating the largest party Fretelin which aimed at full independence for Portuguese East Timor. The military operation to conquer East Timor, *Operasi Komodo*, was conducted as a large-scale military intelligence operation led by General Yoga Sugama, head of the nominally civilian state intelligence agency Bakin (Intelligence Coordinating Agency), and conducted mainly by Kopassandha forces. Kostrad, Marines and Army territorial units were consigned to auxiliary roles.[26]

Formal East Timorese bodies of militias under direct military command had always been a regular feature of military rule. Among them were the Ratih (*rakyat terlatih*, 'trained populace') organisations, staffed with local conscripts and 'volunteers': "[They, I. W.] were village-based auxiliary units, designed to assist the armed forces in detecting and combating the enemy"[27]. All these means failed to achieve their intended goals, however, and this must have left a deep impression on Prabowo. The common feature of early Indonesian CI was that locals supported combat roles and were not involved as pseudo-guerrilla forces as in unconventional warfare. This change of parameters was to become Prabowo's personal contribution to Unconventional Warfare.

In March 1983 the military commander, Colonel Purwanto, signed a secret cease-fire agreement with the leader of the Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor (Fretelin), José Alexandre 'Xanana' Gusmao. The agreement, however, lasted only until 8 August, when the Indonesian military initiated another operation, Operation Unity (*Operasi Persatuan*), which, for the first time, employed East Timorese combatants. Two battalions, attached to the Dili-based Korem (military regional command) were set up, and "locally-recruited paramilitary 'teams' with knowledge of regional dialects and terrain"[28] were used from that time on.

Prabowo is not known to have been specifically involved in the build-up of pro-Indonesian auxiliaries and militias at the time, though this later was to become his hallmark. These forms of co-opting East Timorese as fighters for the Indonesian side

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[24] East Timor: Indonesia's military involvement. In: *The Jakarta Post.com* 31.05.2004.

[25] Ibid.

[26] Ibid. See also John G Taylor (1999) *East Timor, The Price of Freedom*. London, New York, Zed Books.

[27] Robinson 2003: 83.

[28] Kammen 2001: 158f.

dates back to *Operasi Komodo* in 1975, when the oldest local militia, Halilintar (lightning) was established.[29] Halilintar was the first local auxiliary force set up following a covert military training program conducted in West Timor by the powerful military intelligence force at that time, Opsus. Opsus was the intelligence for Special Operations which directly reported to President Suharto. Halilintar forces[30], led by Tomas Goncalves and Joao Tavares, accompanied Indonesian forces in a support capacity in several operations conducted by the Special Forces (named RPKAD at that time) and Opsus in that year. In 1976 the majority of Halilintar troops were re-deployed to form the basis of the formal ('organic') military Battalion 744, attached to the East Timor Korem. Halilintar itself was disbanded in 1982. In the late seventies Timorese were again used in paramilitary roles in local defence units. The use of East Timorese as back-up for regular military and security forces, in the words of James Dunn, "took place against the background of a harsh, and at times brutal, campaign against the population of East Timor by the occupying military force"[31].

Prabowo at the Seskoad – the International Situation in 1986

The entry of East Timor's former colonial power, Portugal, into the European Union in 1986 made the East Timor question a European issue. In Portuguese domestic politics, the former colony became the symbol of the country's renewed global orientation and role. In 1985 the first official talks took place between the Portuguese government and Jose Ramos Horta, the international representative of East Timor's Fretelin. On 25 September, following UN Resolution 37/30, which demanded self-determination for

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[29] "The original Halilintar had been established by the co-opted local ruler of Atabae sub-district in Bobonaro district under Indonesian military instruction following the protracted 1975 battle for Atabae." Mason, Max (2000) *Heroes of Integration. Socialising Autonomy in Pre-ballot East Timor*. Unpublished manuscript, 13 (note 45).

[30] Robinson classifies Halilintar as one of several "more highly trained paramilitary units [… which, I.W.] performed important reconnaissance, intelligence and combat roles, but they also took part in several operations, including assassinations. Formally coordinated at the level of the District Military Command (Kodim), they also had close ties with and often operated alongside the elite counter-insurgency force, Kopassus – and in particular the Intelligence Task Force, SGI, and operational units known as Nanggala." (Robinson 2003: 84). Another attempt to employ East Timorese for combat duties is revealed by Conboy (2003): in 1986 Kopassandha Detachment 81 began a special operation codenamed Task Force 86 (and using the local Tetum codename Railakan, meaning 'Fire and Water'). It was a counter guerrilla operation in which special forces would act as partisans, assisted by former Fretelin rebels mostly taken from prisons, to track down resistance forces. Two teams, team Alfa and Sera, were raised and, directed by Det 81 operatives in long-range patrols, the locals "acted as pseudo gangs by dressing and acting like Fretelin", with some success. Team Sera was credited with six Fretelin kills and 22 captured, and with another team (Saka) set up, the operation was extended a further year. It failed, however, to capture commander 'Xanana' Gusmao (Conboy 2003: 310-312).

[31] Dunn, James (2001) *Crimes Against Humanity in East Timor, January to October 1999. Their Nature and Causes*, http://www.etan.org/news/2001a/dunn1.htm (14.2.2001).

East Timor, the first formal diplomatic contacts since the invasion were established between the governments of Portugal and Indonesia. Portugal positioned itself as the driving force for the self-determination of East Timor, thereby drawing the world's attention to the tiny country's terrible fate under Indonesian rule. This, in turn, put the Indonesian military under pressure to look for a military solution to keep East Timor under military control and out of the international spotlight. In early 1986, East Timor once again became an important topic in world politics and the international media, putting Indonesia's role as occupying force under critical global scrutiny.[32] In July 1986, the very month Prabowo entered the Seskoad, the European Parliament passed a motion criticising the Indonesian annexation of East Timor.[33]

Prabowo at the Seskoad

> Prabowo, some said, became driven by a desire to 'solve' the East Timor question and thus ensure his place in short-term history and his future position at the highest levels of power.[34]

Prabowo's ambition to rise to the top positions of military power and influence found its personal arena in occupied East Timor. Having established his identity within the framework of civilian versus military forces, Indonesia's provinciality versus his own international experience and Western lifestyle, the limited world-view of his military comrades versus his broader vision went beyond the strict limits set by the military. Prabowo never saw East Timor as a purely military problem, but was acutely aware of the diplomatic complexities of the issue and therefore attempted to find a solution that involved both the military and diplomacy. In the diplomatic sphere East Timor continued to alienate Indonesia from the rest of the world, and especially from the West which was now more concerned than ever about protecting human rights. From a military point-of-view East Timor was an embarrassing example of the army's inability to solve a problem handed over to them in 1974 by their mighty brother-in-arms, the United States of America, i.e. the task of defeating Communism in the Archipelago. The vast amount of military aid, both in equipment and in education and training, which had been provided for more than a decade, did not suffice to help the Army defeat a small-scale insurgency. For Prabowo the personal challenge was obvious; if he could solve the problem once and for all, who could stop him from reaching the very top of Indonesia's leadership? Given his close ties to the Suharto first family through

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[32] Schlicher, Monika (1996) Von der Schwierigkeit, Verantwortung einzuklagen. Die internationale Wahrnehmung des Konflikts. In: Ludwig, Klemens, ed. (1996) *Osttimor – Der zwanzigjährige Krieg*. Reinbek, Rowohlt, 82-107.

[33] For an historical overview, see Taylor, John G. (1990) The *Indonesian Occupation of East Timor 1974-1989, A Chronology*. London, Catholic Institute for International Relations (CIIR).

[34] Friend, Theodore (2003) *Indonesian Destinies*. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 324.

his marriage to the President's daughter, Siti Hediati 'Titiek' Suharto in 1983, all doors would be open to him.

Another factor contributing to his success was the open display of brutality and sadism that he almost always managed to utilise for his personal military career advancement. He rose through the Army Special Forces ranks because of his highly ambitious approach to fulfilling, and at times over-fulfilling his tasks. Rather than making him popular, however, Prabowo's ambition sometimes alienated him from some of his superiors, notably from General Murdani. Prabowo's assignment to the Seskoad was also an educational measure by the Army command to let him cool his temper for a year.[35]

Militias for East Timor – The Scenario of 1999 conceived in 1986?

Prabowo attended the Regular Course (*kursus reguler*: Susreg) at the Sekolah Staf dan Komando TNI-Angkatan Darat (Army Staff and Command School) in Bandung, West Java, for the educational year (*tahun pelajaran*) 1986-1987 as a regular student officer (*perwira siswa*, Pasis). This course is to prepare the officers, who usually rank from major to lieutenant-colonel, for higher command staff duties as senior officers and generals (*perwira tinggi*, pati). Training at the school emphasises preparing individual working papers (*kertas karya perorangan*: taskap) and staff studies (*telaah staf*) in working groups.

During the course the school command assigned Prabowo the task of preparing and presenting a staff study (telaahan staf) on a new socio-economic approach to security in East Timor that would contribute to a military solution of the East Timor problem. Although he worked as part of a small work group (kelompok kerja, Pokja) of three or four fellow students, unlike his comrades Prabowo was exempted from most of the regular coursework in order to devote more time to his own study. Unfortunately, no information is available about the other students of his group or what happened to their work. The results and analysis were presented to the class and the school command at the end of the course, and presentation material included diagrams, graphs and transparencies. But, in keeping with school policies, the students were given neither the study nor the presentation material.

Prabowo's study went far beyond the regular scope of such staff studies, as outlined by the Seskoad Student Handbook, the *Vademikum Seskoad*.[36] However, as the Seskoad has always claimed to be a think-tank for strategic military affairs and a place for forward-

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[35] "But his methods in the field alienated his (Prabowo's) boss, General Benny Moerdani, armed forces commander at that time. 'I sent Prabowo to East Timor to set up long-range patrols," he told Adam Schwarz. 'He became obsessed with catching Xanana. He had gone out of control. I heard reports that Prabowo was beating patrol leaders when they came back empty-handed. I had no choice but to bring him back to Java.' Prabowo went from protégé to subversive regarding Moerdani. Such daring endangered his relationship with Suharto" (Friend 2003: 324).

oriented analysis, a study like Prabowo's could well have found its place in the Seskoad archives.

The main thesis of Prabowo's study was as follows: the successful incorporation of East Timor into the Unitary Indonesian Republic must offer strategic groups in the annexed territory exclusive and obvious advantages in terms of material benefits. Only by means of giving them something in return for integration, which they could lose if they went back to fighting for independence, could they be convinced to fight for integration into Indonesia and to defend it against their own people. Accepting material benefits would also make them tools dependent on their Indonesian masters, thereby making it impossible for them to switch loyalties. The pro-independence forces could not offer them anything comparable to what Indonesia was willing to offer. Being motivated to fight the insurgents out of pure self-interest these strategic groups would therefore create a social layer of dependent minions and collaborators eager to please their masters in their role as chain dogs and driven by their known material interests. The hands of the military would ultimately be kept clean from any overt suppression, which would be taken over by their proxies as a force for social control. To the outside world, those proxies could also be presented as the 'real' defenders of East Timor's popular will for integration into Indonesia, sidelining the insurgent Fretelin as a minority voice.

Prabowo explicitly outlined a proposal to offer certain grants and to set up institutions of vocational education and training for pro-Indonesia youths, disadvantaged youth at the fringes of society, and social segments of street and organised crime in return for loyalty to Indonesia. In short, Prabowo advocated a strategic plan to embrace the subclass, the outcasts of Timorese society, to turn them into minions. Such a soft course for bolstering integration would at some later stage replace the repressive approach altogether and consequently alter the negative international perception of Indonesia's occupation of East Timor.

Prabowo implemented this approach in 1994 in his Gada Paksi militia. But his proposal for a 'new solution' for the East Timor question even then was far from new. It reflected the military's dual security approach (*pendekatan keamanan*) which consisted of violent suppression, on the one hand, and the welfare approach (*pendekatan kesejahteraan*) offering material and other benefits, on the other. What was really new was that the 'welfare' approach focussed on one target group that was already known in Indonesia – the *preman* (urban thugs) and street criminals in their East Timorese form.

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[36] Sekolah Staf dan Komando TNI-Angkatan Darat (1987) *Vademikum Seskoad* (3. edition). This handbook was issued immediately after Prabowo's course, and it is possible that some of the results of his study were included in the book. The content, however, is almost entirely devoted to military matters and barely touches on regional or time-specific aspects.

The Contras in Nicaragua: Prabowo's Model?

The most prominent CW campaign at that time was the one that the US Army and the CIA waged against the Sandinista government in Nicaragua. They had set up and maintained a counter-revolutionary proxy force, the contras (counter-revolutionaries), made up of members of the armed forces of former dictator Anastasio Somoza Debayle but fully dependent on their US masters.[37] Elements of their campaign had been financed by a covert operation that later became known as Irangate or the Iran-Contra Affair. Many features of those Contras must have appealed to Prabowo, particularly their anti-Communist outlook, which was almost entirely applicable to the Fretelin resistance which the world already identified as pro-Communist. But there were decisive differences; Prabowo could not rely on an East Timorese military force from which to recruit and man his militia forces, and his financial means were much more limited than those of the US. Thus his militias would have to be made self-sustainable without losing their dependency on Indonesia, specifically on Prabowo himself.

Premanisation of Societies: Indonesia and East Timor

The social foundations of Prabowo's concept were already laid in Indonesia, but not yet in East Timor. He began with the social phenomenon of organised *preman*, like the urban thugs and street criminals who had been employed as proxy forces by military intelligence during the late 1970s to provide 'security services' for the military and civilian members of the regime, and to actively 'guide' voters' choices during the general election campaigns so that the preferred candidate for President Suharto would win. Those gangs had eventually got out of hand and were eliminated between 1982 and 1984 in a killing spree which the public called Petrus, an abbreviation for *pembunuhan misterius* (mysterious killings). Those targeted assassinations were conducted by killer squads believed to be from the Army Special Forces. In their wake many of those groups of *gali-gali* vanished from view, only to reappear a few years later in the guise of *preman* in the first half of the 1990s in the urban centres of Indonesia, specifically in Jakarta and Medan. During Prabowo's Seskoad days, these *preman* were dormant, only to be resurrected with his active support years later.

The institutional basis for Prabowo's study was could build his study on was the New Order's security system, which had a formalised back-up of the security apparatus through civilian support for internal and external security during the early 1980s. The Police set up the environment security system (*sistem keamanan lingkungan,* siskamling), that placed under police command civilian security organisations set up by the police, thereby expanding the police force considerably with civilian security personnel largely

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[37] My comparison of Gada Paksi and Contras is inspired by Loretta Napoleoni (2003).

recruited from among petty criminals and organised crime.[38] At the same time, the military established the system of self-initiated security (*keamanan swakarsa*) by recruiting civilians for unarmed security duties, particularly in the army territorial command system. This system was established by order of the Minister of Defence and Army Commander-in-Chief in 1981[39] and drew intensively from counter-insurgency and unconventional warfare concepts and practices. It formalised such paramilitary organisations as Menwa (Students' Regiment), Hansip (civil defense), Wanra and Kamra (both paramilitary organisations that acted as extensions of the military at local and district levels) and Pramuka (Boy Scouts). The regulations and the contributions of these organisations for military purposes were part of the Seskoad curriculum and are specifically mentioned in Part VI of the *Vademikum Seskoad*.[40] Prabowo certainly was cognizant of them, and it seems remarkable that the relevant chapter in the *Vademikum* did not, yet, mention irregular and covert proxy forces. This was probably to keep such measures hidden from the outside world.[41]

Independence for East Timor: Proposed in 1986?

Another point that Prabowo regularly raised was his proposal to grant East Timor independence – an idea that appears, on the surface, to contradict his UW approach. But from the economic assumptions on which Prabowo based his argumentation it made sense. The idea was: release East Timor into independence, and it will surely collapse, because an independent East Timor is economically unsustainable. After the collapse, East Timor and the world would demand East Timor's re-integration into Indonesia, and Indonesia's victory would be complete.

Privately at the Seskoad, and from 1986 onwards in selected circles, Prabowo frequently proposed this strategy of pseudo-independence. At the moment when East Timor was offered or granted independence, he argued, his vigilante proxy groups would go into action and demonstrate to the world East Timor's true desire to remain with Indonesia, denouncing independence as treason. After going through various developmental

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[38] "[…] a term that was first coined by the head of the Indonesian police in the early 1980s to describe a new way of organizing the local security apparatus so as to give police the responsibility for coordinating and supervising neighbourhoods, and for training and supervising private security guards (*satpam*) for use in commercial and public settings." In this context the term *sistem swakarsa* was also used for 'system of self-initiated security', i.e. allegedly organised by local citizens, but in fact set up by police institutions. Barker, Joshua (1998) State of Fear: Controlling the Criminal Contagion in Suharto's New Order. In: *Indonesia* 66, 7-42.

[39] Vademikum Seskoad, 194.

[40] Vademikum Seskoad, 194-204.

[41] Since the regular Seskoad courses were regularly attended by officers from foreign armed forces who frequently took the manuals back home, internal or secret affairs were usually for Indonesian eyes only.

stages of argumentation, Prabowo made his proposal in public in the early 1990s, but failed:[42]

> In the early 1990s, Prabowo tried to persuade Jakarta to grant autonomy to the territory – a fact confirmed by Indonesia's ambassador-at-large Francisco Lopez da Cruz and former foreign minister Ali Alatas, both long involved in East Timor policy. That would make Prabowo one of the earliest proponents of autonomy. 'In any insurgency situation, there must always be a political solution', says Prabowo, 'and I thought that a special autonomous region would be ideal. But of course who would listen to a second lieutenant, a first lieutenant or a captain?'[43]

The same idea later reappeared in Germany-friendly circles around Minister Habibie in a slightly modified version, and was even raised in Habibie's private discussions with Chancellor Helmut Kohl. Habibie in 1997 had a secret diplomatic note delivered to Helmut Kohl, proposing that Germany should push for the territory's independence in United Nations discussions. Such a move could solve the East Timor problem in two alternative ways: either it could lead to a self-sustaining independence that would remove the 'pebble' from Indonesia's shoe, or it could follow the Prabowo line and ultimately lead East Timor back into the fold of Indonesia. Helmut Kohl, however, aware of the strain which the delivery of the former Eastern German navy war ships to Indonesia had placed on German-Indonesian relations, declined Habibie's proposal. The initiative resurfaced in late 1998 when Habibie moved to hold the East Timor referendum on autonomy or independence in 1999.

Prabowo after the Seskoad: Joining Kostrad again

Having graduated from the staff and command course, Prabowo went back to Kostrad again and served two stints in Infantry Brigade 17, rising to the rank of a colonel in 1991.[44] His new position gave him ample opportunity to return to duties in East Timor and establish contacts with a new generation of Kopassus commanders in the field, most notably Brigadier-General Kuntara.[45]

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[42] This aspect played an important part in my discussions with Prabowo's former comrade. Prabowo's line of argument according to him was clear, but differently formulated. His initial proposal was for independence, because only that would, in his view, guarantee final victory. Later, when in a more powerful position at Kopassus, he said autonomy but meant independence. The idea remained the same.

[43] Tesoro, Jose Manuel (2000) Image of Evil. Prabowo's refracted reputation for ruthlessness in East Timor. In: *Asiaweek* 3.3.2000.

[44] As commander and Lt.-Colonel of the Airborne Infantry Batallion 17, 1989-1991, and Chief of Staff of the Kostrad Airborne Infantry Brigade 17 Kujang, West Java, as a Colonel 1991-1993.

[45] Not much is known about Kuntara or Kuntoro. Born in 1939, a Cirebon Muslim of mixed Chinese ancestry, he rose through the ranks of the Special Forces and surfaced in 1986 as Deputy Commander of Kopassus. In August 1987 he became General Commander of Kopassus. In July 1992 he was appointed Commander-in-Chief of Kopassus, a position he held until September 1994.

East Timor after 1986

The Indonesian government initiated a second attempt to 'normalise' East Timor's status in November 1988, when the province was granted 'equal status' with Indonesia's twenty-six other provinces, thereby removing travel restrictions for Indonesian citizens and, to a limited degree, for foreigners as well. This was done to smooth the strained relations with Europe, especially the former colonial power Portugal, which had become a member of the European Union in 1986. A number of international dignitaries visited East Timor in tightly guarded and stage-managed 'tours' that attempted to present a peaceful province to their eyes, in most cases unsuccessfully. The military, however, supported the government's political soft-line approach, because East Timorese resistance had changed from violent to non-violent forms in which clandestine Fretelin-networks were set up, consisting largely of urban youths who no longer outwardly challenged the military. Indonesian intelligence reports and assessments at that time created the misleading impression that the East Timorese population by-and-large approved Indonesian rule, a self-deception that went on to become a central myth in the self-betrayal of Indonesian intelligence on East Timor.[46] This was the atmosphere Prabowo plunged into when he returned to East Timor in 1989 as Commander of the Kostrad's Airborne Infantry Brigade 17, headquartered in West Java. As soon as he arrived, signs of unconventional warfare began to appear in East Timor's capital, Dili:

> In July 1989 […] new covert operations were unleashed in Dili and the urban centres. During this period hooded gangsters, referred to locally as buffo (clowns), terrorized Dili at night. [… They were, I. W.] East Timorese collaborators given special training by the Special Forces for intelligence, interrogation, and assassination work.[47]

Not much is known about the paramilitaries at that time. During Prabowo's absence, the new Kopassus commanders had stepped up the paramilitarisation of society, a process in which Kuntara must have played an important role. The paramilitary 'scene' had become much more established.

> During the last decade of Suharto's rule, since Brig.Gen Kuntara became the commander of Kopassus in 1988, there were about 3,000 'clandestine' Kopassus members, who did not have official registration numbers who were funded by Prajogo Pangestu. These are highly trained troops, where even a sergeant has the capacity also to fly some fighter airplanes. They are certainly very well-trained snipers. These forces that were only loyal to Prabowo Subianto, Suharto's son-in-law, were based in East Kalimantan, not in Java where the three main Kopassus bases are located […].[48]

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[46] Kammen, Douglas (2001) The Trouble with Normal: The Indonesian Military, Paramilitaries, and the Final Solution in East Timor. In: Anderson, Benedict R. O'G., ed., *Violence and the State in Suharto's Indonesia*. Ithaca, New York, Cornell University, 160-162.

[47] Kammen 2001: 162 and footnote 24.

[48] Aditjondro, George J. (2000) *Financing Human Rights Violations in Indonesia*, www.koteka.net/part2.htm.

The nature of these shadow forces remains largely unknown, particularly their relationship with Prabowo. It could well be that the personal bonds with Prabowo mentioned in the quotation were established later, after Prabowo had regained his formal position at the helm of Kopassus, and that personal connections led to their formalisation during the 1990s.[49] Prabowo's Kalimantan connections survived his dismissal from the military in 1998 and became his economic base in post-Suharto Indonesia.[50]

Another Kopassus commander with whom Prabowo established good working relations at that time was Major-General Sintong Panjaitan, Commander of the Udayana Military Regional Command, which covered East Timor, from 1988-1992. Sintong was close to the 'green' network of generals with close affiliations to political Islam and he assisted in introducing Prabowo to Jakarta politics. He later got close to Habibie and became his advisor on security matters, having played a significant role in President Habibie's decision, announced on 27 January 1999, to allow the East Timorese to vote to accept or reject an Indonesian autonomy offer. One account states that Habibie held the 'most intensive' discussions with Sintong Panjaitan before the decision was made in two successive cabinet meetings.[51]

Santa Cruz, 12 November 1991

On 12 November 1991, Indonesian troops opened fire on unarmed protesters at the Santa Cruz cemetery outside Dili, killing dozens, if not hundreds of civilians in the process. Unfortunately for the military, the incident was filmed and the footage was successfully smuggled out of Indonesia and aired on international television, effectively destroying any credibility the claim that the East Timorese population accepted Indonesia's rule might have had. That incident shook US American-Indonesian military relations to the core and they broke down at the end of the year. Indonesia's army, now without the vital support of the West, and with neither the Cold War nor the threat of Communism to legitimise it, found that the military's harsh rule was no longer accept-

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[49] These forces later received the more or less official designation *milsus* (*militer khusus*, special military). "The term *milsus* should be distinguished from *milsas*, which in fact refers to paramilitary militias, who were often trained by *milsus* members. These *milsus* (and their *milsas* proxies) have been used for covert or illegal operations, especially against civilians, in which formal military involvement would have invited a strongly negative international response. Furthermore, these *milsus* have never been an acknowledged part of the army, despite the fact that, according to documents leaked from East Timor in 1999, they operate on the army payroll and under army orders." Kingsbury 2003: 103.

[50] Most recently were his intentions to unite the PT Kiani Paper project on Kalimantan with the Deutsche Bank in 2006, a move which ultimately failed.

[51] McDonald, Hamish, Desmond Ball, James Dunn *et al.* (2002) *Masters of Terror: Indonesia's Military and Violence in East Timor in 1999*. Canberra Paper 145, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University.

able to a more human-rights-conscious world. Washington imposed a partial military embargo against Indonesia in 1993, which was later raised to a full embargo against Indonesia, banning the export of military equipment to Jakarta and the training of its military.

Prabowo reunited with Kopassus – The Birth of his 'new' Militias

The loss of US support hurt the Indonesian army, but handed Prabowo the platform to make his mark on unconventional warfare in East Timor. He re-entered Kopassus in March 1993 and became head of Kopassus Group III Training Centre in Bandung, thereby frequently moving between West Java and Dili. This position was the first of a tour of duty that lead him to the very top of Kopassus, as he became General Commander with the rank of Major-General in June 1996.[52]

During his five years in Special Forces command positions Prabowo oversaw a number of operations throughout the archipelago, trained a record number of foreign students at Batujajar and increased the cooperation with the US Army. The strength of Kopassus rose to the record number of 6,500 and Prabowo involved his forces in covert 'dirty' operations that intended to protect his father-in-law, President Suharto, who was increasingly beleaguered by rival military factions and a growing grassroots democracy movement. Prabowo closed ranks with Islamic militants that he employed as covert agents and proxies, and he expanded the range of activities of Kopassus Group IV/Sandhi Yudha and Group V (Anti-terror) in terror operations against democracy activists and religious minorities. These networks survived his departure from Kopassus when his father-in-law installed him as Kostrad Commander and Lieutenant-General in 1998, partly to protect him from allegations of being responsible for the 'disappearances' of student activists conducted by his Group IV in 1997-98.

Prabowo returned to East Timor, where after Santa Cruz the Indonesian armed forces applied much harsher measures against the popular resistance. From 1993 onwards the Operation Execution Command (Kolakops) was strengthened, putting the area under much stricter military control. This was the military scenery awaiting Prabowo in 1993.

To crush political dissent especially among young people, Prabowo, assisted by the military leadership in East Timor, employed far-reaching measures of unconventional warfare. Compulsory military training for civil servants and university students was introduced, and the expansion of the people's defence units (now resembling more paramilitary militias than the former teams) was stepped up. In July 1995, Prabowo personally

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[52] Colonel and Commander of Grup III/Training Centre in Batujajar, March 1993 until October 1994; Deputy Commander Kopassus (Brig. Gen.), October 1994 until November 1995, and Commander-General Kopassus (Major-General) June 1996 until March 1998.

funded the creation of the Garda Muda Penegak Integrasi (Young Guards Upholding Integration), which became the institutional realisation of his UW-approach of 1986, i.e. the model organisation of East Timorese 'contras' for unconventional warfare.

Prabowo recruited youths from the fringes of society and provided vocational education and training, such as setting up car repair shops, "but quickly developed a host of illegal or semi-legal smuggling, gambling, and protection rackets. Gada Paksi developed rapidly: by early 1996 it had 1,100 members; in April it was announced that there were plans to add 1,200 members per year; and in May six hundred members were sent to Java to receive training from the Special Forces. Despite its public links to these Forces, two years after its establishment the head of Gada Paksi, Marcal de Almeida, lamented the fact that his organisation was reputed to be *mauhu* – the local Tetum term for military intelligence"[53].

Gada Paksi became embedded in a range of psychological operations aimed at terrorising the population. From 1995 onwards black-clad 'ninjas', disguised as traditional *buffo* (clowns), roamed the streets of Dili at night and terrorised the inhabitants. The formal paramilitary organisations set up and controlled by Kopassus like Halilintar, Saka, Alfa, and Makikit[54], were enlarged and they rampaged through the cities and villages. All these psywar measures contributed to the rise of social conflict in East Timor, and consequently from 1995 onwards riots erupted throughout the urban centres.[55] The basis for Kopassus military and UW-operations were the Task Force Intelligence units, SGI (*Satuan Tugas Intelijen*). Formally an executive unit directly under the military command (Korem), it was mainly staffed with Kopassus intelligence personnel and operated outside the regular lines of military command. Its posts were also used as interrogation and torture centres.[56]

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[53] Kammen 2001: 168-169. Besides those proxy-organisations, formal militias under direct military command did exist side by side, but because of their overt status as military civil organisations can only to a degree count as UW-tools. For an overview and more on the proxy-organisations see Greenlees, Don and Robert Garran (2002) *Deliverance. The Inside Story of East Timor's Fight for Freedom*. Crows Nest, Allen&Unwin, 129-136.

[54] On the history of these paramilitary units see also Crouch, Harold (2000) The TNI and East Timor Policy. In: Fox, James J. and Dionisio Babo Soares, eds., *Out of the Ashes: East Timor*. Canberra, Australia National University Press, 151.

[55] Kammen 2001: 168f; Kammen, Douglas (1999) Notes on the Transformation of the East Timor Military Command and Its Implications for Indonesia. In: *Indonesia* 67, 74-75.

[56] Moore, Samuel (2001) The Indonesian Military's Last Years in East Timor: An Analysis of Its Secret Documents. In: *Indonesia* 72, 9-44.

What was really new in Prabowo's 1986 Approach?

The totality of Prabowo's UW-approach can be seen in the person of Eurico Guterres, commander of Gada Paksi, who later rose to global prominence as the symbol of militia violence during the Referendum in 1999. He was the ultimate 'product' of Prabowo's UW.

Prabowo set his UW-organisations on three pillars, tightly controlled by Kopassus: the material bases of self-sufficiency, the recruitment base, and the militia organisations themselves with their fields of operation. All of these pillars were designed to offer sustainability and longevity and to increase self-motivation, vital elements in making the militias fight for their perceived self-interest.

But another crucial element was necessary to prevent the militias from breaking up or switching sides: a strongly ideological orientation. Here Prabowo borrowed heavily from the US Army's book on psychological warfare and the Contras of Nicaragua and applied a heavy dose of an aggressive, even hysterical, brand of nationalism to the militias which they displayed constantly to justify and motivate their violence. Their emotional nationalism in essence was not East Timorese at all, but a crude mix of simple ultra-nationalist sentiments which was indoctrinated into militia members by the military and culminated in the demand that East Timor must be integrated into Indonesia. It gave the militias a sense of mission and an exclusive belief system that put them above the majority of their own population, who were seen as 'disbelievers' who had to be converted to the right belief. Their nationalism gave the militias a common fighting spirit that took on quasi-religious forms, but was ultimately non-religious and materialistic and served as the ideological superstructure for their material and organisational foundations, which were totally reliant on Kopassus. It also loosened the few roots they had in their own society to such an extent that the militias became commodities which could even be exported to other regions.

The element of self-induced motivation was most certainly based on brainwashing and psychological operations techniques and according to my source, was totally lacking in Prabowo's 1986 study. But it created a uniform group personality of 'converted' proxy-firebrands, which had biographies similar to that of Eurico Barros Gomes Guterres, born in 1971:

> Eurico was born in Uatulari (near Viqueque), East Timor. His parents were killed in 1976 by Indonesian TNI forces due to their known pro-Fretilin views. Though Eurico later accuses Fretilin of their deaths, this is after his conversion to Indonesian ideals. Young Eurico was brought up by an Indonesian civil servant until he was sent to attend the Sacred Heart of Jesus Catholic School in Becora, Dili. He left senior High School becoming involved in petty gangster activity including the government-protected gambling hall (bola guling) at Tacitolu, Dili. In 1988 Indonesian military intelligence detained him for his alleged involvement in a plot to assassinate President Suharto, who was to visit Dili in October. At this time Eurico changes from pro-inde-

pendence to pro-Indonesian alliances, becoming an informer for Kopassus and double agent against the Independence movement until he was expelled around 1990. A counter-insurgency officer, Prabowo had taken special interest in his abilities and in 1994 recruited him into Gada Paksi, an organisation that gave cheap loans to start small businesses, but also used them as both informants and in pro-military vigilante squads. Governor Abilio Soares strongly supported Gada Paksi, which developed a record of human rights abuse.[57]

Young Eurico was traumatised by the early death of his parents, which would explain the turnaround in his personality as his search for a new family and home led him to the 'big family of the Indonesian military'. In Jakarta in May 2006, when he was finally convicted to ten years in jail for his crimes during the Referendum violence in 1999, he testified:

> Regarding his sentence Guterres said he was ready and would be happy to serve it. He said he was proud he had fought to defend the Red and White flag in East Timor 1999. He said he respected the decision of the Supreme Court although it was against his conscience because he is a good citizen. (…) He shed tears when telling about the events in 1959 and 1976 when his parents and relatives were killed by Xanana Gusmao's group and forces. 'I will never forget the events. Until today, I don't know where their bodies have been dumped', he said. He said he would try to locate the graves of his parents and relatives after completing his jail term.[58]

Eurico Guterres was groomed for higher tasks by his masters, who provided him with knowledge that would be useful for his militia activities, economics:

> In 1997 with a high school certificate supposedly provided by the military he began attending the Economics Institute in Dili. Though the Sekolah Tinggi Ilmu Ekonomi (STIE) was run by pro-integrationist Filomeno Hornay, Eurico attended only three semesters. He is married to the niece of Bishop Nascimento of Baucau, and has three children.[59]

This qualification, however rudimentary, made him one of Indonesia's first entrepreneurs in the business of violence and security. After the East Timor referendum failed and Guterres' Dili-based militia Aitarak was in exile in West Timor and no longer of use, his skills lay dormant. He established his personal financial base in Jakarta in two gambling halls and flew regularly to West Timor to oversee his former militia. In December 2003, he set up the Laskar Merah Putih (Red and White Army) intended to crush West Papuan pro-independence groups by UW means. That venture failed, and his endeavours to become an entrepreneur in the growing domestic security and privatised military firms businesses came to en end. In May 2006 he was finally sent to prison for his role in the East Timorese militia violence.

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[57] http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/enc3/eurico_guterres.

[58] Eurico Guterres Begins Serving 10-Year Jail Sentence. In: *Antara* 4.5.2006.

[59] http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/enc3/eurico_guterres.

Expanding UW beyond East Timor: Preman-Exports

Prabowo did not limit his newly-established militia weapon to East Timor, but planted offshoots of Gada Paksi-style *preman* organisations in the major urban centres on Java. The term *preman*, literally free men, designates organised gangs of petty criminals which "quickly carved out niches for themselves in the urban underworld of rackets and extortion, often coming into direct conflict with other paramilitary criminal groups"[60]. They were employed in the illegal shadow economy of the cities, often in close contact with and protected by the local military and police. The *preman* phenomenon raised the level of gang violence considerably in the latter half of the 1990s. *Preman* often were ethnically distinct, regularly competing in their intra-gang turf wars with similarly 'exported' street youths from Ambon (South Moluccas) and other fringe regions of Indonesia. A militia leader of another product of Prabowo from East Timor made a name for himself as a *preman* leader in Jakarta's Tanah Abang District: Hercules Rozario Marsal, a native East Timorese commonly known as Hercules. After serving in militias in East Timor, he was planted in that district together with his band of dependents (*anak buah*) around a huge market complex, and with the help of some military backing (*beking*) quickly became an influential underworld figure. After the riots in May 1998 he disappeared from Jakarta, but reappeared in 2001 and was immediately able to re-establish his turf.

In March 1998, after Suharto had successfully stage-managed another victory in the general elections for another five-year term as president, Prabowo was assigned to the position of Kostrad Commander-in-Chief at the behest of his father-in-law. Almost immediately Prabowo pulled his most loyal UW-forces from East Timor to Jakarta and closer to him, where they could help him achieve his personal military and political ambitions. *Preman* groups were now used for political ends – what Friend (2003) refers to as "the army's use of the underclass to defend the regime against the middle-class"[61].

Kopassus had come under heavy public pressure, when it became known that student activists had been abducted by Group IV/Covert Warfare in 1997-98, and the democratic movement demanded legal action against the Special Forces. Burdened by human rights issues and hoping to use Suharto's political difficulties for his own ends, Prabowo lost interest in East Timor. Having lost his personal battle for the top military position to General Wiranto, who became Army Commander-in-Chief after Suharto's fall from power, Prabowo found that the Army leadership was no longer willing to protect him. He was honourably discharged from the Army in September 1998 and moved out of the public eye via Germany to the Middle East, where he re-established contacts with Jordan and Jordan's Special Forces, which had enjoyed excellent working relationships

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[60] Kammen 1999: 75.

[61] Friend 2003: 345.

with Kopassus during his command. In 2000 he was asked to re-join the circles of the military and political oligarchy and, by making use of the many contacts he had established during his military career, became a wealthy businessman in his own right.

After Suharto's fall, the militias rapidly diversified into a wide variety of guises, displaying a range of UW that transcended Prabowo's concepts by far – a development which shows that UW has never been a weapon confined to specialised troops, but is simple enough for almost anyone to use. One temporary form of proxy-militia, for example, acting as 'security providers' in late 1998, and very similar to East Timorese militias, was the so-called PAM Swakarsa (Self-Organised Security). They were secretly mobilised, set up, and financed by Kostrad as their founder, Major-General Kivlan Zein (or Zen), revealed in detail after the militia had been disbanded.[62] All of the army's three forces and the police utilised proxies, *preman* and militias more or less regularly for their own ends.

The urban *preman* later became a part of communal and inter-ethnic violence after the collapse of the New Order. During the Moluccan civil war from 1999, *preman* groups, who had been brought back from their Jakarta turfs, were employed as means of UW by different units of the military and the police.[63]

In areas with strong separatist movements, like in Aceh and West Papua, post-Prabowo Kopassus set up proxy-militias, which never achieved the impact of East Timor's proxies. They were staffed mainly by minority groups of migrant communities and were never accepted by the local population. More refined forms of unconventional warfare organisations with a distinctively radical-Islamic outlook, such as Laskar Jihad and the Front Pembela Islam (FPI), were militias transformed into fully-fledged privatised military firms which opened a new chapter in the commercialisation of covert warfare and the rise of the private business of providing security and violence.[64]

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[62] Zen, Kivlan (2004) Konflik dan Integrasi TNI-AD. Institute for Policy Studies, Jakarta, based on a Master's-Thesis at the University of Indonesia, and A Book and a Soldier's Shame. In: *Tempo* 22.-28.6.2004.

[63] Aditjondro, George Junus (2001) Guns, Pamphlets and Handie-Talkies. How the military exploited local ethno-religious tensions in Maluku to preserve their political and economic privileges. In: Wessel, Ingrid and Georgia Wimhöfer, eds., *Violence in Indonesia*. Hamburg, Abera, 100-128; Aditjondro, George Junus (2001) Di balik asap mesiu, air mata dan anyir darah di Maluku. In: Salampessy, Zairin and Thamrin Husain, eds., *Ketika Semerbak Cengkih Tergusur Asap Mesiu*. Jakarta, Tapak Ambon 131-177.

[64] Singer, P. W. (2003) *Corporate Warriors. The Rise of Privatized Military Industry*. Ithaca, New York, Cornell University Press. Also: Myrttinen, Henri (2003) Alte 'neue' Kriege. Die Privatisierung der Gewalt in Indonesien. In: Azzelini, Dario und Boris Kanzleiter, eds., *Das Unternehmen Krieg. Paramilitärs, Warlords und Privatarmeen als Akteure der Neuen Kriegsordnung*. Berlin, Hamburg, Göttingen, Assoziation A, 129-142.

The Militias and the Referendum of Independence in 1999

Although the general lines of unconventional warfare in the run up to the Referendum on Independence developed in an almost straight line from Prabowo's Seskoad concept, their implementation was no longer his. There were some remarkable differences, probably due to different commanders with different mindsets and approaches. Most notably a shady intelligence general, Zacky Anwar Makarim, with a career in military intelligence and not a Kopassus man, was put in charge of a covert military operation to keep East Timor inside the Indonesian state:[65]

> He had been ordered to put in place 'a typical model for an intelligence operation'. Its main feature was the use of the militias as a front for the army's activities. The militias' main goals were to prevent the pro-independence side from campaigning effectively and to incite fear among the population over the consequences of rejecting Indonesia's offer of autonomy.[66]

The most striking departure from Prabowo's UW concept was the use of militias as overt proxies and not as covert actors. Zacky initiated a more war-like intelligence operation and robbed UW strategies of a vital component, which Haseman[67], a former US military attaché to Jakarta, explains in military intelligence terms:

> A cardinal component of any covert operation is the need for 'plausible denial'. […] Western intelligence agencies, non-governmental organizations, and the United Nations itself were all aware of the involvement of military and intelligence covert operatives in organizing, recruiting, training, and directing militia force activities. Worldwide television showed police and soldiers standing by while militia forces wreaked violence on a defenceless populace […]. In short, the perpetrators of the covert operation attempted to conduct their efforts using the rules and standards of 20 years ago and completely failed to take into account the impact of instantaneous communication and an open society.[68]

Prabowo's successors employed militia forces as a fully-fledged pseudo-army and overstretched the possibilities of unconventional warfare by far. The military intervention of the United Nations in September 1999 was a consequence of the extreme use of militia violence.

Abdullah Makhmud Hendropriyono is credited with having created the concept of an armed civilian militia in Aceh and East Timor in his position as Head of the Centre for Education and Training Command (Kodiklat) from 1994 to 1996, and his following assignment as Secretary for Operational Guidance of Development to the President (*Sek-*

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[65] Modeled, as the Master of Terror Database records, on the success of General Ali Murtopo's covert operation to have West Papua integrated by dirty warfare means during the 'Act of Free Choice' in 1969, which led to the internationally recognised integration of that half-island into the Indonesian Republic.

[66] Greenlees and Garran 2002: 138.

[67] Haseman, John B. (2000) East Timor: The Misuse of Military Power and Misplaced Military Pride. In: Fox, James J. and Dionisio Babo Soares, eds., *Out of the Ashes: East Timor.* 180-191.

[68] Haseman 2000: 184f.

retaris Pengendalian Operasionil Pembangunan). "This made him in effect the president's assistant to deal with regional security matters. He became a kind of roving operator, observing and monitoring likely places of unrest in remote parts of the country. His concept of arming civilians emerged during this period."[69]

Little is known about the personal relationship between Prabowo and Hendropriyono. They did in fact serve together in East Timor's Kopassus forces in 1976, but in different units.[70] And since Hendropriyono was senior to Prabowo[71], their relationship must have been rather distant. Their later career paths also differed considerably, making it unlikely that Hendropriyono would have been close to Prabowo. Hendropriyono certainly was a member of a top team of planners, managers and executors of UW beginning in the second half of the 1990s. His role, however, never was a dominant one, and many blind spots on his contribution to UW remain. It is more likely that a select group of commanders in the field, among them Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin, another Kopassus-man, Prabowo classmate and ally, collectively made the decisions regarding the militias. But the central role in UW in East Timor in 1999 was played by Major-General Zacky Anwar Makarim, as he was heavily implicated in militia violence in the final Report on East Timor by the Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation in East Timor (CAVR).[72] The role of the Army Headquarters is not known, but it seems likely that the almost exclusive use of Kopassus-officers under the military Commander-in-Chief, General Wiranto, was part of Wiranto's policy of assigning them to special missions outside the capital in order to keep them away from the political nerve centre of Indonesia.[73]

It is also unclear whether Makarim, Hendropriyono and their comrades knew of Prabowo's UW concepts, appreciated them and made specific use of them, or neglected them altogether. Since nearly all of them were former Kopassus commanders, they must have been cognizant of the UW concepts, but they apparently felt that a different strategy was necessary. That said, it is clear that Prabowo never held a copyright on UW, but he conceptualised, initiated and accelerated developments in the history of Indonesia's Unconventional Warfare – and probably much earlier than was previously known – that had severe consequences for both countries: for Indonesia UW meant new forms

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[69] Tapol (2001) *Hendropriyono and Bambang Kesowo, the key figures in Megawati's kitchen Cabinet*, http://www.ta-pol.gn.apc.org/news/files/st010821.htm (21.8.2001).

[70] *Karir para perwira Indonesia yang bertugas di Timor Leste*, www.etan.org/etanpdf/2006/CAVR/bh-08-Anneks4-Karir-para-perwira-Indonesia.pdf.

[71] Hendropriyono, born 7.5.1945, is a graduate of the class of 1967 of the Military Academy. Prabowo, 11.11.1951, graduated from the Class of 1974.

[72] http://www.ictj.org/cavr.report.asp.

[73] The Editors (2001) Current Data on the Indonesian Military Elite: January 1, 1999 - January 31, 2001. In: *Indonesia* 71, 135-156.

of organised violence with a devastating influence on post-New Order internal conflicts. In East Timor, UW almost completely annihilated the country, but the weapon turned against its master, for without international condemnation of the large scale militia violence directed at freedom fighters the tormented country might never have achieved what Prabowo himself frequently had proposed: independence.

From Violence to Voting

Post-Conflict Settlement and Democratisation in Aceh[1]

Bob Sugeng Hadiwinata

The signing of the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between GAM and the Indonesian government on 15 August 2005 in Helsinki, which marked the beginning of an end to the thirty-year separatist conflict in Aceh, has generated a new hope that democracy may serve as an invaluable instrument to resolve conflict and to build an everlasting peace. The settlement of the Aceh conflict has both theoretical and practical implications in the study of conflict resolution. Theoretically, if it is successful the Aceh peace settlement should reflect how peace and democracy is actually intertwined and how democracy generates momentum for dialogue and negotiation in settling conflict. Practically, if sustainable the Aceh peace process should indicate that the provision of the right incentive for participation in negotiation is crucial to start a peace settlement. More importantly, while the standard procedure of peace settlement focusing on DDR (disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration) is important, the democratic process that follows is crucial to maintain the peace process and ensure that ex-combatants are integrated into the political process.

Many have been writing on how democracy relates to peace. Ashutosh Varshney, for example, maintains that in a democratic environment, in which civil society thrives connecting different communities, violent conflicts can be prevented because tensions and conflicts are regulated and managed in a more or less peaceful way.[2] In a similar vein, Ann Griffiths argues that ethno-religious conflicts can be settled or prevented with a democratic political framework because democracy allows differences to be worked out peacefully.[3] Conviction that democracy can generate peace has led scholars and peace activists to believe that a successful post-conflict reconstruction needs democracy as much as democracy needs peace.[4]

[2] Varshney, Ashutosh (2003) Ethnic Conflict and Civil Society: India and Beyond. In: Elliott, Carolyn M., ed., *Civil Society and Democracy: a Reader*. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 434-5.

[3] Griffiths, Ann L. (1998) Introduction. In: Griffiths, Ann L., ed., *Building Peace and Democracy in Post-Conflict Societies*. Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, Dalhousie University, 4.

[4] Weinstein, Harvey M. and Eric Stover (2004) Introduction: Conflict, Justice and Reclamation. In: Harvey M. Weinstein and Eric Stover, eds., My *Neighbour, My Enemy: Justice and Community in the Aftermath of Mass Atrocity*.

Another group of scholars, however, dispute the positive link between democracy and peace. In his controversial book, Jack Snyder maintains that democratisation tends to generate ethnic rivalries that will fabricate violent conflicts. Referring to the experience of conflict-prone countries in different parts of the world, he argues that insecure political elites may use ethno-religious sentiments and sectarian political campaigns in order to mobilise support from the majorities to win the election, which would lead to the politicisation of ethno-religious issues. It is the politicisation of ethno-religious issues that renders new democratic countries in the Balkans, Asia and Africa vulnerable to violent conflict.[5] This contention is supported by Daniel Bell who posits that democracy may not be able to prevent violent conflict in pluralistic societies where a shared language and a common national identity are unlikely to exist. Because democracy requires mutual trust and understanding, different languages and other cultural identities may complicate the decision-making process which may lead to the collapse of the democratic government.[6]

Amid the ongoing theoretical debates on the link between democracy and peace, the recent post-conflict settlement in Aceh seems to indicate that under certain circumstances, democracy may have played an important role in ending the violent conflict. From the Indonesian government side, it was the democratic transition which laid the foundation for negotiations with the separatist fighters. The democratisation in Indonesia that eventually strengthened the position of leaders who committed to a peaceful solution has generated a chance for a peace settlement in Aceh.[7] While the authoritarian government under President Suharto saw the primacy of military strategy as the only way to end the rebellion, the democratic governments in the post-Suharto era – except some nationalist leaders who had opted for a military operation – began to view dialogue and negotiation as the plausible way to end the conflict. From the separatists side, the growing conviction that democratic political framework would make their voices heard and their interests represented (at least at the local government level) has made them prepared to give up their weapons and strike a deal with the Indonesian government through negotiation. This paper will try to identify and analyse circumstances under which democracy can have a positive link with peace.

As far as peace settlement is concerned, most writers on the issue tend to focus on the social, psychological and economic aspects of post-conflict reconstruction. For them, the only political process, if any, in peace settlement is the dialogue and negotiation in

Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 19.

[5] Snyder, Jack (2000) *From Voting to Violence: Democratization and Nationalist Conflict*. New York, W. W. Norton.

[6] Bell, Daniel A. (2004) Is Democracy the 'Least Bad' System for Minority Groups? In: Henders, Susan J., ed., *Democratization and Identity: Regimes and Ethnicity in East and Southeast Asia*. New York, Lexington Book, 29.

[7] Aspinall, Edward (2005) *The Helsinki Agreement: a More Promising Basis for Peace in Aceh?* Policy Studies No. 20, Washington, East-West Center, 2.

the context of peace-making. For the practitioners of peace building, the priority should be on DDR (disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration) in order to ensure that the combatants lay down their arms, government troops withdraw from the conflict area, the internally displaced persons return to their homes, and the economic disruption is recovered. But, the political process after the signing of the treaty should not be forgotten. Another crucial process in the post-conflict reconstruction is how to provide a long-term basis for effective, peaceful civilian governance through the creation of legitimate, representative local and national institutions.[8] Serious attention to building representative institutions will also provide an incentive for ex-combatants to become involved in the democratic process through free and fair elections. This paper will try to examine the political process in the post-conflict settlement in Aceh. It will discuss how the conflicting parties – especially the ex-combatants – perceive democratic process as a way to make their voices heard and to ensure their interests are articulated and represented.

In the case of Aceh, many believe that the earthquake and the subsequent tsunami in December 2004 – which killed at least 127,000 people, left more than 30,000 missing and some 500,000 displaced – have been the most crucial factor in driving both the Indonesian government and the separatists to work toward a settlement linking the reconstruction effort and the peace process.[9] The massive influx of international donors – both governmental and non-governmental agencies – in the aftermath of the tsunami is believed to have strengthened the pressure for demilitarisation and democratic governance in Aceh.[10] Although the tsunami has undoubtedly served as a factor to expedite the peace process, it may not be a cause for the renewed negotiation between the Indonesian government and GAM (Free Aceh Movement). Learning from the failure of previous settlements in the "humanitarian pause" (*jeda kemanusiaan*) and the "cessation of hostilities agreement" (COHA) during 2001-2003, the Indonesian government (through the tireless efforts of the newly-elected Vice-President Yusuf Kalla) made attempts to approach GAM leaders to resuscitate the collapsed peace settlements months before the tsunami. It can therefore be argued that the tsunami is more of an accelerating factor, rather than a cause for the more definitive negotiations between the Indonesian government and GAM.

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[8] Brown, Mark Malloch (2004) Post-Conflict Transitions: the Challenge of Securing Political, Social and Economic Stability. In Cahill, Kevin M., ed., *Human Security for All: a Tribute to Sergio Vieira de Mello.* New York, Fordham University Press, 66.

[9] International Crisis Group (ICG) (2005) *Aceh: a New Chance for Peace.* Asia Briefing No. 40, Brussels, 15.8.2005.

[10] Hedman, Eva-Lotta E. (2005) Back to the Barracks: Relokasi Pengungsi in Post-Tsunami Aceh. In: *Indonesia* 80.

At the time of the completion of this essay, the bill on local government in Aceh (RUU-PA) which accommodates the principles stipulated in the signed MoU had not yet been passed by the Indonesian Parliament (DPR or People's Representative Council). However, the working committee in the DPR has indicated that some crucial problems – especially a special permission to form local political parties and to allow independent candidates to run in the local elections in order to accommodate ex-GAM members – have been resolved, despite strong opposition from PDIP (Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle).[11] Political leaders as well as society in general are optimistic that the law will finally be passed and accepted by the Acehnese people, especially GAM. With optimism in their minds, GAM leaders are currently devising a strategy to define their organisation's involvement in the local elections by preparing to form a new local party and have their members participate in democratic training programs organised by different international organisations, such as the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (Germany) and the Olaf Palme Foundation (Sweden). They have also transformed their armed organisation into a civil society organisation known as the PPDA (Persatuan Perdamaian untuk Daerah Aceh or United Peace for Aceh Region). They also turned its military structure in the district and sub-district levels into a societal network known as the KPA (Komisi Peralihan Aceh or Aceh Transitory Commission).

This paper argues that in a situation where political elites are confident of competing democratically and the incentive to participate in a peace deal is appropriate, democratic process may serve as the most viable way to end conflict. Just as former Governor of Aceh, Abdullah Puteh, metaphorically put it: "If the bride price (*mas kawin* or the "wedding gold") was right, the marriage would last!"[12] In the Aceh conflict, although ethnicity and religion may have played their part, it cannot be denied that the aspiration for independence was generated by disappointment toward the central government, the feeling of injustice in terms of economic distribution, and the military repression. Incentive for a peace deal can therefore be achieved if the government is prepared to end the military operation and ensure the Acehnese manage their own political and economic affairs within limits; and the separatists are prepared to temper their aspiration for independence with justice and autonomy. My hypothesis is that if the confidence among the Acehnese to make their voices heard and their interests represented through democratic process is high, the peace process will seem to be sustainable and the chance of war will be slim.

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[11] Panitia Kerja Setujui Partai Lokal, available at http://www.acehkita.com (31.5. 2006).

[12] Statement by Abdullah Puteh in an interview with ICG in February 2005. See ICG 2005: 2.

The Separatist Conflict and GAM's Identity

The Aceh province, which currently has a population of around 4.4 million, is one of Indonesia's provinces, which is relatively rich in natural resources, especially oil and gas. The province has been known as the area in which the Dutch had never taken full control during the colonial era. A series of rebellions committed by the *ulama* (Islamic leaders) had allowed the region to retain its identity.[13] Being devout Muslims, the Acehnese prided themselves on being "the gate of the Holy Land" (*serambi Mekah*). The famous Dutch orientalist, Snouck Hurgronje, affirms this understanding by portraying Aceh as a door to Arabia for pilgrims from all over the archipelago during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.[14] This indicates the greatness of Aceh during that period.

When resistance against the Dutch became stronger in Indonesia – especially during the independence revolution period between 1945 and 1950 – the Acehnese *ulama* became increasingly subjugated to a national independence struggle on a much larger scale led by Sukarno. For most Acehnese people at that time, the Indonesian struggle for independence was on the same wavelength as the Acehnese Freedom Movement. Thus, in October 1945, the *ulama*, with the support of the Acehnese people, declared that the Acehnese people were firmly united and obediently standing behind the great leader, Sukarno. They also described the Indonesian struggle as a continuation of the past struggle in Aceh led by local heroes such as Tengku Cik Di Tiro, Cut Nyak Dien and Teuku Umar.

However, soon after independence was achieved, disillusionment began to spread in Aceh. After the republic gained control over the region, the political and economic influences of the *ulama* began to decline. There was also an element of frustration among the *ulama* towards the central government. Earlier on, during his meeting with Aceh Military Governor, Daud Beureueh, President Sukarno had promised the enactment of *syariah* (Islamic law) in the region. His failure to keep the promise had generated frustration among the Acehnese, especially the *ulama*. Conflict between Aceh and Jakarta became intensified when in 1953 the central government declared Aceh as integral part of Indonesia. On 20 September 1953, Daud Beureueh announced the formation of *Darul Islam*.[15] He also asserted that Aceh was part of the Negara Islam Indonesia (Islamic State of Indonesia) declared by Kartosuwiryo in West Java a few years earlier. From then on, the aspiration for independence among the Acehnese began to thrive.

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[13] During the colonial era struggles for independence were spearheaded by prominent figures within the *ulama* circle, such as Teungku Cik Di Tiro and Daud Beureuh.

[14] Riddell, Peter G. (2006) Aceh in the Sixteenth and Seventeeth Centuries: 'Serambi Mekah' and Identity. In: Reid, ed., 38-39.

[15] Lembaga Research dan Survey IAIN Ar-Raniry Darussalam (The Research and Survey Institute of IAIN Ar-Raniry) (1978) *Laporan Penelitian: Pengaruh PUSA terhadap Reformasi di Aceh*. Banda Aceh, IAIN Ar-Raniry, 71.

In the New Order era, resistance and the struggle for independence continued. Disappointed with the way the Indonesian government treated Aceh, Hasan Tiro (once a member of the Indonesian delegation to the United Nations in New York and a grandson of the famous hero of the anti-colonial struggle against the Dutch, Tengku Cik Di Tiro) returned to Aceh. Together with around 70 followers (mainly his relatives and friends), in October 1976 he formed GAM (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka or Free Aceh Movement). Although in his memoirs Tiro insisted on the feeling of despair and deprivation among the Acehnese that had aggravated the separatist movement, some scholars believe that Tiro might have been frustrated because his bid for a contract to build a pipeline for Mobil Oil in Aceh had failed. In 1974, Tiro was known to have lost the bid to the U.S. construction company, Bechtel.[16] On 4 December 1976, Tiro and his followers declared the "independence of Aceh-Sumatra" while accusing the "Javanese Indonesia" of being a neo-colonial perpetrator attempting to steal the treasures of Aceh.[17] Thus, unlike the *Darul Islam* in the 1950s in which religion became the main motivation for independence, the economic factor seems to have been the strong motivation of the formation of GAM.

In the late 1970s and the early 1980s, amid the intensifying gas and oil exploration by the Indonesian government in the Aceh province, resistance from GAM tended to increase. This had led the government to declare Aceh the DOM (military operation zone) where the Indonesian armed forces (TNI) used brutal tactics (murder, kidnapping, torture, rape, and so on) to terrorise GAM fighters and their sympathisers. This hard-line approach had several consequences. Firstly, there was a growing sentiment among the Acehnese population of detestation and animosity toward Jakarta. Reports of atrocities committed by TNI members had generated a strong desire for revenge among the young generation in Aceh.[18] Secondly, given that many Indonesian troops deployed came from other ethnic groups, especially the Javanese, the brutal tactics they inflicted had increased the ethnic sentiment among the Acehnese.[19] My encounter with an ex-GAM member confirms this view, as one young female ex-fighter lamented: "When my father was tortured to death by a group of Javanese soldiers, my mind was full of hatred against the Javanese; and I was thinking of revenge against them by joining GAM".[20] Thirdly, the desire for revenge led to an increase in GAM members. If in

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[16] See Schulze, Kirsten E. (2006) Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency: Strategy and the Aceh Conflict, October 1976 – May 2004. In: Reid, ed., 233; and Missbach, Antje (2005) Aceh's Guerrillas: the Internal Transformation of Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM). In: Wessel, Ingrid, ed., *Democratisation in Indonesia: After the Fall of Suharto*. Berlin, Logos Verlag, 164.

[17] Missbach 2005: 163.

[18] Ibid: 167.

[19] Aspinall, Edward (2006) Violence and Identity Formation in Aceh under Indonesian Rule. In: Reid, ed., 159.

[20] Interview with Nur, a former *inong balee* (GAM's special female unit), in Lokhseumawe 7.3.2006.

the 1970s GAM evolved from a small vanguard of a force comprised of 70 members, by the time of the collapse of the peace process in 2003 it was estimated that GAM had around 8,000 members.[21]

In order to assess how GAM develops attitudes toward military and political struggles and how this organisation perceives peace settlement efforts, one has to be able to recognise the identity which determines the characteristics of the organisation. It is important to examine the extent to which ethnicity and religion have or have not influenced GAM's identity. In what follows I will try to discuss these aspects.

GAM's Ethnic Identity

As mentioned earlier, disillusion against the Indonesian government which was portrayed as the "Javanese colonisers" had contributed to the formation of the ethnic identity of the Aceh separatist movement. The Acehnese ethno-nationalist construct advanced by GAM was defined by blood ties, religion, language, ethnic group (*suku*), and a combination of blood and geographic relations (*asal-usul*). Consequently, a true Acehnese is a person whose family has resided in Aceh for generations, is Muslim, is fluent in the Acehnese language, and is a member of one of Aceh's nine ethnic groups: Aceh, Gayo Alas, Gayo Luwes, Singkil, Tamiang, Kluet, Anek Jamee, Bulolehee, and Simeuleu.[22] According to Hasan Tiro, Aceh is an "authentic nation" in its own right in the sense of traditional cultural community with a common history for many centuries. While dismissing other ethnic groups in Indonesia as being "unauthentic", Tiro quite simplistically emphasised on the homogeneity of the Acehnese.[23] His enduring effort to make reference to the past glory of the Acehnese Sultanate is a reflection of how difficult it is to make ethnicity a single unifying factor.

Thus, there is a strong element of history in Aceh's identity. The first historical element was the reference to the glorious Golden Age under Sultan Iskandar Muda (1607-1636) and Sultan Iskandar Thani (1636-1641) when the pre-modern Sultanate stretched its power beyond the Melaka Straits and established important political and economic links with other kingdoms in China, India, and the Middle East.[24] The second historical binding tie was the collective suffering from foreign intrusions, especially during the Dutch occupation in the eighteenth century. The story about heroic struggles for independence committed by leaders such as Teuku Cik Di Tiro, Teuku Umar, and Cut Nyak Din

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[21] Schulze, In: Reid, ed., 242.

[22] Schulze, Kirsten E. (2004) *The Free Aceh Movement (GAM): Anatomy of a Separatist Organization*. Policy Studies No. 2, Washington, East-West Center, 7.

[23] Missbach 2005: 174.

[24] For further information on the pre-modern Sultanate in Aceh, see Anthony Reid (2006) The Pre-modern Sultanate's View of Its Place in the World". In: Reid, ed., 52-71.

was passed down to successive generations. For many young people within GAM, this story justifies their resistance against foreigners, especially the "Javanese colonisers". Tiro was relatively successful in inciting hatred against the foreign intruders who robbed the treasures of Aceh.

Although Aceh ethnic identity may have played a role in driving the separatist sentiment, Acehnese nationalism may not have been sufficient to generate an armed rebellion. As Antje Missbach has argued: "ethnic identity simply based on historical misconception by Hasan Tiro may not be enough to achieve GAM's purpose to obtain independence from Indonesia"[25]. In a similar vein, Sulaiman noted that it would be wrong to overrate the role of ethno-nationalist identity as the basis of the separatist movement in Aceh because the root cause was a combination of political frustration, economic disappointment, personal ambition and the vested interests of the founders of the movement.[26] Thus, it can be argued that ethnicity may not be the strongest unifying factor for GAM in perpetrating the struggle for independence.

The inclusion of non-Acehnese in the struggle for independence seems to further prove that ethnicity is more of a rhetoric to mobilise the support of the Acehnese, rather than the core value of GAM's struggle. On one occasion, I came across an ethnic Chinese fighting for GAM. Nicknamed "Adi Cina" (Chinese Adi), the young man was originally from Tanjung Balai, North Sumatra, and joined GAM during the military emergency in 2002. His first encounter with GAM was between 1999 and 2000 when he ran a logging business in Singkil and Tapak Tuan. In an interview, he admitted that he was attracted to join GAM because he was treated like a family member by GAM members and he became sympathetic toward the separatist movement after spending so much time with them.[27] Towards the end of the military emergency in early 2004, Adi was captured by the TNI and jailed. He escaped from prison in Banda Aceh after the tsunami destroyed his prison cell in December 2004. Among his colleagues, Adi seems to be well respected. Some junior members call him simply "Bang Adi" (brother Adi), while senior members address him as "Tengku Adi". When I asked how many other non-Acehnese have joined GAM, the answer was several dozen, consisting of Chinese and Javanese. As for the Javanese involvement, some ex-GAM officials mentioned that those who have joined GAM are migrants who share the feeling of marginalisation and impoverishment with the Acehnese.[28]

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[25] Missbach 2005: 175.

[26] Sulaiman, M. Isa (2006) From Autonomy to Periphery: a Critical Evaluation of the Acehnese Nationalist Movement. In: Reid, ed., 139-40.

[27] Interview with Adi, 8.3. 2006, in Lokhseumawe.

[28] Interviews with GAM's ex-governor (*ulee nanggroe*) for Linge (2.2.2006) and the ex-district military commander (*panglima sagoe*) of Lhok Tapak Tuan (3.2.2006) in Banda Aceh.

GAM's Religious Identity

Although Islam has always been part of GAM's identity, it nevertheless serves more as a reflection of Acehnese identity and culture rather than as an organisational aspiration. It must be acknowledged, however, that all members of GAM are Muslims. But, GAM has never clearly declared its idea of an Islamic state nor explicitly expressed its aspiration to enshrine the *syariah* (Islamic law) in the region. Despite reference to the revival of the "pre-modern Sultanate of Aceh" and the "re-establishment of the historic Islamic State" – as Hasan Tiro has often mentioned in his speeches and writings – GAM has never been clear on what kind of state should be established in an independent Aceh. GAM does not seem to share the same commitment to build an Islamic state as the Darul Islam movement did in the 1950s.[29]

Even after the Stavanger Declaration of July 2002, GAM's leadership – especially those who resided in Sweden – changed their position by referring to the establishment of a democratic state (instead of an Islamic state) in Aceh.[30] Occasionally, however, GAM leaders in Aceh presented their struggle in Islamic terms which involved condemnation of the impious behaviour of Indonesian rulers, the promise to endorse the implementation of *syariah* in the region, and support for requiring women to wear the headscarf (*jilbab*). But GAM commanders did not seem to follow the Islamic route.[31] My conversation with one of GAM's ex-district military commander confirms this finding. He said that he never obliged his female members (*inong balee*) to wear the headscarf. When I asked what kind of law GAM used when his members committed adultery, he plainly answered: "If they are single individuals, no problem, we marry them right away; but if they already have a wife or husband, we have to arrange a meeting and ask them to pay heavy fines". When I try to remind him of the possible use of *syariah*, his response was astonishing as he replied: "We are an armed group, not an Islamic group. We do not have time to learn about *syariah* and set up the Islamic court to deal with this problem. After all, we are not struggling for Islam, we want justice and freedom to be installed in Aceh".[32]

GAM's ambiguity toward Islam and *syariah* has been noted by a number of scholars. Kirsten Schulze, for example, argues that GAM's ambiguity on Islam can be explained by the way in which Islam as a religion and culture is intertwined with Acehnese identity and heritage. On the one hand, being an organisation claiming to struggle for the

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[29] Smith, Anthony (2002) Aceh – Democratic Times, Authoritarian Solutions. In: *New Zealand Journal of Asian Studies* 4, 1, 69.

[30] Schulze 2004: 7.

[31] Ibid: 8.

[32] Interview with the ex-district military commander (*panglima sagoe*) of Lhok Tapak Tuan (3.2.2006) in Banda Aceh.

interests of the Acehnese, GAM could not avoid identifying itself with Islam. Its leaders' reference to the Aceh Islamic Sultanate as the indigenous model to emulate is indicative of the organisation's commitment to incorporate Islamic identity in its struggle.[33] On the other hand, the need to accommodate the non-Islamist elements within the organisation and to increase international support (especially from Western countries), GAM leadership has to be very careful in talking about Islam by not perceiving it as the organisation's identity. The declaration to form a democratic state (instead of an Islamic state) in Aceh made in July 2002 seems to reflect GAM's ambiguity toward Islam.

While arguing that GAM is not an Islamic movement, Antje Missbach posits that for GAM Islam is simply an instrument for mobilising, recruiting and attracting more followers as it often used mosques, *dayah* (religious schools) and Friday prayer-meetings for propaganda. Moreover, Islam was also used by GAM to deepen trenches between non-Acehnese migrants and the indigenous Acehnese by pointing out that the Acehnese practice of Islam is more pious and therefore more authentic compared to that, of the Javanese migrants, for example.[34] Given that Islam does not constitute the essential identity of GAM, it is therefore not surprising that this organisation was not enthusiastic about the Indonesian government's attempt to end the conflict by offering to implement *syariah* in the Aceh province under the *Undang-Undang Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam* (UU-NAD or Law on Aceh Darussalam) No. 18/2001. If ethnicity and religion do not constitute GAM's quintessential identity, what reason has driven the organisation's long struggle for independence? We may point to a combination of factors such as the feeling of betrayal, long-time repression, economic disappointment, and frustration with corrupt political leaders. As William Nessen correctly argues, the aspiration for independence in Aceh seems to have grown from a steadily deepening perception among the Acehnese that they would never attain physical security, dependable economic welfare, reasonable moral standards in government, and justice for grave human abuses in the region if Aceh remained part of Indonesia.[35]

Peace Settlements: Lessons from Past Failures

Since the collapse of the New Order regime, several peace settlements have been attempted to end the conflict in Aceh. While the authoritarian government's non-compromising approach had denied every possibility of dialogue and negotiation, the democratic post-New Order governments showed a growing intention to find a peace-

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[33] Schulze 2004: 8.

[34] Missbach 2005: 175-6.

[35] Nessen, William (2006) Sentiments Made Visible: the Rise and Reason for Aceh's National Liberation Movement. In: Reid, ed., 179.

ful settlement in Aceh. The democratic leaders of the Indonesian government even allowed international non-governmental organisations (NGOs) to initiate the peace process and serve as the third-party mediator. Beginning in early 2000, a series of talks was facilitated by a Swiss-based NGO, the Center for Humanitarian Dialogue (HDC), which produced a "Humanitarian Pause" (*jeda kemanusiaan*) in mid-2000 and the more complex process of a "Cessation of Hostilities Agreement" (COHA) in December 2002.

However, a number of factors which included the lack of commitment of both sides (Indonesian government and GAM), the failure to set up the right incentive for a sustainable peace, the lack of credibility and capacity of the mediator in implementing the agreements, the failure to touch upon the key issues, and the presence of uncontrollable spoilers on both sides, had led to the collapse of the peace deals. In May 2003 President Megawati issued the presidential decree No. 28/2003 announcing the military emergency in the province and ordering a full-scale military offensive dubbed as the *Operasi Terpadu* (integrated operation), which marked the beginning of the most brutal and violent armed conflict in the region since the formation of GAM in 1976. Why did both the humanitarian pause and COHA fail to sustain peace? In what follows, I will try to elaborate four key factors that may have caused the collapse of the peace settlements in 2000-2002.

The Lack of Flexibility and Commitment of both the Indonesian Government and GAM

The lack of flexibility and commitment of both the Indonesian government and GAM had rendered the peace process fragile. On the one hand, the government was adamant that Aceh should remain an "integral part of the NKRI" (*Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia* or Indonesian United Republic). To the frustration of many GAM leaders, this expression had been used time and again by the Indonesian military leaders, political elites and negotiators on many occasions and set as one of the terms for negotiation. On the other hand, GAM leaders and representatives were also not flexible enough to work on an alternative strategy to negotiate their demand for independence. At least until 2003, many GAM leaders were insistent that a full independence for Aceh was a non-negotiable (*harga mati*) target, thus there would be no negotiation if the Indonesian government kept insisting on Aceh as being part of the NKRI.[36] GAM's inflexibility in the peace settlement partially resulted from its misjudging and misreading of the post-New Order government which it perceived as being on the verge of collapse and territorial disintegration.[37] While a peace negotiation required commitment from both sides, the Indonesian government and GAM did not show the required commitment as they

[36] Interview with Faisal Putra, GAM's prominent figure and member of the Aceh committee for the new bill on Aceh government in Banda Aceh, 1.2.2003.

[37] Aspinall 2005: 4; Schulze 2006: 243.

both failed to come up with the new concept of the political and economic future of Aceh.

In the meantime, the inflexibility and lack of commitment on the part of the Indonesian government can be explained by the internal dynamics within Megawati's government. Suffering a defeat during the presidential election in 1999 (although her party, PDIP, topped the Parliament by securing 34 percent of the seats), Megawati was appointed as president only after Abdurrahman Wahid, her predecessor, was bitterly impeached by the Parliament in 2001. Realising that her position was not entirely secure (especially in facing the Islamic coalition of the 'central axis'), she tried to acquire support from top military generals by agreeing to focus on the primacy of the military approach in dealing with the country's security problems. Thus, despite her promise to the Acehnese "not to allow a single drop of blood to be spilled in Aceh"[38], she issued a decree ordering a full-scale military offensive in May 2003.

The Failure to Set Up the Right Incentive

The early peace settlements – especially COHA – seem to have failed to set up the right incentive that could guarantee a sustainable peace. In the peace negotiations, the government needed to provide the right incentive for the separatist group in order to make it accept the terms and conditions set out in the deal. In its attempt to win the hearts and minds of the Acehnese and the GAM leaders, the Indonesian government issued Law No. 18/2001 (UU-NAD) allowing the *syariah* to be implemented in the province. Although the law was meant to give full autonomy to Aceh, it authorised the implementation of the Islamic law without clarifying how it would be codified or enforced, how judges, prosecutors and police for the Islamic court would be recruited and trained, and under what circumstances civil law would continue to be in force.

Moreover, since the law made no mention of human rights, justice, how local political parties should be formed, nor the provision of some degree of freedom for the local government to administer natural resources, the law did not provide enough incentive for GAM to participate in the political process. Thus, although the UU-NAD was perceived by the government as an incentive to settle the conflict in Aceh, in some ways it even made things worse.[39] The failure on the part of the Indonesian government to provide an attractive incentive to the Acehnese resulted from its failure to understand the root cause of the separatist movement. For the political elites, the depiction of Aceh as a distinct Islamic community has led to misjudgement about the core of the matter. The Indonesian government – at least during 2001 to 2004 – also misread

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[38] After her inauguration as president, Megawati visited Aceh in December 2001 and made this statement in a public address to the Acehnese in Banda Aceh.

[39] International Crisis Group (ICG) (2003) *Aceh: a Fragile Peace*. ICG Asia Report No. 47, Jakarta, Brussels, 4.

GAM as being an Islamic organisation. Consequently, it failed to work on some kind of economic and political incentives for the Acehnese. As already noted earlier, GAM grew out of economic disappointment with the central government and used ethnicity and Islam simply as an instrument to mobilise followers and to keep itself part of the Aceh identity. Thus, the absence of economic and political incentives had rendered the peace settlement unappealing, especially for GAM fighters.

The Lack of Credibility and Capacity of the Mediator to Implement the Agreement

Both the humanitarian pause and COHA were also hampered by the lack of credibility and capacity of the mediator to implement the agreement. To be a successful mediator, an NGO should not only be familiar with the issue but also have the institutional capacity to deal with state or group leaders and potential spoilers, to secure its authority and reputation in the area concerned, and to gain respect from the negotiating parties.[40] This is exactly what HDC failed to produce. HDC was not only a relatively little-known NGO, but it also lacked the political clout that UN peacekeeping missions or states can bring to peace mediation and implementation. Thus, when COHA was about to be implemented, HDC lacked the authority to make the parties comply with its provisions or to force them back to the negotiating table when there were impediments on the ground.[41]

For example, when COHA was at the brink of total collapse, Amien Rais (then speaker of the Indonesian Parliament) rejected HDC's demand for Indonesia's return to the negotiating table by saying: "HDC is just a small NGO, we should not agree to everything they tell us to do. We are an independent state, so we have the right to move on with our own agenda in Aceh and not allow ourselves to be dictated to by a small NGO".[42] Another problem with HDC was its inability to produce an effective monitoring arm. The Joint Security Committee (JSC) – which was supposed to monitor the implementation the agreement – was spoiled by obstruction, hard bargaining, and horse-trading which led to the failure to investigate violations and punish the wrongdoers.[43] In this situation, COHA could not be sustained and conflict was unavoidable.

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[40] Natsios, Andrew (1997) A NGO Perspective. In: Zartman, I. W. and J. L. Rasmussen, eds., *Peacemaking in International Conflict: Methods and Techniques*. Washington, D.C., United States Institute of Peace, 337-61; and Rieff, David (2004) Humanitarian Action in a New Barbarian Age. In: Cahill, Kevin M., ed., *Human Security for All: a Tribute to Sergio Vieira de Mello*. New York, Fordham University Press, 52-9.

[41] Aspinall 2005: 4-5.

[42] *Kompas* 7.1.2003.

[43] Huber, Konrad (2004) *The HDC in Aceh: Promises and Pitfalls of NGO Mediation and Implementation*. Policy Studies No. 9, Washington, East-West Center, 33-4.

The Failure to Touch upon the Core Issues

The collapse of both the humanitarian pause and COHA can also be linked with the failure to touch upon the essence of the matter. While the humanitarian pause was meant to be a ceasefire, COHA was a more complicated and ambitious process as it also included demobilisation and disarmament activities. As a peace negotiation, COHA failed to reach agreement on some crucial matters, such as how to reach a compromise between the separatists' demand for independence and the government's insistence that Aceh be part of Indonesia, how the reintegration of ex-GAM members should be carried out, and to what extent ex-GAM members could participate in the local politics.

The proposal of a 'special autonomy' (UU-NAD) offered by the Indonesian government was unappealing because the government did not seem to be interested in reintegrating ex-GAM fighters into Aceh society and politics. For example, proposals from the Acehnese to appoint GAM's top leader, Hasan Tiro, as an honorary *Wali Nanggroe* (state guardian) and to incorporate GAM fighters into the provincial police force were rejected by Jakarta. The failure to incorporate GAM into the local administration was seen as a weakness on the part of Indonesian government to work on the inclusive political process in the post-conflict resettlement. As one Acehnese Member of Parliament, Teuku Syaiful Ahmad, lamented: "How could we ask GAM to surrender if we did not give them any positions (in the local government) at all?"[44] Indeed, the lack of agenda on the participation of ex-GAM leaders and members in Aceh's political process had made the peace deal less attractive, especially from GAM's point of view. It is therefore not surprising that GAM tried to use the humanitarian pause and COHA to consolidate and increase its presence in the sub-districts (*kecamatan*) and districts (*kabupaten*). Its leaders were also able to make good use of the ceasefire to intensify their propaganda for an independent Aceh through various *pengajian* (prayer meetings) in mosques, *dayah*, and many other premises.

The collapse of both the humanitarian pause and COHA in May 2003 was followed by a massive military offensive by the Indonesian military. In the renewed armed conflict, the Indonesian armed forces (TNI) deployed some 40,000 troops to the region. Soon after the conflict broke out, humanitarian problems (internally displaced persons, school burnings, extortions, non-judicial killings, and so on) increased. Violation of human rights soon became the major concern. During the first week of the military operation, for example, there were reports of non-judicial executions by security forces, of plans by the Indonesian military to forcibly relocate large numbers of Acehnese in order to separate them from GAM members, of a wave of burning of schools by unidentified persons, and of kidnappings of human rights activists. The United Nations Sec-

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[44] Miller, Michelle Ann (2006) What's So Special About Special Autonomy in Aceh? In: Reid, ed., 303.

retary General, Kofi Annan, also expressed his concern about the human cost of the armed conflict in Aceh by stating the "deep concern about the impact of renewed hostilities on civilian populations in Aceh, particularly by the reports of extra-judicial killings and widespread burning of schools"[45]. By the end of 2004, when the tsunami hit the province, the military conflict had ended, having killed more than 800 people and leaving more than 200,000 people displaced.

There are several things we can learn from the failure of both the humanitarian pause and COHA. Firstly, a peace settlement should first of all deal with the conflicting parties by trying to help them identify a list of issues that can be brought to the negotiating table. Conflicting parties must be prepared to adopt a flexible approach in order to start dialogue and negotiation. Secondly, the identification of the root cause of the conflict is crucial to start negotiation, especially to allow the government to offer the right incentive for the insurgents to participate in the negotiation and abide by the terms and conditions reached in the agreement. Without knowing the right incentive, the peace process is unlikely to be sustained because the agreement has less appeal to the parties concerned. Thirdly, the peace settlement must incorporate the inclusive political process as a package.

Toward a Democratic Solution

The change of government in Indonesia as a result of the 2004 elections turned the direction of the conflict in Aceh. The election of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (more popularly known as SBY) and Yusuf Kalla – as President and Vice-President – in the first ever attempted direct presidential election raised new hope for the peace process in Aceh. Although SBY was a retired military general, he had been involved (in his capacity as Coordinating Minister for Political and Security Affairs) in a number of peace negotiations for Aceh, Maluku and Poso during 2001 to 2003. On the ground, however, the peace negotiations during that period were carried out by Yusuf Kalla (then Minister for People's Welfare) and his team. The two prominent figures teamed up and won the 2004 elections. Not long after he was elected, the new Vice-President began to work on an undisclosed plan for peace in Aceh. He formed a secret negotiating team involving Hamid Awaluddin (Minister of Justice and Human Rights), Sofyan Djalil (Minister of Communication and Information), and Major General Syarifuddin Tipe (former regional military commander of Aceh) and asked the team to quietly approach GAM leaders who had been in exile (in Sweden and Malaysia) for many years and search for a more workable peace solution in Aceh.

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[45] United Nations News Service: Indonesia: Annan Deeply Concerned about Hostilities' Effect on Civilians in Aceh, 29.5.2003.

Peace Talks Prior to the Tsunami

Kalla's peace initiative began to unravel even during Megawati's presidency, when he asked his deputy Minister for People's Welfare, Farid Husain, to make contact with GAM leaders in Sweden in early 2004. Husain's visit to Helsinki in February 2004 had brought the peace initiative to the attention of former Finnish president, Marti Ahtisaari, who subsequently agreed to involve his organisation, the Crisis Management Initiative (CMI), to serve as a the third party mediator.[46] This suggests that peace negotiations that led to the Helsinki Agreement in August 2005 had actually begun months before the tsunami hit Aceh. Thus, unlike those who believe that the tsunami played a crucial role in putting to an end the armed conflict in Aceh, I argue that the peace process in Aceh (constructed under the Helsinki Agreement in 2005) is a result of the ongoing democratic process in Indonesia that has raised awareness among the Indonesian ruling elite and GAM leaders of the vital importance of dialogue and negotiation to settle differences. If the tsunami did play a part, it simply increased the speed of the peace process.

The initial meeting between the Indonesian government's representatives and GAM leaders was followed by an intensive exchange of communication from both sides. On 31 October 2004, at a meeting in Kuala Lumpur, the two sides signed the so-called "Points of Agreement between Negotiators of the Government and GAM". The agreement contains some crucial issues that had never been raised in the previous peace settlements. In the agreement, the Indonesian government offered economic incentives to GAM, which can be summed up as follows: (1) the state-owned plantation and its assets in North and East Aceh would be turned over to the provincial government for distribution to GAM members; (2) the government would allocate some US$ 6 million to compensate GAM members; (3) plantation land would be allocated for 150 *dayah* (traditional Islamic boarding school) up to a maximum 100 hectares per school; (4) all mosques in Aceh would receive free electricity; and (5) GAM would turn in 900 weapons in exchange for a full amnesty that would include those already in detention or convicted, with an extra 100 weapons to be handed over when a peace agreement was signed.[47]

In order to avoid negative comments and attacks from politicians, Kalla's team kept the initiative – including the statement – informal and secret. But he made a thorough report to President Yudhoyono. In November 2004, after his consultation with the president, Kalla told his negotiating team that the government not only agreed with the signed agreement but also wanted it to be implemented immediately.[48] The involvement

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[46] ICG (2005) *Aceh: a New Chance for Peace*. Asia Briefing No. 40, Jakarta and Brussels, 15.8.2005, 2.

[47] Ibid: 2-3.

[48] Ibid: 3.

of the CMI and in particular its founder, Marti Ahtisaari, was instrumental in accelerating the peace process. Compared to the HDC in previous peace settlements, the CMI secured a relatively higher degree of authority and capacity in serving as a peace mediator. It was relatively easy for Ahtisaari, for example, to gain access to high-level authorities such as the UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, and the European High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy, Javier Solana, which proved to be invaluable in the early stages of the talks. During the process, Ahtisaari received confirmation from both the Indonesian government and GAM that the peace talks would resume in late December 2004.[49] But, on 26 December 2004, the tsunami hit Aceh following an earthquake of 9.0 magnitude off the north-western coast of Sumatra.

The Helsinki Agreement

Amid the massive devastation brought by the tsunami, the peace talks resumed in January 2005 in Helsinki. On the Indonesian government's side, the negotiating team included Hamid Awaluddin (Minister of Justice and Human Rights), Sofyan Djalil (Minister of Communication and Information), Farid Husain (Deputy Minister for People's Welfare), and Wiryono Sastrohandoyo (a career diplomat) who served as the chief negotiator. While on GAM's side the team involved senior leaders such as 'Prime Minister' Malik Mahmud and 'Foreign Minister' Zaini Abdullah as well as prominent members of Acehnese diasporas accompanied by foreign advisors. Several issues were on the agenda of the talks: (1) how the demobilisation and demilitarisation should be carried out; (2) how monitoring and implementation of the agreement should be enforced; (3) how amnesty and reintegration of ex-combatants into society should be pursued; and (4) how the future political status of Aceh and GAM's involvement in the local politics should be determined.

The seven months of negotiations through a series of meetings between January and July 2005 was not only an exhausting process, but also an exasperating activity that nearly brought the whole process to a collapse. One of the main problems was the pressure by the hard-liners in both the Indonesian government and GAM to adopt the old approach, which produced a deadlock. From the Indonesian government's point of view, between 2001 and 2003 the hard-liners – who wanted GAM to put down its weapons and "return to the bosom of the Motherland" (*kembali ke pangkuan Ibu Pertiwi*) – were dominating the solution for Aceh which, to some extent, had contributed to the collapse of COHA.[50] Parliament members and prominent figures had attempted to block the talks on the grounds that the peace negotiation was giving too many concessions to GAM at the expense of the nation's unity. In June 2005, amid the on-going ne-

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[49] Aspinall 2005: 19.

[50] Ibid: 31.

gotiations, Agung Laksono, the Speaker of the Parliament, wrote a letter to the President demanding the talks be stopped on the issues of international involvement and concessions given to GAM beyond the existing political framework (special autonomy under UU-NAD).[51] From GAM's point of view, while in the past GAM dismissing the idea of special autonomy offered by the government, this time GAM insisted on the ceasefire to allow humanitarian aid for the tsunami victims and was less interested in negotiating its aspiration for independence.

As time passed by, however, GAM began to make a breakthrough. In the second round of the talks, on 21-23 February 2005, GAM leaders announced that they would accept a solution based on 'self-government' rather than full independence. While they insisted that they still could not accept special autonomy (due to its negative association with the limited concessions offered by the UU-NAD), they would be prepared to accept the extended version of self-government. This dramatic change of position can be linked to two factors. The first was the learning process on the part of GAM-leaders: although the hard-line founder of GAM, Hasan Tiro, was still in control of the organisation, his deteriorating health condition had prevented him from participating directly in the talks. Realising that insistence on the aspiration for independence could produce an impasse, which could renew an armed conflict, the younger generation of leaders of GAM began to think of a more tangible approach that could lead to a possible solution. As Bakhtiar Abdullah, GAM spokesperson, put it: "The conflict cannot be solved like that (by insisting on demand for independence) and we have to come to terms with that … That (self-government) is the main thing on the table … in the negotiations we go with the tangible thing on the table".[52] The second factor was the pressure from the international community to end the conflict immediately to allow humanitarian aid for the tsunami victims to flow without obstruction. Moved by the unprecedented suffering of the Acehnese, the international community began to put pressure on the conflicting parties to pay more serious attention on the peace agreement. A similar appeal was also made to the government of Sri Lanka and the Tamil separatist group. While President Yudhoyono announced a ceasefire and suggested a permanent peace solution soon after the tsunami, the international community had expected GAM to adopt a more flexible approach.

After five rounds of talks (27-29 January, 21-23 February, 12-16 April, 26-31 May, and 12-17 July 2005), the Indonesian government and GAM finally produced a memorandum of understanding (MoU) covering governance, political participation, economy, rule of law, human rights, amnesty and reintegration, security arrangements, monitoring, and dispute resolution. A joint press statement issued on 17 July 2005 concluded:

[51] *Kompas* 2.6.2005.

[52] Aspinall 2005: 26.

> The Government of Indonesia and Free Aceh Movement confirm their commitment to a peaceful, comprehensive and sustainable solution to the conflict in Aceh with dignity for all. The parties are committed to creating conditions within which the government of the Acehnese people can be manifested through a fair and democratic process within a unitary state and constitution of the Republic of Indonesia … The parties to the conflict commit themselves to building mutual confidence and trust.[53]

The success of both the Indonesian government and GAM in striking a peace deal in August 2005 can be linked to at least three factors. The first was the defeat of the hard-liners through the democratic process. As mentioned earlier, the election of both Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and Yusuf Kalla in July 2004 had brought new hope for a peace process in Aceh. The reopening of negotiations following their election, according to Edward Aspinall, signalled a strengthening of forces interested in a peaceful solution.[54] Indeed, the democratic election has brought down those who opted for the primacy of a military solution in Aceh. Under the new leadership, peaceful solution was put as a priority. For example, when Ermaya Suryadinata – head of the government's security agency, the LEMHANNAS (National Defence Institute) – suggested that the government should review the whole process of negotiation due to the concessions received by the insurgents, he was immediately summoned to the office of Vice-President and was reprimanded for making statements contrary to government policy.[55]

Even the military leaders were forced to come to terms with the government's more compromising approach toward Aceh. In the spirit of 'civil supremacy' pursued in the ongoing security sector reform, military leaders left the decision on the peace deal entirely to the government. As General Endriartono Sutarto, the chief of the armed forces, put it: "The TNI (Indonesian armed forces) would do to GAM whatever the government told them to do. That is not my capacity to decide. We could keep wiping them out, shake hands, or even sleep with them if necessary".[56] Although Indonesian democracy is by no means sustainable nor consolidated, the change of leadership and the democratic learning process among Indonesian political elites have allowed the peace settlement in Aceh to evolve.

Secondly, as mentioned earlier, the Helsinki agreement was more appealing (compared to COHA) because it gave more incentive for GAM to participate in the peace process. Economic incentives offered by the Kalla negotiating team during the peace talks prior to the tsunami were indeed more attractive given that one strong reason for GAM's independent struggle was a demand for more economic control. Thus, unlike *syariah*, which proved to have little effect in convincing GAM to surrender its weapons, eco-

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[53] Joint statement by the Indonesian government and GAM, 17.7.2005, available at http://www. cmi.fi/?content=press&id=61.

[54] Aspinall 2005: 31.

[55] Ibid: 36.

[56] *Kompas* 2.2.2005.

nomic incentives (especially the allocation of state-owned plantations for distribution among ex-GAM members) received a more serious response. My own field observation indicates that in April 2006, the KPA (Komisi Peralihan Aceh or Aceh transition commission) – a newly-formed organisation to house ex-GAM fighters – in the district of Greater Aceh and Northern Aceh had formed business firms in anticipation of running plantation and logging activities. Asked what he thought about the possible activity of his newly-formed company, Tengku Usman Muda replied: "We do not know exactly when the government will hand over the land promised to us. But, at least we established the business firm in anticipation of it".[57] Another incentive for GAM was that they were allowed to participate in the local elections by forming their own political parties or having ex-GAM members run as independent candidates. While COHA made no mention of the possibility of GAM's participation in local government, the Helsinki MoU allowed GAM to form its own parties and nominate candidates in the local elections. By accepting the idea of self-government, GAM leaders began to realise that they could control local politics through democracy. As Bakhtiar Abdullah, spokesperson of GAM, put it: "We believe that our idea of self-government we put forward during the peace negotiation can be achieved through a democratic process. What we need to learn now is how to practise democracy with dignity".[58] Indeed, my observation during the sessions in democratic training confirms that ex-GAM members were enthusiastic about democracy, especially in foreseeing their participation in the local political process.

The third factor was the battle fatigue and the destruction suffered by GAM, especially during the military emergency of 2003-2004. Soon after the massive military deployment in Aceh, GAM members were forced to retreat to the mountains. While the *sagoe* (sub-district administration) was considered the 'centre of gravity' for GAM operations, by mid-2004, one year into the military emergency, GAM's supply lines and communications at this level had been seriously disrupted causing those who were fighting in the mountains and other remote areas to become isolated and run out of essentials supplies. GAM's 'governor' for the Linge region, for example, recounted the situation: "The massive military presence during the military emergency had forced us to retreat to the mountains. For months we have had to survive with almost no supply of food, moving constantly every four to five hours. Logistically, we have to survive on whatever we can find in the jungle. Sometimes we sneaked out to get something from the villa-

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[57] Interview with Tengku Usman Muda, a prominent figure of KPA in Greater Aceh district, Banda Aceh, 6.4.2006.

[58] Remarks made by Bakhtiar Abdullah in a closing session of democratic training in Banda Aceh organised by the Friedrich-Ebert Foundation (Germany), 3.2.2006.

gers' plants. We ate coconut, cassava, banana, jackfruit, anything".[59] In this situation, a peaceful solution appeared to be more appealing than a continuing war.

The Way Forward

The final version of the MoU was finally signed on 15 August 2005 in Helsinki. The signing of the MoU was by no means the end of the whole exhausting process. The Indonesian government still needed to convince the sceptics, especially those in Parliament (DPR or People's Representative Council) and the Ministry of Home Affairs, to endorse the formation of local parties in Aceh and allow ex-GAM members to run for local elections. It was this issue which seems to have created tough negotiations in the last round of the talks. The law No. 31/2002 on political parties stipulated that parties could be allowed to contest if they had an established branch structure in more than half of the 27 provinces, and within each of these provinces they must also have established branches within over half of all districts and municipalities. Given that Indonesia is a pluralistic society in terms of religion and ethnicity, this law was designed to prevent the formation of local, ethnic-based parties that could be detrimental to the country's unity. Thus, to allow local parties to be formed in Aceh, the government had to first amend the law. Indeed, the plan to revise the law had generated protests from the nationalists. Pramono Anung, the Secretary-General of the second largest party (the PDIP), for example, rejected the idea of local parties by referring to the danger of the separatist threat posed by ethnic-orientated parties in the Basque region and Quebec.[60]

However, there was no point in retracting. The peace deal had already been signed and its implementation was awaited. Despite the fact that the law on Aceh government (RUU-PA) was still in the making, signs of an agreement (in the DPR) to endorse local parties in Aceh are becoming more visible. To draft the law on the Aceh government, the Indonesian government requested the Acehnese to form their own team to submit a draft to the government. Consisting of representatives of GAM, academics, local parliament members and civil society organisations the team completed the draft which was submitted to the State Secretariat in December 2005. The State Secretariat subsequently passed the draft to be discussed and enacted by the DPR, which had already formed a *panja* (*panitia kerja* or working committee) to work on the final draft of the law. Reports suggested that the State Secretariat had substantially "trimmed" (*memangkas*) the original version of the draft. It was leaked to the media that among the crucial points wiped from the original version were clauses stipulating the independent candidacy in the local elections much wanted by ex-GAM members and the special autonomy

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[59] Interview with Husni Djalil, Banda Aceh, 3.2.2006.

[60] *Koran Tempo* 7.7.2005.

of the Aceh region to conduct its own foreign economic relations. There was discussion among GAM members that such trimming was a reflection of the government's betrayal of the Helsinki Agreement. Before the situation got worse, Yusuf Kalla intervened by ensuring that the original draft of the law would not be changed until it reached the *panja* in the DPR.[61]

The law on Aceh government was originally planned to be passed by the DPR by 31 March 2006 in anticipation of the local election (*pilkada*) scheduled for April 2006. However, when the *panja* started its discussions in February, there was a list consisting of 1,446 questions to be clarified and solved. Thus, the government decided to extend the timetable to at least July 2006, and the local election was rescheduled for September 2006. At the time of the completion of this paper, however, the draft was still in the making. Despite some sceptical comments from different groups in Aceh with regard to the *panja's* capability to solve all of the problems, GAM leaders were relatively satisfied with the development of the draft. Malik Mahmud, the GAM's 'prime minister', for example, expressed his satisfaction with the current development on RUU-PA as he put it: "Despite some problems here and there, the current situation of RUU-PA is satisfying (*memuaskan*). It proceeds according to the spirit of the Helsinki agreement. In general, we are pleased with it".[62] The atmosphere in the DPR indicated that the problem of the formation of local parties in Aceh had finally been agreed. Earlier on, nine of the ten factions in the DPR agreed to allow local parties to be formed in Aceh. The PDIP (the only faction rejecting the plan) finally gave in, after some serious internal discussions.[63]

Although initially GAM was thinking of forming a political party and competing in the upcoming election, on second thoughts it found it unreasonable to force its participation in the 2006 local elections. GAM realised that forming a political party in such a short time runs the risk of failure in the election that could lead to distrust and disintegration. Thus, GAM tended to be cautious in its plan to form a local party. As Irwandi Yusuf, GAM representative in the AMM (Aceh Monitoring Mission), argued: "It depends on whether or not the RUU-PA still retains the right of the Acehnese to form their own parties. If necessary, we can wait until the law on political parties is amended. If not, we can announce the formation of a political party. We are ready. The networks are already there, we just reactivate them".[64]

But, in the face of the upcoming local elections for provincial governor and district heads scheduled for September 2006, GAM decided not to participate but not to pre-

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[61] *Serambi Indonesia* 4.2.2006.

[62] http://www.acehkita.com, 4.5.2006 (accessed on 3.6. 2006).

[63] http://www.acehkita.com, 31.5.2006 (accessed on 3.6.2006).

[64] http://www.acehkita.com, 8.5.2006 (accessed on 5.6.2006).

vent members from running as individual candidates, as Bakhtiar Abdullah remarked: "As an organisation GAM will not nominate any candidates for the upcoming local elections in Aceh. But we give freedom to members to run as individuals, and not on behalf of GAM".[65] GAM leaders realised that participation in the local elections without enough preparation was too risky, and therefore they would target the next general elections in 2009. In a press conference, Malik Mahmud stated: "We have been thinking and have decided that our aim is not this election, but the 2009 general elections. By then, we would have our own party and be ready to participate in the political process".[66] It was clear that GAM was not interested in forcing itself to participate in the upcoming local elections. Although GAM is aiming at the 2009 general elections, it must be able to find something that can link the organisation to national politics. Some scholars predict the possibility of a coalition between ex-GAM party and Golkar at the national level in the 2009 elections. Given that Yusuf Kalla is the chairman of Golkar and his popularity from initiating the peace process is growing, this coalition is not an impossible option.

Although the peace process in Aceh is currently heading in the right direction, a setback is not necessarily impossible. This setback may come from two sets of potential spoilers. The first potential spoilers that may bring the peace process to a stalemate may come from the Indonesian government, that is, the hard-line nationalists (especially represented by the conservative elements within the PDIP associated with its own leader, Megawati) and the state bureaucracy (especially those in the Ministry of Home Affairs). In the drafting of the law on Aceh government (RUU-PA), for example, the PDIP had strongly rejected the idea of local parties and independent candidacy for the Acehnese. Meanwhile, the Ministry of Home Affairs was adamant on giving Aceh only two percent of the local revenue (as stipulated in the law on *otonomi khusus* or special autonomy) instead of the five percent demanded by the Acehnese. As Djoko Susilo, a member of the *panja* on the RUU-PA furiously put it: "If there is a setback in the peace process in Aceh, we have to blame the government (e.g. the Ministry of Home Affairs) which stubbornly insisted on the two percent allocation from local revenue to the Aceh government. We have to wait for President Yudhoyono's intervention. Then we can have a more or less acceptable law on Aceh government".[67]

The second potential spoiler to the peace process is indeed the anti-GAM militia whose presence in Aceh is notable. There are currently 15 anti-GAM militia groups spread across Aceh. The three largest organisations are the Barisan Rakyat Anti Separatis

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[65] http://www.acehkita.com, 30.5.2006 (accessed on 6.6.2006).

[66] Ibid.

[67] Interview with Djoko Susilo, Member of Parliament for National Mandate Party (PAN) and member of the *panja* on RUU-PA, in Jakarta, 21.6.2006.

GAM (People's Alliance for Anti-separatist GAM) with some 125,000 members, the Front Perlawanan Separatis GAM (Anti-GAM Separatist Front) with 62,000 members and the Gerakan Pemuda Merah Putih (Red-and-White[68] Youth Movement) with 25,000 members. During the war, these groups were helping the military to intercept GAM's operations and to mobilise an oath of loyalty to Indonesia among the villagers.[69] During the peace process, these groups were jealous of the government's special treatment of GAM (the provision of land compensation, reintegration fund, rights to run the local elections, and so forth). For them, both the MoU and the law on Aceh government had given too many privileges to GAM.[70] Thus, they would do whatever they could to disturb the process and then blame every problem on GAM. For example, in April 2006, these groups attacked and destroyed the office of a civil society organisation known as SIRA (Aceh Referendum Information Centre) in Pidie. There were concerns that these groups could instigate extortions, intimidations, and arms clashes which could undermine the peace process.[71] Despite the threat posed by the potential spoilers, the public in Aceh and GAM members are confident that the Helsinki Agreement will stand and the thirty-year armed conflict in Aceh will end permanently. Thanks to democracy, those who believe in the primacy of a peaceful settlement (at the expense of the hardliners) have been made stronger, and the insurgents have been given the opportunity to participate in the political process. Through the democratic process, the conflicting parties are able to work on the right incentives which would bind them to the terms and conditions of the agreement.

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[68] Red and white is the official colour of the Indonesian flag.

[69] *Serambi Indonesia* 13.5.2006.

[70] Interview with Saifuddin Bantasyam, a human rights specialist at the University of Syah Kuala, Banda Aceh, 5.4.2006.

[71] Tjhin, Christine Susana (2006) Post-tsunami Reconstruction and Peace-Building in Aceh: Political Impacts and Political Risks. In: John, Marei and Judith Illerhues, eds., *A New Dynamic for Peace? Post-Tsunami Reconstruction and Its Impact on Conflict Resolution*. Bonn, Friedrich-Ebert Stiftung, 25.

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Kompas
Koran Tempo
Serambi Indonesia

What Future for Papua?

Alex Flor, Marianne Klute & Petra Stockmann

The Helsinki agreement of 2005 marks the historic peace process for Indonesia's westernmost province Aceh. After three decades of violence and repression, the long self-determination conflict is in the process of being resolved. Both the Free Aceh Movement and the Indonesian government have made substantial concessions for this to happen. However, for the second most burning and long lasting self-determination conflict, concerning Indonesia's easternmost region Papua, formerly called Irian Jaya, such steps are nowhere near in sight. But they need to be undertaken, and soon, lest the volatile situation escalates and Papua sinks deeper into the downward spiral of violence and 'counter-violence'. This paper will describe the developments in and concerning Papua over the course of the past eight years and will seek to explain key problems that need to be addressed in order to reach a sustainable resolution of the conflict.

Indonesia's *reformasi* in Papua

During the first months after the fall of Suharto in May 1998, the spirit of the reform era or *reformasi* that had gripped the country could not at all be felt in its easternmost province. Its status as Military Operation Zone (*Daerah Operasi Militer*, DOM) remained in place for another five months and the security forces suppressed the now more assertive independence demonstrations with the familiar brutality: several protestors were killed during independence rallies in various cities. Sweeping arrests took place. The worst such incidents occurred in the coastal town of Biak in July that year.[1] As regards reactions in Jakarta, certain repercussions of the *reformasi* spirit could be discerned when the national parliament (DPR) sent a fact-finding team to Papua after the violence. Its members met also with the Forum for the Reconciliation of Irian Jaya Society (*Forum Rekonsiliasi Rakyat Irian Jaya*, Foreri), which had just been formed by a group of intellectuals, church leaders, NGO activists and traditional leaders. Foreri suggested that a national dialogue on a solution for the situation of Papua should be held whereby the options were to include autonomy, a federal system, and independence.

The Habibie administration reacted somewhat positively to the idea of such a national dialogue but aimed at restricting discussions to an autonomy solution. In autumn, various meetings between Papuan leaders, provincial government officials, representatives of the State Secretariat and the national parliament took place and paved the way for a

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[1] HRW 1998: 6ff for details.

meeting of Papuan leaders with the President in February the following year. The so-called Team of 100, a group which Human Rights Watch characterised as "the most representative body of Papuans ever assembled"[2] and which was led by the traditional leader Tom Beanal, got the unprecedented chance to present the Papuans' concerns and aspirations directly to President Habibie and his cabinet.

In its statement then, the team expressed the Papuans' wish to secede from Indonesia and proposed that the United Nations become involved in the independence process by overseeing a transitional government. President Habibie who had reportedly been advised not to meet the delegation, answered spontaneously to its statement showing understanding and even sympathy. "The aspirations you have expressed are important, but founding a country isn't easy; let's contemplate those aspirations again," Habibie was reported as having said. "Go home, and take my greetings to the Papuan people."[3]

In the aftermath of the meeting, however, the forces that had tried to prevent it seemed to gain the upper hand: the envisaged next stages of the national dialogue never got off the ground. All this has, of course, to be seen against the backdrop of the turn of events unfolding in East Timor at the time, where President Habibie had just opened the door for a referendum. Whereas these developments fanned hopes in Papua that independence might be within reach, the very idea of embarking on a similar journey for Papua as for East Timor was certainly a nightmare for nationalists and security forces alike.

The government's response to the Team of 100's statement, which Foreri was busy socialising among Papuans, was a renewed upsurge in Suharto-era style repression combined with a divide-and-rule tactic. In April 1999, the provincial police banned, among others things, the dissemination of results of the Team of 100's meeting with Habibie and ordered the dismantling of the communication posts (*poskos*), which had previously been set up all over the province to socialise Foreri's ideas and activities. Scores of protestors were detained after flag-raising events and charged under the corresponding notorious criminal code provisions with inciting rebellion and spreading hatred against the government.[4]

Furthermore, in co-operation with the central government a number of provincial officials began promoting the idea of partitioning the province. This was then given a legal form by Law No. 45/1999, which the Habibie government and the last Suharto-era DPR enacted shortly before leaving office and which, as one commentator put it, "smelled of the New Order"[5]. Law 45/1999 determined that two new provinces, Cent-

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[2] For this and for details on the above HRW 2000: Ch. IV.

[3] Ibid.

[4] HRW 2000: Ch. V, VI.

[5] ICG 2003: 3; for details on the following ibid and HRW 2000: Ch. VII.

ral Irian Jaya and West Irian Jaya, were to be carved out of Irian Jaya, as Papua was still called then. In October 1999, Drs. Herman Monim and Brigadier-General Abraham Atururi were sworn in as governors of the two new provinces. This occurred despite Governor Freddy Numberi who had been among those promoting partition plans then advising otherwise. The move to partition Papua was met with a storm of protests and demonstrations. The protests did not remain unheard by the new provincial parliament, which recommended to the government in Jakarta that the law be repealed.

This was only days before Abdurrahman Wahid was sworn in as Indonesia's new president. It was during the initial stages of his presidency that a breeze of change could also be felt as far as Papua, although this did not result in an end of human rights violations by the security forces there.[6] The new administration officially acknowledged the provincial parliament's rejection of the law and halted its implementation. Signs of the changed attitude of the Wahid administration were also that the political birthday 'party' of prominent pro-independence leader, Theys Eluay, in November, and the celebration of what Papuans refer to as their independence day on 1 December could take place. On the latter occasion, the raising of the Morning Star flag, which had hitherto been a "virtually assured route to arrest on rebellion charges"[7], was not repressed by the security forces.

A month later, on a presidential visit to the province, Wahid demonstrated another conciliatory move of high symbolical importance when he declared: "On this day, together with the rising sun, I declare Papua the name for this province."[8] The name Irian Jaya meaning 'victorious Irian' had always been widely rejected.[9] In this unprecedented opening of political space in Papua, two important events took place. In February 2000, exactly one year after the Team of 100 had met President Habibie, around 400 Papuan leaders from all over the province, as well as representatives from the armed resistance movement OPM (*Organisasi Papua Merdeka*) resident in neighbouring Papua New Guinea, convened and held what was called the Great Papuan Consultation (*Musyawarah Besar Papua, Mubes*). The main topics discussed at the *Mubes* were the need to 'rectify history', to draft a political agenda and to consolidate the movement. The *Mubes* established the 18 member-strong Papuan Presidium Council that had the task of leading the movement. Members represented different groups, including *adat* (customary law), women, politicians, intelligentsia, youth, religion, and former political prisoners.

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[6] Tebay 2004: 132ff; SKP 1999, 2000.

[7] HRW 2001: 10; for details also SKP 1999; ICG, 2001: 11.

[8] Chauvel & Bhakti 2004: 27.

[9] The First Papuan Council had determined to call the land West Papua. Indonesian and pro-Indonesian politicians understood the probably originally Biak term Irian to mean *Ikut Republika Indonesia Anti Nederland*, i.e. follow the Indonesian Republic against the Netherlands; for this and other details on the name issue Zöllner 2005.

The Presidium was chaired by Theys Eluay and Tom Beanal. In its concluding state-ment the *Mubes* rejected the flawed UN-sponsored Act of Free Choice, which had led the international community to accept Indonesian rule over Papua, and underlined Pap-uan aspirations for independence.[10]

Three months later, the Second Papuan People's Congress was held with more than 20,000 Papuans participating, among them also representatives from the various com-munities in exile. The Congress repeated the *Mubes'* statement and gave the Presidium a mandate to organise the movement. President Wahid had intended to open the con-gress, which his government sponsored with one billion Rupiah. But Wahid backed down at the last minute and, after the event, distanced himself from it, stressing that he did not recognise the congress and considered it illegitimate as it did not represent all sectors of Papuan society.[11]

This U-turn on Papuan policies was to no avail: in the eyes of his opponents, who were just tipping the internal power balance in their favour, Wahid had gone too far. The president's reneging on his promise to speak at the congress could be seen as the begin-ning of a power and policy shift in the administration. Wahid's policies came under a heavy concerted attack during the annual session of the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) in August that year. The MPR did not endorse the presidential initiative to change the name of the province and to allow the Morning Star flag to be raised in Pap-ua.[12] Rather, the Assembly, to which the President was at that time still accountable, ordered Wahid to take decisive measures against separatism. Special autonomy, which the MPR had already devised in its 1999-2004 binding policy guidelines as a step to be taken for Aceh and Papua, was seen as one means to this end.

Apart from pursuing the special autonomy option, the government employed both 'car-rots' and 'sticks': The 'carrots' came in the form of the 'Cash Program', special funds for Papua to be distributed at the district level over a period of four months to increase social welfare.[13] The 'sticks' were put into action again by the security forces[14] whose numbers had been increased in Papua after the MPR session: crack-downs against inde-

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[10] For details SKP 2000.

[11] SKP 2001; HRW 2001: 10f; Chauvel & Bhakti 2004: 28f; ICG 2001: 17.

[12] SKP 2001; ICG 2001: 23.

[13] For details ICG 2001: 18.

[14] The security forces, alarmed by the recent developments, handed their own list of recommendations to the Minister of Home Affairs on how to deal with the looming threat of Papuan independence. Autonomy, acce-leration of the partition of the province, i.e. implementing the defunct Law 45/1999, and creating new admi-nistrative districts (which due to parallel administrative and military – territorial – structure implied the esta-blishment of corresponding new military posts) were among the suggestions, as were a number of overt and covert actions ranging from co-optation to East Timor-style support for pro-Indonesia militias; Chauvel & Bhakti 2004: 29.

pendence supporters took place with mounting frequency. The raising of the Morning Star flag was again mercilessly suppressed. Violent clashes between the security forces and protestors increased, leaving many people dead and wounded.[15] The worst cases of violence that year were in the town of Wamena in October and in Abepura in December.

Also the time around 1 December differed markedly from the previous year; the show of military force and repression were the rule of the day: shortly before the 'Independence Day', Theys Eluay and four other Presidium members were detained on familiar charges of subversion. As reasons for the charges served apparently several activities, which had been if not openly supported and accepted then at least condoned by the Wahid administration.[16]

Special Autonomy

As mentioned, the MPR had determined that special autonomy legislation for Aceh and Papua should be released, and this at the latest on 1 May 2001. Apart from the government, leading figures in Papua also started work on draft legislation.[17] A working group was formed under the leadership of Frans Wospakrik, Rector of Cenderawasih University. As the option of autonomy, albeit special autonomy, did not have many supporters in Papua – it had been promised before but left unfulfilled – the working group aimed at broad participation from different societal groups, and it sought the advice of independent experts and discussions with members of the national parliament. The official hearing of the draft, in its 13th version, resulted in a tumult, which left one person dead and many wounded. But the law drafting process went ahead nonetheless. The provincial parliament unanimously endorsed the 14th and final version of the Papuan Draft Special Autonomy Law, which was then submitted to President Wahid. Surprisingly, the national parliament then opted for the draft from Papua as the basis for its deliberation. Finally, in November 2001, the Law on Special Autonomy for Papua, as the province was now officially named, was enacted. The law carries the signature of Megawati Sukarnoputri, who had in the meantime succeeded Abdurrahman Wahid as President.

The Special Autonomy Law contains a number of provisions, which, if implemented comprehensively, are no doubt to the benefit of the Papuan people. But, as was to be expected, the law is an extremely watered down version of the original Papuan draft.

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[15] ICG 2001: 18f; ICG 2003: 5 for details.

[16] ICG 2001: 20f.

[17] For details on the following Zöllner 2004: 12f.

One of the key problems has always been that Papua is the poorhouse of Indonesia despite the province's riches. For decades, the natural resources have been ruthlessly exploited, at the expense of the people and the environment. Profits have been transferred to Jakarta and abroad, leaving the local people in poverty and despair. The Special Autonomy Law addresses these grievances determining that 70 to 80 percent of the revenues from the exploitation of the natural resources are to remain in the province – at least for the next 25 years, after which Papua's share of oil and gas revenues will be reduced to 50 percent. Apart from this, the province shall receive a number of other special autonomy funds.[18]

Enhancing the role of indigenous Papuans in the governance of the province is another issue that the law addresses: the most notable move in this direction is the introduction of a new institution, the Papua People's Council (*Majelis Rakyat Papua*, MRP). The MRP can be seen as a cornerstone of the original Papuan draft. It is to be staffed entirely with indigenous Papuans, representing in equal parts *adat* (customary law) communities, religions, and women. Although the MRP does not have the strong standing of a second chamber of the provincial parliament, as the Papuan draft had proposed, it is still granted considerable political authority including a role in the legislative process. *Inter alia*, MRP approval is mandated for gubernatorial candidates, for provincial legislation, for contracts with third parties that touch on indigenous Papuans' rights and, last but not least, for any plans to partition the province. Measures to enhance Papuan representation in the other branches of government are that the Governor has to be an indigenous Papuan and that indigenous Papuans are accorded the right to priority appointment as judges and prosecutors.[19]

Theoretically, Papuans could also opt to defend their rights and promote their ideas and concerns through Papuan political parties; the Special Autonomy Law grants every Papuan citizen the right to do so. However, in practical terms this right is rendered meaningless, as according to other national legislation any political party in Indonesia has to have representations in at least half of the country's provinces – an unlikely event for any Papua-specific party.[20] The issue may come back to the agenda, now that after the Helsinki Peace Agreement concerning Aceh the new law on government in Aceh allows local parties for the province. This could serve as a precedent, which Papuans, among others, might want to invoke.

Papua is the province with the lowest population density in Indonesia. Thus, for decades people from overpopulated areas on other islands have moved to Papua, partly

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[18] Art. 34 Special Autonomy Law (Law No. 21/2001); for an English translation of selected provisions of the Special Autonomy Law cf. FES, West Papua Network & Watch Indonesia! 2004: 163-194.

[19] Art. 19, 20, 76, 12, 62 Special Autonomy Law.

[20] Art. 28 Special Autonomy Law; Art. 2 Party Law (Law No. 31/2002).

also through official transmigration programs. The migration has led to the fact that in some urban areas indigenous people no longer constitute the majority of the population. The Special Autonomy Law has not followed the proposal in the draft law to stop all transmigration programmes, but only determined that the governor has a say in these policies as well.[21]

Against the background of Papua's former status as Military Operation Zone and the long history of repression suffered at the hands of the security forces, their massive presence and their conduct are matters of great concern for Papuans. Security matters are, however, among the areas which remain firmly under central government control. The law allows for the deployment of military and non-Papuan police forces to the province whereby, with only the governor being accorded a rather unspecific co-ordinating role, Papuan institutions do not have much of a say in the process. Again, the draft had included different proposals.[22]

Ending human rights abuses and the impunity of security forces, as well as dealing with past human rights abuses, are other key demands that need to be addressed in order to achieve a sustainable resolution of the long-lasting conflict and to make special autonomy an attractive option for the majority of Papuans. The way in which these issues are dealt with in the chapter 'Human Rights' of the Special Autonomy Law differs considerably from the proposals in the draft. For the implementation of the central and provincial government's obligation to promote and protect human rights, branches of the National Human Rights Commission, of the Human Rights Court and of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission are to be established in Papua. The authors of the draft had envisaged independent Papuan institutions. Furthermore, as Papuans have long demanded a review of the Act of Free Choice, 'rectification' of Papua's historical record was another important issue that the Papuan draft had included. The draft law envisaged that the central government and the provincial parliament would take steps towards resolving the issue in the case that results of the work of the envisaged Commission for the Rectification of History showed that the integration of Papua into Indonesia had not been in accordance with international law.[23] The Special Autonomy Law foresees no such steps nor such a commission. Rather, it mandates as one task of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission to "clarify the history of Papua in order to stabilise the unity and integrity of the nation within the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia".[24] With this and the fact that the statutes for the national Truth and Reconciliation Commission (of which the Papuan commission is to be a branch) are strongly

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[21] Art. 61 Special Autonomy Law; van den Broek 2004: 78.

[22] Art. 4, 49 Special Autonomy Law; van den Broek 2004: 77f.

[23] Van den Broek 2004: 80f.

[24] Art. 46 (2) Special Autonomy Law.

biased in favour of perpetrators,[25] the law is a far cry from the demands of Papuans and the proposals of the draft. The issue of Papuan history has in the meantime received some attention at the international level, though, especially after in 2005 a comprehensive study on the Act of Free Choice was published. Conducted by Prof. Pieter Drooglever on behalf of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, it shows the flaws of the process.[26] The study has been welcomed by Papuans, some of whom see it as supporting their cause for independence.

The Special Autonomy Law, which was finally passed in October 2001, was rejected by members of the Papuan Presidium Council, including its chairman, Theys Eluay, who had independence on their agenda. For Eluay, it had not always been so. As a traditional leader, he had been among the 1,026 Papuan leaders who had determined the outcome of the Act of 'Free' Choice, whereby Eluay had apparently campaigned for integration into Indonesia. A member of the ruling Golkar party, Eluay had long worked as a parliamentarian during the Suharto era. He is said to have had close contact to certain groups within the security forces, including to Kopassus, the Army's Special Forces.[27]

Three weeks after of the Special Autonomy Law was passed, Eluay was murdered on his way home from a reception at the local Kopassus base. Several members of the notorious Special Forces were eventually found guilty and sentenced to, at the most, three-and-a-half years in jail – verdicts which were strongly criticised.[28]

Under the Megawati Government Partitioning Papua Back on the Agenda

Policies of the Wahid administration towards Papua had already changed following the 2000 MPR session. But under Wahid's presidential successor, Megawati Sukarnoputri, this was even more the case. Increasingly, the Special Autonomy Law, which carries her signature but had been drafted in the largest part when Wahid was still at the helm of Indonesian policies, was counteracted. Necessary implementing legislation, especially for the important institution of the Papua People's Council, was delayed – infinitely, it seemed. This increased frustration in Papua over the law, which many had viewed with suspicion all along. In January 2003 then, Megawati issued the controversial Presidential Instruction 1/2003 on the Acceleration of the Implementation of Law 45/1999. With this instruction, implementing the partition of Papua was back on the agenda. Protests

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[25] For details e.g. ICTJ 2005.

[26] Pieter J. Drooglever: Een Daad van Vrije Keuze. De Papoea's van westelijk Nieuw-Guinea en de grenzen van het zelfbeschikkingsrecht, Amsterdam, Uitgeverij Boom, 2005

[27] For details on Eluay Ipenburg 2002; ICG 2001: 12.

[28] For details ICG 2002: 3.

were voiced from different sides, and also prominent legal experts stressed that the presidential instruction was against the Special Autonomy Law.[29]

The legal problem here was that the status of Law 45/1999 had not been addressed in the Special Autonomy Law. Thus, two laws concerning Papua were in place with contradictory provisions: Law 45/1999 – although not implemented – still determining the establishment of the provinces West and Central Irian Jaya; and the Special Autonomy Law, mandating the approval of the – at that time not yet established - Papua People's Council and the provincial parliament for any partition of Papua.

Despite the protests, the central government pressed ahead with the establishment of the two new provinces: West Irian Jaya was officially established in February 2003, with its acting governor, Abraham Atururi, officially appointed to the position in November of the same year. As regards Central Irian Jaya after violent clashes, which left several people dead, the central government announced in August 2003, that it had put on hold plans to go ahead with the establishment.

Papuan leaders meanwhile pursued other ways to alleviate their grievances over recent developments and sought legal recourse: following one legal claim, the Jakarta State Administrative Court obliged the government to revoke the appointment of Atururi as Governor in June 2004.[30] In November 2003, the chairman of Papua's provincial parliament, John Ibo, submitted a petition for a judicial review of Law 45/1999 to the Constitutional Court. In its highly controversial verdict in November 2004 the Court ruled that with the enactment of the Special Autonomy Law the validity of Law 45/1999 was unconstitutional and that Law 45/1999 no longer had any binding legal force as of the date of the announcement of the verdict. However, in a puzzling legal argument that displays a number of inconsistencies the court declared the existence of West Irian Jaya as valid.[31]

The Papua People's Council

Apart from the return to divide-and-rule tactics, the central government under President Megawati dragged its feet in implementing a key tenet of the Special Autonomy Law: the Papua People's Council was only established under her successor, Bambang Susilo Yudhoyono, who had scored rather well in Papua during the presidential elections. Shortly after taking office, at Christmas 2004, he went to Papua and brought with him as a kind of *kado natal*, or Christmas present, the long awaited government regulation concerning the establishment of the MRP. The gift was, however, ungraciously re-

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[29] For one legal argument on the matter Alrashid 2004.

[30] *Tempo Interaktif* 14.06.2004.

[31] For an analysis of the verdict and details on the following Stockmann 2006 (forthcoming).

ceived – and for good reason: the government regulation further reduced the authority of the Papua People's Council, which is of such high importance to Papuans, or at least to those among them who against all odds still advocate special autonomy. By the procedural small print in this implementing legislation, the political authority, which the MRP is accorded in the Special Autonomy Law, has been crippled almost beyond recognition.[32]

It took another ten months before the MRP was eventually inaugurated in October 2005. The establishment process was fraught with difficulties: for one, the *Dewan Adat Papua* (Papuan Customary Council), representing 253 Papuan *adat* communities – i.e. those communities that would send one-third of the representatives to the MRP – displayed its attitude towards the Special Autonomy Law most drastically when it set a deadline for the government to properly implement the law and, deciding that this had not been forthcoming, symbolically handed back the law in August 2005. Furthermore, religious institutions, responsible for sending another third of the representatives to the MRP, refused for a good while to nominate candidates. And that the provincial branch office of the Ministry of Home Affairs was given the authority to coordinate the (s)election process did not help to raise confidence in the mechanism. However, in the end, difficulties and rejectionist attitudes could be overcome to such an extent that the MRP was eventually established. Irregularities in the process have somewhat tainted the legitimacy of the Council but have not led to discrediting it completely. MRP-chairman, Agus Alue Alua, who at the same time is deputy secretary-general of the pro-independence Papua Presidium Council, and his deputy, Frans Wospakrik, former rector of the Cenderawasih University and, as mentioned, a chief architect of the Special Autonomy Law, have certainly played a part in gaining the acceptance of the Council. Apparently, both the pro-independence Presidium and the rejectionist *Dewan Adat* cooperate more or less formally with the MRP.[33]

As of the day of writing (August 2006), the situation is complicated and – as the violence in March this year has shown – extremely volatile. West Irian Jaya's political and administrative institutions are largely established, it has an elected parliament and a governor directly elected by the people, Abraham Atururi by name. However, it remains unclear what the legal basis of the province will be. If West Irian Jaya is not covered by the Special Autonomy Law for Papua but by the law regulating decentralisation, the Papuans living there will miss out on the increased share of revenues from exploitation of the resources and other funds granted under the special autonomy.

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[32] For details Stockmann 2005.

[33] For details ICG 2006.

Excursus: Exploitation of Natural Resources

The protests and clashes in several parts of Papua during the first months of the year 2006 erupted on a scale not seen before, for example in Timika, where on 14 March angry crowds attacked and damaged a hotel, and in Abepura, where two days later clashes between students and mobile brigades of the national police (Brimob) had fatal consequences. Four policemen, one student, and one soldier died, and civilians were wounded. Security forces responded with sweepings and detentions. Arrested civilians held in police custody are said to have been tortured; hundreds of others escaped detention by fleeing to the highlands.

The attacks and the anger of the Papuans targeted the mining corporation Freeport-McMoRan Copper & Gold Inc. (FSX), specifically its Indonesian subsidiary PT Freeport Indonesia (PT-FI). The Timika hotel was attacked because high ranking Freeport staffs were gathering there, while the clashes between students and security forces on 16 March were the result of protests against the same corporation. Protesters – not only in Papua but also in other parts of Indonesia – even demanded the closure of Freeport's mining operations situated near the town of Tembagapura.

The anger was not new, and not only a result of the violent events a month earlier. In February 2006, after illegal gold diggers had been expelled from the tailing deposits near the Freeport mining area, clashes with police had been so intense that Freeport was forced to suspend the mining operations for some days. Rather, the resentment is deep-rooted and persistent. Mentioning the name of Freeport only evokes bad images in the mind of Papuans. Not only for them has 'Freeport' become a synonym for the linkage between environmental destruction and human rights violations. The Freeport case highlights the fundamental root cause of the Papua conflict: Papua's wealth in natural resources,[34] and the denial of the Papuans' right to enjoy their share.

The control over natural resources is closely linked with Papua's political, social and human rights problems. One might conclude that one reason why the Special Autonomy Law has not been comprehensively implemented, are the strong economical interests of parts of the political and military elite to maintain that control. Papua is too important a contributor to state and corporate revenues, especially Freeport. In this part let us have a closer look at this company and the relation between exploitation of natural resources and the Papua conflict, mainly during the last eight years.

Since the fall of Suharto in 1998, there have been fundamental changes concerning the exploitation of natural resources. Notably these are:

- Indonesian business interests are more diverse and extend beyond the former elite around Suharto and his cronies;

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[34] This is mainly gold, copper and nickel, gas and oil, timber and forest products.

- decentralisation opens opportunities for local stakeholders and at times brings about decentralisation of corruption;
- the business role of the security forces is more exposed;
- mining production has greatly increased and mining technology has advanced, thus cutting production costs but increasing profits and environmental destruction;
- forests are the last frontier of trans-national companies, i.e. from China and Malaysia, and fast clear-felling;
- environmental and social problems have reached a new dimension;
- *reformasi* demands more transparency and public accountability.

Mountain of Wealth, River of Waste:[35] Freeport

Only an aerial view gives an idea of the size of the mining area.[36] The Grasberg, the mountain whose gold and copper have been exploited since 1991, is a decapitated mountain with an open pit two kilometres diameter and a huge down gate inside. Initially, Freeport was attracted to Papua in the sixties by an ore mountain, the Ertsberg. According to Freeport itself, this region is the richest copper and gold deposit in the world. In 2005, Freeport produced more than 2000 tons of copper, 400 kg of silver and 240 kg of gold daily.[37] Economic analysts state a striking increase in turnover and profits over the last few years and expect more in the future.

This area is home to the Amungme and Kamoro. They believe that they have never received a fair share of the enormous profits of the company. Rather, they suffered from its devastating social impacts. Amidst the richness of the nature of the area they remain poor. Despite the fact that Papua is a main contributor to state revenues,[38] its poverty rate is one of the highest in Indonesia. In Timika, the town near the Freeport mining area, outsiders outnumber the indigenous Papuans by far. The marginalisation of Papuans is not only due to the fact that few find employment.[39] It is even visible in normal life: in the markets of the town, in the streets, in social life, non-Papuans dominate. Community development sponsored by the Freeport Partnership Fund for Community

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[35] Perlez, Jane and Raymond Bonner (2005) The Cost of Gold, The Hidden Payroll. Below A Mountain of Wealth, A River of Waste. In: *New York Times* 27.12.2005.

[36] Freeport's concession area covers 230 km^2; Tapol 2006.

[37] Calculated on data of: Finanzen.net / Aktiencheck.de AG 13.07.2006.

[38] According to Freeport, the company's direct and indirect benefits to Indonesia accumulate to $ 33 billion, including $ 64 million for community development projects. In 2005, Freeport paid $ 1.2 billion in taxes, royalties, dividends, and fees to the Indonesian government.

[39] The workforce at the Freeport mine consists mainly of outsiders and only 20 percent are Papuans. Amungme and Kamoro from local communities are less frequently employed. These peoples consider this dilemma to be a major source of frustration for them; cf. interviews conducted by WALHI n 2005/2006 in WALHI 2006.

Development seems to fail, despite the fact that Freeport has worked to improve its standing and employed more locals.[40] In a recent report two Papuan civil society organisations ask: "Where are the Kamoro and Amungme university graduates? You can count with your fingers the number of graduates in the last decade. These are the people who are directly impacted. Where have the funds gone?"[41]

Remaining poor, some Amungme and Kamoro, together with Papuans from other communities and non-Papuan migrants, participated in illegal gold-panning, desperate to make a living on the waste of the – in the words of former Freeport manager, George A. Mealey – "richest deposit of copper and gold in the world". The illegal digging started just recently, around the year 2000. Down to Earth argues that, initially diggers from outside arrived in the area because of economic reasons.[42] But the fact that during the last eight years the volume of waste has, compared to 1997, quadrupled, may also have attracted the diggers.

In 1995, the British-Australian Rio Tinto, a global mining giant, established a joint venture with Freeport McMoRan. After an investment of US\$ 1.7 billion, production and likewise the waste disposal rate at the Grasberg open pit mine have doubled.[43] Since then, it may be estimated that worldwide no other industrial activity produces bigger volumes of waste (overburden and tailings)[44] than the new joint venture Freeport-Rio Tinto.[45] Overburden and tailings contain considerable quantities of heavy metals. The surprisingly high level of metals is the result of the flotation process used by Freeport.[46] In the long run, heavy metals are leaching out of the tailings, and the rocks become acid ('go acid'), thus destroying the ecosystem and sensitive aquatic species in the river. The rivers, surroundings and the estuary become dead zones. The waste is dumped into the Aghawagon-Otomona-Ajkwa river system, and finally washed into the estuary and out

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[40] ICCA 2005; Freeport's response at http://icca-corporateaccountability.org/PDFs/PTFIResponse05.pdf.

[41] Yahamak 2006.

[42] Down to Earth, Newsletter 26.05.2006.

[43] WALHI (2006) argues that the rate of tailings disposal was relatively low at Grasberg's predecessor, the Ertsberg mine (1973-1991). With the establishment of the Freeport-Rio Tinto joint venture, a permit was granted in 1997 to increase ore processing.

[44] Waste rock is the overburden lower grade ore lying above the higher grade ore. Tailings are the ground ore after the extraction of valuable minerals. According to John McBeth, Freeport's tailings contain 14 percent of copper from the ore; cf. WALHI 2006.

[45] WALHI (2006) estimates that the tailings dumped over the first quarter century of mining at Freeport amounted to only a quarter of the tailings so far; three-quarters had been released in the eight years following Rio Tinto's investment, from 1998 onwards.

[46] Extracting copper and gold by flotation has certain advantages compared to extraction by cyanides: it is cheap and fast, and is therefore promising high revenues. Unfortunately, the flotation process uses chemicals, which are toxic e.g. to aquatic life.

into the Arafura Sea.[47] The drastic increase of Freeport-Rio Tintos's waste disposal of metal-rich tailings, together with poverty and economic marginalisation, may have lured people there for income.

It is difficult to estimate the real threat to the environment and to health because for independent investigators access to the area is strictly limited. Monitoring is mainly done by the company itself, which operates under a shroud of secrecy in remote Papua; independent institutions depend on Freeport and government data.[48] The government admits to having been inactive: "To be honest," says B. D. Djanuarto, Environmental and Technical Director of the Directorate-General of Minerals, Coal and Geothermal Energy, "up until now there has certainly not been any monitoring of the environment, because it is outside our priority work area"[49]. Because of the government's lacking capacity (and political will) to pursue the violations of environmental laws, multinational corporations such as Freeport seem to enjoy immunity.

The Indonesian environmental network WALHI (Friends of the Earth Indonesia), has done the government's homework and recently documented the environmental damages of Freeport's mining activities. Based on unreleased Freeport and government data, the experts consider Freeport's practices as damaging to the environment and violating several laws and regulations which for example prohibit the disposal of waste into rivers, lakes and the sea.[50] The Minister for the Environment, Rachmat Witoelar, had already warned Freeport in March 2006 to obey the law and to obtain proper li-

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[47] Cf. satellite images of the damages to the floodplain, river system, and forests in the mine's concession area, between the years 1988 and 2003 at http://skytruth.mediatools.org/content/objects/view.acs?object_id=9081. Since then, the mine has expanded and the tailings burden increased. Cf. satellite image of the tailings plume at http://www.tinylink.com/?U2nk65prt2.

[48] According to WALHI (2006), the government has stated that Freeport-Rio Tinto:

- has been negligent in waste rock management, responsible for repeated slips at the Lake Wanagon waste rock dump culminating in a fatal accident and uncontrolled release of toxic waste (in year 2000);
- should build a tailings containment dam, which complies with the legal engineering standard for dams instead of the current inadequate levee system (in year 2001).
- relies on legally invalid permission from a local official to use the highlands river system to transport tailings. The company has been asked to build a tailings pipeline to the lowlands (in years 2001, 2006);
- is polluting the river system and estuarine environment in breach of regulatory water quality standards (in years 2004, 2006);
- is discharging acid rock drainage without a hazardous waste licence, at levels breaching industrial effluent standards, and has failed to establish mandated monitoring points (in year 2006).

[49] Interview by *Business Indonesia* (2006).

[50] I.e. Law on Environment (1990), Law on Environmental Management (1997), Regulations on River Management (1991), Regulations on Hazardous Waste Management (1999), Regulations on Water Quality and Water Contamination Control (2001), Ministerial Decree on Quality Standard of Sea Water (2004).

cences. "The damage caused by PT Freeport has been so serious, but I do not bring the data," Witoelar said.[51]

What a dilemma for the Indonesian government! Enforcing the law on behalf of the environment would demand the halting of Freeport's mining activities. But closure would have, according to President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, harmful effects on the national economy.

To understand Freeport's extraordinary position and role in today's Indonesia, one should not forget the early beginnings. Actually, it is not easy to answer the question about the hen and the egg: which was earlier, the establishing of the New Order or Freeport's presence in Papua? The first Contract of Work with Indonesia was signed in 1967, two years after Suharto's accession to power and even two years before Papua was incorporated into Indonesia after the Act of Free Choice in 1969.[52] Suharto himself opened the first open pit mine at the Ertsberg mountain, whose copper was exploited for the next twenty-four years.

"President Suharto has led the Republic of Indonesia since 1967, and the calm political climate under his leadership has allowed steady economic development", writes George A. Mealey. It was a win-win deal for both; Freeport contributed intensely to state revenues and Suharto's personal wealth, while Freeport enjoyed broad powers over people and resources. For PT Freeport Indonesia and its Indonesian business partners, the last years of the New Order, 1991 to 1998, were golden years. In 1987, the company had discovered a new mountain, extraordinarily rich in minerals, the Grasberg, the richest gold deposit worldwide, and the third-richest in copper deposits. The government declared the Grasberg mine a strategic national asset. Under a new Contract of Work dating from 1991, Freeport got the right to exploit the Grasberg for the next 50 years. The company advanced to become an important player in the global gold and copper business, and Indonesia participated in this venture. The company had not only become Indonesia's largest taxpayer, but also a close business crony of the Jakarta elite, as "company officials found themselves under pressure to cut Soeharto's family and friends into business deals. Freeport McMoRan helped Soeharto allies to buy shares in the mine"[53].

The loser in this 'development' was the local community. The Amungme and Kamoro had no say in any agreement; they had to surrender their ancestral lands; they were and are exposed to dramatic social changes; they are witnesses of the destruction of their environment, and from the beginning on in the early 1970s, they had to face violence. The military was part of Freeport's security forces, and after the new Contract of Work in 1991, a permanent military detachment was installed. During the last years of Suharto's

[51] JATAM (2006) *Damage Caused by Freeport to Environment is Serious: Minister Says*. Statement, Jakarta, 26.1.2006.

[52] The pre-contract was signed in April 1965, five months before the coup on 30th September.

[53] Global Witness 2005: 10.

regime, PT Freeport Indonesia became notorious for human rights abuses, perpetrated by Indonesian soldiers, who have not been brought to justice.[54] John Rumbiak states that Freeport is not an exception. "In Papua – and Indonesia as a whole – we have seen countless examples of the military committing widespread human rights violations in the name of safeguarding some economic interest – whether its own or that of a multinational corporation such as ExxonMobil, Freeport McMoRan Copper & Gold, or Rio Tinto," Rumbiak says.[55]

Since 1998, after the fall of Suharto and Freeport-Rio Tinto's expansion of production, there has been no significant change in Freeport's security approach, on the contrary. Eventually, during the last eight years or so, up to one thousand Indonesian soldiers and policemen were permanently in charge of safeguarding the mine, and in other parts of Papua, the military presence increased, too. Freeport's security department even has its own intelligence group, labelled 'Security - Intelligence Collection' whose job is to collect information on potential separatists. In the words of the late Munir: "The TNI has degraded into a bunch of paramilitar[ies] paid to protect Freeport's interests."[56] It is believed that the military has been actively provoking conflicts to justify its presence in the area, thereby defending not only corporate and national but also its own economic interests.

Freeport is paying for the military's services, and bribing officers. Transparency about the kind of payments made is still missing, even after in 2002 two New York pension funds called for specific information concerning the relationship with the military. The pension funds had grown suspicious after the killings of three Freeport teachers and the murder of Papuan leader, Theys Eluay, and were concerned that Freeport might face risks concerning its reputation and share value. According to Global Witness, "failure to be transparent, and to install proper safeguards, may encourage a culture of graft and rent-seeking around companies that might well prefer not to pay bribes. A company can become complicit in a crime, in regions where the rule of law is absent".[57] For the first time, there have been revelations about bribes to the military.

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[54] Walton (2004) lists the following: "Torture, rape, indiscriminate and extrajudicial killings, disappearances, arbitrary detention, racial and employment discrimination, interference with access to legal representation, and severe restrictions to freedom of movement; violation of subsistence rights resulting from seizure and destruction of thousands of acres of rainforest, including community hunting grounds and forest gardens, and contamination of water supplies and fishing grounds; violation of cultural rights, including destruction of a mountain and other sites held sacred by the Amungme; and forced resettlement of communities and destruction of housing, churches, and other shelters."

[55] Rumbiak, John (2003) Remarks at the conference "Europe in the world: EU external relations and development", 19.05.2003, Brussels.

[56] Tapol 2006.

[57] Global Witness 2005: 4.

Conclusion and View Ahead

Freeport is only one exemplary case that shows the complexity of interconnected problems that characterise the situation in Papua. It is obvious that efforts to minimise, for instance, the environmental damage caused by the mine which, although a top priority, would by no means be sufficient to significantly change the overall perception of Freeport as long as other key issues like the exploitation of natural resources, human rights violations, and the role of the security forces remained unresolved.

Another example already mentioned is the partition of the province. It is a striking fact that the public debate is more focussed on the legal aspects than on the substantial pros and cons of that partition. The partition is not in the first place criticised because of its potential negative effects, but for the reason that once again Papuans feel betrayed by the central government.

A glimpse at the map of Papua gives an idea about the underlying problem: a straight line from north to south marks the border between the Indonesian province Papua and the neighbouring independent state of Papua New Guinea. It is obvious that this border was the result of a political deal between former colonial powers rather than a boundary demarcating different ethnic or cultural entities. Nowadays everybody living west of that border is a citizen of Indonesia, regardless of whether his grandfathers suffered under Dutch colonialism or never happened to see any Dutch person in this remote part of the world. But from the very beginning the self-image of the Republic of Indonesia has been its existence as the independent successor state to the former Dutch colonies in Southeast Asia, including Papua. A famous slogan of the Indonesian independence movement was the term 'from Sabang to Merauke' – referring to the westernmost harbour island in Aceh and to the easternmost city close to the border of Papua New Guinea. In Indonesia's nationalist camp, a heavyweight in the country's political landscape, this slogan is still of immense importance. It is a backbone of national pride, and therefore – despite the fact that Papua became officially part of the country only two decades after Indonesia's independence – the territorial integrity of the unitary state of Indonesia is sacrosanct.

On the other hand, indigenous Papuans hardly identify themselves as citizens of Indonesia. A recent study shows that 96 percent of interviewees are proud to be Papuans, but 52 percent are of the opinion that the culture of Papua is distinct from Indonesian culture(s), and only 14 percent identify themselves as Indonesians.[58] As Indonesian citizens their rights and duties are defined by the constitution. In theory, constitutional rights protect every citizen of a state. Activist lawyer Johnson Panjaitan cites Muhammad Hatta and Sutan Sjahrir, two founding fathers of the republic, who repeatedly stated that the ability of the state to protect every single individual is the fore-

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[58] SNUP 2006.

most standard to be applied. According to Hatta and Sjahrir the state was no longer relevant if it failed to fulfil that standard. But, states Panjaitan, the Papuans "never enjoyed a guarantee that the constitution also protects them"[59]. Whether supported by facts or not, in any case this statement reflects the perception of many people in Papua. Therefore it seems impossible to simply demand the people's loyalty to the unitary state and its constitution. It has to be the Indonesian government that takes pro-active steps to win the hearts and minds of the Papuans. There is no alternative to trust building measures, dialogue, and a genuine will to understand the factual situation and the Papuans' mindset, if Indonesia does not want to risk an escalation of the conflict.

More and more indigenous Papuans feel like foreigners in their own land. Migrants from other parts of Indonesia already constitute about half of Papua's population. Like in other parts of the world, the presence of migrants has led to conflicts over land rights, markets, political influence, and the like. But in most other places, public opinion as well as government policies tend to side with the indigenous people, whereby sometimes, unfortunately, even xenophobia is invoked. Not so in Papua. Since this remote part of the world has been part of the giant state of Indonesia, Indonesian public opinion has predominantly been sympathetic towards the migrants. Politicians, army, police, and, last but not least, the national press are dominated by 'Javanese' as they are called in Papua – native Malays, regardless of whether they originate from Java, Sulawesi, the Moluccas or any other part of Indonesia outside Papua. Indigenous Papuans are tolerated in the ideological framework of the national motto *bhinneka tunggal ika* (unity in diversity). But if there is any trouble in Papua, particularly when conflicts between indigenous and migrants erupt, almost the entire Indonesian public will side with the migrants, whose cultural background is so much closer to their own than that of the 'primitive and savage' natives of Papua.

As mentioned above, tentative improvements in one or the other area are not sufficient to bring about significant change. A sustainable solution of the Papua conflict can only be reached through a comprehensive approach that takes into account financial matters, the human rights situation, rule of law, public health, environmental protection, education and many other determining factors. Any such approach must guarantee that the Papuans have full ownership of that process and that their cultural identity is honoured. Initially, many believed that the Special Autonomy Law could fulfil most, if not all the mentioned criteria. „However, more than four years after its passage, the special autonomy law remains only partially implemented, which has been worse than no implementation at all, because expectations of change have been raised and then dashed again," comments a recent study by the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR).[60]

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[59] Panjaitan 2005: vii.

[60] King 2006: 22.

Special autonomy has not significantly changed the daily lives of most Papuans, who are in fact in even deeper frustration today. The central government has to be criticised for the half-hearted implementation of the law, in particular for the much delayed establishment of the Papua People's Council (MRP). What is worse, many Papuans saw the way the government went ahead with the partition of the province as just another betrayal. Nevertheless, it seems far too easy to just blame the central government for all the unfulfilled expectations. A recent report on public expenditure in Papua shows that quite a substantial amount of special autonomy funds was transferred to the province by the central government. However, the authors, who comprise experts from the provincial government, universities, and the World Bank, found that only a little of that money was spent to improve people's welfare. Remarkable sums were spent on government facilities, and, most worryingly, a huge amount of money was simply unaccounted for.[61]

Thus, there is an obvious lack of good governance, not only in Jakarta, but – maybe even more so – in Jayapura. Misperceptions, lack of information, and a tendency on both sides to stick to 'traditional' prejudices bear the risk that matters worsen further. While people in Papua tend to blame the central government, people in Jakarta may see themselves proven right in viewing Papuans as ungrateful and their political elites as incapable. If this holds true, then in the course of special autonomy, which many had hoped would help bridge the gap, the divide between Jakarta and ordinary people in Papua has only deepened.

But is there an alternative? Political independence, albeit attractive to some, does not seem at all like a viable solution. The idea of special autonomy has to be revived, either by improving the existing law or by a complete overhaul of the concept. There is an urgent need for dialogue between Papua and Jakarta, and it seems that there are at least some Indonesian decision-makers who are aware of that need. Maybe they are still in a minority position, but constructive support and prudent policies by the international community could help strengthen them. After all, this was possible in the case of Aceh – however, only after the devastating tsunami of 2004.

A more complicated question is: dialogue with whom? Blair A. King from the CFR proposes to hold a joint session with representatives of the Papua People's Council, the Papuan provincial parliament and of the West Irian Jaya provincial legislative. Other indigenous Papuans' organisations, such as the Papuan Presidium Council and the Papuan Customary Council, should be invited as observers to monitor the proceedings, Blair suggests.[62] It will be difficult enough to convince decision-makers in Jakarta to accept the pro-independence Presidium Council as an observer. And it is far from certain

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[61] World Bank 2005.

[62] King 2006: 19f.

that the Presidium will accept to be nothing more than that. But even if all these hurdles could be taken, it would still be questionable whether the delegates of such a diverse forum could guarantee for the behaviour of their fellow citizens. The organisational degree of the militant Free Aceh Movement (GAM), on the other hand, was strong enough to enable its negotiators to give credible guarantees on a cessation of hostilities. It is questionable whether any group or institution in Papua, or even all of them combined, could give that sort of guarantee.

For the time being, any free and objective dialogue on Papua's future will be complicated by the usage of highly emotionally charged terms, on the meaning of which there is so far no common understanding. '*Merdeka*' is only the most prominent of these terms. CFR recommends that: "Papuans should also be encouraged to develop a political discourse that distinguishes between *merdeka* (social freedom or emancipation) and *kemerdekaan* (political independence), two terms that are conflated in current discourse."[63]

According to this interpretation the nationalist camp can calm down. '*Merdeka*' does not necessarily mean political independence. Muridan S. Widjojo, an Indonesian political scientist, supports this interpretation, but continues to dialectically explain that the meaning of *merdeka* may be even more than that: "… I am inclined to say that when Papuans talk about *merdeka* they expect and imagine more than just political independence. Yet authorities in Jakarta mostly interpret their social and religious movements as simply political in nature. This may be the most painful miscommunication between Papuans and policy makers in Jakarta"[64].

In lieu of a conclusion, we would like to let Widjojo speak once more: "There should be support for the powerful efforts within the central government to change the nationalist hard-line perception and the related political judgement concerning the conflicts in Papua. We should assert the understanding that in essence the idea of *merdeka* is a set of dreams and hopes for a better life. These beliefs do not necessarily threaten the unity of the nation-state Indonesia. I believe that being a nationalist defending the unity of the state and progress for all its citizens is justifiable, but it should be done by winning the hearts of the Papuans and not by frustrating them further. It should be done by the development and implementation of sincere policies and actions that safeguard the humanity, basic rights, human autonomy and a better future for its people. Jakarta should develop such an approach to Papua that would convince the Papuans that being Indonesian is meaningful for their well-being."[65]

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[63] Ibid: 17.

[64] Widjojo 2005.

[65] Ibid.

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III

Current Tendencies in Indonesian Islam

Radikalisierung des Islams in Indonesien[1]

Bernhard Dahm

Häufig wird die in der jüngeren Zeit zu beobachtende Radikalisierung des Islams in Indonesien Einflüssen fundamentalistischer Gruppen aus dem Nahen Osten oder aus Pakistan, oder, konkreter, den Aktivitäten der Anhänger radikaler Forderungen von Sayid Qutb oder Sayid Maududi zugeschrieben. Diese spielen, wie sich zeigen wird, auch in Indonesien eine Rolle. Aber daneben gibt es auch im Lande selbst Voraussetzungen, deren Kenntnis notwendig ist, den seit Mitte der neunziger Jahre zu beobachtenden neuen Trend einer Radikalisierung des Islams in Indonesien zu erklären. Die Forschungsergebnisse der von der American Academy of Arts and Sciences angeregten und von Martin Marty und Scott Appleby durchgeführten Untersuchungen über Ursachen und Formen des Fundamentalismus können auch beim Versuch der Erklärung des Radikalismus in Indonesien herangezogen werden. Nach der Definition der beiden amerikanischen Wissenschaftler ist der Fundamentalismus ein in den letzten Jahrzehnten in unterschiedlichen Religionsgemeinschaften immer stärker in den Vordergrund getretenes Phänomen, das sich als Strategie manifestiert, mit der Gläubige, die sich angegriffen fühlen, versuchen, ihre unverwechselbare Identität als Volk oder Gruppe zu wahren. In dem Gefühl der Bedrohtheit dieser Identität suchen Fundamentalisten ihre Identität durch selektive Wiederbelebung von Doktrinen, Glaubensvorstellungen und Praktiken aus einer intakten heiligen Vergangenheit zu festigen.[2]

Auch in Arbeiten über Anfänge des Nationalismus in Asien wurden in den letzten Jahren, die früher weniger thematisierten Folgen der Identitätsbedrohung einer Gruppe als wesentliche Faktoren zur Massenmobilisierung, neu entdeckt,[3] sodass es reizvoll erscheint, die erwähnte Definition des Fundamentalismus von Marty und Appleby zum Ausgangspunkt für einen Diskurs über die Ursachen der Radikalisierung des Islams in Indonesien zu nehmen.

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[1] Für die Festschrift für Ingrid Wessel überarbeitete Version eines 2003 an der Universität Kiel im Rahmen einer Ringvorlesung zum Thema Fundamentalismus gehaltenen und bisher ungedruckten Vortrags: „Indonesien: Der moderate Islam in Bedrängnis".

[2] Marty, S.M. und S. Appleby (1996) *Herausforderung Fundamentalismus*. Berlin, Campus Verlag, 46.

[3] Dahm, Bernhard (1996) Religious Revival as Reaction to the Threat of Cultural Alienation. In: *Temenos* 32, 37-54.

Frühe Beispiele eines Fundamentalismus in Indonesien

Obgleich der Islam bei seiner Verbreitung in der indonesischen Inselwelt seit dem 15. Jahrhundert große Zugeständnisse an vor-islamische Traditionen machte und es im Laufe der Geschichte seither wiederholt zu Reformversuchen von aus Mekka oder anderen Orten aus dem Nahen Osten zurückkehrenden Pilgern gekommen ist, kann man vor dem frühen 20. Jahrhundert in Indonesien schwerlich von fundamentalistischen Reaktionen sprechen. Der Grund ist in erster Linie in der Vielzahl der in der Inselwelt lebenden Völker zu sehen, die ihre eigenen Identitäten entwickelt hatten, in denen islamische Vorstellungen nicht in ihrer Totalität, sondern nach der erprobten Methode der selektiven Adaptation aufgenommen worden waren. Wie stark sich islamische Vorstellungen durchzusetzen vermochten, lag bei den völlig anderen als im Koran beschriebenen Verhältnissen in Gesellschaft und Umwelt vor allem an der Häufigkeit der Kontakte mit dem arabischen Raum. So hatten in Aceh, im Norden Sumatras, das sich als letzte Station bei der Abreise der Pilger nach Mekka und als erste nach deren Rückkehr in die Inselwelt den Namen ‚Veranda von Mekka‘ erworben hatte, die vielen Kontakte auch mit anderen Reisenden aus der arabischen Welt schon frühzeitig zu einer stärkeren Islamisierung geführt; auch in Westjava (Banten), in Madura oder in Südsulawesi (Makassar) war wegen des Seeweges islamischer Händler in die Molukken die Islamisierung weiter fortgeschritten als in anderen Teilen der Inselwelt. So waren neue örtliche Identitäten entstanden, die im Grade ihrer Islamisierung variierten, an vielen Orten dominierten auch nach der Aufnahme einiger islamischer Vorstellungen noch indische Traditionen oder auch die Gebräuche der Stammeskulturen weiter. Hinzuzufügen ist, dass es bis ins 20. Jahrhundert hinein auch noch keine nationalen ‚indonesischen‘ Bewusstseinsstrukturen gab. Diese entwickelten sich erstmalig im Zusammenhang mit der Entstehung einer neuen Elite, die erst nach dem japanischen Sieg über Russland (1904/05) damit begann, ihre Forderungen nach der Unabhängigkeit der Inselwelt von der holländischen Kolonialherrschaft zu formulieren.

Allerdings war schon in früheren Auseinandersetzungen mit der niederländischen Kolonialmacht das Potential des Islams bei der Verteidigung der eigenen Identität aufgeblitzt. So z.B. bei den Padri-Kriegen in der Zeit von 1803 bis 1835, als heimkehrende Pilger aus Mekka, wo sie den Wahhabismus kennengelernt hatten, in Westsumatra gewaltsam versuchten, den dortigen Islam von nicht-islamischen Elementen zu reinigen, obgleich die Kolonialherren die Traditionalisten gegen die islamischen Eiferer unterstützten. Noch deutlicher kam das fremdenfeindliche Potential des Islams im Jahre 1888 zum Ausdruck, als nach einem viele Opfer fordernden Aufstand in Tjilegon (Westjava) später der Einfluss von *haji* und *ulama* sichtbar wurde, die den Geist der Auflehnung in der islamischen Welt gegen den Westen, wie er damals z.B. von Jamal al Afghani

gefordert wurde, in Westjava verbreitet und zur Vorbereitung des Aufstandes genutzt hatten.[4]

Im Unterschied dazu war der Aceh-Krieg (1873-1903) mit dem hartnäckigen Widerstand des stolzen Sultanats im Norden Sumatras gegen den Versuch der Holländer, Aceh zur Absicherung ihrer Herrschaft in der Inselwelt in das niederländische Kolonialreich aufzunehmen, nicht auf eine selektive Wiederbelebung von alten Glaubensvorstellungen zurückzuführen. Hier handelte es sich um die verzweifelten Bemühungen eines Volkes, den im Rahmen von Arrondierungsmaßnahmen in der Blütezeit des Imperialismus drohenden Verlust seiner bis dahin weithin anerkannten Unabhängigkeit zu verlieren.[5] Dass der Islam diesem Widerstandswillen seine besondere Dynamik gab, steht außer Zweifel, aber es war der Freiheitswille und keine fundamentalistischen Wiederbelebungsversuche, die diese Dynamik bewirkten.

Ein Ereignis, bei dem in der Kolonialzeit frühe fundamentalistische Ansätze deutlicher beobachtet werden können, ist später aus Westjava bekannt geworden, und zwar im Zusammenhang mit dem Kommunistenaufstand des Jahres 1926. Dort waren nach dem Ausbruch der Rebellion eine Anzahl von *haji* als Rädelsführer verhaftet worden, was unter den Muslimen neue Unruhen hervorrief und schließlich zu neuen Kämpfen führte, nachdem eine islamische Versammlung entsprechend entschieden hatte. In der Begründung hieß es, dass es jetzt keine Rolle mehr spiele, ob diese oder jene der aufgestellten Forderungen islamisch oder eher kommunistisch sei, jetzt gelte es, „unsere islamischen Brüder im Kampf gegen die ungläubige Regierung zu unterstützen", worauf die wirklichen Kämpfe von Banten im November 1926 erst begannen. Die Schlüsselrolle bei diesem Ereignis spielte das geistliche Oberhaupt der Region, der 70-jährige *kyai* von Tjaringin. Sein Schwiegersohn, Haji Ahmad Chatib, den die Kommunisten für ihre Propaganda-Arbeit gewonnen hatten, hatte das Treffen arrangiert. Vor der Moschee des *kyai* wurde die Versammlung abgehalten. Zu ihm war eine große Zahl von Gläubigen gekommen, um in der kritischen Situation seinen Rat zu erhalten, ob gegen die ‚Ungläubigen' gekämpft werden sollte oder nicht. Der *kyai* hatte darauf geschwiegen. Dieses Schweigen war dann jedoch von den versammelten Muslimen als Zustimmung ausgelegt worden. Ein Wort von ihm hätte genügt, so argumentierten später die Kolonialbehörden, um die Kämpfe zu verhindern. Aber dieses Wort blieb aus. Deshalb wurde der *kyai* verbannt, auch wenn ihm die direkte Aufforderung zum Kampf nicht nachgewiesen werden konnte.[6]

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[4] Eine ausführliche Dokumentation der Aufstandsbewegung: Kartodirdjo, Sartono (1966) *The Peasants Rebellion of Banten in 1888. Its conditions, Cause and Sequel*. The Hague, M. Nijhoff.

[5] Zur Annektion Acehs: Reid, Anthony (1969) *The Contest for North Sumatra: Atjeh, The Netherlands and Britain 1858-1898*. Kuala Lumpur, Oxford University Press.

[6] Vgl. Dahm, Bernhard (1974) *Emanzipationsversuche von kolonialer Herrschaft in Südostasien. Die Philippinen und Indonesien: Ein Vergleich*. Wiesbaden, Harassowitz, 128ff.

Das Verhalten des *kyai* wurde von den Behörden meiner Ansicht nach nicht falsch ausgelegt. Die geistlichen Würdenträger wissen um ihre Verantwortung und scheuen sich vor klaren Anweisungen, die man ihnen später zu ihrem Nachteil vorhalten kann. Dies sollte sich im Verhältnis islamischer Würdenträger zu den staatlichen Autoritäten auch später im unabhängigen Indonesien noch oft wiederholen. Auch die Rolle des nach dem Bali-Attentats (Oktober 2002) vor Gericht stehenden angeblichen Führers der Jemaah Islamijah, Abu Bakar Bashir, der jede Verantwortung für die radikalen Akte militanter Gruppen ablehnte, ist eigentlich nur so zu erklären. Auf ihn wird noch zurückzukommen sein. Zur Scheu vor der Verantwortung vor möglichen unkontrollierbaren Konsequenzen kommt das Ausweichen der Javaner und eines großen Teils anderer Indonesier vor Entscheidungszwängen. Letzteres ist auf das traditionelle Harmoniebedürfnis zurückzuführen, das in der indonesischen Kultur besonders ausgeprägt ist. Durch präzise Stellungnahmen ist die Harmonie und die Bereitschaft zum Kompromiss, von der besonders das Nebeneinanderleben unterschiedlicher Glaubensrichtungen in der indonesischen Geschichte so lange profitierte, zumindest gefährdet. Diese Überlegungen sind notwendig um zu verstehen, warum Aktionen fundamentalistischer Gruppen in Indonesien erst verhältnismäßig spät Eingang gefunden haben. Es ist ein Faktum, dass sich in Indonesien die großen religiösen Bewegungen im Islam seit dem frühen 20. Jahrhundert bei aller unterschiedlicher Ausrichtung im Verhältnis zur Kolonialmacht wie später zur indonesischen Regierung eher loyal und kooperativ als aggressiv und konfrontativ verhielten, um ihre Wünsche nach einer stärkeren Berücksichtigung islamischer Vorstellungen durchzusetzen. Das gilt für die sich auf die Lehren des Ägypters Mohammed Abduh stützende Muhammadiyah (1912 gegründet), die sich zu dessen Reformen und einer Distanzierung von der absoluten Gültigkeit der vier Rechtsschulen bekannte. Ebenso betrifft das die Nahdlatul Ulama (1926 gegründet), die diese vier *mazhab* nach wie vor als Antwort auf die Reformer betrachtete.

Es ist daher auch nicht verwunderlich, dass diese beiden großen moderaten islamischen Organisationen bis in die Gegenwart hinein die weitaus größte Zahl der Anhänger in Indonesien haben, inklusive aller sonstigen Gruppen, die sich in der einen oder anderen Form zum Islam bekennen. Aufgrund ihres traditionellen Harmoniebedürfnisses und ihrer Bereitschaft zum Kompromiss bevorzugten die Massen den gemäßigten vor dem kämpferischen Islam, der in der Kolonialzeit wie in der Zeit seit Gründung der Republik Indonesien daher stets eine kleine Minderheit blieb. Das hat sich bei allen Wahlen so gezeigt wie auch bei Abstimmungen darüber, ob die *syariat* die nationalstaatliche Verfassung ersetzen solle. Kritischer wurde es schon bei der Frage, ob wenigstens den indonesischen Muslimen die Befolgung der Forderungen der *syariat* zur Pflicht gemacht werden sollte. Dieser Vorschlag, die so genannte Jakarta-Charta, war 1945 kurz vor der Erringung der Unabhängigkeit bei der Diskussion der Frage der Rolle des Islams in der indonesischen Verfassung eingebracht und damals wegen der dort zum Ausdruck kom-

menden Kompromissbereitschaft auch akzeptiert worden. Die säkulare Regierung hat die Jakarta-Charta nach Verkündung der Unabhängigkeit allerdings wieder aus der Präambel mit der Begründung gestrichen, dass ein solcher Passus in modernen Staaten unüblich sei. Aber es gibt in Indonesien islamische Gruppen, die bis heute fordern, diesen Kompromiss wieder in die indonesische Verfassung aufzunehmen. Noch 2002 wurden solche Forderungen in den für die Änderung der Verfassung zuständigen Gremien eingebracht, aber erneut mit großer Mehrheit abgelehnt.[7]

Die *Darul Islam*-Bewegung

Die Forderungen nach einem Islam-Staat zeigen, dass es neben der großen Mehrheit der Moderaten im indonesischen Islam stets auch eine Minderheit gegeben hat, die davon träumte, einen islamischen Staat in Indonesien einrichten zu können. Unter Führung des aus einer politischen islamischen Organisation hervorgegangenen S. M. Kartosuwirjo ist es in der Zeit von 1948 bis 1962 dann auch dazu gekommen. Als die Niederländer sich weigerten, die neu gegründete Regierung anzuerkennen und so genannte Polizeiaktionen in verschiedenen Gebieten Indonesiens gegen sie durchführte, ergriff Kartosuwirjo, der als Mitglied der Masyumi-Partei Truppen in Teilen Westjavas kommandierte, die Gelegenheit, ab 1948 indonesisch-niederländische Abkommen zu ignorieren und am 7. August 1949 in dem von ihm beherrschten Gebiet einen islamischen Staat (*Negara Islam Indonesia*) auszurufen.[8]

Kartosuwirjo gehörte zu den Führerpersönlichkeiten im politischen Islam Indonesiens, der schon zur Kolonialzeit eine konsequente Durchsetzung der Politik der Non-Kooperation mit der niederländischen Kolonialmacht gefordert hatte. Er war 1907 geboren und seit 1927 Protegé des Gründers und langjährigen Vorsitzenden der Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia (PSII) H. O. S. Tjokroaminoto und dessen Stellvertreter gewesen. Als Kompromissler hatte Tjokroaminoto die radikalere Haltung Kartosuwirjos bewundert. Nach Tjokroaminotos Tode (1936) entwarf Kartosuwirjo in Schulungskursen seine so genannte *hidshra*-Politik für Mitglieder der PSII, um im gegebenen Falle in der Lage zu sein, das Land selbst zu regieren. Das politische Programm in den Schulungskursen war verhältnismäßig vage. Er verglich die politische Ausbildung mit dem *jihad* während der Zeit der *hidshra*. Sie sei islamische Politik, gemäß den Lehren des Islams. Sie sei somit keine westliche Politik und schließe die religiösen Pflichten der Muslime mit ein. *Jihad* sei daher nicht nur als physischer Kampf zu sehen, er richte sich sowohl gegen die äußeren wie gegen die inneren Feinde des Menschen. Als er in der PSII damit zunehmend

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[7] Siehe *The Straits Times* 06.08.02 und 10.08.02 sowie *The Jakarta Post* 10.08.02.

[8] Ausführlicher dazu Dengel, Holk H. (1986) *Darul Islam. Kartosuwirjos Kampf um einen islamischen Staat Indonesien* (Beiträge zur Südasienforschung der Universität Heidelberg, Bd. 106). Wiesbaden, Steiner Verlag, 93ff.

auf Unverständnis stieß, gründete er ein Komitee zur Verteidigung der Wahrheit und wurde 1939 schließlich aus der Partei ausgeschlossen. Bei Malabong in Westjava gelang es ihm in der Folgezeit, einige Kader in seinem Sinne weiter auszubilden. Als Ziel seiner Bemühungen sah er die Schaffung eines *Darul Islam*-Staates, der im Gegensatz zu dem der Nationalisten kein Groß-Indonesien sein sollte, sondern ein Gemeinwesen, in dem jeder Muslim so weit wie möglich die Gesetze der islamischern Religion praktizieren konnte. Diese Kaderausbildung erfuhr nach Ausbruch des Pazifik-Krieges eine Unterbrechung, dennoch hatte er bereits einige seiner späteren Gefolgsleute für die Idee eines Islam-Staates gewonnen. Gegen Ende des Krieges, als die Japaner das militärische Training von Guerilla-Einheiten gestatteten, hat Kartosuwirjo in seinem ‚Medina in Westjava' auch Truppen für die Hizbullah, die Armee Allahs, ausgebildet, mit der er später gegen die Niederländer zu Felde zog.

Daneben hatte er im Laufe der Zeit das von ihm beherrschte Terrain zum Teil durch Mission (*dakwah*), zum Teil durch Terror, ausweiten können und sich eine gesicherte Basis für seine Aktionen nach Ausrufung des Islam-Staates im August 1949 geschaffen. Echte Versuche einer Verständigung mit der Führung der Republik Indonesien hatte es von beiden Seiten nicht gegeben. Stattdessen hatte Kartosuwirjo schon im Mai 1948 einen Dewan Imanah, einen Vorläufer seines späteren Kabinetts, gegründet und eine Verfassung für seinen Islam-Staat ausgearbeitet, bei der die Gewaltenverteilung und die Machtkonzentration bezüglich der Rolle des *imam* stark der präsidialen Verfassung der Republik Indonesien aus dem Jahre 1945 ähnelte. In der Präambel ist die Rede von einem unabhängigen islamischen Staat, der die islamischen Gesetze ausführen werde, der jedoch auch Andersgläubigen die freie Religionsausübung gestatte. Dies überrascht, weil der Kern der Pancasila-Ideologie der Republik mit der Anerkennung eines allmächtigen Gottes, gleich welcher Glaubensrichtung, den *Darul Islam*-Kämpfern zutiefst verhasst war. Und gültiges Recht im *Darul Islam*-Staat war der Islam, höchste Rechtsinstanzen waren der Koran und die Sunnah. Vorgesehen waren ferner ein Parlament (Majelis Sjuro), dessen Rechte auf den *imam* übertragen werden konnten. Daneben gab es einen Fatwa-Rat (Dewan Fatwa), der als oberstes Beratungsgremium eine ähnliche Funktion ausüben sollte wie der Dewan Pertimbangan Agung, der oberste Beratungsrat in der indonesischen Verfassung. Im Dewan Fatwa sollten ein Großmufti und bis zu sieben weitere Muftis vertreten sein.[9]

Das größte Problem für Kartosuwirjo aber war die Konkretisierung seiner Pläne. Dies begann bereits mit der Besetzung der einzelnen Fachministerien, da es an geeigneten Kandidaten fehlte, sodass die Gefallenen und Vermissten schon nach den ersten Kampfhandlungen nicht mehr gleichwertig ersetzt werden konnten. Bald mussten die wichtigsten Ressorts, wie das des Oberkommandierenden, des Außenministers und des

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[9] Ibid: 15ff.

Innenministers von Kartosuwirjo selbst verwaltet werden. Nicht minder enttäuscht war der *imam* darüber, dass der erwartete Zulauf der Massen ausblieb. Die im Gebiet der *Darul Islam* lebende Bevölkerung fühlte sich durch die Brutalität der Aktionen und die große Zahl der Opfer eher abgestoßen. Auch die großen islamischen Parteien haben ihre Positionen in den Kabinetten der Republik nicht genutzt, den Imam Kartosuwirjo und seine Vorstellungen von einem Gottesstaat in irgendeiner Weise zu unterstützen. Stattdessen wurden die *Darul Islam*-Kämpfer auch dort als Terrorbanden angesehen. Kartosuwirjo wurde schließlich im Jahre 1962 aufgespürt. In einem Prozess bekannte er sich noch einmal zu seinen Ideen. Er erklärte, von Anfang an die Gründung eines Islam-Staates verfolgt zu haben; er bestritt dabei jedoch, je irgendwelchen mystischen Richtungen oder Sekten angehört zu haben. Er sei, so sagte er, immer Anhänger der Ahlussunnah Waljama'ah, d.h. einer der vier orthodoxen *mazhab* gewesen, in seinem Falle der in Indonesien dominierenden Rechtsschule der Syafiiten. Gutachter stellten fest, die Wahrscheinlichkeit, dass er in Zukunft von seinen Prinzipien und seiner Ideologie ablasse, sei äußerst gering und so wurde er, nachdem durch Zeugenaussagen die Terroraktionen und Verbrechen der *Darul Islam*-Bewegung noch einmal bestätigt worden waren, zum Tode verurteilt und nach Ablehnung eines Gnadengesuches am 5. September 1962 erschossen.[10]

Zur *Darul Islam*-Bewegung werden in Indonesien auch Kampfgruppen in Südsulawesi unter Kahar Muzakkar und in Aceh unter Daud Beureuéh gerechnet. Kahar Muzakkar erklärte 1952, dass er sich der Bewegung Kartosuwirjos angeschlossen habe und in Aceh begann der Aufstand gegen Jakarta im Jahre 1953. Beide Fälle sind jedoch ebenfalls als Protestaktionen gegen politische Maßnahmen der Zentralregierung und weniger als Resultate fundamentalistischer Überzeugungen zu sehen. In Südsulawesi war es die Behandlung der Anhänger des Staates Ostindonesien, die Kahar Muzakkar gegen die Zentralregierung in Jakarta aufbrachte, in Aceh war es die Missachtung der Forderung der Aceher nach einem Sonderstatus für ihre Region, der ihr schon 1949 von Jakarta zugesichert worden war. Sie hatte diesen aber durch die Eingliederung in die Provinz Nordsumatra bald darauf wieder verloren. Bei der stark durch den Islam geprägten Kultur in Aceh und in Südsulawesi war es kein Wunder, dass die Protestaktionen sofort ein starkes islamisches Gepräge bekamen. Aber vorrangig waren es, wie auch die späteren Entwicklungen zeigten, keine religiösen, sondern machtpolitische Überlegungen. Auch bei dem im Jahre 1976 wieder neu ausgebrochenen Konflikt zwischen der indonesischen Zentralregierung und der Unabhängigkeitsbewegung Acehs (GAM) ging es weniger um die Schaffung eines Islam-Staates als um die Kontrolle der reichen Erdölvorkommen in der nordsumatranischen Provinz.

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[10] Ibid: 162ff.

Im Gegensatz dazu waren Kartosuwirjos Aktivitäten seit seiner frühen Jugend auf die Verwirklichung seines Ideals eines islamischen Staates gerichtet, der auch von anderen, wie z.B. von seinem Ziehvater Tjokroaminoto, als Nachfolgestaat für das Kolonialreich angestrebt worden war. Aus staatspolitischen Erwägungen hatte letzterer dieses Ideal schließlich wieder aufgegeben. Im Falle Kartosuwirjos aber lassen die beharrliche Verfolgung der von ihm als berechtigt erkannten Ziele auch ohne theologische Ausbildung und ohne Kontakte zu Autoritäten in der islamischen Welt durchaus als einen kompromisslosen Mujahiddin und damit als indonesisches Pendant zu dem Pakistani Maududi oder dem Ägypter Qutb erscheinen. Diese zeigten in ihren Aufrufen zur Mobilisierung der islamischen Gläubigen gegen ihre angeblichen Feinde zwar eine ungleich größere Kenntnis relevanter islamischer Texte, sie unterschieden sich von Kartosuwirjo aber nicht in der Methode, nämlich der selektiven Wiederbelebung dessen, was als notwendig zur Begründung des Kampfes gegen die Ungläubigen angesehen wurde.

Demütigungen des politischen Islams unter Suharto

Die Kämpfe gegen die *Darul Islam*-Bewegung waren vor allem von den Truppen des indonesischen Heeres zu führen gewesen und der Radikalismus der Rebellen hatte bei den Offizieren ebenso wie bei den nationalistischen Politikern ein Gefühl des Misstrauens gegenüber dem politischen Islam geweckt, den man als Wegbereiter für die Unruhen verantwortlich machte. Verdächtigt wurde vor allem die islamische Nachkriegspartei Masyumi, der auch Kartosuwirjo eine zeitlang angehört hatte. Sie war eine Zusammenfassung der verschiedensten islamischen Richtungen, die 1943 von der japanischen Besatzungsmacht verlangt worden war, um eine Verzettelung der Kräfte gegenüber den Alliierten zu vermeiden. Nach dem Krieg hatte die Masyumi sich dann als einzige politische islamische Kraft neu formiert, weil sie den Vorteil einheitlicher Aktionen aller Islamiten im Unterschied zur Vorkriegssituation, wo sich die vielen islamischen Richtungen eher feindlich gegenüberstanden, inzwischen zu schätzen gelernt hatte. Als sich die Masyumi Ende der fünfziger Jahre an einem Aufstandsversuch gegen die Regierung in Jakarta beteiligte, weil man glaubte, dass sie kommunistenhörig sei, wurde sie nach der Niederschlagung des Aufstandes von Präsident Sukarno 1960 verboten und bis zu seinem Sturz im Jahre 1966 nicht wieder zugelassen.

Den politischen Islam vertrat hinfort die alte Nahdlatul Ulama, die 1952 wieder aus der Masyumi ausgetreten war, weil sie mit deren modernistischen Ansichten nicht übereinstimmte. Bei den Wahlen im Jahre 1955 hatte sie fast ebenso viele Stimmen wie die Masyumi erhalten und galt daher nach dem Verbot der Masyumi als größte islamische Kraft. Als General Suharto 1966 von Sukarno die Macht übernahm, hoffte die Masyumi vergeblich auf ihre Wiederzulassung für die indonesische Politik. Suharto teilte die Abneigung seines Vorgängers gegen den von ihr vertretenen aggressiven Islam und ver-

suchte alle Kräfte auf ein nationales wirtschaftliches Aufbauprogramm zu konzentrieren. Dazu wurde probeweise 1968 eine neue islamische Organisation, die Partai Muslim Indonesia (Parmusi) gegründet. Als sich aber herausstellte, dass sich in ihr wieder Kräfte der Masyumi Geltung zu schaffen versuchten, wurde sie schließlich mit allen anderen islamischen Gruppen inklusive der Nahdlatul Ulama 1973 in eine ‚gesamtislamische Partei' übergeführt, die den Namen Vereinigte Nationale Aufbau-Partei erhielt (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, PPP). Dieser Name zeigt deutlicher als alles andere, welche politische Rolle dem Islam in Suhartos neuer Ordnung in Indonesien zugedacht war: überhaupt keine, denn der Name der Organisation enthielt wie ersichtlich keinerlei Hinweis darauf, dass sich in ihr alle islamischen Organisationen Indonesiens zusammengefunden hatten.

Aber es sollte noch schlimmer für die Muslime kommen. Das Bekenntnis zu Allah in der Satzung der einzelnen islamischen Organisationen sollte durch ein Bekenntnis zu den Pancasila, zu den fünf Prinzipien der indonesischen Staatsideologie, ersetzt werden. Und das erste davon forderte religiöse Toleranz, den Glauben an den einen allmächtigen Gott, gleich, auf welche Weise er angebetet wurde. Dies wurde seit 1976 in den *penataran*, das ganze Land und alle gesellschaftlichen Schichten erfassenden Schulungskursen über die ‚richtige Interpretation' der Pancasila systematisch verbreitet. Die Nichtbeachtung islamischer Interessen fand schließlich ihren Höhepunkt in der Forderung nach Aufnahme der Pancasila als *azas tunggal* (einziges Grundprinzip) in die Satzungen aller noch zugelassenen Organisationen, und die islamischen Gruppen waren davon natürlich nicht ausgenommen.

Die Jahre von etwa 1973 bis 1986 wurden daher von den Muslimen Indonesiens aller Richtungen als Periode der Demütigung empfunden. Insbesondere in jenen Kreisen, die die Pläne Kartosuwirjos zur Verwirklichung eines islamischen Staates begrüßt hatten, auch wenn sie die Terrorakte zur Durchsetzung seiner Ziele missbilligt haben mochten, begann sich in jenen Jahren der Widerstand gegen Suhartos so genannte Neue Ordnung zu regen. Dies geschah zunächst durch offene Proteste seitens der Studenten gegen die Missachtung islamischer Vorschriften bei einer neuen Gesetzgebung zur Eheschließung, sodass den Studenten bald jegliche politische Betätigungen untersagt wurden; dann kam es zu blutigen Auseinandersetzungen zwischen der Polizei und islamischen Gruppen (Tanjung Priok-Affäre, 1984) und zu Bombenattentaten in Jakarta und auf den weltberühmten buddhistischen Tempel Borobudur. Gravierender aber war in seinen Konsequenzen, dass an den Religionsschulen im Lande, an den tausenden von *madrasah* und *pesantren*, die nicht unter staatlicher Kontrolle standen, eine wachsende Unzufriedenheit mit der staatlichen Politik, insbesondere dem Islam gegenüber entstanden war. Von den *kyai* und den *ulama* und ihren Schülern (*santri*) wurde diese Unzufriedenheit weiter verbreitet und in einigen Schulen wurde wieder ganz offen für einen isla-

mischen Staat geworben.[11] *Kyai* und *ulama*, die so gegen Suhartos Politik agierten, wurden verhaftet und für längere Zeit in Gefängnisse gesteckt. Bis Ende der 70er Jahre waren dies bereits 166 Personen.[12] Unter ihnen waren alte *Darul Islam*-Kämpfer, einige von ihnen waren noch eng mit Kartosuwirjo liiert gewesen und hatten versucht, in den 70er Jahren eine neue Kampforganisation mit dem Namen Komando Jihad aufzurichten.

Zu den aktivsten Gegenspielern der Neuen Ordnung gehörten Abdullah Sungkar und Abu Bakar Bashir. Sie hatten 1972 das Pesantren al-Mukmin in Ngruki in der Nähe von Solo gegründet und zum Hauptort ihrer Aktivitäten gemacht. Abdullah Sungkar, 1937 in Solo, und Abu Bakar Bashir, 1938 in Jombang (Ostjava) geboren, waren beide halbjemenitischer Herkunft. Sie waren also in ihrer Erziehung nicht ausschließlich mit den javanischen Prinzipien der Notwendigkeit der Konfliktvermeidung und der Suche nach einem harmonischen Ausgleich konfrontiert, wie die ganz aus der javanischen Tradition stammenden, und daher eher zu Kompromissen neigenden javanischen Muslime, und beide hatten in der Zeit der *Darul Islam*-Bewegung einer islamischen Jugendbewegung angehört, die mit Kartosuwirjos Aktionen zumindest sympathisierte. In den siebziger Jahren trafen sie mit den früher mit Kartosuwirjo liierten islamischen Kämpfern zusammen, die wieder zu Terroraktionen übergegangen waren. Deshalb wurden sie Ende der 70er Jahre inhaftiert und zu langjährigen Gefängnisstrafen verurteilt. Mitte der 80er Jahre gelang es beiden, nach Malaysia zu entkommen. Diese Flucht bezeichneten sie als ihre *hidshra* und sie kehrten erst nach Suhartos Sturz nach Indonesien in ihr altes Pesantren al Mukmin bei Solo zurück.[13]

Über die Aktivitäten Sungkars und Bashirs während ihres fast vierzehnjährigen Aufenthaltes in Malaysia gibt es zurzeit keine Klarheit. Nach der Aussage von Bashir (Abdullah Sungkar war kurz nach seiner Rückkehr nach Indonesien im Jahre 1999 verstorben) will er dort Handel mit in der Türkei gekauftem Honig betrieben haben; daneben habe er als *pendakwa bebas* (freier Missionar) in vielen *pesantren* unterrichtet und jugendliche Freiwillige beraten, die nach Afghanistan gehen wollten, um an den Kämpfen der Taliban gegen die Sowjetunion teilzunehmen. Er ist selbst auch einmal nach Pakistan, aber

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[11] Aus einer Statistik des Religionsministeriums in Jakarta geht hervor, dass es Ende der 1990er Jahre in Indonesien 37.362 solcher Religionsschulen gab, von denen nur 3.226 (8.6 Prozent) staatliche Schulen waren, alle anderen wurden privat unterhalten. Im akademischen Jahr 2001/02 waren in den *madrasah* insgesamt 5,6 Millionen Studenten eingeschrieben, davon besuchten nur etwa eine Million die vom Staat kontrollierten Schulen. Mehr als 4,5 Millionen Studenten und Schüler waren somit ständig dem Einfluss oft radikaler religiöser Lehrer ausgesetzt. Siehe Bernstein, L. C. (2002) Getting to the Roots of Islamic Radicalism in Indonesia. In: *The Straits Times* 06.08.02.

[12] Vgl. ICG Briefing (2002) *Al Qaeda in Southeast Asia: The Case of the 'Ngruki-Network' in Indonesia.* Jakarta, Brussels, 08.08.02, 5 (Fußnote 20). Siehe auch ICG Asia Report (2003) *Jemaah Islamiyah in South East Asia: Damaged but still Dangerous.* Jakarta, Brussels, 26.08.03.

[13] ICG Briefing 08.08.02, 57ff.

nie bis nach Afghanistan gereist.[14] Nach den Aussagen vieler inzwischen in Malaysia verhafteter Mujahiddin sollen die beiden Indonesier dort die Jemaah Islamijah gegründet haben, die über Ridwan Isamuddin alias Hambali enge Verbindungen mit dem Netzwerk der Al Qaida hatte, mit der Aufgabe, den islamisierten Teil Südostasiens, d.h. Malaysia, Singapur, Brunei, Indonesien und die südlichen Philippinen in einem kalifatähnlichen islamischen Staatenbund Nusantara Islamijah Asia Tenggara zusammenzufassen. Nach seiner Rückkehr nach Indonesien habe Bashir jedenfalls eine Radikalisierung der Auseinandersetzung mit nicht-islamischen Gruppen betrieben, Attentate auf christliche Kirchen am Heiligen Abend im Jahre 2000 gutgeheißen und später auch einem Plan zur Ermordung der damaligen Vizepräsidentin Megawati zugestimmt. Der von indonesischen Behörden im Juni 2002 an die USA ausgelieferte angebliche frühere Vertrauensmann Bashirs, Umar al Faruq, hat in Verhören in den USA zu diesen Vorwürfen detaillierte Angaben gemacht, die Abu Bakar Bashir jedoch vehement bestritt. Die indonesische Polizei erhielt darauf von der amerikanischen Regierung die Gelegenheit, die Aussagen Umar al Faruqs in den USA zu überprüfen und fand sie durchaus glaubwürdig.[15]

Die Schlüsselfigur zur Frage der Beziehungen zwischen Bashir und der Al Qaida, Ridwan Isamuddin alias Hambali, wurde erst im August 2003 in Thailand gefangen und seither in amerikanischer Gefangenschaft gehalten. Von ihm sind bis heute (März 2006) zu diesen Fragen noch keine Aussagen bekannt geworden. Der Prozess gegen Abu Bakar Bashir in Jakarta hatte zur Zeit der Inhaftierung Hambalis bereits begonnen. Trotz aller Zeugenaussagen und der Verurteilung Bashirs zu vier Jahren Gefängnis wegen Anstiftung zum Aufruhr (der Staatsanwalt hatte 15 Jahre Haft gefordert) steht bis heute nicht fest, ob es von Seiten Bashirs konkrete Verbindungen zum internationalen Terrorismus gab und worin diese ihren Niederschlag fanden. Eine Beteiligung am Attentat auf Bali am 12. Oktober 2002 konnte Bashir jedenfalls nicht nachgewiesen werde. Auf Drängen vieler islamischer Gruppen kam es im Februar 2004 zu einer Ermäßigung der Haftstrafe Bashirs von vier auf zwei Jahre, aber auch danach gab es aufgrund angeblich neuer Zeugenaussagen anhaltenden Widerstand gegen seine Freilassung.

Wesentlicher als die Frage, ob es die Jemaah Islamijah wirklich gegeben hat, wie sie strukturiert war und welche Rolle Bashir in ihr spielte, ist die Feststellung, dass erst die unnachgiebige Politik Suhartos gegenüber dem politischen Islam die Voraussetzungen zur Radikalisierung des Islams in der Zeit seiner ‚gelenkten' Demokratie in Indonesien geschaffen hat. Jugendliche und islamische Aktivisten, die im größten islamischen Staat der Erde die Politik in ihrem Sinne mitgestalten wollten, erhielten dazu keine Gelegenheit und mussten in den Untergrund abtauchen, wenn sie ihren eigenen Vorstellungen

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[14] Dazu ausführlicher die Interviews mit Abu Bakar Bashir in *Tempo* 30.09.02 und 02.11.02.

[15] *The Jakarta Post* 18.10.02 und 09.11.02; *Far Eastern Economic Review* 07.11.02 und 14.11.02; *The Straits Times* 10.11.02 und 18.04.03. Zum Prozess gegen Bashir *Südostasien aktuell* 4, 3, 324 und 6, 3, 524.

nachgehen wollten. Als Abu Bakar Bashir 1999 nach Java zu seinem alten Pensantren al Mukmin in Ngruki bei Solo zurückkehrte, erhielt er als anerkannter Kritiker der Islam-Politik der Neuen Ordnung unter Suharto daher gerade aus diesen Kreisen großen Zu-lauf.

Die Radikalisierung des Islams von außen

Bisher ist bei der Frage nach den Gründen der Radikalisierung des Islams in Indonesien nur die Entwicklungen im Lande selbst und dem Potential in den vielen traditionellen Schulen, den *madrasah* und *pesantren* nachgegangen worden, das sich in Protesten, De-monstrationen oder auch in Rebellionen äußerte. Aber es gab noch eine andere Ent-wicklung, die den moderaten indonesischen Islam allmählich in die Defensive drängte, und das waren von außen kommenden Impulse, die in Indonesien in den neunziger Jahren immer deutlichere Aufnahme fanden.

Einer der Gründe dafür war, dass Suharto seit Ende der 80er Jahre seine demütigenden Eingriffe in das religiöse Selbstverständnis der indonesischen Muslime aufgab und mit deutlichen Zeichen eines veränderten Verhaltens die Sympathie der Muslime zurück zu gewinnen trachtete. Dieser Gesinnungswandel Suhartos ist darauf zurückzuführen, dass die in den ersten Jahrzehnten seiner Herrschaft unbedingte Loyalität der indonesi-schen Armee durch eine professionellere Ausbildung der Offiziere in den Militärakade-mien allmählich brüchig zu werden drohte. Das Ende des alten Systems, des so genann-ten *bapakisme*, auf dem die unbedingte Loyalität der Soldaten zu ihren Vorgesetzten bis hin zum Präsidenten beruhte, war abzusehen. Als neue solide Basis seiner – trotz allen demokratischen Gepräges – absoluten Herrschaft hatte sich der Muslim Suharto offen-sichtlich die große Mehrheit des moderaten indonesischen Islams ausgesucht. Vielleicht war ihm bewusst geworden, dass er mit dem Zwang der Anerkennung der säkularen Pancasila als alleinigem Grundprinzip aller Vereinigungen die Gefühle der indonesi-schen Muslime stärker verletzt hatte, als es ihm selbst zunächst deutlich geworden war. Wollte er die Sympathie der Muslime neu gewinnen, so war spektakuläres Entgegen-kommen fällig. Eingeleitet wurde die ‚neue Politik‘ im Jahre 1990 durch seine offizielle Teilnahme an der Pilgerfahrt nach Mekka, sodann ging er an die Erfüllung anderer isla-mischer Wünsche, die bisher stets ignoriert worden waren. Dazu gehörte, dass der Is-lam in den Lehrplänen der Schulen stärkere Berücksichtigung fand, dass islamische Ge-richte mehr Autorität erhielten und dass Versuche zur Einrichtung islamischer Banken eine staatliche Förderung erfuhren.[16]

Als wichtigste neue Einrichtung sollte sich aber ICMI, der Bund indonesischer muslimi-scher Intellektueller erweisen, der Ende 1990 unter dem Vorsitz von Suhartos Günst-

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[16] Dahm Bernhard in B. Dahm und R. Ptak, Hrgs. (1999) *Südostasienhandbuch*. München, C.H. Beck, 247.

ling Habibie gegründet wurde. Schon bald stellte ICMI unter Verweis auf die große islamische Mehrheit in der Bevölkerung Forderungen nach stärkerer Berücksichtigung von Muslimen bei der Besetzung wichtiger Ämter in der Regierung, in der Verwaltung und im Bildungswesen. Dadurch entstand Unruhe vor allem in den Kreisen der religiösen Minderheiten, von denen viele aufgrund einer besseren Ausbildung an christlichen Schulen und Universitäten im Gefolge des jetzt geforderten Proporzsystems aus ihren Ämtern verdrängt zu werden drohten. Einflussreiche Politiker im Führungsstab der ICMI, wie der Vizevorsitzende der Muhammadiyah Amien Rais, der arabischer Herkunft war und schon aus diesem Grunde wenig Verständnis für das traditionelle Ringen der Javaner nach Ausgleich und Kompromissen hatte, brachten mit ihrer Forderung nach einer islamischen Gesellschaft eine bislang ungewohnte Schärfe in das Verhältnis der bislang zumeist friedlich nebeneinander lebenden Religionen. Abdurrahman Wahid, einer der bekanntesten islamischen javanischen Intellektuellen und Führer der moderaten Massenorganisation Nahdlatul Ulama, trat nicht in die ICMI ein, weil er in der Forderung nach einer islamischen Gesellschaft den versteckten Versuch sah, in Indonesien einen islamischen Staat zu errichten. Er erklärte: Für ihn bedeute der Begriff ,islamische Gesellschaft' Verrat an der indonesischen Verfassung, weil auf diese Weise nichtislamische Einwohner Indonesiens zu Bürgern zweiter Klasse degradiert werden würden. Er forderte stattdessen eine indonesische Gesellschaft, in der die Muslime stark seien, und unter ,stark' wollte er verstanden wissen, dass sie in guter Zusammenarbeit ihre Differenzen überwanden und ihre Wünsche auf demokratischem Wege durchsetzen konnten. Die ICMI hatte nach seiner Ansicht die Funktion eines trojanischen Pferdes, das durch eine Abkehr von der durch die Pancasila garantierten religiösen Toleranz die Politik manipulieren und re-konfessionalisieren wollte.[17]

Amien Rais, der in den USA Politikwissenschaft studiert hatte und dort auch promoviert worden war, wies die Anschuldigungen von Abdurrahman Wahid zurück und betrachtete gerade die Forderung nach Verwirklichung des Proporzsystems als einen wichtigen Schritt auf dem Wege zur Demokratisierung. Das wiederum bedeutete für ihn eine stärkere Beteiligung des Islams in der indonesischen Politik, die notwendig sei zur Verhinderung einer ,schleichenden Christianisierung'. Durch die von ihm und einigen Gleichgesinnten entfachte Diskussion und die Aktivitäten von ICMI zur Durchsetzung der neuen Forderungen wuchs im Laufe der neunziger Jahre das Spannungsfeld zwischen den religiösen Gruppen an und wurde der Boden für die radikalen Aktionen vorbereitet, die sogleich nach Suhartos Sturz im Jahre 1998 begannen. Amien Rais, der diesen Sturz aktiv mit herbeigeführt hatte, trat damals als Vorsitzender der inzwischen von ihm geführten Muhammadiyah zurück, weil er bei den Wahlen im Juni 1999 die Nachfolge von General Suharto anstrebte. Um auch die Mitglieder des moderaten Islams zu

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[17] Ramage, Douglas E. (1995) *Politics in Indonesia. Democracy, Islam and the Ideology of Tolerance.* London and New York, Routledge, 62ff.

gewinnen, gab er sich jetzt ganz als Mann der Mitte und gründete vor der Wahl eine Partei der nationalen Sammlung (Partai Amanat Nasional, PAN), in der auch nicht-islamische Organisationen vertreten waren. Umso größer war daher seine Enttäuschung, als er bei der Wahl nicht einmal fünf Millionen Stimmen erhielt. Seine Partei erlangte insgesamt 35 Mandate. Weit vor ihm lagen die säkularen Parteien wie PDI-P (Megawati) mit 25 Millionen Stimmen oder 154 Mandaten, die frühere Partei der Anhänger Suhartos (Golkar) mit 120 Mandaten und selbst die konkurrierenden islamischen Parteien wie die PKB (Abdurrahman Wahid nahe stehend) und die alte PPP erhielten mit 58 bzw. 51 erheblich mehr Sitze als die Partei von Rais.[18]

Dieses Wahlergebnis zeigt, dass die indonesischen Bevölkerung in ihrer überwiegenden Mehrheit die neuerliche Politisierung des Islams nicht billigte, nur neun Prozent der Wähler hatten für eine islamische Gruppe votiert, die sich gelegentlich zu radikalen Parolen bekannte. Auch Amien Rais hatte seine Kehrtwendung zur Mitte kurz vor den Wahlen nichts gebracht. Aber das besagt nicht, dass der seit einigen Jahren gepredigte Radikalismus in Indonesien keinerlei Folgen gehabt hätte. Im außer-parlamentarischen Raum hatte es eine Anzahl von Gruppengründungen gegeben, die die neuen Forderungen zunächst diskutierten und bald auch versuchten, sie in begrenztem Rahmen durchzusetzen. So gab es den Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia, der sich schon in der Zeit der Demütigung des indonesischen Islams gebildet hatte, der geradezu zu einer „support base for 'fundamentalistic' thinking in Islamic circles" wurde, der für die Anerkennung der Jakarta-Charta in der indonesischen Verfassung warb und schon früh vor angeblich fortgesetzten Bemühungen zur Christianisierung Indonesiens warnte. 1987 hatte der Rat zur Gründung eines Solidaritätskomitees für die islamische Welt (KISDI) aufgerufen, das sich zunächst für die Unterstützung bedrohter islamischer Völker in der Welt (Palästina, Afghanistan, Bosnien-Herzegowina und Mindanao) einsetzte, sich dann aber im weiteren Verlauf der 1990er Jahre mehr und mehr auf indonesische Konflikt-Regionen zu konzentrieren begann.[19]

Schon bald nach dem Sturz Suhartos wurde in Jakarta im August 1998 die Front der Verteidiger des Islams (Front Pembela Islam, FPI) gegründet. Sie hatte das erklärte Ziel auf Dauer die volle Verwirklichung der islamischen Gesetze durchzusetzen, auch wenn sie im Augenblick noch darauf verzichtete, einen islamischen Staat in Indonesien zu fordern. Sie hatte einen paramilitärischen Flügel, der sich aus den religiösen Schulen und arbeitslosen Jugendlichen rekrutierte, die in Jakarta bald den ‚Islam beleidigende Etablissements' wie Bars, Casinos und Bordelle überfielen, Schutzgelder erpressten und unter anderem Gäste attackierten. Es dauerte nicht lange, bis die ersten Überfälle gegen christliche Gemeinschaften gemeldet wurden. Der Anführer der FPI war Habib Mu-

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[18] *The Jakarta Post* 27.07.99.

[19] Vgl. ICG Briefing (2001) *Indonesia: Violence and Radical Muslims.* Jakarta, Brussels, 10.10.01, 11ff.

hammad Rizieq, ein religiöser Lehrer von arabischer Abstammung, damals etwa Mitte dreißig, der in Saudi-Arabien erzogen worden war und wohl noch weniger Verständnis für javanisch-synkretistisches Denken aufbrachte als Amien Rais.

Eine weitere Organisation, die den Radikalismus unter den indonesischen Muslimen verbreitete, war das ebenfalls im Jahre 1998 in Yogyakarta gegründete Forum Kommunikasi Ahlus Sunnah wal Jamaah (Kommunikationsforum der Anhänger der Sunnah). Sie machte sich vor allem die Verteidigung angeblich bedrohter islamischer Gruppen in Indonesien zum Ziel. Als es 1999 im Rahmen der Proporzforderungen bei Neubesetzungen von Ämtern in den Molukken zu Kämpfen zwischen Christen und Muslimen kam, gerieten letztere in der traditionell christlichen Region in die Defensive und es sah aus, als könnten sie die Auseinandersetzungen verlieren. In dieser Situation gründete das Kommunikationsforum Anfang des Jahres 2000 die Laskar Jihad (Kampfgruppe Heiliger Krieg). Ihr militärisches Training wurde in der Nähe von Bogor nicht weit von Jakarta entfernt durchgeführt. Obgleich der inzwischen zum Präsidenten Indonesiens gewählte Abdurrahman Wahid das Trainingslager schließen ließ und befohlen hatte, zu verhindern, dass Einheiten nach den Molukken eingeschifft wurden, gelang es Tausenden von *jihad*-Kämpfern dorthin zu gelangen und die Kämpfe gegen die Christen wieder aufzunehmen. Dies war möglich, weil Teile der indonesischen Streitkräfte die Anordnungen des neuen Präsidenten schlicht ignorierten und Forderungen der radikalen Muslime für sie offensichtlich wichtiger waren als die Anordnungen der Zentralregierung. So weit war es zwei Jahre nach dem Sturz Suhartos also bereits gekommen und zum ersten Mal kam echte Besorgnis auf, dass die militanten Kräfte im indonesischen Islam den moderaten Islam an die Seite drängen könnten.

Anführer der Laskar Jihad war der erst 1961 geborene *ustad* oder Religionslehrer Ja'afar Umar Thalib.[20] Von beiden Elternseiten her war er arabisch-jemenitischer Herkunft, er hatte in Ostjava verschiedene Religionsschulen besucht, bevor er in Jakarta ein arabisch-indonesischen Religionsinstitut besuchte. Das Studium brach er aber wegen unterschiedlicher Auffassungen über die *syariat* mit dem dafür zuständigen Dozenten ohne Examen ab. Das gleiche geschah ein paar Jahre später in Pakistan, wo er am Maududi-Institut studierte, auch hier kam es wegen unterschiedlicher Auffassungen nicht zu einem ordnungsgemäßen Abschluss seines Studiums. Stattdessen reiste er zu den Taliban nach Afghanistan, wo er Osama bin Laden kennen lernte. Dessen Islam-Kenntnisse fand er ziemlich ‚flach', was er nach dem Attentat vom 11. September 2001 auch öffentlich in Indonesien verkündete. Seine Ausbildung zum *ustad* hat er schließlich in Nord Jemen abgeschlossen, wo er Anfang der 1990er Jahre studierte. Nach seiner Rückkehr nach Indonesien gründete er 1993 in Yogyakarta das Pesantren Ihya'us Sunnah, von wo aus er einen Reform-Islam nach seinen Vorstellungen verkündete. In ei-

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[20] *Tempo Interaktif* 24.05.02.

nem Interview erklärte er: „Ich bin nicht radikal, sondern ein Intellektueller. Das politische Prinzip, dem ich folge, ist zunächst die wissenschaftliche Erfassung eines Problems und danach dessen verantwortungsbewusste Lösung."[21]

Vielleicht ist er diesem Prinzip eine Zeit lang gefolgt, aber nach der Gründung der Laskar Jihad zum heiligen Krieg gegen die Christen in den Molukken war es damit vorbei. Auch aufgrund der von ihm verordneten Steinigung einer angeblichen Ehebrecherin im März 2001[22] und der öffentlichen Aufforderung bei einem Vortrag, die damalige Vizepräsidentin Megawati Sukarnoputri zu töten, kann von „wissenschaftlichem Durchdringen" und „verantwortungsvollen Lösungen" wohl kaum noch die Rede sein. Daneben ist wiederholt seine Unkenntnis von wesentlichen Elementen des islamischen Glaubens in öffentlichen Diskussionen mit dem islamischen Vorzeige-Intellektuellen Indonesiens, Nurcholish Madjid, dem Gründer der privaten islamischen Universität Paramadina, in peinlicher Weise deutlich geworden. Das alles besagte eher, dass Ja'far Umar Thalib geradezu als Prototyp eines islamischen Fundamentalisten angesehen werden kann: Er nimmt aus den heiligen Schriften was ihm gerade wichtig erscheint und versucht dies mit dem Appell ‚Islam in Gefahr' in brutaler Weise durchzusetzen. Ein weiterer Aspekt des Fundamentalismus, der allen Religionen offensichtlich eigen ist, ist der, dass sich die Vertreter radikaler Ideen niemals in einer einheitlichen Organisation zusammenfinden können und dass sie über die Auslegung von Doktrinen und anderen Themen, die Außenstehende als unbedeutend ansehen würden, oft hoffnungslos zerstritten sind.

Das lärmende Auftreten einer größeren Zahl islamischer Gruppen nach dem 11. September bei Anlässen wie den Massendemonstrationen gegen die amerikanischen Angriffe in Afghanistan und im Irak täuscht somit eine Gemeinsamkeit vor, die de facto noch längst nicht existiert. Dass sich überhaupt so viele Indonesier, die sich traditionell von Demonstrationen eher fernhalten, in den letzten Jahren solchen Protesten in großen Scharen angeschlossen haben, ist eine Reaktion auf die lange Unterdrückung der Meinungsfreiheit und demokratischer Prinzipien, denen in der letzten Phase der neuen Ordnung unter Suharto nur noch akklamatorische Funktionen zugebilligt worden waren. Aber dieser ‚Aufbruch' war, abgesehen von vagen Forderungen nach mehr Demokratie, zunächst noch weitgehend ziellos geblieben. Auf diese Weise bot sich den im arabischen Raum ausgebildeten Personen eine gute Gelegenheit, ihre dort erworbenen Vorstellungen in dem nach neuen Führerpersönlichkeiten suchenden Indonesien zu verbreiten.

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[21] Ibid: 3, "Saya tidak radikal. Saya lebih bersikap intelektual ilmiah dalam memandang berbagai permasalahan. Artinya, prinsip politik yang saya anut itu bisa didiskusikan secara ilmiah dan bisa dipertanggungdjawabkan."

[22] ICG Briefing 10.10.01, 13.

Zusammenfassung

Alle drei hier etwas ausführlicher diskutierten Fundamentalisten waren im Zusammenhang mit dem Attentat auf Bali vom 12. Oktober 2002 und den darauf erlassenen neuen Anti-Terror-Gesetzen von den indonesischen Behörden bald in Haft genommen worden. Ja'far Umar Thalib war wegen seiner Aufrufe zur Gewaltanwendung schon vorher verhaftet worden, die von ihm geführte Laskar Jihad wurde unmittelbar nach dem Attentat aufgelöst. Bisher gibt es noch keine Indizien für eine tatsächliche Verwicklung der Organisation in die Vorbereitungen des Attentats auf Bali im Oktober 2002. Abu Bakar Bashir wurde nach dem Attentat in seinem *pesantren* verhaftet, gegen ihn hat inzwischen ein Prozess stattgefunden, in dem ihm, wie erwähnt, bisher ebenfalls noch keine wichtige Rolle bei der Vorbereitung des Verbrechens nachgewiesen werden konnte. Habib Muhammad Rizieq stellte sich nach seiner Rückkehr von einem neuerlichen Besuch im arabischen Raum freiwillig den nach ihm fahndenden Behörden. Alle fühlten sich, wie sie in wiederholten Stellungnahmen zum Ausdruck brachten, unschuldig und völlig zu Unrecht verdächtigt, dem Terror zugearbeitet zu haben. Nach der hier vorgetragenen Einschätzung haben sie jedoch gerade das getan. Sie haben dem Terror den Boden bereitet und sind in hohem Maße für die Radikalisierung des indonesischen Islams in den letzten Jahren verantwortlich.

Alle drei hatten (wie der Politiker Amien Rais) wegen ihrer Abstammung aus dem arabischen Raum – lebten sie nun als erste, zweite oder schon dritte Generation in Indonesien – keine Wertschätzung des traditionell indonesischen und insbesondere javanischen Bedürfnisses nach einem harmonischen Zusammenleben der verschiedenen Gesellschaftsgruppen nach Konsens und Kompromiss. Dieses Streben wurde im Gegenteil als Ausweichen vor notwendigen Entscheidungen interpretiert. Amien Rais wollte daher das Proporzsystem bei der Besetzung der Ämter einführen, wohl wissend, dass er damit eine Lunte an das friedliche Nebeneinander in der multikulturellen indonesischen Gesellschaft legte. Für ihn war dies als nicht-javanischer Politiker keine Brüskierung seiner Landsleute, sondern eine Förderung des demokratischen Prozesses. Dass dies auf die Dauer die religiöse Toleranz, wie sie z.B. in den Pancasila garantiert war, gefährden musste, kümmerte ihn nicht. Irgendwann würde sich schon eine Lösung des Problems finden. Die wahrscheinlichste war, dass neue Mehrheiten in den Gremien für neue Grundprinzipien sorgen würden. Und das war ihm, dem islamischen Politiker, nur Recht. Für die fundamentalistischen Religionslehrer Habib Rizieq und Ja'far Umar Thalib war dagegen wie für ihre Gesinnungsgenossen schon alleine die Tatsache, dass in einem so überwiegend islamischen Land die religiöse Toleranz im Grundgesetz verankert war, ein Skandalon, eine Beleidigung der Lehre des Propheten, gegen die man in militanter Weise vorzugehen hatte.

Während sich die islamische Gemeinschaft (abgesehen von der *Darul Islam*-Bewegung Kartosuwirjos in den fünfziger Jahren) wegen der machtpolitischen Verhältnisse in Indonesien lange mit einem unpolitischen Islam abgefunden hatte, ergriffen Rizieq und Thalib daher die erste Gelegenheit nach dem Sturz von Präsident Suharto, um die Verwirklichung des Islam-Staates zu fordern, auch wenn sie, wie Kartosuwirjo in den fünfziger Jahren, trotz ihrer religiösen Ausbildung in angesehenen Schulen nur verworrene Vorstellungen hatten, wie ein solcher Islam-Staat auszusehen hatte. Aber die Entscheidung zum Kampf ist nun einmal ein Charakteristikum überzeugter Fundmentalisten. Sie geben, wie Ja'far Umar Thalib vor, das Problem wissenschaftlich gründlich analysiert zu haben und betrachten die anschließende Durchführung von Mordtaten als verantwortungsbewusstes Handeln. Das Übrige liegt in den Händen Allahs. Diese Einstellung ist mit indonesischen Vorstellungen nicht mehr zu begründen, dies ist arabischer Radikalismus auf indonesischem Boden. Er bringt die große Mehrheit der indonesischen Muslime in Bedrängnis, schreckt sie aber wegen der Entscheidungszwänge bisher noch von einer bedingungslosen Gefolgschaft ab.

Dieser Tatsache ist sich auch Abu Bakar Bashir bewusst, dessen Rolle zum Schluss dieses Beitrages noch einmal betrachtet werden soll. Auch seine Vorfahren stammen aus dem arabischen Raum, aber er hat von Kindheit an seine Erziehung in Indonesien und nicht im Jemen oder in Saudi-Arabien oder in Pakistan erfahren, sodass er das Zögern der indonesischen Muslime, radikalen Parolen zu folgen, wohl versteht und ihm die offensive Vorgehensweise von Rizieq und Thalib daher fehlt. Dabei ist auch er zweifellos Fundmentalist im Sinne der eingangs gegebenen Definition. Er gehörte zum Kreis der Bewunderer Kartosuwirjos, auch wenn er diesem nicht in den bedingungslosen Kampf folgte. Er nahm offen Stellung gegen die Demütigungen des Islams durch Suharto in den 70er und 80er Jahren und wurde deswegen inhaftiert, konnte dann aber aus Indonesien nach Malaysia fliehen. Wie weit sich Bashir mit internationalen islamischen Netzwerken arrangierte, die versuchten, den islamischen Teil Südostasiens unter dem Namen Nusantara Islamiyah als ein mögliches späteres Kalifat zusammen zu fassen, ist zur Zeit noch ebenso wenig bekannt wie eine klare Antwort auf die Frage, welche Rolle er bei diesem Versuch spielen sollte. War oder ist er der Gründer und Leiter jener ominösen Jemaah Islamiyah als den ihn der amerikanische Geheimdienst aufgrund von Zeugenaussagen in Malaysia verhafteter Verdächtiger ausgemacht hat? Bashir hat dies geleugnet, er gibt an, die Zeugen nicht zu kennen, auch einige, die nachweislich mit ihm in Verbindung gestanden hatten. Dies war einer der Gründe seiner Verhaftung. Wird er in die Enge getrieben, dann schweigt er. In vielfacher Weise erinnert er in seiner nach außen würdevoll erscheinenden Art und in seinem ganzen Verhalten an den oben, im Kapitel Anfänge des Fundamentalismus in Indonesien erwähnten *kyai* von Tjaringin, der nach dem kommunistischen Aufstandsversuch von 1926 von den niederländischen Kolonialherren für den Ausbruch der späteren Kämpfe in Banten verantwortlich ge-

macht wurde. Zweifellos hatte er sie gebilligt, aber nachzuweisen war es ihm nicht. Auch der *kyai* von Tjaringin war in seiner Zeit ein Fundamentalist, aber – so möchte man hinzufügen – ein javanischer Fundamentalist, der auf seine Art die Anhänger mehr überzeugte als die lauthals vorgetragenen Forderungen von den mit der indonesischen Kultur weniger vertrauten Agitatoren seit Beginn der neunziger Jahre.

Es ist damit jedoch nicht gesagt, dass dies auch in Zukunft so bleiben wird. Was sich an den tausenden von privaten *madrasah* und *pesantren* im Lande zurzeit tut, ist von außen nur schwer zu beurteilen. Die Selbstverständlichkeit, dass sich die große Mehrheit auch in Zukunft um Harmonie, Ausgleich und Konfliktvermeidung bemühen wird, ist durch die neueren Entwicklungen zumindest in Frage gestellt. Robert Hefner, ein langjähriger Beobachter des indonesischen Islams aus den USA, hat es Anfang 2003 so ausgedrückt: "There is a larger process occurring. It's the struggle for the very soul of Indonesian Islam".[23] Damit hat er nach meiner Ansicht einen derzeit vor sich gehenden Wandel im indonesischen Islam treffend charakterisiert. Der Eindruck, dass eine neue islamische Elite in Indonesien zur Zeit wachsende Zustimmung gewinnt, die den traditionellen Harmoniebestrebungen kritischer gegenübersteht als einem weltweit zu beobachtenden radikalem Aktionismus, hat sich seit dem Auftreten der neuen islamischen Partei für Wohlfahrt und Gerechtigkeit (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera) in den letzten allgemeinen Wahlen im Jahre 2004 weiter gefestigt.

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Religiöser Extremismus auf dem Vormarsch?

Interpretation der derzeitigen Situation in Indonesien

Franz Magnis-Suseno SJ

Der Sturz Suhartos 1998 läutete auch das Auftauchen islamischer Extremisten aus dem Untergrund ein. Auf einmal waren sie da, oft in mittelöstlicher Bekleidung. Sie forderten lautstark die Einführung der *Scharia*-Gesetzgebung, demonstrierten gegen Amerika, vandalisierten ‚Stätten der Sünde' und stellten die ‚Gefahr der Christianisierung' als größte Bedrohung für den indonesischen Islam dar. Das offensive Auftreten dieser radikalen vorher von Suharto unterdrückten Gruppen hat zu einer allgemeinen Verhärtung und wachsender Intoleranz im indonesischen Islam geführt. In manchen Provinzen, Städten oder *kabupaten* (Kreise) wurden *Scharia*-Bestimmungen über örtliche Verordnungen eingeführt.[1] Nicht nur wird es immer schwieriger für religöse Minderheiten, Erlaubnis für den Bau von Kirchen oder Tempeln zu erhalten, sondern Gewaltandrohung gegen ‚illegale Kirchen' hat erschreckend zugenommen.[2] Bei den Wahlen im Jahr 2004 erhielt die Partai Keadilan Sejatera (Gerechtigkeits- und Wohlfahrtspartei, PKS), die ideologisch an der ägyptischen Muslimbruderschaft ausgerichtet ist, sozusagen aus dem Stand sieben Prozent und wurde in Groß-Jakarta sogar zur stärksten Partei. Seit 1999 explodieren immer wieder Bomben, die von islamischen Extremisten gezündet wurden.[3] Seit dem ersten Bali-Attentat am 12. Oktober 2002 bezweifeln auch muslimische Indonesier immer weniger, dass es tatsächlich eine Terrororganisation namens Jemaah Islamiah gibt.

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[1] Zum Beispiel in Kotamadya Padang, Kabupaten Cianjur, der Provinz Sulawesi Selatan, Tangerang, neuerdings Depok.

[2] Im Juli und August erzwang AGAP (Anti-Apostasy Movement) die Schließung von 25 so genannten ‚illegalen Kirchen' in Bandung und drohte, die Schließung weiterer tausend Kirchen in Westjava zu durchsetzen. Inzwischen sind mindestens weitere 20 Kirchen in Westjava aufgrund muslimischer Gewaltandrohung geschlossen worden.

[3] Erster Höhepunkt waren die Terroranschläge auf christliche Kirchen in der Weihnachtsnacht 2000. Etwa 50 Bomben wurden gelegt, von denen 30 explodierten. Es gab 19 Tote und über 100 verletzte. Die Bomben explodierten innerhalb einer Stunde in so weit auseinander liegenden Orten wie Batam, Medan (wo alle entschärft werden konnten), Jakarta, Bogor, Bandung, Jombang und Mataram. Die Polizei untersuchte die Fälle nur lässig. Erst nach dem Bali-Attentat am 12.10.2002, dem 202 Menschenleben zum Opfer fielen, begann die Polizei, Terroranschläge gründlich und erfolgreich zu untersuchen. Dabei stellte es sich heraus, dass einige der Weihnachtsbomben von Leuten aus dem Bali-Attentäterkreis gelegt worden waren. Aber erstens sind längst nicht alle Weihnachtsattentate von 2000 inzwischen geklärt, und zweitens fragt man sich, ob selbst eine Gruppe wie *Jemaah Islamiah* die logistische Fähigkeit hat, 30 Bomben gleichzeitig in einem Gebiet, das sich über 2000 km erstreckt, explodieren zu lassen.

In diesem Interpretationsversuch möchte ich der Frage nachgehen, wohin sich der indonesische Islam bewegen wird. Wird der Extremismus zunehmen? Das würde einerseits einen Rückgang des traditionellen NU- und Muhammadiyah-Islam bedeuten, andererseits zu einer weiteren Verhärtung auch im mehr traditionellen Islam führen. Oder werden die Extremisten eine Randerscheinung bleiben, was implizieren würde, dass Indonesien auf dem Weg zu einer soliden Demokratie, basierend auf der Sicherstellung der Menschenrechte, weiter fortschreiten wird. Im ersten Teil gebe ich einen Überblick über die verschiedenen Gruppierungen im indonesischen Islam, im zweiten Teil frage ich nach möglichen Entwicklungen in Indonesiens Zukunft.

Kultureller Islam, Traditionalisten, Modernisten

Stark schematisiert kann man in Indonesien drei Gruppen von Muslimen unterscheiden: Die ‚kulturellen Muslime‘, die Traditionalisten und die Modernisten.[4] Die Religiosität der ‚kulturellen Muslime‘ ist stärker durch die eigene Jahrtausende alte Tradition und, bei der javanischen Oberschicht durch den Hinduismus geprägt, als durch den Islam. In vielen javanischen Dörfern gab es noch vor 50 Jahren keine Moschee. ‚Kulturelle Muslime‘ beteten weder täglich noch hielten sie das volle islamische Fasten. Unter den Javanern sind die ‚kulturellen Muslime‘ die Träger dessen, was man die javanische Kultur nennt: *wayang* (Schattenspiel), *gamelan*-Orchester, die klassischen Tänze, die Hofkultur der javanischen Könige und Fürsten. Die meisten Modernisten und traditionellen *santri* beteiligen sich da nicht, da diese Kultur praktisch nicht islamisch geprägt ist.[5] Ent-

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[4] Ich gebrauche den unbefriedigenden Ausdruck ‚kulturelle Muslime‘ mangels eines besseren, um Clifford Geertz's *abangan* zu vermeiden (1961, *The Religion of Java*. New York, The Free Press). Geertz unterschied bekanntlich zwischen *abangan, priai* und *santri*. Ich dagegen fasse die gesellschaftlich weit auseinander liegenden *abangan* und *priai* als ‚kulturelle Muslime‘ zusammen, während Geertz's *santri* in Wirklichkeit klar in die mehr ländlichen Traditionalisten, deren Großorganisation Nadlatul Ulama (NU) ist, und die städtischen Modernisten (Muhammadiyah) zu unterscheiden sind. Natürlich haben Traditionalisten und Modernisten ebenfalls ihre Kultur, weshalb mein Ausdruck ‚kulturelle Muslime‘ ziemlich ungeschickt ist. Ich will damit sagen, dass diese Muslime ihre soziale Identität primär aus ihrer Kultur, z.B. der javanischen, ziehen oder sich primär als ‚Indonesier‘ und erst sekundär als Angehörige einer Religion ansehen. Außerdem beziehe ich mich auf ganz Indonesien und nicht nur auf die Javaner. Hier sei angemerkt, wie sehr uns eine der Geertz'schen (und seiner Kollegen und Kolleginnen) gleichwertige Untersuchung des javanischen und indonesischen Islam fehlt. Viele der von mir im Folgenden dargestellten Veränderungen bedürften dringend einer Präzisierung und überhaupt einer grundlegenden Neuuntersuchung. So bedürfte z.B. Moeslim Abdurrachmans These von der *santrinisasi kaum priai* dringend einer Nachuntersuchung. Abdurrachman stellt die These auf, dass in den 1970er Jahren, auf Grund des Druckes der Neuen Ordnung, die *priai* begonnen hätten, die islamischen Pflichten (fünfmaliges Gebet, Fasten, *Hadj* usw.) einzuhalten. Aber die Tatsache, dass bei den Wahlen 1999 und 2004 die Stimmen für islamisch orientierten Parteien nicht zugenommen haben, zeigt, dass tief greifende und politisch relevante kulturelle Muster (*politik aliran*) weiterhin effektiv bleiben.

[5] Es gibt zwar auch Schattenspiele mit islamischen Inhalten, aber das weitaus populärste, das *wayang purba*, nimmt seine Geschichten aus dem indischen Kulturraum. Traditionelle javanische Kleidung, vor allem feierliche Kleidung am Hof, sowie die Bekleidung bei den Tänzen ist kaum mit den traditionellen islamischen Auf-

scheidend für die gesamte politische Entwicklung Indonesiens war, dass die ‚kulturellen Muslime‘, die immer eine Mehrheit der Muslime darstellten, säkulare Parteien wie die Nationalisten (PNI) und die Kommunisten (PKI) wählten. Ihnen verdanken es die Indonesier, dass sie 1945 nicht einen Islamstaat bekommen haben. In der indonesischen politischen Sprache werden die ‚kulturellen Muslime‘ als Nationalisten bezeichnet und dem Islam gegenübergestellt. Es waren die Nationalisten, die von Anfang an jeden Versuch, die islamische *Scharia*-Gesetzgebung zum Staatsgesetz zu machen, zunichte machten.[6] Die letzten Wahlen zeigen, dass, obwohl viele ‚kulturellen Muslime‘ inzwischen praktizierende Muslime geworden sind, sie ihre kulturelle Ausrichtung, einschließlich der Ablehnung des politischen Islam, beibehalten haben.[7]

Die Traditionalisten und Modernisten gestalten im Gegensatz zu den ‚kulturellen Muslimen‘ ihr Leben bewusst aus dem Islam und halten die islamischen Pflichten wie das fünfmalige Gebet am Tag und das Fasten ein. Modernisten nennt man diejenigen unter ihnen, deren islamisches Selbstverständnis und Praxis durch die ägyptischen Erneuerer des Islam vom Ende des 19. Jahrhunderts wie Al-Afghani und Muhammad Abduh bestimmt sind. Diese wollten einerseits zurück zum ‚reinen‘ Islam, wie ihn seit dem 18. Jahrhundert die *Wahabis* verfochten, andrerseits sahen sie ein, dass der Islam nur dann wieder zu Weltgeltung kommen könnte, wenn er sich westlichen Wissenschaft öffnete. *Die* modernistische Organisation in Indonesien ist die 1912 in Yogyakarta gegründete Muhammadiyah, die in ganz Indonesien moderne Schulen, Universitäten und Krankenhäuser unterhält. Die Muhammadiyah zählt nach eigenen Angaben etwa 30 Millionen Mitglieder.

Zum Teil als Reaktion auf die ‚lästige‘ Kritik der Muhammadiyah an den stärker inkulturierten Formen des traditionellen Islams gründeten ostjavanische *kyai*, Leiter von *pesantren*, traditionellen islamischen Internatsschulen, 1926 die Nadlatul Ulama (NU), die heute von 30 bis 40 Millionen Mitgliedern spricht. Obwohl strenge Muslime, die, wie auch die Muhammadiyah, die von den *abangan* bis heute gepflegte javanische Kultur des Schattenspiels und der Tänze nicht praktizieren, folgen sie in ihren *pesantren* einem Islam, der viele traditionelle, vorislamische Elemente wie Wallfahrten und Verehrung der *wali,* der Missionare, die den Islam nach Indonesien brachten, integriert haben. Die NU

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fassungen über gehörige Kleidung in Einklang zu bringen; siehe Magnis-Suseno, Franz (1981) *Javanische Weisheit und Ethik. Studien zu einer östlichen Moral.* München, Wien, Oldenbourg.

[6] Viele javanische *abangan* legen Wert darauf, die javanische Kultur als über den Religionen stehend anzuerkennen. Ben Anderson stellte vor 40 Jahren die These auf, dass die Katholiken deshalb unter den Javanern so akzeptiert seien, weil deren Existenz es den Javanern ermöglichte, sich vom Islam abzusetzen. Anderson, B. R. O'G. (1965) *Mythology and the Tolerance of the Javanese.* Ithaca, Cornell University.

[7] Es wäre nicht schwierig, zu zeigen, dass das Vollziehen islamischer Riten sehr gut in das alte javanische religiöse Muster passt und dass daher die äußere Islamisierung nicht zu einer ideologischen geführt hat.

sind tolerant gegenüber den *abangan*[8], unterstützten Sukarno, und akzeptieren unter Suharto die *Pancasila* (die fünf Grundprinzipien, die allen religiösen Bekenntnissen Gleichberechtigung zuerkennt). Politisch konnten Modernisten und Traditionalisten bis heute kaum zusammenarbeiten.

Diese drei Gruppen, die das moderne Indonesien bestimmt haben, sind natürlich keineswegs homogen, aber sehr deutlich gegeneinander abgesetzt. Vor allem Modernisten haben immer wieder versucht, aus Indonesien einen ‚Islamstaat‘ zu machen oder wenigstens für Muslime die *Scharia*-Gesetzgebung einzuführen. Solche Bestrebungen haben bisher in Indonesien nie eine Mehrheit finden können. Es gibt in der ‚islamischen‘ Gruppe – so nennen Indonesier selbst NU- und Muhammadiyah-Mitglieder – tolerante und aufgeschlossene Anhänger, aber auch *hardliner*.[9] Ein beachtlicher Teil der ‚Islamisten‘ hat ein tiefes Misstrauen gegen andere Religionen, vor allem gegen die Christen (von denen im Koran steht, dass sie keine Ruhe geben werden, bevor sie nicht den letzten Muslim bekehrt haben[10]). Auch hat es in Indonesien immer Extremisten gegeben. Ein *Darul Islam*-Aufstand konnte sich in Westjava von 1950 bis 1962 und in Südsulawesi sogar bis 1966 halten. Auch in Aceh gab es damals einen *Darul Islam*-Aufstand. Anfang der 1980er Jahre kam es zu vereinzelten Terroranschlägen islamischer Extremisten auf Java, die allerdings von der Suharto-Regierung sehr effizient niedergeschlagen wurden.[11] Die furchtbaren Morde an Kommunisten 1965, vor allem durch NU-Milizen und Hindus, aber in geringerem Ausmaße auch durch Katholiken auf Flores und Protestanten in Nordsumatra verübt, beweisen im Übrigen, dass die berühmte indonesische Toleranz klare Grenzen hat, deren Überschreitung zu Greueltaten führen kann. Dagegen haben die beiden Bürgerkriege zwischen Christen und Muslimen 1999 bis 2002 auf den Molukken und in Zentralsulawesi wohl einen anderen Hintergrund.

Interne Islamisierung

Seit den 1970er Jahren hat in Indonesien eine interne Islamisierung stattgefunden. Suharto unterdrückte zwar den politischen Islam, wollte aber, dass die Bevölkerung ihre

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[8] Mit einer Ausnahme: Es waren NU-Milizen, die nach dem missglückten Oktobercoup von 1965 Hunderttausende von ‚Kommunisten‘ in Ostjava niedermetzelten. Von den NU-Anhängern gilt also, dass sie nicht über eine bestimmte Schwelle hinaus gereizt werden dürfen.

[9] Diese finden sich etwa im Dewan Dakwah Islam Indonesia (Islamischer Missionsrat Indonesiens) und in KISDI (Indonesisches Komitee für Solidarität mit der islamischen Welt); auch MUI, der Rat Indonesischer Ulama, vertritt im Allgemeinen harte Positionen.

[10] Al Baqarach (Sure 2), 120: „Die Juden und Christen werden nicht mit dir zufrieden sein, solange du nicht ihrem Bekenntnis folgst.“

[11] Höhepunkt und Anfang war 1978 die Entführung des Passagierflugzeuges Woyla nach Bangkok das dort von indonesischen Kommandos ohne Verluste bei den Entführten gestürmt wurde, jedoch alle Entführer getötet wurden.

Religionen praktiziert.[12] In den 1970er Jahren wurde islamisches Verhalten sozusagen hoffähig. Während früher praktizierende Muslime manchmal als rückständig galten, wurden nun in allen Staatsamteien und großen Betrieben Moscheen oder zumindest *mushola* (Kapellen) gebaut. Die meisten Muslime beteten von da an fünf Mal am Tag. Sie schämten sich, wenn sie beim Freitagsgebet fehlten oder während des *ramahdan* (Fastenmonat) nicht fasteten. Jugendliche bildeten jetzt Gruppen, um gemeinsam den Koran zu rezitieren. Das Praktizieren einer Religion wurde immer mehr zum Zeichen einer zuverlässigen ideologischen Ausrichtung.

Pluralistischer Islam

In den 1970er Jahren begann sich auch ein offener, pluralistischer, inklusiver Islam zu zeigen. Dessen Vorkämpfer waren der 2005 verstorbene neomodernistische Theologe Nurcholish Madjid und der spätere Präsident Abdurrachman Wahid. Nurcholish verkündete, dass es ein Fehler der islamischen Gemeinde sei, sich auf politische Parteien zu konzentrieren, dass Säkularisierung, richtig verstanden, eine Konsequenz des Islams sei, dass der Islam eine humanistische Religion sei, die auch den Wissenschaften offen stände, und dass der Islam eine inklusive Heilsauffassung vertrete, nach der auch Anhänger anderer Religionen gerettet werden könnten. Über die Paramadina, eine Art Volkshochschule, führte Nurcholish tausende junger Muslime in sein Denken ein. Später gründete er eine Universität und dann eine Mittelschule, die aus Prinzip 20 Prozent Nichtmuslime aufnimmt, die Religionsunterricht in ihren Religionen erhalten.

Noch stärker war der Einfluss von Abdurrachman Wahid, dem Enkel des Gründers der NU und 15 Jahre lang Vorsitzender dieser größten islamischen Organisation der Welt. Er hatte keinerlei Berührungsängste Andersgläubigen gegenüber, spottete über islamische Enge, und sah sich als Beschützer aller anderen Minderheiten. Nach Suhartos islamischer Wende (1990) gründete Abdurrachman Wahid ein ‚Demokratie-Forum‘, dem auch Nichtmuslime angehörten und weigerte sich, in die von Habibie geführte islamische Dachorganisation ICMI einzutreten, wodurch er dieser einen beachtlichen Teil ihrer Legitimation untergrub. Es ist die größte Leistung von Wahid, der NU-Jugend eine offene Ausrichtung gegeben zu haben. Heute bildet, auch nach dem Urteil von kritischen Modernisten, die NU-Jugend die intellektuelle Speerspitze des Islams in Indonesien. Diese jungen Leute lesen Marx und Foucault, studieren Befreiungstheologie und sind mit Christen, Hindus und Konfuzianern befreundet. Inzwischen bewachen *Ansor*-Jugendliche, die Milizen der NU, in der Weihnachts- und Osternacht christliche Kirchen in exponierten Gebieten.[13] In der konservativen Muhammadiyah erfährt ihre liberale und pluralistische Jugendorganisation Jaringan Intelektual Muda Muhammadiyah

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[12] Religion sah er als Bollwerk gegen den Kommunismus.

(Intellektuellennetzwerk der Muhammadiyah-Jugend, JIMM) oft harte Kritik, ja Muhammadiyah-*hardliner* haben gefordert, dass JIMM wegen seines ‚Liberalismus' aus der Muhammdiah-Familie ausgeschlossen wird. Dieser Islam ist pluralistisch, demokratisch, setzt sich engagiert für die Menschenrechte ein und lehnt einen Islamstaat und den Einsatz staatlicher Macht zu religiösen Zwecken ab. Ein offener Islam wird auch an den großen islamischen Staatsuniversitäten des Landes (UIN, IAIN) gelehrt, während die Fundamentalisten vor allem unter den Studenten von Technik und Naturwissenschaften der großen weltlichen Universitäten zu finden sind.

Extremisten

Zu den auffallenden Neuentwicklungen nach dem Sturz Suhartos 1998 gehörte das plötzliche Auftauchen islamischer Extremisten aus dem Untergrund. Ihre prominentesten Vertreter sind die Front Pembela Islam (Front der Verteidiger des Islam, FBI), die in der Fastenzeit gelegentlich Cafés oder Karaokebars demolieren und bei Aktionen lokaler Muslime gegen so genannte illegale Kirchen Unterstützung bieten. Ferner gehören dazu die Laskar Jihad (Jihad-Krieger), die von Java aus in den Bürgerkrieg in den Molukken eingriffen und sich nach dem ersten Bali-Terroranschlag im Oktober 2002 auflösten. Zu den extremistischen Gruppen gehören auch Hizbut Tahrir, die das Khalifat wiederherstellen möchten, der sehr militante Majelis Mujahiddin Indonesia (Rat der indonesischen Mujahiddin, MMI), der von dem inhaftierten Abu Bakar Bashir geführt wird, und andere.[14]

Das Auftauchen des radikalen Islams kam allerdings nicht unerwartet. Kein anderer als Abdurrachman Wahid hatte ihn als logische Folge der Gründung von Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim se-Indonesia (Vereinigung Islamischer Intellektueller aus Ganz-Indonesi-

[13] Salahuddin Wahid, Mitglied des Präsidiums der NU und jüngerer Bruder von Abdurrachman Wahid, nennt als ‚progressive' Gruppierungen innerhalb der NU Lakpesdam (Lembaga Kajian Islam dan Pengembangan Sumberdaya Manusia), Ansor (die offizielle Jugendorganisation der NU, deren Milizen sich Banser nennen), P3M (das von Masdar A. Mas'udi geführte Perhimpunan Pengembangan Pesantren dan Masyarakat, die seit 20 Jahren, *low profile*, für eine innere Erneuerung des Islam arbeiten), LkiS (Institut für islamische und gesellschaftliche Studien), LSAD, das von Jenny Wahid, einer Tochter von Abdurrachman Wahid, geführte The Wahid Institut*e* sowie besonders aktiv und mutig das Jaringan Islam Liberal (Netzwerk des liberalen Islam, JIL), dessen zentrale Figur Ulil Abshar Abdalla ist. Salahuddin Wahid schreibt, dass Angriffe gegen diese progressiven Gruppen, und alternative Islamauffassungen nicht aus der NU selbst kommen. Allerdings sei zu vermuten, dass die *fatwa* der MUI im Juli 2005 die konservativen Elemente innerhalb der NU gestärkt hätten (*Mau ke Mana NU?*, unveröffentlichtes Paper, das mir der Autor zur Verfügung gestellt hat). – Zu nennen ist hier auch das von Syafi'i Anwar geführte ICIP (International Center for Islam and Pluralism) sowie das Freedom Institute, das mit den Zentrum von Utan Kayu verbunden ist.

[14] Etwa Front Pemuda Surakarta (die vor allem die Muslime im ambonesischen Bürgerkrieg unterstützten), ferner Lasykar Jundullah, Lasykar Hizbullah, Darul Islam, Ikhwanul Muslimin Hammas; siehe M. Syafi'i Anwar (2005) *The State, Shari'a and the Challenge of Pluralism in Post-Suharto Indonesia*. Paper presented at the seminar on "The Future of Pluralism in Indonesia", Jakarta, 29.11.2005.

en, ICMI) längst vorausgesagt. ICMI, im Dezember 1991 gegründet und von B. J. Habibie geführt (Technologiezar und von 1998 bis 1999 Präsident Indonesiens) war der deutlichste Ausdruck der Wende Suhartos zum Islam Anfang der 1990er Jahre. Um seine politische Basis zu verbreitern, ließ Suharto nun jahrelang verzögerte Gesetze, die *Schariah*-Bestimmungen enthielten, in Kraft setzen. Das Verbot, in staatlichen Schulen islamische Kleidung zu tragen, wurde aufgehoben. ICMI vereinte viele muslimische Intellektuelle, war aber in Wirklichkeit eine politische Organisation, über die sich Muslime den lange verwehrten Zugang zu lukrativen politischen Ämtern erhofften. Nur Abdurrachman Wahid lehnte ICMI ab (und erschreckte Suharto durch die Gründung des ‚Demokratie-Forums‘) und war seitdem, zusammen mit Sukarnos Tochter Megawati Sukarnoputri, der inoffizielle Oppositionsführer Indonesiens. Abdurrachman Wahids Ablehnung der ICMI verhinderte, dass ICMI im Namen aller indonesischen Muslime sprechen konnte. Suhartos islamische Kehre führte zu einer Islamisierung von Golkar und Staatsinstitutionen im Allgemeinen. Damit zusammen ging eine ‚De-Benny-Moerdani-isierung‘ des Militärs: Die Nationalisten (*ABRI merah putih*) um den früheren Verteidigungsminister Benny Moerdani (die Suharto 1993 gezwungen hatten, Militärchef Try Soetrisno zum Vizepräsident wählen zu lassen) wurden zum Teil durch islamisch orientierte Generäle (*ABRI hijau*) ersetzt. Eine Nebenfolge dieser Islamkehre war die schlagartige Zunahme von Attacken auf christliche Kirchen, deren Höhepunkt Progrome Ende 1996 und Anfang 1997 waren.[15]

Insofern muss man sagen, dass eine Verhärtung von Teilen des Islams sowie der religiösen Gegensätze schon unter Suharto und unabhängig von den Extremisten stattgefunden hat. Diese kam auch nach Suhartos religiöser Besinnung nicht zum Vorschein, da er ICMI benutzte, islamische Kritiker unter Kontrolle zu halten. Echte Extremisten hatten im Kalkül Suhartos keinen Platz. Sie mussten sich weiterhin bedeckt halten. Erst die demokratische Öffnung 1998 ermöglichte es ihnen, aus der Deckung zu treten.

Woher kamen diese Extremisten?[16] Zum Teil kamen sie aus den Kadern der *Darul Islam*-Kämpfer der 1950er Jahre. In Indonesien war auch immer islamischer Extremismus aus dem benachbarten Malaysia sehr einflussreich. Dazu kommen etwa 3.000 junge Indonesier, die in Afghanistan gegen die Sowjets gekämpft hatten und dort teilweise mit Osama bin Laden in Kontakt gekommen waren. Das hat, wie in der gesamten islamischen Welt, auch in Indonesien zu einer Zunahme des mittelöstlichen *Salafi*-Islams

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[15] Nach einer Stelle der PGI, der Dachorganisation Indonesischer Protestanten, wurden seit der Unabhängigkeit Indonesiens 1945 bis zum 4. Mai 2004 insgesamt 938 Kirchen in Gewaltakten beschädigt, zerstört oder abgebrannt: zwei während Sukarnos Regierungszeit (1945-66), 456 unter Suharto (1966-98), davon etwa 50 vor 1990, die übrigen danach, der Rest unter den folgenden drei Präsidenten; zieht man die etwa 250 Kirchen ab, die während des islamisch-christlichen Bürgerkrieges auf den Molukken zerstört wurden, so kommt man immer noch auf 688 attackierte Kirchen in an sich vollkommen friedlichen Gebieten.

[16] Siehe dazu: Yunanto, S. *et al.* (2003) *Gerakan Militan Islam Di Indonesia dan Di Asia Tenggara*. Jakarta, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, The Ridep Institute.

geführt. Darunter versteht man die Richtungen, die, im Sinne des Saudi-*Wahabismus,* zum reinen Islam des Propheten Muhammad und der recht geleiteten Kalifen zurückkehren möchten und sich von dieser Rückkehr die Heilung aller Probleme islamischer Gesellschaften, ja der Menschheit, erwarten („Islam is the solution!", Maududi).[17] Daneben aber haben politische Schachzüge nach dem Sturze Suhartos, vor allem im Militär, einen erheblichen Einfluss gehabt. So geht die FBI (und möglicherweise auch die Jihad-Krieger) auf die *Pamswakarsa* zurück, Milizen, die führende Generäle im November 1998 in Jakarta zur Terrorisierung der gegen Habibie demonstrierenden Studenten gründeten.[18]

Dieser extreme Islam ist heute zu einer echten Bedrohung für Indonesien, für die Religionsfreiheit in Indonesien und für den mehr pluralistischen Islam in Indonesien selbst geworden. In zunehmendem Maße werden christliche Kirchen durch islamische Massen gezwungen, zu schließen, unter dem Vorwand, dass sie keine gültige staatliche Erlaubnis hätten (die vielfach nicht zu erhalten ist). In gewissen Provinzen, wie in Westjava, scheint es eine organisierte Bewegung zu geben, um den Christen sozusagen durch ständigen Druck die Luft abzudrehen.

Gegenstand besonderer Wut der Salafisten ist der pluralistische Islam.[19] Nicht ohne Grund, denn es sind die Pluralisten und ‚Liberalen‘, die über die Medien darstellen, dass die Quellen des Islams eine offene, tolerante, pluralistische Einstellung enthalten und dass umgekehrt die Extremisten den Islam verfälschen. So ist zu verstehen, dass Jaringan Islam Liberal (Netzwerk des liberalen Islam, JIL) und Jaringan Intelektual Muda Muhammadiyah (Intellektuellennetzwerk der Muhammadiyah-Jugend, JIMM) Gegenstand ständiger verbaler Attacken sind. Ulil Abshar Abdalla, der führende intellektuelle Kopf von JIL wurde bereits 2002 wegen der von ihm gesponsorten Fernsehsendung *Islam Warna-Warni* (‚Bunter Islam‘) vom Forum Ulama Umat Indonesia (Forum von Religionsgelehrten der indonesischen Gemeinschaft) in Bandung mit einem *fatwa*, das die

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[17] Syafi'i Anwar 2005: 11ff gibt fünf Hauptcharakteristika der *Salafi*-Bewegung: 1. ein Verständnis des Islams als einer ‚textualistischen Zivilisation‘, in welcher Islam als ‚Text‘ und nicht als Diskurs gesehen wird; das führe zu einer rigiden und intoleranten Haltung im täglichen Leben anderen gegenüber, und im Islam selbst zu einer exklusiven und intoleranten Ausrichtung; 2. Fokus auf die formale Einsetzung der *Scharia* als Staatsgesetzgebung für alle Bereiche islamischen Lebens; 3. Antipluralismus; die Welt wird schwarz-weiß in Muslime und Heiden (*kafir*) eingeteilt; 4. *Jihad* gilt für sie in erster Linie als Kampf gegen Sünde und Ungläubige (*Jihad* als *qital*) (und nicht wie im Verständnis moderater Muslime primär als Kampf gegen die eigenen ungeordneten Leidenschaften); und 5. Salafisten haben einen starken Glauben an Verschwörungstheorien und betrachten Muslime generell als Opfer.

[18] Yunanto 2003: 83-90.

[19] In einem zweieinhalbstündigen, in guter Atmosphäre verlaufenden Gespräch, das drei protestantische Pastoren und ich im September 2005 mit Habib Rizieq, dem Führer der FPI hatten, verurteilte Habib die islamischen Pluralisten aufs schärfste und erinnerte uns daran, dass wenn wir Christen mit ‚problematischen Muslimen‘ wie Abdurrachman Wahid, Nurcholish Madjid und Ulil zusammenarbeiteten, würden wir auch problematisch werden.

Todesstrafe aussprechen würde, bedroht. Nachdem eines der *fatwa* des Majelis Ulama Indonesia (Rat der islamischen religionsgelehrten Indonesiens, MUI) vom Juli 2005 ‚Säkularismus, Liberalismus und Pluralismus‘ geächtet hatte, wurde das Hauptquartier von JIL (Utan Kayu 68A in Jakarta[20]) von einer Gruppe lokaler Muslime und der Front Pembela Islam (FPI) wiederholt bedroht und ultimativ zum Verlassen ihres Geländes aufgefordert und erst in Ruhe gelassen, als Banser (Miliz der NU) das Gelände zu schützen begann. Vor allem die Modernisten sind für den Salafismus anfällig, während die NU mit Ihrer Doktrin des Maßhaltens (*tawassuth*) und der Toleranz (*tasamuh*) sich einer Einstellung des Respekts gegenüber anderen religiösen Überzeugungen verpflichtet fühlen.[21]

Wohin geht der indonesische Islam?

Syafi'i Anwar sieht die Situation des indonesischen Islams seit dem Sturz Suhartos als einen Kontest zwischen der radikalen *Salafi*-Bewegung und dem ‚progressiv-liberalen Islam‘.[22] In ihrem Bemühen um die Einführung der *Scharia* haben die Salafisten zwar eine Niederlage einstecken müssen: 2002 hat die Verfassunggebende Versammlung einen entsprechenden Antrag mit großer Mehrheit abgelehnt. Zudem haben die Führer der beiden großen islamischen Organisationen, NU und Muhammadiyah, eine Formalisierung der *Scharia* als inopportun zurückgewiesen. Inzwischen aber haben die Anhänger der *Scharia* ihre Taktik gewechselt. Nach Syafi'i Anwar benützen sie nun die Taktik der ‚Hintertür‘, indem wesentliche Bestimmungen der *Scharia* auf Bezirks- oder Provinzebene eingeführt werden. Das ist zwar gegen das Gesetz, denn der Gesetzgebung zufolge ist Religion Angelegenheit der Zentralregierung und des nationalen Parlaments, aber bisher hat die Regierung in Jakarta nicht gewagt, gegen die ‚schleichende *Scharia*isierung‘ einzuschreiten. Die schon erwähnten *fatwa* der MUI im Juli 2005 haben weiterhin zu einer Verhärtung der Positionen geführt. Eine Folge waren gewalttätige Attacken auf die Ahmadiyah-Bewegung. Dagegen haben islamische Führer und Aktivisten von Nichtregierungsorganisationen im vergangenen Oktober eine Aliansi Masyarakat Madani untuk Kebebasan Beragama (Allianz der Zivilgesellschaft für religiöse Freiheit) gegründet. Schon vor zwei Jahren hatte Dr. Musdah Mulia, eine führende islamische Intellektuelle, für das Religionsministerium Vorschläge für eine Erneuerung des islamischen Rechtes vorgelegt, in der Polygamie verboten und Frauen beim Erbe mit Männern gleichgestellt gewesen wären; dieser Vorschlag löste wütende Reaktionen aus, so dass das Ministerium ihn stillschweigend beerdigte.

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[20] Dort befinden sich u.a. ein Radiostudio und -sender, ein Buchladen, ein Versammlungsraum mit Bühne und ein Café.

[21] Syafi'i Anwar 2005: 16.

[22] Ibid: 24.

Damit stellt sich die Frage, wohin sich der indonesische Islam bewegen wird. Wird der *Salafi*-Islam zunehmen? Das würde einerseits einen Rückgang des traditionellen NU- und Muhammadiyah-Islam bedeuten, andererseits zu einer weiteren Verhärtung auch im mehr traditionellen Islam führen. Oder werden die *Salafisten* eine Randerscheinung bleiben und der indonesische Islam seine relative Toleranz bewahren? Und was wird der Einfluss des inklusiv-pluralistisch-liberalen Islamflügels sein?

Die Signale sind mehrdeutig. Das unerwartet niedrige Abschneiden der Islamparteien in den Wahlen von 1999 und 2004 (37 Prozent und 40 Prozent) beweist, dass die interne Islamisierung seit den 70er Jahren das Wählerverhalten nicht beeinflusst hat. Die Kinder der ehemaligen ‚kulturellen Muslime‘ wählen weiterhin keine islamisch orientierten Parteien, Traditionalisten (NU) wählen keine modernistische Islampartei und islamische Modernisten wählen ausschließlich modernistisch oder *salafisch* ausgerichtete Islamparteien. Dieses Fortbestehen tief verwurzelter kultureller Muster würde dafür sprechen, dass unter normalen Umständen die *Salafisten* keine demokratische Chance haben.[23] Es gibt weitere Zeichen, dass sich trotz aller Verschärfung der Gegensätze zwischen den Religionsgemeinschaften kulturelle Muster der Toleranz als beständig erweisen. Besonders auffällig und wenig beachtet ist die Tatsache, dass die Konflikte in den Molukken und in Zentral-Sulawesi (1999-2002) nicht auf andere Gebiete überschwappten, dass es z.B. auf Java nicht zu Racheakten von Muslimen an Christen gekommen ist.[24] Nicht nur das. In den letzten neun Jahren, genauer seit dem Situbondo-Progrom[25], haben sich die Beziehungen zwischen Christen und der NU dauerhaft verbessert, und ebenso, wenn auch in schwächerem Maße mit der Muhammadiyah.[26] Im Zusammenhang mit den *fatwa* vom Juli 2005, deren eines ‚Säkularismus, Liberalismus und Pluralismus‘ verurteilte, beeilten sich Vertreter der MUI, richtig zu stellen, dass die Pluralismusverurteilung sich

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[23] Dem widersprechen auch nicht die beachtlichen 7,5 Prozent, die die *salafistische* PKS erhalten hat. Die PKS führte ihre Wahlkampagne ausschließlich für soziale Gerechtigkeit und gegen Korruption und schwieg über ihre islamistischen Zielsetzungen.

[24] Im Januar 2000 wäre es allerdings fast soweit gewesen. Damals brachten die Medien Nachrichten von Tausenden von Muslimen, die auf Halmahera von Christen abgeschlachtet worden seien. Eine Versammlung von Hunderttausenden von Muslimen im Zentrum von Jakarta war drauf und dran, in ein Pogrom gegen Christen umzuschlagen, hätten sich nicht muslimische Führer wie Amien Rais an die Spitze gesetzt und jeglichen Gewaltausbruch verhindert. Später stellte es sich heraus, dass ‚nur‘ 800 Muslime umgebracht worden waren, und dass es sich um einen hochkomplexen Hintergrund mit massiven wirtschaftlichen Einsätzen handelte.

[25] In Situbondo in Ostjava wurden im Oktober 1996, ohne jeden Anlass von christlicher Seite, alle 25 Kirche systematisch total abgebrannt: Ein protestantischer Pastor kam ums Leben. Zuvor waren zehn Kirchen in Surabaya angegriffen und durch Steinwürfe beschädigt worden. Am zweiten Weihnachtstag brannten Massen, wieder ohne jegliche christliche Provokation, in Tasikmalaya 18 von 19 christlichen Kirche ab. Kurz danach wurden alle fünf Kirchen in Rengasdengklok zerstört. Nicht eine einzige Person ist je in diesem Zusammenhang vor Gericht gestellt worden. Die Angriffe traumatisierten damals viele Christen.

[26] Als im Dezember 2005 der Chef der Muhammadiyah, Din Samsyuddin, Christen, deren vorläufige „Kirchen" geschlossen worden waren, anbot, in Muhammadiyah-Schulen ihre Weihnachtsgottesdienste zu feiern, wurde er von einigen Anhängern der Muhammadiyah scharf getadelt.

nicht auf die Existenz anderer Religionsgemeinschaft bezöge, sondern auf die von ‚liberalen' Muslimen vertretene Auffassung, alle Religionen seien gleich und Anhänger aller Religionen könnten erlöst werden. Seit dem ersten Bali-Attentat sind auf islamische Initiative mehrere Foren für Begegnung der Religionsgemeinschaft gegründet worden. Muslimische Führer erkennen inzwischen an, dass islamischer Terrorismus ein Problem ist, und haben ihn eindeutig verurteilt.[27] Versuche, die *Scharia* auf nationaler Ebene einzuführen wurden im Parlament mit mehr als 80 Prozent abgelehnt, und ebenso von der NU und der Muhammadiyah.

Andererseits darf die Anziehungskraft des *Salafi*-Islam nicht unterschätzt werden. Der *Salafi*-Islam schwimmt auf der Welle islamischer Wiedergeburt, die sich wesentlich aus dem *jihad* gegen Amerika, Hass auf Israel, anti-islamischen Konspirationstheorien und überhaupt einer Weltsicht speist, deren wichtigstes Element der Glaube an eine internationale Kampagne gegen den Islam ist. Auf Schulen und in Moscheen werden diese Punkte ständig den Gläubigen erzählt, vor allem den Kindern. Ständig werden ‚Christianisierungskampagnen' christlicher Gruppen hochgespielt. Kinder werden aufgefordert, Kontakte mit Andersgläubigen und Chinesen zu vermeiden. Es existiert eine *fatwa* gegen Weihnachtsglückwünsche. Eine Umfrage 2004 unter etwa 3500 repräsentativen Muslimen aus ganz Indonesien ergab beunruhigende Ergebnisse: 55 Prozent stimmen der Steinigung von Ehebrechern zu, 50 Prozent möchten keine Kirche in ihrer Nachbarschaft, 40 Prozent sind für das Händeabhacken bei Diebstahl, 16 Prozent haben Sympathien für die Terroristen und fünf Prozent hätten auf die eine oder andere Weise aktiv mit Extremisten zusammengearbeitet.[28] Dafür, wie sich das mit den Wahlergebnissen vereinbaren lässt, wird keine Erklärung geboten. Es ist klar, dass mit *salafistischen* Einflüssen eine allgemeine Radikalisierung einhergeht. Damit vergrößert sich automatisch auch das Potential möglicher Terroristen. Das wiederum kann eine allgemeine Verhärtung und eine Zunahme anti-pluralistischer Einstellungen in der Muhammadiyah, aber auch in der NU zur Folge haben.

Dagegen stellen die ‚liberalen' und ausdrücklich pluralistischen Muslime noch eine kleine Minderheit dar, der auch viele moderate *mainstream* Muslime misstrauen. Ihre theologischen Auffassungen und kulturelle Erneuerung islamischer Lebensweisen dürften aber auf die Dauer nicht ohne Wirkung bleiben.

Es ist also wohl so, dass derzeit ein Kampf um die Seele des indonesischen Islams im Gange ist. Sollte sich die Verwurzelung in kulturellen Orientierungen, die bisher so stark war, als stabil erweisen, so würde das bedeuten, dass der moderate Islam dominie-

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[27] So veranstaltete z.B. im Januar 2006 die *pesantren Al-Muqmin* in Ngruki, die lange von Abu Bakar Bashir geführt worden war und aus der mehrere indonesische Terroristen hervorgegangen ist, ein internationales Seminar mit dem Ziel zu beweisen, dass sie den Terrorismus verurteilen.

[28] *Islamisme dan Sikap Anti-Amerika. Temuan dari Survei Nasional*, PPIM, Freedom Institute dan Jaringan Islam Liberal, 2.-3.11.2004.

rend bleibt; dann hat Indonesien eine gute Chance, eine stabile, tolerante und pluralistische Demokratie zu entwickeln. Aber es könnte auch der etablierte NU- und Muhammadiyah-Islam langsam von innen her durch den *Salafismus* unterwandert werden. Dann würde Indonesiens Demokratie scheitern und das Land großen Erschütterungen entgegengehen, die selbst seine nationale Einheit gefährden könnten. Die Antwort hängt vermutlich von nicht-religiösen Faktoren ab. Hier sei, ohne weitere Begründung, die Vermutung geäußert, dass die kulturellen Verwurzelungen, die bisher für einen unter dem Strich gemäßigten und toleranten Islam gesorgt haben, auch weiterhin stark bleiben werden. Indonesier erweisen sich immer wieder als kulturell außerordentlich stabil (was zum Beispiel daran zu sehen ist, dass Indonesier, die, vielleicht als Studenten, viele Jahre im Westen verbracht haben, keineswegs ‚verwestlicht' oder als halbe US-Amerikaner oder Europäer zurückkehren; es ist eher, als ob sie das westliche Leben wie das Regenwasser auf einer Regenhaut abschütteln und dann kulturell nicht anders sind als vorher). Die stabilen Muster des Wahlverhaltens der Indonesier scheinen mir in hohem Maße relevant. Allerdings gilt das wohl nur unter der Voraussetzung, dass sich die Zustände in Indonesien politisch und vor allem wirtschaftlich stabilisieren. Solange Indonesier noch an ihre individuelle Zukunft glauben, so lange sie Hoffnung haben, dass es langsam Verbesserung eintreten, darf angenommen werden, dass Radikalismus und Extremismus – die, wie schon erwähnt, immer im indonesischen Islam vorhanden waren – keine wesentlichen Einbrüche in den traditionellen Islam erzielen werden. Anders, wenn das Land wirtschaftlich nicht auf die Beine kommt, wenn sich die Situation vor allem der Bevölkerung mit niederen Einkommen noch weiter verschlechtert, wenn sie das Vertrauen verliert, dass der jetzige Präsident Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono wirklich soziale Gerechtigkeit schaffen wird, dann werden die gesellschaftlichen Spannungen, und darunter sicher in prominenter Weise die religiösen, zunehmen. Das Gefühl lang anhaltender Ungerechtigkeit – wo der Reichtum der Oberschicht immer demonstrativer zur Schau getragen wird, während das täglich Leben für die meisten Menschen immer schwieriger wird – vergiftet das soziale Kapital der Nation. Das Jahr 2006 könnte da entscheidend sein. Seit Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono im Jahre 2004 an die Macht kam, ist es den Menschen ständig nur schlechter gegangen. Am auffälligsten waren zweimalige Erhöhungen des Benzinpreises. Wenn es in der Zukunft auch nicht gelingt, die Nation aus der Talsenke herauszuführen, könnten Geduld und Vertrauen der einfachen Bevölkerung erschöpft sein. Und dann würden radikale Kräfte eine Alternative darstellen. Es ist nicht deutlich, wie weit sich die derzeitige Regierung über diese Zusammenhänge im Klaren ist.

Labelling Indonesian and Malaysian Islam

Kees van Dijk

In November 2005, when military ties between Indonesia and the US were resumed, the spokesman for the US State Department, Sean McCormack, said that Indonesia was "a voice of moderation in the Islamic world" (JP.c 23.11.2005). The following month, his boss the US Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, answering questions after she had delivered a speech on Iraq at The Heritage Foundation in Washington DC, was also full of praise. She applauded the Indonesian Government for "its stated aim of becoming a voice for moderate Islam" and cited Indonesia as an example that Islam and democracy can coexist (JP.c 14.12.2005). In March 2006, when Rice visited Indonesia, equally pleasant words were spoken: "Here in Indonesia the deserved reputation for tolerance and inclusion and for the celebration of diversity is indeed an inspiration to the entire world."[1] A few days after Rice had left, the British Prime Minister, Tony Blair, arrived in Indonesia. He also expressed his appreciation of the moderate nature of Indonesian Islam and of the way mutual understanding between communities with different beliefs is fostered in Indonesia. These politicians are not alone in portraying Indonesia as a country of moderation and tolerance. Mass media both in- and outside Indonesia are busy stressing that Indonesia is a country which, with the unhappy exception of a few terrorists, is populated by moderate Muslims.

Malaysia is given the same treatment. In October 2005, the US Under-Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, Karen P. Hughes, charged with improving America's image abroad, visited Malaysia. As the Singaporese newspaper *The Straits Times* chose to describe this: "she was almost gushing about Malaysia's power-sharing government and moderate Islamic practices" (STI 26.10.2005). Hughes not only praised the Malaysian Islam Hadhari concept, at present intensively being promoted by the Malaysian Government, which stresses a tolerant, progressive, and modern Islam.[2] The

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[1] Conversation with Indonesian Foreign Minister Noer Hasan Wirajuda (www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2006/63087).

[2] Islam Hadhari was developed by Abdullah Ahmad Badawi after he had become Prime Minister of Malaysia in October 2003. He translates it as "civilisational Islam" (NSTO 12.4.2005). "Islam", Badawi (2004a) said in explaining the concept, "makes it compulsory for Muslims to embrace knowledge in all fields. ... Islam demands the mastery of science and technology and the enhancement of skills and expertise," and will make the Muslim community less dependent on others. Encompassing ten points, Islam Hadhari calls for "Faith and piety in Allah", "A just and trustworthy Government", "A free and independent people", "Mastery of knowledge", "Balanced and comprehensive economic development", "A good quality of life", "Protection of the rights of minority groups and women", "Cultural and moral integrity", "Safeguarding the environment", and "Strong Defence Capabilities" He elaborates his ideas further in *Islam Hadhari: A model approach for development and progress* (Badawi 2006).

Malaysian political system also impressed her. In it, as the main pillar the United Malay National Organization (UMNO) cooperates with the Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC) and the Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA) in a coalition – at present called the Barisan Nasional (National Front) – which has ruled Malaysia since Independence. Hughes even ventured to state that such political co-operation in which "the majority [that is the Malays] has shared power ... can be an example to places like Iraq" (STI 26.10.2005).

The statements made by Rice, Blair, and Hughes are calculated political statements intended to flatter their hosts. Nevertheless, these assessments of Indonesian and Malaysian Islam are a far cry from what was said, written, and done in the months directly after 9 September 2001. What attracted attention abroad then was not moderation but the presence of Islamic terrorists in Southeast Asia, and, especially with regard to Indonesia, the frequent and at times noisy demonstrations protesting against the invasion of Afghanistan. Not only did Indonesians and Malaysians experience delays and problems in obtaining a visa for the United States at that time, simply because they were Muslims; the projected image of Indonesia and Malaysia was one of countries in which terrorists were hiding. At the end of May 2002, Paul Fujimura, US Counter-terrorism Officer for East Asia and the Pacific at the State Department, claimed there was concrete evidence that Al-Qaeda had set up a base in Indonesia, in the wake of the American-led military operations in Afghanistan. Indonesia was "a potential terrorist haven"; an ideal sanctuary. Its geography made it extremely suitable to be a hide-out, as did the presence of people who sympathised with Al-Qaeda's cause (K 24.5.2002, STI 26.5.2002). Malaysia was tarred with the same brush. In January 2002, the Malaysian Prime Minister, Dr. Datuk Seri Dr. Mahathir bin Mohamad showed himself to be angry over the fact that *Newsweek* of 27 January 2002, quoting a secret FBI report, had called Malaysia a "primary operational launch pad for the September 11 attacks" and had described Malaysia as "a good place for Arabs to lie low" (STI 29.1.2002).[3] The reporting about Al-Qaeda and Malaysia in *Time Asia* also elicited indignant reactions in Malaysia. The reason was, as was described in *The Straits Times*, that it had placed "a Tourism Malaysia advertisement on the back page of a magazine issue that portrayed the country more as a haven for gun-running and terrorism than a holiday hotspot" (STI 15.3.2002).

In view of the present praise accorded Indonesia and Malaysia, it is perfectly valid to pose the question of what the significance of the label 'moderate Muslims' or 'a moderate Islamic country' implies. Are those not empty terms? Does the terminology say anything about the actual state of affairs? Who do people have in mind when they use

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[3] One of the reasons Malaysia was linked to 9/11 was that Al-Qaeda operators involved in the planning and execution of the attacks and of the suicide bombing of a US Navy destroyer, the USS *Cole*, in the port of Aden in October 2002, had met in an apartment near Kuala Lumpur in January 2000.

words like moderate Muslims or a moderate Islamic country? Or, more precisely, what mental constructions prompt them to use such qualifications, and do these constructions reflect reality? The same set of questions can be asked about the antonyms of moderation: when people speak of fundamentalist or radical Muslims. Some Muslims find it abhorrent when Western observers or scholars use such qualifications, others, 'moderate' as well as 'strict' Muslims, embrace the term with open arms. In Malaysia when he was still Prime Minister Mahathir, just like his successor Badawi, a proponent of a tolerant Islam geared to meet the challenges of the world of today, took some pleasure in explaining to a Western audience that Islam in Malaysia is not moderate at all (and he meant Islam as adhered to by UMNO members and not the scriptualist Islam propagated by the Malay opposition party, Parti Islam seMalaysia or PAS). In May 2002, when he visited the US and Europe, he explained that Malaysia was a fundamentalist Islamic country where the basic Islamic tenets were honoured. He said that upon hearing his words, Western politicians had looked somewhat shocked. In their eyes – according to Mahathir – a fundamentalist Muslim was a violent person who perpetrated all kinds of evil deeds. They were wrong. The fundamental principles of Islam commanded a person to behave properly and to co-operate with others. The idea cherished in non-Islamic countries that Malay Muslims were moderate was also false: "We are not moderate Muslims. We are fundamentalist … that is we are steadfastly holding to the fundamental Islamic teachings" (STI 21.6.2002).

In Indonesia, Ahmad Sumargono, one of those strict Islamic leaders who publicly testified his support for the Laskar Jihad, proudly calls himself a fundamentalist. "I am a Fundamentalist" was the title of a book he published in 1999. On other occasions he has made no secret of the fact that he found being called a fundamentalist an honorific to be cherished.

The qualification of Indonesian Islam as moderate is all the more intriguing when reading newspaper reports about Blair's Indonesian tour. When important foreign politicians visit Indonesia, they are usually invited to a private meeting with four or five prominent Indonesian Islamic figures. As a rule, the conversation partners include top leaders of the two largest Islamic religious organisations in the country, each with tens of millions of members and supporters, the Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama, and both invariably described as moderate.[4] In Blair's case, one of the Islamic leaders invited was Din Syamsuddin, the general chairman of the Muhammadiyah. *Ireland On-Line* reported that he and the others selected to meet Blair were "known as moderates on social and political issues" (www.cs.monitor.com/ 2006/0330/dailyUpdate.html). The Indonesian news agency Antara shared this view. It wrote that both Blair and the In-

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[4] To highlight that the nature of Indonesian Islam is moderate Islam, even though its believers are critical of the intentions of the West, visits to Islamic schools for foreign politicians are also arranged.

donesian President, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, considered Blair's conversation part-
ners 'moderate' Muslims (www.antara.co.id/seenws/?id=30925). In actual fact, the im-
age presented of Din Syamsuddin is different. In 2001, he was in the forefront of the
protests against the invasion of Afghanistan and the calls for a *jihad* and a boycott of
American products which were to be heard on all sides at that time.[5] Din Syamsuddin
did so in his capacity as Secretary-General of the Majelis Ulama Indonesia (MUI), the
Indonesian Council of Ulamas; a body created in 1975 under Soeharto's New Order as
an institution to represent the whole of the orthodox Islamic community and its differ-
ent denominations. After Soeharto's fall, the MUI did a *volte face*. It began to voice hard-
line Islam (though at times hesitant to turn the points discussed into concrete
decisions), denouncing for instance, vested interest and religious liberalism and plural-
ism.[6] It also no longer serves as a mouthpiece of the Government. It even hampers the
Indonesian Government by issuing radical statements at moments when interests are
best served by moderation. The person associated with this change and with the con-
certed effort within the MUI to promote strict, orthodox Islam is Din Syamsuddin.

Any discussion of the nature of Islam in Indonesia and Malaysia, if indeed this is pos-
sible in view of its diversity, involves an overview of past developments and of some
recent trends. It has also to be acknowledged that the debate now has a different tone
to that before 9/11. In the past, the focus, at least in Indonesia, was on the Islamic
population as a whole. Pride of place was given to the many syncretistic Muslims in that
country, who it was argued blocked an Islamisation of society. Indonesia was a 'moder-
ate' Islamic country because the devout Muslims, adhering rigidly to the doctrine as
they interpreted it, and constituting a minority, would never be able to impose their
will. Concentrating on the 'devout' Islamic community in Indonesia in articles and talks
could lead to comments that this was not real Indonesian Islam. Now, the discussion

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[5] At that time Din Syamsuddin pointed out that, as was still almost invariably done in Indonesia then, when
the prospect of a *jihad* was raised, that a *jihad* does not necessarily mean war and joining in combat, but can
also take the form of other forms of support. People never tired of stressing that the *jihad* the organisations
had in mind was not one in which Indonesian Muslims would take up arms.

[6] In July 2005, the MUI condemned a liberal (that is a non-scriptural) interpretation of Islam and religious
pluralism, which it defines as the tendency to consider all religions to be equal, without recognising the su-
premacy and ultimate truth of Islam. The third evil attacked by the MUI was 'secularism', the idea that reli-
gion prescripts are fixed and not open to debate when they concern the relationship with God but that reli-
gious rules do not necessarily have to govern social life. After the MUI had been criticised for its denunci-
ations, some of its leaders tried to refine the decree against liberalism, pluralism and secularism somewhat.
Nevertheless, a rigid interpretation is probably what most of its leaders had and have in mind. In June 2006,
the *mufti* of Perak, the highest religious authority in this Malaysian state, also spoke out against religious liber-
alism and pluralism during a conference entitled "Purifying Islam from Liberalism and Pluralism". He ex-
plained that these concepts were propagated by Western enemies of Islam to erode this religion after they had
realised that the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and the other efforts to combat Islam physically would fail to
accomplish their aims. He also proposed that Islamic countries should set up bodies to check the infiltration
of Western culture.

has turned to the opinions within the orthodox Muslim community and the different opinions and beliefs held there. A further essential introductory remark is that the threat to public order and to the secular state is now supposed to come from a different direction from which it came in the past. As Laffan (2005: 3) has observed "there has been an amazing inversion in perceptions of who the enemy is in orientalist discourse and in public opinion". In the nineteenth century, the culprits were traditional Muslims, especially members and supporters of mystical brotherhoods. Nowadays people tend to view with suspicion individuals and groups belonging to the modernist stream of Islam, convinced that this religious environment forms the breeding-ground for radicalism, and, of course, for *Wahabbi*-inspired Muslims and other Islamists. It is a wrong assessment. Recent examples in Indonesia, Malaysia and even in Thailand indicate that traditional Islam, and much more so than modernist Islam, is still very much a factor in inspiring anti-government violence (Van Dijk 2005).

The manifestations of strict or conservative Islam to be observed in Southeast Asia nowadays are not a new phenomenon. A more radical undercurrent to mainstream Islam has never been absent. Adherents of scriptural Islam, or perhaps more aptly uncompromising Islam, propagating a strict adherence to what its advocates consider the essential elements of Islamic law and behaviour, have always been there. The basic ideas of such Muslims usually included the rule of Islam, and sometimes it may have, but not always, included, as it still does, a rejection of Western culture and way of life.

Concentrating on the years after World War II, the best illustration of the strength and appeal of the idea of establishing an Islamic state and implementing Islamic law in Indonesia is the *Darul Islam* (Abode of Islam) rebellion. Taking shape in the course of 1948 and officially declared in August 1949, that is before the Netherlands was forced to recognise Indonesia's Independence, the Negara Islam Indonesia (Islamic State of Indonesia, NII), forcibly rejected the religious-neutral ideological base of the Indonesian Republic, the *Pancasila*.[7] Although it began in West Java, the rebellion spread to other parts of Indonesia: to parts of Central Java; to Aceh; to South Sulawesi; and to South Borneo. Initially the Indonesian army was hard pressed to deal with the rebel army, the Tentara Islam Indonesia (Islamic Army of Indonesia, TII), as vast areas were under the insurgents' control or were threat by them (Van Dijk 1981). The turning point came only in the middle of the 1950s, but even from that time the cost in lives and material damage continued to be enormous. One estimate, based on figures supplied by the Indonesian army and Government is that, in West Java alone, *Darul Islam* fighters killed 22,895 persons and destroyed 115,882 houses between 1955 and 1960

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[7] One of the pillars of the *Pancasila* mentions the Belief in the One and Only God as a fundamental aspect of Indonesian life.

(Pinardi 1964: 177). The cost in lives and property of operations launched by the government army are not mentioned.

The mid-1960s witnessed the end of the *Darul Islam* rebellion, but its ideals lingered on and continued to motivate Muslims, individuals and Islamic groups, to aspire to achieve an Islamic state, if necessary one attained by force. Former *Darul Islam* fighters and those who sympathised with them also refused to give up their ideals. They continued to champion the transformation of Indonesia into an Islamic state and were very much opposed to the *Pancasila* as the ideological foundation of the Indonesian State.

The persistence of radical or strict Islam is also evident in Malaysia. For decades there, religious and political strife has been dominated by the rivalry between two Malay political parties. One is UMNO, which has dominated the Government since independence in 1957. The other is the Islamic opposition party, PAS. As the *Islam Hadhari*-concept indicates, the leaders of the former liked and still like to influence thinking to modern, progressive Islam. Leaders of PAS were and are in favour of a strict, fundamentalist Islam. Relations between UMNO and PAS are tense at times. Words such as animosity and hatred rather than respect and friendship tend to spring to mind.

PAS leaders have declared UMNO members infidels or at best lapsed Muslims. One of the most important of them is Abdul Hadi Awang. He gained notoriety because of what has become known as the *Amanat Hadi*, also known as the 'Hadi Decree', a speech he delivered in 1981 in which he said that UMNO members were infidels and that those who were killed fighting UMNO died a martyr's death. Even today such ideas are vented in religious speeches and also in PAS-controlled private religious schools, the Sekolah Agama Rakyat (SAR), People's Religious Schools, and kindergartens. In such schools UMNO leaders are castigated. The schoolchildren were, for instance, taught that Prime Minister Mahathir was the 'pharonic leader', or the greatest earthly enemy of God's people. In some SARs the national anthem has been banned. With such extreme ideas on the curriculum the schools had become a real worry to the government, uneasy about the quality and scope of the education they provide and about the indoctrination of its pupils by hard-line Muslim teachers. In 2002, Kuala Lumpur started an offensive against them, denigrating SARs as "a breeding ground for future Muslim terrorists" (STI 17.1.2003) and belittling them as institutions where hatred of the government was taught. After 9/11 UMNO politicians also did all they could to depict PAS as a group of the Taliban ilk.

Violent confrontations, though few in number, have not improved relations between UMNO and PAS. This is a suitable juncture to mention what happened in November 1985 in Memali, a village in the State of Kedah, where a religious teacher and PAS-leader, Ustaz Ibrahim Mahmood, better known as Ibrahim Libya, had taken refuge. Ibrahim Libya was accused by the authorities of propagating the establishment of an Islamic

state by violent means. When security forces tried to arrest him, the result was a five-hour battle between villagers armed with primitive weapons and the police equipped with M-16 rifles and deploying armoured cars. Ibrahim Libya and thirteen villagers, all male, and four policemen died. The Memali victims have become a powerful symbol. Each year they are commemorated on a Memali Day, also in religious schools. PAS announced that they had died as *syahid*, martyrs. *Syahid* is also the inscription which is carved on their gravestones (Metzger 1996: 67). The Government thought differently. In February 1986, the discussion threatened to take a macabre twist when it was suggested that the graves be opened to see what state the corpses were in. Were the bodies decomposed, then those who had died were not martyrs; were the bodies still intact then they were (Metzger 1996: 79-80). More importantly, leaders of the group, now known as the Jemaah Islamiyah, used the Memali incident to expand their influence and drum up support in Malaysia.

Since the 1980s, the protagonists of a strict or conservative Islam have been growing in numbers and influence all over Southeast Asia. Congregations of fundamentalist Muslims have also been gaining ground in Indonesia, but there their presence only became especially conspicuous after the fall of President Soeharto. After May 1998, for the first time in decades, its leaders were free to propagate their ideals among a wider public, and in the new political climate in which verbally at least primacy was given to reform (*reformasi*), human rights, and individual freedom, they did so enthusiastically. Consequently some hard-line groups, busily fighting sin and indecent behaviour and propagating a strict interpretation of Islam succeeded in stealing the limelight of public attention not least because of the belligerent tone adopted by their leaders and in some cases the intimidating and unruly behaviour of their members. A new term entered Indonesian vocabulary: *preman berjubah*, gangsters in Arab robes, though not all members of such groups dress in this way.[8]

One such group was the Laskar Jihad of Ja'far Umar Thalib, an Afghanistan veteran and one of the Indonesian Islamic leaders instrumental in the spreading of the *Salafi*-movement in Indonesia. The Laskar Jihad was founded in April 2000 to provide armed assistance and religious guidance to the Muslims in the Moluccas where, its founders argued, the Government had failed to shield Muslims from the onslaught of Christians in the religious civil war raging there, and who Muslim public opinion feared might become victims of genocide. The Front Pembela Islam (Front of the Defenders of Islam, FPI), of which Al-Habib Muhammad Rizieq bin Husein Syihab is its *Imam Besar* or Great Leader, was also – and still is – attracting plenty of attention in the wake of its aggressive raiding of what they consider to be dens of iniquity; bars and other centres of entertainment. After 9/11, they gained additional notoriety because of their

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[8] The term may have been introduced by Syafii Ma'arif, a Muhammadiyah leader (see Haq 2006).

threats of 'sweepings', that is the hunting down of citizens of the US and its allies, whom they threatened they would escort to airports and force to leave the country. In April 2006, FPI-members again made headlines in the newspapers when they were in the forefront of demonstrations against the publication of the Indonesian version of *Playboy* and in the van that took part in the attack on its editorial office in Jakarta. In this case they got what they wanted. Initially, fearing more demonstrations, the police asked the editors to delay the publication of a second issue. Thereupon the editors decided to make a temporary stop to publication and move their offices to 'Hindu' Bali.[9] Yet another organisation playing a very conspicuous role in the unruly religious demonstrations staged in Jakarta was the Forum Betawi Rempug (Betawi Brotherhood Forum, FBR).

Two other radical organisations championing Islamic law should also be mentioned. One is the South Sulawesi-based Komite (Persiapan) Penegak Syariat Islam (the (Preparatory) Committee for the Implementation of Islamic Law, KPPSI). It was established during the First South Sulawesi Muslim Congress in October 2000. The other is the Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI), the Indonesian Jihad Fighters Council, founded in August 2000. The MMI is headed by Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, the alleged spiritual head of the Jemaah Islamiyah. Its stated aim is to have Muslims in Indonesia and the rest of the world follow Islamic law. MMI-members, and they are not the only ones, hold an unshakable belief that all disasters, natural and man-made, are God's punishment for not following His laws and that, once Islamic law is in force, all problems will disappear.

Usually groups like the Laskar Jihad and FPI are described as fringe groups, a small minority of fanatics, dwindling into insignificance compared to the vast majority of moderate Muslims in Indonesia, and as said before, formally represented by the Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama. But this is only part of the picture. The tolerance and moderation displayed by the boards of the Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama at the central level can be absent among its leaders at lower administrative levels, in the villages and cities, and may also be lost among the rank and file. Likewise although central boards of Islamic political parties may speak out against local legislation inspired by a narrow interpretation of Islam, local politicians may be in favour. Leaders of the Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah, moreover, do sit on the central board of MUI. The general chairman of the Muhammadiyah, Din Syamsuddin, is even the face of the change in orientation the MUI has undergone and its efforts to promote strict, orthodox Islam. Members of the two organisations can also be found on the boards of the Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia of Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, of the KPPSI and of other,

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[9] The second issue of *Playboy* appeared in June 2006. It contained no advertisements.

mostly local organisations advocating the introduction of Islamic law. The same can be said of the radical Front Pembela Islam Surakarta (Yunanto *et al.* 2003: 56).

Such groups, their leaders, and the religious ideals they espouse can also count on sympathy among the political, bureaucratic, and military elite, which creates a kind of informal network. Feelings of religious solidarity, anti-American or anti-Western sentiments, and congruence in religious outlook may contribute to this. Sometimes support is given quite openly. The best example in Indonesia is provided by Hamzah Haz. When Ja'far was under house arrest in May 2001 for having allowed the stoning of a Laskar Jihad member who had raped a thirteen-year old girl in Ambon, one of the people who visited him was Hamzah Haz.[10] In July 2001, Hamzah Haz became Vice-President. This did not prevent him from continuing to testify to his religious beliefs which differed sharply from those of the then President, Megawati Sukarnoputri. Hamzah made no secret of the fact that he was a proponent of transforming Indonesia into an Islamic state. In the Indonesian context, this meant that he spoke out in favour of the Jakarta Charter, a compromise reached in 1945 which differs from the Pancasila in that it obliges Indonesian Muslims to follow Islamic law. Hamzah Haz did not bother to hide his sympathies in December 2001, when he attended the Second South Sulawesi Muslim Congress, lending an air of decorum to the group which had established the KPPSI. In May 2002, after Ja'far had been arrested for a second time, this time accused of having given an inflammatory speech in Ambon, Hamzah Haz visited him in his cell at the headquarters of the National Police. They embraced and kissed each other on the cheek. Hamzah Haz also made no attempt to hide the fact that he had dined with Ba'asyir (by then already accused of being a leading Southeast Asian terrorist by Washington), Ja'far, and Habib Rizieq in March 2002. A few days later, Hamzah Haz opened the national congress of the Forum Komunikasi Ahlus Sunnah Wal Jamaah (FK-ASWJ), the mother organisation of the Laskar Jihad. At the end of May 2002, he also visited the Al-Mukmin *pesantren* of Ba'asyir in Ngruki, where he spoke with Ba'asyir for over an hour.[11]

Such meetings provide political capital. In May 2001, when Hamzah Haz made his gesture of public support towards the Laskar Jihad, he was challenged as chairman of the Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (United Development Party, PPP), by a popular preacher, KH Zainuddin M. Z., also known as the *dai*, the missionary to a million people. KH

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[10] Hamzah Haz knows Ja'far quite well. Ja'far's older brother was a neighbour of Hamzah Haz's second wife (he has three wives), who lived in Bogor. Hamzah Haz had asked Ja'far to pray for him when his election as Vice-President came up.

[11] After Ba'asyir had been arrested in October 2002 and had been admitted to the police hospital in Jakarta, Hamzah Haz had at first intended to visit him there. In the end he decided to send Lukman Hakim, a member of his staff, instead. Before that, while still in the Muhammadiyah hospital in Surakarta, Ba'asyir, already under arrest, had been visited by Syafii Ma'arif and Solahuddin Wahid, important leaders of, respectively, the Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama.

Zainuddin M. Z. had visited Ja'far on 7 May, just before Hamzah Haz did. Afterwards he said that Ja'far "had done 'a lot of good' for the Muslims" in the Moluccas (JP 8.5.2002). Zainuddin also praised Ja'far for his many 'positive religious and social activities' (R 8.5.2002).

In some regions in Indonesia – West Java, South Sulawesi, and parts of Sumatra, for instance – the local movements determined to implement Islamic law are strong. Or, perhaps, they are not so strong, but sufficiently well situated to enforce what they want, as only a few local people want or dare to speak out against them. A miscalculation by the Abdurrahman Wahid administration is partly to blame. Misjudging the separatist movement in Aceh, the Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (Free Aceh Movement, GAM), to be inspired by religious motives, his government granted Aceh special autonomy, including in the field of Islamic law. This was embodied in an Act promulgated in August 2001. It made Aceh the only region in Indonesia to have the legal authority to promulgate Islamic regulations, independent of any directives of or limitations set by the national Government. The act and the subsequent gradual introduction of Islamic legislation by local Acehnese Republican administrations (and the re-introduction of public canings) have become a source of inspiration for Muslims wanting to introduce Islamic law elsewhere in Indonesia.[12]

The whole matter had been aggravated by a 1999 Act (adjusted in 2004) regulating decentralisation. Although it lists religion as one of the fields in which authority does not devolve from the central government to the regional administration, in some twenty *kabupaten* (regencies) and municipalities regulations have been issued, which can only be called Islamic, forcing for instance female Muslim civil servants and female schoolchildren to wear a headscarf, banning the sale of alcoholic drinks, or making the knowledge of Arabic a condition for entering junior high school.

The most extreme example is the municipality of Tangerang in West Java, where an anti-prostitution decree was issued by the city council in November 2005. The decree banned women whose attitude and behaviour might give the impression that they were prostitutes (suspicion is enough) from streets, public buildings, hotels and similar establishments, places of recreation, from private houses and – to leave them no space at all to go – what were defined in the decree as 'other places' in the city. Female labourers protested about the decree. They feared that they might be arrested in the evening (that is after seven o'clock), as they were waiting for public transport or for their husbands to

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[12] One of the criticisms levelled in Aceh against the way *syariah* is implemented there is that Islamic legislation is only concerned with such minor matters as (petty) gambling, consuming alcoholic drinks, eating and drinking during the day in the fasting month, hugging and kissing in public, and improper female attire. Consequently, the persons who have been charged with and subsequently tried for violating Islamic law have been the man-and-woman-in-the-street, not people committing widespread corruption and other rich and powerful persons who have committed other equally dastardly crimes.

take them home after work. Women arrested can face a jail sentence of up to one month or a fine of up to Rp. 5 million.[13] Unwarranted arrests have indeed been made. As it turned out, women eating at food stalls or buying food in the evening also ran the risk of being apprehended. Among the victims was a thirty-five-year-old pregnant married woman waiting for a mini-van. In February 2006 she was arrested together with twenty-six others during a raid and tried in a court set up in a public park on a local festival day in front of a jeering crowd. There was no defence lawyer. Her crime was that she used make-up. This had been proof enough for the men arresting her to conclude that she was a prostitute. The judge agreed and sentenced her to Rp. 300,000 or three days' imprisonment. Because she did not have the money on her, she had to spend three days in jail.

Admittedly, the issuing of such local decrees is formally denounced by the central leadership of the Muhammadiyah (among those who did so was its general chairman, Din Syamsuddin), Nahdlatul Ulama and most of the larger Islamic parties, but some of their members may have other ideas. In any case, support for the regional, Islam-inspired decrees came from a new and popular strict Islamic party, the Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS, Party of Justice and Prosperity), favouring the implementation of Islamic law. In the 2004 general election, the PKS captured 8.3 million votes (7 percent), entitling it to forty-five seats in the national parliament. Even more impressive was the performance of the PKS in the general election for the representative body of Jakarta, in which it scored almost one-fifth of the votes and gained eighteen of the seventy-five seats. That, legally correct or not, regional representative councils have enacted Islamic by-laws adds an important element to the debate about the introduction of Islamic law. Usually PKS politicians state that Islamic law should only be in force in a society after the members of that society themselves have been convinced that this is the right way to proceed; a condition they probably was fulfilled when the regional representative council voted in favour of issuing Islamic legislation.

In fact, Islamic law has a firmer constitutional root in Malaysia than in Indonesia. In Indonesia only in Aceh are Islamic regulations observed. In Malaysia each state has its own gazetted Islamic legislation and its own civil servants responsible for enforcing its stipulations. Raids to arrest people who do not follow these rules, and for instance, commit *khalwat*, that is persons of different sex, who are not husband and wife or close relatives, being together alone in a room, are occasionally held in UMNO- as well as in PAS-ruled states, belying the label moderate. Both regulations and their enforcement are strictest in the north of the country, in Kelantan and Terengganu, states still or until recently governed by the PAS. A PAS administration implies – in theory at least – the

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[13] Tangerang also banned the selling of alcohol (except in certain hotels and restaurants). In June 2006 the Mayor of Tangerang revealed that 28 other regions had shown interest in the way the municipality had tried to solve the social problems of prostitution and teenage drinking.

segregation of the sexes in public spaces; even in carriages of ferris wheels. Since 1996, Kelantan supermarkets have had separate check-outs for men and women. In buses men and women have separate sections; though not many seem to bother to observe this. A PAS administration also means that female civil servants and women working in shops and restaurants are encouraged and sometimes obliged, to wear a *tudung*, the Malay-style headscarf leaving the face uncovered. Such morality drives can go to extremes. In January 2003 the Municipal Council of Kota Bharu in Kelantan ordered all business premises in the city to remove pictures and advertisements showing women without a headscarf within seven days, irrespective of whether those portrayed were Muslim women or not. The advice given was to display only posters featuring men. In September 2003, the council issued a complete ban on the featuring of women, even those wearing a *tudung*, on billboards and in the cinema advertisements. Another of its regulations was even thought nonsensical by PAS leaders. In April 2004, the Kelantan administration annulled a Kota Bharu ban on shop-window dummies in dress shops.

The undisputed leader of PAS and also Chief Minister of Kelantan, Nik Abdul Aziz Nik Mat, (now in his seventies) has more than once created a commotion by passing rather silly remarks, about bared navels arousing him sexually, or about the evil of the use of lipstick or perfume by women, going so far as to suggest that lipstick and perfume, even when used by women wearing a headscarf, could attract the unwanted attention of men and result in molestation or rape. He also suggested that the Kelantan administration should employ unattractive women. This was only fair because beautiful women usually married rich husbands and did not need employment.[14]

At a more serious level, in both Kelantan and Terengganu laws have been passed regulating the implementation of the severest forms of Islamic criminal law (*hudud*).[15] Among the most contested provisions of the Terengganu draft bill was the one which stipulated that when a man accused of rape did not confess and the woman who had reported that she had been raped could not submit the evidence required by Islamic law (the testimony of four male Muslim witnesses of good character), she would be charged with slanderous accusations of illicit intercourse (*qazaf*), punishable by eighty lashes. The same sentence hung over the heads of witnesses who had testified that the woman had been raped. Worse still, the woman who lodged the accusation could even be

[14] Bared navels have also aroused the ire of the Indonesian President, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, who considers them obscene. Recently he told a female singer invited to perform at the Presidential Palace to leave because her navel was exposed.

[15] In November 1993, a revised Kelantan Syariah Criminal Enactment Bill, deriving from fundamentalist Islamic legal views, was passed by the state (Ismail 1995). In October 2003, a *Syariah* Criminal Enactment (*Hudud* and Crime Revenge Restitution) Act was gazetted in Terengganu. *Hudud* concerns the sentences appropriate to crimes mentioned in the Koran and *Hadith* which "require public punishment of convicted offenders which include the public mutilation of limbs, *rajam (radjm)* or stoning to death, crucification, and lashing" (Othman 1995: 31).

charged with illicit intercourse (*zina*), punishable by a hundred lashes and one-year's im-prisonment, if such illicit intercourse was committed by an unmarried person, or by stoning to death in the case of adultery. After a wave of protests against the original draft, circumstantial evidence (*qarinah)* was eventually allowed. The bills were gazetted but have never been implemented. The Malaysian legal system prevents this. Though religion is the reserve of the individual states, the Federal Constitution clearly states that criminal law falls under the authority of the Federal Government.

As a rule, Islamic regulations and by-laws are said not to apply to non-Muslims. Never-theless, occasionally Muslims in favour of upholding Islamic law indicate that it would be ideal if its jurisdiction extended to non-Muslims. Considering Islamic law the perfect legal system, they apparently find it difficult to imagine that others will not be won over in the end. In Malaysia the two most important PAS leaders, Nik Abdul Aziz Nik Mat and Abdul Hadi Awang, have made statements to this effect (see also Metzger 1996: 211, 220).[16] Non-Muslims find this all the more threatening in view of the prominent place *hudud* occupies in Malaysian *syariah* discussions.

Recently in Indonesia, where the main issue has not been *hudud* but norms of decency and morality, some Muslims have also spoken their minds. The public debate focuses on Aceh and its Islamic regulations. In March 2006, a Nahdlatul Ulama leader, Soleh Amin, advancing the argument of equal treatment and efficiency, spoke out in favour of Islamic law regulations issued in the province to apply also to non-Muslims. The same argument, equality in law, was put forward in the discussion in Indonesian Parlia-ment in the first half of 2006 about the Bill on the Administration of Aceh, to be draf-ted in accordance with the peace agreement reached with the GAM in August 2005. Some of its members wanted Islamic law also to apply to non-Muslims in Aceh, or as the spokesman of the Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, Nasir Djamil, chose to formulate this: "for all Indonesians and others who resided in Aceh or visited the province".[17]

The discussion about the scope of Islamic law in Aceh came at a moment when a draft of another act, the Anti-pornography and -pornoaction (*pornoaksi*) Bill had sent shock-waves through society, exposing a cultural clash. The draft which had been drawn up by the MUI and revised by the Ministry of Religious Affairs forbade among other things erotic art (an exception was made for art exhibitions, but posing as an artistic model was a crime) and erotic dancing. Singled out a number of times as a special cat-egory was the erotic swaying of the hips, *bergoyang erotis*, made popular by the female singer Inul Daratista, famous for her '*ngebor*' (drilling) hip movements and a thorn in the

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[16] Abdul Hadi Awang was even sure that, when Islamic legislation was in place it "would create 'willingness to surrender', as Muslims believe that punishment under Islamic laws will cleanse them of their sins" (SUARAM 2003: 121).

[17] In the Government draft, the jurisdiction of the *syariah* court was limited to Muslims.

flesh of some Indonesian Muslims (Art. 14, 20, 28).[18] The bill suggested that performing erotic dances in public or making erotic hip movements on stage would cost a dancer between eighteen months and seven years' imprisonment and/or a fine of between Rp. 150 and 750 million (Art. 82). The representation in any form or the performance in public of masturbation and onanism, or gestures resembling such acts (Art. 28), and necrophilia (Art. 17 par. 4) were also mentioned. Among the many other actions the draft forbade were kissing on the lips in public, to be punished with between one and five years' imprisonment and/or a fine of between Rp. 100 and 500 million (Art. 27, 81),[19] ordering a person to kiss in this fashion in public, and portraying such kissing in any form of art, including poetry and other literary works. The display of "sensual parts of the body" was made a crime under the heading pornoaction (Art. 25). In the explanation of the individual articles, it was stated that these "among other" body parts included the genitals, thighs, hips, buttocks, navel and female breasts (also if only partly visible). Men's knees are not included in this enumeration.[20] Though not mentioned in the bill, people also began to wonder about the covering of women's hair, shoulders and legs. The proposed penalty for exposing sensual parts of the body was between two and ten years' imprisonment and/or a fine of between RP 200 million and 1 billion (Art. 79). The bill required all citizens to report all acts of pornography and pornoaction of which they had seen or heard.

The Anti-pornography and pornoaction Bill was, Franz Magnis-Suseno SJ wrote in *The Jakarta Post* (10.3.2006), "a blatant attempt by narrow-minded and culturally dumb ideologists to impose on Indonesian society an alien way of life". Fierce opposition, and even talk of separation, came from Bali, where the bill was seen as an attack on Hindu culture and a potential blow to the tourist industry. Even women in Lombok protested, afraid that the bill would outlaw vernacular dress, as it also would in Java. (Article 36 of the bill made exceptions for traditional dress and behaviour, but only in the case of religious ceremonies. Sport is another field in which certain forms of pornoaction would be allowed, albeit subject to Government permission). In Surakarta, *tayub* dancers joined a parade protesting about the bill. In Jakarta intellectuals and artists, united in the Aliansi Bhineka Tunggal (Unity in Diversity Alliance) held a Cultural Carnival at the

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[18] If accepted the ban on erotic swaying of the hips could easily lead to problems of interpretation. Among those who condemned Inul's performances was the equally popular *dangdut* singer, Rhoma Irama. On some of his VCDs, his female backing group also sway their hips. Rhoma Irama himself makes a distinction between aesthetic and artistic *dangdut* hip movements (*goyangan*) and those which are erotic, lewd, and eye-catching (*seronok*).

[19] The city of Tangerang was in the process of drafting an act forbidding kissing for longer than five minutes, touching each other in a sensual way, and opening each other's clothing in public.

[20] In 2001 the MUI had issued a ruling on Islamic attire according to which a man's body should be covered from navel to knees and a woman's body from head to toe with the exception of the face, the palms of the hands and the soles of the feet (*Risalah* 43, 12, 16).

Hotel Indonesia roundabout. Afterwards the organiser, Ratna Sarumpaet, complained about the intimidating behaviour of scores of Forum Betawi Rempug members, reportedly offended by transvestites showing their bare breasts during the demonstration. The FBR members had come to the office of the Jakarta Arts Council and had demanded an apology from her. Other participants had similar experiences. One of them was Inul Daratista, who had sung and danced at the event. A crowd of FBR members came to her house to tell her it would be best if she were to leave Jakarta and return to the region where she was born, East Java. In the evening of the same day FBR groups visited her karaoke outlets in Jakarta which they threatened to close down were Inul not to repent and continue with her dance performances.

A variety of Islamic groups and politicians (including members of the central boards of the Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah, Vice-President Jusuf Kalla and Rhoma Irama) came out in support of the bill. Some were clearly motivated by puritanical ideas about morality. Among them was the PKS. For some of those demonstrating in support of it, the bill was also a rallying point, an opportunity to show that they were there and that their interpretation of Islam was the morally correct version. Some also considered it an opportunity to testify to their aversion to those opposing the bill and their way of life. Of still others it is not clear whether they agreed with the original draft or were simply upset by the perceived infiltration of Western cultural elements and of a moral decline, and wanted an anti-pornography act to guard morality, vehemently rejecting any suggestion that such an act was not necessary as existing criminal law could be used to combat pornography. At one point, on 21 May, Muslims in favour of the bill staged a demonstration in the centre of Jakarta in which tens of thousands of people participated. Maybe by chance, the report by *BBC News* on its web site, observing that in Indonesia most Muslims' "interpretation of the faith is generally seen as tolerant" mentioned the participation of supporters of the FPI and Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia, but not that of members of the Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah.[21]

From the start, the advance of radical Islamic groups not shunning violence alarmed or at least worried other more liberal devout Muslims. The promulgation of regional religiously inspired by-laws and the introduction of the Anti-pornography and pornoaction Bill, and the way hard-line groups defended it only caused anxiety to grow. One concerned Muslim leader, Ahmad Suaedy, even warned that if the Indonesian government did not act Indonesia might turn into an Islamic state. He said that "Indonesia was only one step away from turning into an Islamic state" (JP 8.6.2006). Another alarmed Indonesian observer wrote, "Indonesia's inner borders were 'under serious threat' and that imposing an Islamic ideology will only aid in the disintegration of Indonesia, as several provinces are predominantly non-Muslim, and will fight against accepting Islam

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[21] News.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/5001786.stm.

as the state ideology" (Tirtosudarmo 2006). The potential dangers were even greater than stated here. Relations within the Islamic community were also strained, especially when we take into account the large number of Muslims in Indonesia who were not particularly devout and whose way of life would be seriously affected should Islamic law be implemented.

Initially the Indonesian Government only reacted by starting a campaign stressing the vital importance of the *Pancasila* and the unitary state. The Day of the Birth of the *Pancasila*, 1 June, was celebrated by the Government as never before. In a televised speech the Indonesian President, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, said that abandoning *Pancasila* for narrow religious or ethnic-based ideologies would threaten the unity and diversity of Indonesia. The strategy seemed ineffective. In one Islamic newspaper such efforts were dismissed as "a jacket to camouflage the supporters of the pornography and pornoaction industry in Indonesia" (R 9.6.2006). Leaders of the MUI and the Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia, another of the hard-line groups, were quick to point out that they accepted the *Pancasila*, but that every Indonesian had the right to interpret it in his or her own way; coming very close to the discussion of the 1940s and 1950s in which devout Muslims favoured the Jakarta Charter and its stipulation that Indonesian Muslims should be obliged to follow Islamic law. It took till early June before the Indonesian Government announced that legal action would be taken against groups which resorted to violence in pursuing their religious ideals, and that these groups might even be disbanded.

The Anti-pornography and pornoaction Bill indicates that regulations defining decency and morality are borderline cases, where Muslims, and they are not the only ones, do not have the least hesitation in enforcing their norms on the wider society, even declaring them universal. In the opinion of some Muslims, such as the chairman of the Partai Amanat Nasional (Party of the National Message, PAN) faction in National Parliament, Abdilllah Toha, drinking alcohol and gambling are included in this category (JP.c 9.2.2006). Developments in Malaysia also testify to this tendency. In the PAS-controlled regions, non-Muslim women are urged to wear non-revealing clothes. In April 2002, the chairman of the Terengganu Tourist Committee, Wan Hassan, even announced that the state was drawing up dress codes for foreign tourists. Women tourists should dress properly and wear a decent swimsuit, not a bikini. Female tourists would also only be allowed to hire female guides; while male tourists would have only male guides. Hotels, at least the newly-built ones, should have separate swimming pools for men and women. The religious zeal is not confined to PAS territory. In March 2006, the federal Inspector-General of Police, Tun Sri Mohd Bakri Omar, had urged all policewomen to wear a headscarf at official functions and parades. Up until then, headscarves had only been compulsory for policewomen serving in Islamic courts. The measure was said to have been taken for the sake of 'uniformity' and to improve the

image of policewomen. It was promised that no disciplinary action would be taken against non-Muslim policewomen who disregarded the instruction.

Even such a modern and international setting as the Kuala Lumpur Petronas Twin Towers is not immune. In August 2003, a Chinese couple received a summons because they were seen kissing in the adjacent park. In April 2006, the Federal Court ruled that the head of the city administration had the right to enact decency or morality by-laws and could prosecute such "disorderly behaviour" as that perpetrated by the couple (NSTO 5.4.2006).[22] To plead their cause Malays in favour of a universal ban on hugging and kissing in public have also evoked Asian morality, Malaysian culture (though in other instances they zealously guard Malay culture), and even one of the five points of the Malaysian ideological national code, the *Rukun Negara*, which emphasises Good Behaviour and Morality. A Minister in the Office of the Prime Minister, Datuk Dr Abdullah Mat Zin, suggested that Muslims kissing and hugging in public or running around naked could be prosecuted under Islamic law, while non-Muslims should realise that such behaviour was contrary to Malaysian culture. The Chinese protested carrying a placard reading "You have the right to kiss".

Such efforts to enforce a strict Muslim code of conduct take place against the background of a more general development in Southeast Asia. A stricter Islam, or at least a yearning for a stricter Islam, is gaining ground. Local Muslims worried by this sometimes speak about an Arabisation of Southeast Asian Islam; which is reminiscent of the discussion about the difference between Arab and Indonesian culture in the debate about women's headdress in the early twentieth century (Van Dijk 1997). In Malaysia, though in the general election of 2004 UMNO recovered from its 1998 low and succeeded in gaining Terengganu, and enrolment at SARs was on the increase, until the government decided to act. The SARs, in the past mainly a rural institution, had begun to make their appearance in the cities, where they also catered for children of the middle-class; just as mosques in middle-class neighbourhoods have become places where anti-government sermons are delivered.

In Indonesia, one of the indications of the growing appeal of puritanical Islam in wider circles is the emergence of the PKS as a young and successful political party. There is also some consensus among observers who agree that the reluctance of the Indonesian Government to act upon radicalism, or the care with which it would proceed if it did, is partly inspired by a fear of a Muslim backlash. It has even been observed that there is "a growing tendency for it to be considered politically incorrect to oppose militancy" in Indonesia (Subianto 2002: 124).

Though it is always difficult to assess the reliability of such findings, and it is also never possible to predict how people will react when their ideals are actually implemented,

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[22] The maximum penalty for such behaviour is RM 2,000 or one year in jail.

opinion polls indicate that, in theory at least, a significant section of Indonesian society is in favour of introducing Islamic law in its full extent. One survey conducted earlier this year by the Indonesian Survey Institute (LSI, Lembaga Survei Indonesia) found that half of the Indonesian population agreed that people engaging in illicit sex should be stoned to death (JP 17.3.2006). Eight percent of the respondents even agreed with the statement that the bombing attacks in Indonesia were permissible as a form of Muslim resistance against the West. More than half of the male respondents and 24 percent of the female could agree with the fact that Islam allows a man to have up to four wives. One-third of the respondents disapproved of a woman being head of state, which has recently been a sensitive issue in Indonesia because it was used as an argument in 1999 to try to prevent Megawati Sukarnoputri from becoming President.

The same reluctance to allow women a leading role in politics also emerges from another survey carried out this year by the Jakarta-based International Centre for Islam and Pluralism (ICIP) in twenty *pesantren* (religious boarding-schools) in West Java. The results indicated that we should not turn to such institutions for tolerance and moderation, as becomes evident from an almost general denunciation of Muslims uttering Christmas greetings (JP 18.1.2006). Even the suggestion that Muslims might say "Merry Christmas" can arouse Muslim anger. In 1991 a primary school-book on *Pancasila* morality asked schoolchildren what they would do if invited to a Christmas celebration by a class-mate.[23] One of the options was to go and wish him or her "Merry Christmas". The result was a ban in Aceh on all schoolbooks issued by the publisher, Intan Pariwara (Prasetyawati 1989: 5).[24] Another indication that tolerance might not be strong at the grassroots level is a remark made by the Head of the Anti-terror Desk of the Office of the Co-ordinating Ministry of Political, Legal and Security Affairs, Inspector General Ansja'ad Mbai, who said that half of the people delivering Friday sermons spread hatred and incited hostility against other religious groups (JP.c 21.10.2005).

[23] In Malaysia PAS leaders and leading *ulama* have problems with Muslims attending 'open houses' held at Chinese New Year, Christmas and other non-Islamic holidays. Muslims could still visit such events but only after the religious part is over. In June 2006 a National Ulama Conference cautioned that going to such events might erode faith and could result in sin (*syirik*). Some cannot even agree with open houses organised by the states or the Federal Government on Islamic holidays because, as is the explicit aim of such events, non-Muslims are also attending when prayers are said.

[24] The same picture of the popularity of uncompromising implementation of Islamic law, and the establishment of an Islamic state (and the aversion to wishing Merry Christmas) emerges from the still unpublished report of a survey carried out at Islamic institutions of education in eight Indonesian provinces by the Centre for the Study of Islam and Society (PPIM) of the State Islamic University Jakarta (Jamhari and Burhanudin 2006). Among the findings are that almost 60 percent of the respondents were in favour of the amputation of the hands of thieves, and that almost 80 percent were against women travelling unaccompanied by their husbands or close relatives. Almost 19 percent condoned bombing as an act in the Islamic struggle against the West. According to an opinion poll by the Washington-based Pew Global Attitudes Project (2006), ten percent of Indonesian Muslims are of the opinion that "Violence against civilian targets in order to defend Islam" was "often/sometimes justified". Eighteen percent still found it "rarely" justified.

In view of the above-mentioned examples and developments it appears that some moderation is needed when using the term moderate and the same applies to radical. This is all the more so because, depending on the topic and context and on personal and group interests, one and the same person or group can be moderate one moment and radical the next. In the last couple of years, responding to complaints, demonstrations and outright mob attacks by Muslim groups, local administrations in Indonesia have closed scores of places where Christian religious services were held, because they had been built without the proper permissions for such purposes.[25] In the recent offensive against such buildings the FPI played an important role. Nevertheless, in December 2005 FPI members joined volunteers from the Muhammadiyah and the Nahdlatul Ulama in guarding churches to prevent what had happened on Christmas Eve 2000, when churches were made the target of bomb attacks. In Malaysia after the poor election results of 2004, some younger PAS leaders spoke out in favour of moderation in applying and enforcing the strict rules championed by their party.

What does this all imply for the future? Is moderate Islam losing out? Especially in Indonesia, Islamists seem to be able to have some of their demands for the introduction of Islamic law and an Islamic way of life met, but the uncompromising, narrow interpretation of Islam is only one of the undercurrents in the Islamic community of Southeast Asia. At certain moments in history it seems to be on the advance, but there is also another undercurrent, equally deeply rooted in society and also always present, which acts as a countervailing force. This is the one which represents local culture and folk traditions. It ensures that traditional culture survives and revives within an Islamic setting and, for instance, that even in Kelantan and Terengganu PAS leaders still organise art performances branded un-Islamic by their administration and that women in Lombok protest against the Anti-pornography and pornoaction draft.

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[25] A joint decree of the Ministers of the Interior and Religious Affairs issued in 1969, states the consent of the local administration and local residents was mandatory for the building of houses of worship; a condition not always easy to meet in an Islamic environment. According to the Indonesian Committee on Religion and Peace, more than 1,000 'churches' which did not meet this requirement have been destroyed or vandalised since 1969 (JP 20.2.2006). In March 2006, the decree was revised to solve this problem. One of its new articles stipulates that when local consent is not given, the local administration has to provide a facility for the congregation in question.

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Abbreviations

JP	*The Jakarta Post*	JP.c	*The Jakarta Post.com*
K	*Kompas*	NSTO	*New Straits Times Online*
R	*Republika*	STI	*The Straits Time Interactive*

"Islam versus Muslims"

Qur'anic Hermeneutics and the Discourse on Gender Equality in Indonesia

Nadja Jacubowski

In many cases Islam is misused as an instrument of control mechanism or to justify the violation of women's rights.[1] The patriarchal-based exegesis of Islamic sources has serious ramifications for women in all Muslim societies. This also affects Muslim women in Indonesia. As Islam is not a static religion, concepts and practices are influenced by location, historical period, ethnic group and social class. In Indonesia, which contains the world's largest Muslim community, religion is considered as an essential part of social life, thus for the majority of Indonesian Muslims Islamic gender concepts, gendered practices and traditions are relevant determining factors in their lives.

Objective of this article is to give an insight into the contemporary discourse on Islam and gender equality in Indonesia with special regard to the phenomenon of Islamic feminism. This article examines how certain Islamic concepts are linked to Indonesian Muslim women's social and physical vulnerability. It shows how gender-based oppression can be challenged within an Islamic framework. To illustrate the current discourse on Islam and gender equality in Indonesia, the present article gives an example of Lily Zakiyah Munir's critique on hegemonic patriarchal interpretations of Islamic sources and related practices.

Islamic Feminism

The discourse on Islamic feminism is closely related to the current situation of Indonesian Muslim women. Elements of this international discourse are incorporated within the national Islamic discourse on gender and sexuality in Indonesia. Work on Islamic feminists has been widely received among Muslim intellectuals and has been applied by some progressive and/or feminist researchers and activists.[2]

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[1] Ilkkaracan, Pinar (2001) Islam and Women's Sexuality. A research report from Turkey. In: Hunt, Mary, Patricia B. Jung and Radhika Balakrishnan, eds., *Good Sex: Feminist Perspectives from the World's Religions*. New Jersey: Rutgers University Press.

[2] Sikand, Yoginder (2005a) Lily Munir on Indonesian Islamic Liberation Theology. In: *Muslim wakeup!* 24.5.2005; Munir, Lily (2003b) *The Koran's spirit of gender Equality*; Membincang Feminisme (1996) *Diskurs Gender Perspektif Islam*. Surabaya, Risalah Gusti.

Islamic Feminism: Definition and Methodology

The issue of Islamic feminism has been controversially discussed among western and non-western scholars. First, there were some critiques relating to this new scientific field of interest caused by the discussion of Muslim women's problems in comparison with those of non-Muslim women, who live under completely different circumstances. Thus, Islamic feminism has been equated with orientalism due to the field of interest. However, as the historian Margot Badran formulated, there is a difference between Islamic feminism and the Orientalist approach. Islamic feminism goes back to the text. "It's Muslims talking to Muslims. Orientalists are people from the West and they talk back to the West."[3] Badran points out that Muslim feminism refers to Muslim feminists/women who use a particular feminist discourse, which can also consist of various strands, e.g. nationalist elements (Arabic, Egyptian, Turkish or other nationalism) Islam, human rights, democracy and other elements that refer to them in a special, personal way. It is their own discourse, characterised by their own experiences. The Islamic discourse is part of this feminist discourse, but with separate discursive strands. Thus, Islamic feminism is based on an Islamic discourse.[4] Badran defined Islamic feminism as "a discourse of gender equality and social justice that derives its understanding and mandate from the Qur'an and seeks *the practice* of rights and justice for *all* human beings in the totality of their existence across the public-private continuum"[5]. She derived this definition from Amina Wadud's and Asma Barlas' work, even though neither one of them calls herself a feminist.[6]

Methodologically, Islamic feminists examine the basic sources of Islam in the context of contemporary situations for concrete ideas.[7] They use Islamic categories such as the concept of *ijtihad* (literally endeavour[8]). But there are also other tools used, such as linguistic methodology or historising, but the framework is within Islam.[9] Islamic feminists use different methodologies, but one central principle is the *tawheed*, which means to assert the unity of God. Islamic feminists argue that some patriarchal and misogynistic

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[3] Sikand, Yoginder (2005b) Islamic feminism is a Universal Discourse. http://www.quantara.de/webcom/ show_article.php/_c-307/_nr-26/i.html?PHPSESSID=133099777 (23.03.2006).

[4] Sikand 2005b.

[5] Badran, Bargot (2003) Islamic Feminism: Beyond Good and Evil, Beyond East and West. In: Barlas 2004a: 9.

[6] Barlas, Asma (2004a) *Towards a Theory of gender Equality in Muslim Societies*. Paper presented at CSID Annual Conference, Washington, D.C., 29.5.2004, 9.

[7] Milli Gazette (2004) Islamic feminism means justice to women, 16.-31.1.2004.

[8] *Ijtihad* is a secondary source of Islamic law and means the process of making a legal decision by independent interpretation of the sources of the law, the Qur'an and the *Sunnah* (Prophet Muhammad's way of life viewed as a model for Muslims). Within the jurisprudence it is understood in the sense of an exegesis of a text (hermeneutic) in order to find a legal rule or to contribute to a finding of justice respectively. See also ZIF 2005.

[9] Milli Gazette 2004.

practices as well as interpretations are in contradiction to the principle of *tawheed*. Therefore, they refer back to the Qur'an and not to the Islamic jurisprudence (*fiqh*). This new interpretation of the Qur'an constitutes a crucial step in terms of a reconsideration of the traditional *fiqh*.[10]

Asma Barlas (2002) developed the theoretical model of Qur'anic hermeneutics of liberation. She focuses on the interplay between text, tradition and reason from a different perspective. Barlas challenges the hegemony of readings of Islam and argues against them on historical and hermeneutic grounds.[11] The hermeneutic aspect of her argument aims to recover the Qur'an's egalitarian and anti-patriarchal epistemology. She states that "Qur'anic hermeneutic also engages, but also opens up to critique text, tradition and reason"[12]. Within the model of Qur'anic hermeneutics the text constitutes the apex of knowledge. She stresses that there is no way "to understand the text in isolation from its own double history (of revelation and of reading), or to understand tradition in isolation from the process of construction"[13]. Barlas sees tradition as historically constructed: referring to al-Ghazali, she argues, that tradition has to be understood as a synthetic rather than 'natural' product. Barlas stresses that it is also necessary to challenge the "instrumentalist reason by means of which interpretative authority is exercised in the public sphere in the name of text or tradition"[14].

Gender Relations in Indonesia

Traditionally women have gained relatively high prestige in Southeast Asian countries. The status of Indonesian women is mainly characterised by traditional rules. The local law system (*adat*) arranges gender-specific rights and obligations. But there exist a large heterogeneity across the country, social classes and ethnic groups. The strong influence of Indonesian women on financial matters is relatively known. A woman was the unofficial head of the family.[15] During the colonial period the position of Indonesian women changed. European values influenced especially the Indonesian upper class in the late nineteenth century. The colonial concept of the nuclear family has since been ad-

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[10] Sikand 2005b.

[11] Barlas, Asma (2004b) Text, Tradition, and reason: Qur'anic Hermeneutics and Sexual Politics, paper presented at the Cardozo Law School, Yeshiva University, 10.-12.10.2004. Barlas introduced this approach in Barlas, Asma (2002) *"Believing Women" in Islam. Unreading Patriarchal Interpretations of the Qur'an.* Austin TX, University of Texas Press.

[12] Ibid: 6.

[13] Ibid: 7.

[14] Ibid.

[15] Vreede-De Steurs, C. (1960) *The Indonesian Woman, Struggles and Achievements.* The Hague, Mouton Publishers.

opted.[16] Commercial activities of married women became considered more and more as inappropriate, and their roles were limited to the domestic sphere. The missionaries also played a relevant role in terms of the new concept of women. They planned to produce "Christian wives and the mothers for new-male converts in order to prevent the latter lapsing into their former beliefs"[17].

Although women's organisations contributed significantly to the nationalist movement in the 1930s and 1940s, their influence decreased clearly after Indonesia's independence under the Old Order government (1945-1965). At that time, women were supposed to leave the political sphere.[18] The concepts of 'equality' and 'difference' were constructed in a patriarchal tradition. Thus, equality was seen as dynamic, because it had been achieved through participation, and while 'difference' was associated with innate attributes which justified unequal marriage rights. Therefore, women's subordination was legitimised by deterministic reasoning. Party politics were constructed as a male sphere, whereas the interests of the women's movement were restricted to female issues or social concerns.[19]

The New Order state (1965-1998) returned to the colonial bourgeois gender concept and extended it to all classes. The main elements of this gender ideology was *housewifisation* with elements of *ibuism* (*ibu* = mother, woman). The term *ibuism* refers to the Javanese society at the beginning of the 20th century and tries to explain a special combination between elements of the western middle-class values and Javanese values.[20] The *ibuism* concept includes an idealisation of the mother. With the beginning of the New Order this concept was instrumentalised, in order to maintain its power over society.[21] Suryakusuma extended the concept by introducing the term state *ibuism*. The New Order state propagated a gender ideology by emphasising women's 'true natural' role as wives and mothers and at the same time their participation in the development process (*pembangunan*). The central point of the New Order gender ideology was the application of the family concept. The state defined itself as a family. According to this concept, the autonomy of women was very limited. The *bapak* (father, man) was considered as the fundamental source of power, whereas the *ibu* was one of the mediums of this

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[16] See also Dzuhayatin, S., *Islam, Patriarchy and the State in Indonesia*, http://www.law.emory.edu /IHR /word-docs/ruhaini1.doc (23.03.2006).

[17] Jayawardena, K. (1986) *Feminism and Nationalism in the Third World*. London, Zed Books, 16.

[18] Wieringa, S. (2002) *Sexual Politics in Indonesia*. Houndmills, Palgrave Macmillan.

[19] Ibid.

[20] Djajadiningrat, M. (1987) Ibuism and priyayisation: Path to Power? In: Locher-Scholten, E. and A. Niehof, eds., *Indonesian Woman in Focus*. Dordrecht, Foris Publications, 43-51.

[21] Suryakusuma, J. (1987) *State Ibuism: Social Construction of the Womanhood in the Indonesian New Order*. Institute of Social Studies The Hague; Suryakusuma (1996) The state and sexuality in New Order Indonesia. In: Sears, L., ed., *Fantasizing the feminine in Indonesia*. Durham, Duke University Press, 92-119.

power. But the state gender ideology, which propagated the ideal of bourgeois women, did not fit the circumstances of the majority of Indonesian women, such as poor urban and rural women.

Muslim Women and the Feminist Movement

The current situation of the feminist movement in Indonesia is still influenced by the politics of the New Order state, which led to the forcible dissolution of all left-wing women's organisations. These groups were outlawed and others were sponsored and instrumentalised for development goals. The women's federation KOWANI has been pushed into the apolitical sphere and has been strictly controlled by the state.[22] Currently, Indonesian's feminist movement is in transition. It is diverse and fragmented, characterised by competing paradigms such as human rights, Islam and international feminism.[23]

As the situation of Muslim women in Indonesia is influenced by factors like ethnicity, social class, location, sexual orientation etc., the response to the feminist movement is also diverse. Generally, some concepts of western feminism are seen to be contradictory to Islam, as Islam is not only a religion but also away of life.[24] However, Muslim women in modern-day Indonesia are challenging gender-based discrimination and subordination, which are among others reflected in contributions to gender studies, the feminist movement as well as a combination of theoretical approaches and interventions.

Islamic Discourse and Gender

The Islamic discourse in Indonesia on women and gender relations respectively is still dominated by traditional patriarchal attitudes and interpretations. Generally, women are considered to be the inferior gender that has to be protected by male family members. This patriarchal view on gender includes a strong spatial segregation that is based on the Islamic sexual ethic. This ethic consists of discriminative practices and traditions which are rooted in the dualistic world view of the Arabic-Muslim society.[25] The traditional Islamic world view holds that female sexuality is a threat to the social order,

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[22] Blackburn, Susan (2001) Women and the Nation http//:www.onlinewomeninpolitics.org/indon/women_nation.htm (16.08.2004).

[23] Ibid.

[24] Siregar, Wahidah, F*eminism in Indonesia: A Movement Between the west and the Muslim Society*, http://psi.ut.ac.id/jsi/82cov.htm (23.03.2006).

[25] Mernissi, Fatima (1985) *Beyond the veil: male-female dynamics in Muslim society*. London, AlSaqi Books.

which leads to social chaos (*fitna*) if uncontrolled.[26] Therefore, female sexuality needs to be controlled by men. Some of these control mechanisms, which are justified by Islamic legal and/or illegal sources and their patriarchal exegesis, lead to violence against women, dependency and to extensive disempowerment.

Islamic sources, such as verses of the Qur'an and *hadith*, are used to emphasise the spatial segregation which allocates women the private space and men the public space. Based on this perspective, it has been argued that political participation of (married) women is actually dependent on their husbands' permission. Istidah (1994) stated that in Indonesia, the most popular verse regarding gender relations is Annisa': 34. The official translation from the Indonesian Religious Affairs Department which contains conventional discourses regarding women is:

> Kaum laki-laki itu adalah pemimpin bagi kaum wanita, oleh karena Allah telah melebihkan sebagian mereka (laki-laki) atas sebagian yang lain (wanita), dan karena mereka (laki-laki) telah menafkahkan sebagian dari harta mereka. Sebab itu maka wanita yang saleh ialah yang taat pada Allah lagi memelihara diri ketika suaminya tidak ada oleh karena Allah telah memelihara (mereka). Wanita-wanita yang kamu khawatirkan nusuznya maka nasehatilah mereka dan pisahkanlah mereka di tempat tidur, dan pukullah mereka. Kemudian jika mereka menta'atimu, maka janganlah kamu mencari-cari jalan menyusahkannya. Sesungguhnya Allah Maha Tinggi lagi Maha Besar.

> Men are the leaders of women, because God has given the one (men) more (advantages) than the other (women), and because (men) have supported them from their means. Therefore, the righteous women are devoutly obedient to God (and) protect themselves in the absence of the husbands as God has protected them. As to those women on whose part ye fear disloyalty and ill conduct, admonish them and refuse to share their beds, and beat them. If they return to obedience, seek not against them. For God is the Most High (and) Great.[27]

This verse is generally seen as a regulation of the relationship between husbands and wives. The conventional interpretation of this verse implies three main concepts: a) the superiority of husbands over their wives, b) the obedience of the wife to the husband and c) the sexual division of labour in the family and the community respectively. This interpretation, as part of the conventional Islamic discourse in Indonesia has been criticised by neo-modernist Indonesian Muslim intellectuals such as Wahid, Mas'udi and Shihab based on various argumentations.[28] Thus, Shihab argues that the biased interpretation of the position of women is caused by a lack of understanding by Muslims of Islamic concepts, so that Islam is misused to legitimise this biased interpretation.[29]

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[26] Mernissi 1985.

[27] Istidah (1994) *Muslim Women in Indonesia: Investigating Paths to Resist the Patriarchal System*. Working Paper 91, Monash University, 6.

[28] Ibid.

[29] Shihab, Quraish (1994) Membumikan Al-Qur'an: Fungsi dan Peran Wahyu dalam Kehidupan Masyarakat. Bandung, Mizan.

Islam and Sexuality

Discourses on sexuality in Islam in many cases do not consider differences in practices in different Muslim communities. These discourses lead to a contradictory picture of women's sexuality. On the one hand, Islam is characterised by a relatively open attitude towards sexual morality and contains elements, considering the sexual drives of men and women and the rights to sexual fulfilment.[30] On the other hand, as pointed out before, according to the Islamic dualistic world view, female sexuality is considered as a threat to the social order, which leads to social chaos (*fitna*) if uncontrolled.[31] The preoccupation with controlling female sexuality is discursively constructed as the "omnisexual woman", related to a powerful sexual principle.[32] Shaikh (2006) points out that this view is based on a determinist perspective on women. It has significant influence on classical as well as contemporary Islamic discourses on gender which are directly linked to the construction of the "traditional Muslim ideal of a submissive, docile and obedient woman"[33].

Some of these control mechanisms, which are justified by Islamic legal and/or illegal sources and their patriarchal exegesis, lead to violence against women, dependency and to an extensive disempowerment. The *nusyuz* (disobedience) concept plays an important role in terms of a married woman's everyday life. The *nusyuz* concept bases on the sura Al-Nisa' verse 34. Traditionally, *nusyuz* means:

- The wife leaves the house without the knowledge of the husband or against her husbands will,
- The wife refuses sexual contact with her husband,
- The wife behaves rudely to her husband,
- The wife refuses to follow her husband's orders (if they are not in contradiction with Islamic principles).

With regard to the context of reproductive and sexual health, the concept of *nusyuz* plays an important role. It means if a Muslim man demands intercourse with his wife, she has little choice but to refuse it. If she does not comply she may be considered to be *nusyuz*, and then she is not eligible for *nafaqah* (maintenance, including financial support).[34]

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[30] Ilkkaracan 2001.

[31] See ibid and Mernissi 1985.

[32] See also Mernissi 1985 and Shaikh, Sa'diyya (2006) *Exegetical Violence: Nushuz in Quranic Gender Ideology*, http://www.crescentlife.com/thisthat/feminist%_20muslims/exegetical_violenceI_nushuz_in_quran.htm (1.5.2006), 7.

[33] Shaikh 2006.

[34] Wadud, Amina (2003) Muslims, Islam and AIDS: Thoughts on the 2nd International Muslim religious leaders Consultation on HIV/AIDS 2003.

Women's Rights within Islamic Family Law

In contemporary Indonesia, civil and religious courts work parallel to each other. Decisions of the Islamic courts are based on the *Kompilasi Hukum Islam di Indonesia* (Compilation of Islamic Law in Indonesia). In 2004, the Ministry of Religious Affairs introduced a new draft law, including issues such as gender equality, pluralism justice, human rights and democracy. This draft has attracted controversial discussion. Conservative clerics criticised it, reproaching that the new provisions were contrary to Islamic principles. In May 2005, the draft was submitted to Parliament, but it has not been enacted yet.[35] The *Kompilasi Hukum Islam* sets out the relations of married couples, including duties and responsibilities. In article 79 it is laid down that the husband is the head of the household, and as required by article 80 (4) (a) and (b) is responsible for the maintenance, clothing, residence, household and medical costs of the wife. The husband has to protect and guide his wife, provide for her domestic needs as well as for her religious education. Article 80 (7) determines that the responsibility lapses if the wife is *nusyuz*.[36] The issue of *nusyuz* is regulated in article 83. The wife is required to fulfil certain responsibilities such as physical and mental devotion to her husband, and except when there are particular legal reasons for not doing so, she can be considered *nusyuz*. Although the case of *nusyuz* requires legal evidence, the issue is critical as in many cases judges take the silence of a wife as proof of her misconduct.[37] *Nusyuz* is only used with regard to the wife. Conservative *ulama* have even widened the definition, including all attitudes of a wife that displease the husband. Therefore, irresponsible husbands can claim *nusyuz* to legitimise their behaviour and abusive husbands can use it to justify domestic violence/forced sexual intercourse.[38]

Qur'anic Hermeneutics in the Context of Indonesia: Lily Zakiyah Munir's Critique

Lily Zakiyah Munir is a leading Muslim human rights activist. She is founder and director of the Centre for Pesantren (Islamic boarding school) and Democracy Studies in Jakarta. This NGO promotes democracy and human rights education among Muslim grassroots communities. Munir is a board member of the Muslimat NU (Nahdlatul Ulama) and a researcher on Islam and gender. Her views on women's issues and gender

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[35] Karamah, Women's Rights within Islamic Family Law in Southeast Asia. http://www.Karamah. org/docs/ Womens_rights_%20SEA.pdf (23.03.2006).

[36] Ibid.

[37] Ibid.

[38] Ibid.

relations reflect clearly the character of the contemporary discourse on Islam and gender equality and Islamic feminism in Indonesia.

Munir holds that the core of Islamic feminism is to bring justice for women according to the Qur'an and the Prophet's tradition. She states that "the essence of the Islamic feminist struggle is to bring justice for women, as promised in the Qur'an and the Prophet's tradition, from discourse into reality"[39]. This justice has to be measured from the women's perspective, the perspective of the oppressed object. Munir believes that there is a big gap between Islamic teachings and their manifestation in Muslim societies. Domestic violence against women reflects these contradictions. Regarding women's rights, Munir stresses that a distinction has to be made between Islam as "the sum of attitudes and behavioural acts of the major part of Muslims in Muslim societies (which are – like many other societies worldwide – patriarchal societies)" and "a set of moral teachings and rituals revealed to bring blessings to all of mankind, including women"[40]. Thus, she argues, "the issue is Islam versus Muslims"[41]. Between these two phenomena is a wide gap that has to be closed by educating the people, the general public as well as the Muslims. She points out that there are at least 30 verses in the Qur'an that support gender equality: firstly, the creation of human beings, which states that all women and men were created from a single source (*nafs wahida*) without indicating a superior gender. Secondly, the Qur'an does treat women and men equally regarding sinful behaviour. Thirdly, women and men enjoy equal rights to pursue education; as both genders are clearly encouraged to seek knowledge. Fourthly, women and men have the same rights and obligations to engage in social/public activities, and both are obliged to strive for a virtuous life and to prevent sins (*al-amr bi'l ma'ruf wa n-nahy 'an al-munkar*).[42]

Munir states, that the gap between certain Islamic teachings such as the concept of egalitarianism, gender equality and *al-amr bi'l ma'ruf wa n-nahy 'an al-munkar* and the actual status of women in Muslim societies results mainly from the following reasons:

· Liberal and emancipatory messages are not easy to understand, especially if the recipient of the Qur'an is prejudiced by the patriarchal-ideological hegemony. The concept of gender and (marital) sexual equality, which is anchored in al-Baqarah: 187, is mostly not taken into consideration by the majority of Muslims because they are used to gendered subordination.

· Generally preachers do not promote the concept of gender equality and women's rights respectively. Major themes of the religious teachings are the superiority of God and the "superiority" of men over women.

· Most of the Muslim women who are public figures tend to promote the role of the devout Muslima.[43]

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[39] Munir, Zakiyah Lily (2003a) Nurturing Tolerance in Pesantren. In: *The Jakarta Post* 5.9.2003.

[40] Munir, Zakiyah Lily 2003b.

[41] Ibid.

[42] Ibid.

In one of her recent articles Munir (2005) examines domestic violence in Indonesia in the context of the Islamic framework. She discusses case studies of two Muslim women with different social backgrounds and relates the impact of Islamic teachings to individual marital experiences. She highlights the prevailing contradictions in Islamic texts and the diversity of interpretations. Therefore, expectations regarding justice in marital relations and the justification of gender-based oppression can arise from the same source.[44] According to Munir, domestic violence is the most obvious reflection of unbalanced gender relations in Muslim societies. This phenomenon is not restricted to certain classes but prevalent among educated and non-educated people with different socio-economic backgrounds.[45]

In her argumentation Munir also includes the interpretation of sura Al-Nisa 4: 34 in the *Uqud al-Lujayn*, a classical text collection which is very popular among Indonesian *pesantren*. This book contains numerous misogynist elements. A wide range of discriminations towards Indonesian women are practised on the basis of the *Uqud al-Lujayn*. This book, which is used to refer to sex education and gender relations within marriage, significantly influences the everyday life conditions of Muslim Indonesian women. She discusses the interpretation of the *Uqud al-Lujayn* with regard to a more gender-friendly version of Yusuf Ali (1989) and concludes that the same text can be interpreted differently, depending on the exegete's background. Crucial to the understanding is how certain words (e.g. *qawwam*, and *nushuz*) are interpreted. Here, she refers to the work of international Islamic feminists such as Amina Wadud and Azizah Al-Hibri, who argue that *qawwamum*, usually translated as protector/maintainer, means 'breadwinners or those who provide a means of support or livelihood'[46]. Hence, the term *qawwam* does not imply men's superiority as it has been interpreted by a wide range of conservative *ulama*.

Additionally Munir cites Engineer (2000), who gives an alternative interpretation of the verse. He holds that the husband-wife relationship is not hierarchically structured, but rather constitutes a friendship (*rafaqat*). He refuses the assumption that the Qur'an recommends wife-beating. According to his view, the concept *nusyuz* does not refer to rebellion of women within the marital union but to rebellion in general.[47]

Munir's critique shows that the Indonesian discourse on gender equality implies an Islamic paradigm that promotes women's rights. Munir incorporates theoretical ap-

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[43] Ibid.

[44] Munir, Zakiyah Lily (2005) Domestic Violence in Indonesia. In: *Muslim World Journal of Human Rights* 2, 1.

[45] Munir 2005.

[46] Here, Munir refers to Riffat Hassan, in: Barlas 2002. See Munir 2005 on feminist Qur'anic exegesis and translations of these concepts see also Barlas 2006.

[47] Munir 2005.

proaches of the discourse on Islamic feminism into her argumentation. She applies an Islamic feminist hermeneutical method to the Indonesian context and links theoretical constructs with issues on the everyday-life level of Indonesian women, which are related to particular vulnerabilities.

Concluding Remarks

The work of Munir and other Muslim scholars/activists like Sinta Abdurrahman Wahid, Masdar Masudi, Husein Muhammad and Lies Marcoes has been strongly refuted and criticised by radical conservative Muslim groups.[48] Websites of the Indonesian fundamentalist movement reflect clearly this tendency. However, the Islamic discourse on gender equality in Indonesia indicates that progressive Muslim scholars and activists challenge gender-based oppression. The discourse on Islamic feminism in Indonesia constitutes a special discourse, but it becomes increasingly differentiated and embedded in the international discourse. Thus, in 2005, Lily Zakiyah Munir participated as one of the main speakers at the First International Congress on Islamic Feminism in Barcelona.[49] Additionally other prominent international Muslim scholars like Azizah Al-Hibri and Asma Barlas visited Indonesia, presented their work and established relations with the local networks.

This article shows that certain Islamic concepts like *nusyuz* are highly relevant to Indonesian women's social and physical vulnerability. The concept of *nusyuz* is closely related to women's marital experiences. It is a crucial issue regarding marital sexuality, and women's reproductive and sexual health. To look at how this academic discourse is perceived at grassroots level, how reformist approaches can be operationalised on a broader level and to what extent everyday life conditions are shaped, further qualitative research has to be conducted.

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Barlas, Asma (2002) *"Believing Women" in Islam. Unreading Patriarchal Interpretations of the Qur'an*. Austin TX, University of Texas Press.

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[48] E.g. Swara Muslim. http://swaramuslim.net.

[49] She was a speaker in 2005 and will also participate in the 2nd Congress in October 2006; see http://www.feminismeislamic.org/eng/index.htm.

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IV

Dance, Literature and Past

Getanzte Geschichte

Tanz und Geschichte auf Java[1]

Sri Kuhnt-Saptodewo

Der Anthropologe Jack Goody hat verschiedene Kulturen danach unterschieden, wie sie ihre Vergangenheit wahrnehmen. So stelle sich die Vergangenheit in literalen Gesellschaften als etwas „in sich Abgeschlossenes" dar, während sie in oralen Kulturen stets neu mit der Gegenwart verhandelt werde. Daher ist nach Goody die Vergangenheit in literalen Gesellschaften „objektiver", während sie in oralen Kulturen „veränderbar" und dadurch „manipulierbarer" sei.[2] Die Vergangenheit sei zudem in literalen Gesellschaften von der Gegenwart klar abgetrennt, während sie in oralen Kulturen nicht so isoliert zu betrachten sei.[3]

Schon der Historiker Edward H. Carr stellte aber fest:

> Geschichte ist ein fortwährender Prozess der Wechselwirkung zwischen dem Historiker und seinen Fakten, ein unendlicher Dialog zwischen Gegenwart und Vergangenheit (Carr 1964: 30-55).

Damit meint er nicht nur einen Dialog zwischen abstrakten und isolierten Individuen, sondern zwischen der Gesellschaft der Gegenwart und der Vergangenheit.

Die Interaktion zwischen der Vergangenheit und der Gegenwart existiert — im Gegensatz zu Goodys Meinung — sowohl in der schriftlich fixierten als auch in oral orientierten Kulturen. Die Vergangenheit kann sich nämlich ändern, wenn die Gegenwart sich verändert, da ja die Vergangenheit in ihrem Gegenwartsbezug betrachtet wird. James

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[1] Auszüge aus der Habilitationsschrift, eingereicht 2003 an der Fakultät der Philosophischen Fakultät III der Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin (Kuhnt-Saptodewo, Sri (2006) *Getanzte Geschichte. Tanz, Religion und Geschichte auf Java*. Wien, LIT-Verlag, Veröffentlichungen zum Archiv für Völkerkunde Bd. 11).

[2] Vgl. u.a. Goody 1981: 54; die Diskussion dazu auch in Goetz 1999.

[3] Vollrath zeigt dagegen anhand eines Beispiels aus der mittelalterlichen Kirche in Deutschland, wie sie „aus geheiligten Texten ihre Orientierung in der Welt gewann und als Institution die Schriftlichkeit pflegte", nämlich dadurch, dass die Mönche für den gegenwärtigen Besitz ihrer Kirchen Garantie-Urkunden auf den Namen längst verstorbener Herrscher fälschten. Somit projizierten sie die Gegenwart nach rückwärts in die Vergangenheit. Ihre These ist, dass die deutsche Kultur im Mittelalter auch eine orale Kultur war; deswegen bezeichnete sie diese Handlung als eine typische Handlung der oralen Kultur, da „der Sog der mündlichen Kultur so stark war, daß selbst Geistliche ihm erlagen, indem sie auf den Umgang mit schriftlichen Texten gleichsam orale Verhaltensweisen übertrugen" (1981: 589). Dieses Beispiel zeigt genau das Kernproblem, nämlich dass erstens sowohl in oralen als auch in literalen Kulturen die Geschichte manipuliert werden kann und zweitens die Unterscheidung zwischen „oralen" und „literalen" Kulturen nicht so unproblematisch ist, wie Goody sich dies vorstellte.

Fox nennt es „the past perceived for its relevance to the present" (Fox 1979: 4). So entsteht eine Interaktion zwischen Vergangenheit und Gegenwart, die für die Zukunft der betreffenden Gesellschaft eine Rolle spielen kann. In dieser Interaktion können verschiedene Aspekte in Betracht gezogen werden, wie Geschichte, Geschichten, Mythen, Erzählungen, Rituale, darstellende und bildende Kunst usw., die als „Erinnerungsfiguren" fungieren können. Jan Assmann beschreibt in seinem Buch „Kultur und Gedächtnis" die Fixpunkte des kulturellen Gedächtnisses (d.h. die „Erinnerungsfiguren") als „schicksalhafte Ereignisse der Vergangenheit, deren Erinnerung durch kulturelle Formung (Texte, Riten, Denkmäler) und institutionalisierte Kommunikation (Rezitation, Begehung, Betrachtung) wachgehalten wird" (Assmann 1988: 12). Diese „Erinnerungsfiguren" sollten wie eine „kulturelle Enzyklopädie" (in Anlehnung an Havelock 1963: 27) gelesen und in dem jeweiligen kulturellen Kontext und Wertesystem interpretiert werden.

Eine andere Funktion der Geschichte wird vom Kulturhistoriker J. Huizinga als eine Art von „Rechenschaft ablegen" bezeichnet. Damit bilde Geschichte die geistige Form, in der eine Kultur sich über ihre Vergangenheit Rechenschaft gebe (Huizinga 1979: 36).[4]

Die ‚traditionelle'[5] Geschichte kann als intern geleitete Darstellung der Vergangenheit angesehen werden, etwa um ein bestehendes Königreich, eine Epoche oder eine Gesellschaftsstruktur zu legitimieren. Somit ist die Einstellung zur Geschichte und zur Vergangenheit kulturabhängig.

Wir kennen verschiedene Arten, wie Geschichte wiedergegeben wird; sei es, um die Vergangenheit zu rekonstruieren, eine Brücke zwischen der Gegenwart und der Vergangenheit zu schlagen oder Entwicklungen der Zukunft aufgrund geschichtlicher Erfahrungen vorauszusehen. Die zwei gängigen Unterteilungen der Wiedergabe von Geschichte sind die mündliche und die schriftliche Überlieferung. Unter mündlicher Überlieferung werden u.a. Gesänge, Rezitationen bei Ritualen, Mythen, Legenden, Sagen, Märchen, Redensarten, Interviews verstanden. In der modernen Welt zählen Medien wie Radio, Film und Fernsehen dazu.[6] Bei der schriftlichen Übertragung handelt es sich u.a. um Dokumente, Briefe, Chroniken, Tagebücher, Aufzeichnungen und Kalender.

Bislang weitgehend unerforscht geblieben ist jedoch eine dritte Kategorie, nämlich die nonverbale Präsentation historischer Ereignisse. Die nonverbale (und zugleich nicht-schriftliche) Weitergabe von Geschichte kann sowohl durch bildende Kunst wie Male-

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[4] „De aard der geesteswerkzaamheid, waaruit Geschiedenis onstaat, wordt omschreven als een 'zich rekenschap geven'".

[5] Hier im Sinne von „vor der wissenschaftlichen Niederschreibung der Geschichte".

[6] Nach Meinung von Walter Ong führen die modernen Medien wie Telefon, Radio und Fernsehen zu „sekundärer Oralität", siehe Ong 1987.

rei, Plastik und Relief als auch durch darstellende Kunst wie Musik, Theater und Tanz geschehen. Die darstellende Kunst ist eine Mischung zwischen verbaler und nonverbaler Geschichtsüberlieferung und spielt in Südostasien eine sehr wichtige Rolle. Leider sind sie bisher aber kaum als Quelle für einen historischen Erkenntnisgewinn genutzt worden.

Nonverbale Präsentation — die darstellende Kunst

Die oral orientierten Kulturen haben andere Möglichkeiten als die auf Schrift fixierten Kulturen, sich auszudrücken und verwenden andere Medien, um ihre Traditionen weiterzugeben. Diese Kulturen nutzen verschiedene Medien, um ihre Geschichte zu konservieren, andererseits aber auch, um sie in einen lebhaften Dialog mit der Gegenwart treten zu lassen.

Seit Ende der 80er Jahre werden im Umkreis der Heidelberger Altphilologen Jan und Aleida Assman bildende Kunst, Architektur und Riten als Elemente betrachtet, die das „kulturelle Gedächtnis" einer Gesellschaft prägen und ihr Selbstverständnis im Bezug zur Vergangenheit bilden.

> Das *kulturelle* Gedächtnis richtet sich auf Fixpunkte in der Vergangenheit. Auch in ihm vermag sich Vergangenheit nicht als solche zu erhalten. Vergangenheit gerinnt hier vielmehr zu symbolischen Figuren, an die sich die Erinnerung heftet. [...] Auch Mythen sind Erinnerungsfiguren: Der Unterschied zwischen Mythos und Geschichte wird hier hinfällig. Für das kulturelle Gedächtnis zählt nicht faktische, sondern nur erinnerte Geschichte. Man könnte auch sagen, daß im kulturellen Gedächtnis faktische Geschichte in erinnerte und damit in Mythos transformiert wird. Mythos ist eine fundierende Geschichte, eine Geschichte, die erzählt wird, um eine Gegenwart vom Ursprung her zu erhellen. [...] Durch Erinnerung wird Geschichte zum Mythos. Dadurch wird sie nicht unwirklich, sondern im Gegenteil erst Wirklichkeit im Sinne einer fortdauernden normativen und formativen Kraft (Assmann 1997: 52).

Durch die Aufführungen der darstellenden Kunst wird die Geschichte von Generation zu Generation immer wieder zurückgeholt und erneut präsentiert. Die Aufführung benötigt allerdings ein Medium, einen *performer* und ein Publikum. Wenn ein Element fehlt, schlägt auch die Übertragung der Geschichte bzw. Geschichten fehl. Die Präsentation vergegenwärtigt die Ereignisse der Vergangenheit oder nimmt darauf einen Bezug.

In der javanischen Tradition kreierte ein König meistens nach einem Siegeszug einen *bedhaya*-Tanz, um erstens seine Dankbarkeit an die Gottheit zu schicken, zweitens seinen Sieg zu feiern und drittens diesem Sieg ein Denkmal zu setzen. Durch die Vorführung dieser Tänze wird die nachfolgende Generation an seinen historischen Sieg erinnert. Einige Beispiele sollen dies verdeutlichen.

Der Tanz ‚Bedhaya Anglir Mendung'

‚Bedhaya Anglir Mendung' wurde von Mangkunegoro I. choreographiert. Er verwende-te ein altes Musikstück (*gending*), das der Überlieferung nach bereits von Sultan Agung komponiert wurde. Dieser Tanz wurde im Rahmen eines von Raden Mas Said (späterer Mangkunegoro I.) im Jahre 1752 geführten Krieges gegen Mangkubumi, seinen eigenen Schwiegervater (Yogyakarta), und Pakubuwono II. (Surakarta) choreographiert.

Der Vater von R. M. Said, Pangeran Arya Mangkunegoro, war der rechtmäßige Thron-folger. Er hatte mit anderen Prinzen gegen die VOC rebelliert, gab aber 1723 nach und durfte in die Hauptstadt, Kartasura, zurückkehren. Er war bei Gleichgesinnten beliebt und erzeugte dadurch Missgunst beim Kanzler (*patih*) Danureja. Danureja stellte ihm 1728 eine Falle: Nach dem Tod seiner Frau war Mangkunegoro nämlich sehr traurig und wurde stets von einer chinesischstämmigen Frau, einer früheren Nebenfrau (*selir*) des Sunan Pakubuwono II., seines Brudes, getröstet. Dies war eigentlich nicht verbo-ten, da Pakubuwono II. sie nicht mehr beanspruchte. Danureja aber sah in dieser Affä-re eine Möglichkeit, seinen Konkurrenten loszuwerden. So beeinflusste er Pakubuwono II., dass er seinen Bruder mit Hilfe der Holländer ins Exil nach dem Kap der Guten Hoffnung schickte. Obwohl die VOC den gegen Mangkunegoro vorgebrachten Vor-würfen keinen Glauben schenkte, hatten sie Angst vor einer erneuerten Rebellion, die von Pangeran Arya Mangkunegoro ausgehen könnte. So wurde er ins Exil zuerst nach Batavia, danach nach Ceylon und zum Schluss zum Kap der Guten Hoffnung ge-schickt, wo er im Jahre 1738 verstarb.

Während des chinesischen Aufstandes im Jahre 1740 kämpfte der Sohn des Pangeran Arya Mangkunegoro, R. M. Said, auf der Seite der Chinesen gegen die Holländer, wäh-rend Pakubuwono II. für die Holländer war (‚Babad Mangkunegara I', 1993: 209). Als Pakubuwono II. den Krieg mit Hilfe der VOC doch noch gewann, musste R. M. Said 1743 den *kraton* (‚Fürstenpalast') verlassen und ging mit seinem Gefolge nach Nglaroh, östlich von Surakarta. Von dieser Gegend aus führte er 15 Jahre lang (1741-1757) einen Guerillakrieg gegen die VOC und deren Verbündeten Surakarta und später auch gegen Yogyakarta. Während des Krieges lebte er mit seiner Frau (der Tochter des Mangkubu-mi, des späteren Hamengkubuwono I.), den Nebenfrauen, seinen Soldatinnen (*bedhaya*) und Soldaten und anderen Gefolgsleuten in den Wäldern und Bergen. Dort ließ er abends als Zerstreuung und Ermutigung für sich und seine Gefolgsleute *gamelan*-Musik und Tänze aufführen.

Im Jahre 1749 gab es im Dorf Kesatrian, in der Nähe von Ponorogo, einen heftigen Kampf zwischen den rebellierenden Prinzen mitsamt R. M. Said und seinem Schwieger-vater Mangkubumi auf der einen Seite, gegen Pakubuwono III. mit den Holländern auf der anderen Seite. Im ‚Babad Mangkunegara I' steht dazu, dass die Truppen der Gegen-seite etwa 10.000 Mann stark waren. Die Rebellen unter R. M. Said konnten jedoch

trotzdem die Städte Madiun, Magetan und Ponorogo annektieren ('Babad Mangkunega-ra I', 1993: 234-237). Im Zuge dieses Krieges entwickelten sich aber Missstimmungen zwischen R. M. Said und Mangkubumi, so dass sie sich ab dem Jahr 1752 auch gegen-seitig bekämpften. Dieser Krieg war für die Mangkunegoro-Dynastie von großer Be-deutung, weil er mit dazu beitrug, dass R. M. Said ein eigenes Gebiet zugesprochen be-kam. Deswegen machte er ihn immer wieder zum Gegenstand in den Tänzen, um die-sen historischen Sieg an spätere Generationen weiterzugeben.

Nach Beendigung des Krieges kreierte R. M. Said einige *bedhaya*-Tänze. Einer davon war der Tanz 'Bedhaya Anglir Mendung', um den Krieg gegen seinen eigenen Schwie-gervater zu verarbeiten und zugleich seine Freude über den Sieg auszudrücken. Aus den Gedichten, die Mangkunegoro I. für den Tanz schrieb, lassen sich seine Zweifel erken-nen, gegen den eigenen Schwiegervater zu kämpfen:

Duk samana Dipati Mangkunegara	Zu dieser Zeit wollte Mangkunegoro
Sakawoné rama ´ji,	nach der Niederlage des Schwiegervaters,
kandheg pambujungnya,	seine Verfolgung nicht fortsetzen,
mila kandheg samana,	hörte sogar damit auf,
tan nedya mangsah narpati,	konnte nicht gegen den König antreten
lahir bathinnya,	von ganzem Herzen,
emut mratuwa aji.	erinnerte er sich an seinen Schwiegervater.
Tan angimpi sedya mungsuha	Konnte sich nicht vorstellen, gegen den Vater
sang rama,	zu kämpfen,
yen den-kajenga ugi,	Auch wenn es passieren würde,
ing pambujengira,	in der Verfolgung,
kadi Sunan kacandhak,	bis der Sunan (Mangkubumi) verhaftet wäre,
Kangjeng Pangeran Dipati,	Pangeran Dipati (Mas Said)
enget ing driya,	würde sich daran erinnern,
lahir tumekeng batin.[7]	von ganzem Herzen.[8]

Sonst enthalten die Gedichte eine Huldigung an sich selbst und Ausdruck seiner Freude über den Sieg:

Jeng Pangeran Dipati Mangkunegara	Der Fürst Mangkunegara,
anindhi ngajurit,	der den Krieg führte,
mangamuk anyakra,	wild mit seinen Waffen, Cakra[9],
gandewane lir kilat,	der so schnell ist wie der Blitz,
antuk pitulunging widi,	von Gott geholfen,
mengsah keh pejah,	viele Feinde wurden getötet,
larut tan mangga pulih.	endlos niedergeschlagen.

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[7] Tembang Durma, 71-72; Dagboek, 1780-1791, entnommen aus Wahyu Santoso 1990: 45-47.

[8] Übersetzung der Autorin.

[9] Eine Art Bogenschiessen.

Dunya kadya sinebaran	Der Welt wird bekanntgemacht
katha bandhangané asri,	Viel schöne Beute,
tuhu kusuma pinujul,	Er ist eine richtige Blume,
rembes terahing Mataram,	Zweifelos Nachkomme von Mataram,
Terus wijiling atapat,	Von seinem Meditationsort kommend,
Kedhep prentahing sesami,	gab er einen Befehl an seine Leute,
Wadyabala suka bungah,	Die Soldaten waren sehr froh,
Wadya yén tulusa, enggih,	Wenn alles in Erfüllung geht,
Yén tulusa suka wirya, enggih	Wenn alles in Erfüllung geht, dass sie
Yén tulusa wirya. [10]	froh und mutig sind /Wenn sie mutig sind.[11]

Im Jahre 1757 wurde R. M. Said ein eigenes Gebiet zugesprochen. Danach nannte er sich Mangkunegoro I. und regierte von 1757 bis 1795. M. C. Ricklefs stellt zu Mangkunegoro I. fest:

> Of the three main Javanese aristocrats, Mangkunegara was the least well-placed, the most volatile, and the most feared by both the Dutch and other Javanese (Ricklefs 1974: 153).

Nach der Beendigung dieses Krieges wurde der ‚Bedhaya Anglir Mendung' als Sakraltanz des neuen Reiches Mangkunegoro I. an dessen Hofe gepflegt. Der ‚Bedhaya Anglir Mendung'[12] wird entgegen der Regelung für *bedhaya*-Tänze von sieben Tänzerinnen aufgeführt. Der Grund dafür ist, dass dieser Tanz von Mangkunegoro I. entworfen wurde und dieses Fürstentum dem *susuhunan* Pakubuwono untergeordnet war. Deshalb hatte die Mangkunegoro-Dynastie nicht das Recht, einen *bedhaya*-Tanz mit der kompletten Zahl von neun Tänzerinnen aufzuführen.[13]

Im Vergleich zu anderen Königen hat Mangkunegoro I. die vollständigste Dokumentation über sich für die Nachwelt hinterlassen. Dabei handelt es sich um die von R. M. Said selbst geschriebenen Tagebücher ‚Babad Tutur', ‚Babad Lelampahan', die von sei-

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[10] Gesang für ‚Bedhaya Anglir Mendung', entnommen aus Budi Sulistyowati 1989: 44-64, sie transkribiert den ganzen Gesang des ‚Bedhaya Anglir Mendung' und vergleicht ihn mit den späteren Versionen. Der Gesang für ‚Bedhaya Anglir Mendung' komponiert von Mangkunegoro I. besteht aus drei Strophen Melodie Sekar Durma, fünf Strophen Melodie Ketawang Tinon Asri, und fünf Strophen Melodie Ketawang Mijil Asri.

[11] Übersetzung der Autorin.

[12] *anglir* = so wie; *mendung* = wolkig sein; wortwörtlich übersetzt heißt es ‚so wie die Wolken'.

[13] Zainuddin interpretiert die Verwendung von sieben Tänzerinnen im *bedhaya*-Tanz im Puro Mangkunegoro als eine freiwillige Entscheidung des R. M. Said als Anhänger des Naqshabandiyah; sie symbolisiert nämlich die sieben vorgeschriebenen Punkte im *dhikr latha'if* als die höchste Manifestation der Selbstaufgabe gegenüber Gott (Zainuddin 2000). Wahyu Santoso behauptet hingegen, dass die Komposition mit der Zahl sieben indigen und die mit der Zahl neun islamisch geprägt sei (Wahyu Santoso Prabowo 1996: 144). Meines Erachtens ist diese Interpretation zu weit gegriffen. Zu beachten ist in diesem Zusammenhang, dass die Komposition des *bedhaya*-Tanzes mit neun Tänzerinnen älter ist. Die Interpretation der Zahl neun ist somit in der javanischen Kultur ausgeprägter und auch in anderen Bereichen zu beobachten. Aus der inneren Perspektive betrachtet, spiegelt also die Komposition mit der Zahl neun die javanische Religion stärker wider. Die Komposition mit der Zahl sieben wurde m.E. aus hierarchischen Gründen eingeführt. Dies wird auch durch andere Regelungen bekräftigt wie durch die Unterschiede im Tragen der Kostüme und durch die Sitzordnung für die ‚Neuankömmlinge' Mangkunegoro.

nen *bedhaya* auf seinen Befehl hin geschriebene Chronik ‚Serat Babad Nitik Mangkuna-
garan' sowie um seine Briefsammlung. ‚Babad Tutur' enthält seine Biographie vom 16.
bis zum 32. Lebensjahr (also bis 1757), und ‚Babad Nitik Mangkunegoro I.' umfasst
den Zeitraum von 1781 bis 1791.

Mit den schriftlich festgelegten Informationen über ihn kann man auch rückwirkend zu
seiner Person forschen. Er bildet nach wie vor ein beliebtes Thema für die neuere For-
schung und es werden immer wieder neue Erkenntnisse über ihn publiziert.[14] Neueren
Untersuchungen zufolge war R. M. Said ein Muslim, der bereits vom Sufismus geprägt
war. Zainuddin behauptet sogar, dass er Anhänger des Naqshbandiyya-Ordens[15] war.

Er entwarf den Stoff zum *bedhaya*-Tanz, *dodot* genannt, mit einem Kalligraphie-Muster
in arabischer Schrift und den Worten *Allah*, *Hu*, *Hu*, was auf *Allah Hu Akbar* (‚Allah ist
groß') hindeutet.[16] Die Aufführung des Tanzes selbst betrachtete er als eine Art *dhikr*
und er benutzte ihn als Medium, um Gott, *Allah*, nahezukommen (vgl. Wahyu 1990:
66-90; Zainuddin 2000).

Es besteht eine Art des *dhikr* darin, das Wort *Allah* oder die rhythmische Formel *la ilaha
illa 'llah* wiederholt auszusprechen und mit gewissen Bewegungen zu begleiteten. Das
Wort *Allah* wird immer weiter verkürzt, bis nur sein letzter Buchstabe, *h*, übrig bleibt.
Die Silbe *ha* wird ausgesprochen, in dem man den Kopf nach links dreht, die Silbe *hu*
mit dem Kopf nach rechts, die Silbe *hi* mit dem Kopf nach unten. Das Aussprechen
dieser Silben, die auf *Allah hu Akbar* (‚Allah ist groß') hindeuten, ist eine Art, um das
höchste *dhikr* zu erreichen.

In seinen Tagebüchern notierte R. M. Said, dass er vor jedem Angriff mit seinen Solda-
ten die Silbe *hi* aussprach. Zainuddin interpretiert dies als „totale Selbstaufgabe an

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[14] Vgl. Houben 1986; Budi Sulistyowati 1989; Wahyu Santoso Prabowo 1990 und Zainuddin 2000.

[15] Der Naqshbandiyya-Orden wurde im 14. Jahrhundert gegründet und betrachtete nicht Baha ʻal-Din al-
Naqshbandi als den spirituellen Gründer des Ordens, sondern Abu Yusuf al-Hamadani (gest. 1140) und Abd
al-Khaliq al-Ghujdawani (gest. 1120). Dieser Orden war in der Anfangszeit stark im osmanischen Reich ver-
breitet, ab dem 17. Jahrhundert auch in Syrien und Indien. (Spencer Trimingham 1999: 59-95). Nach Schim-
mel berief sich der Orden auf den im 10. Jahrhundert verstorbenen Tirmidhi, der längere Zeit im Irak gelebt
hatte. Tirmidhi wurde auch der ‚Philosoph' genannt, was darauf hindeutet, dass durch ihn gewisse hellenisti-
sche philosophische Ideen in den Sufismus eingedrungen sein könnten (Schimmel 1985: 92). Die Grade der
Heiligkeit in diesem Orden hängen mit dem Grad der Erleuchtung und Erkenntnis, die der Betreffende er-
reicht hat, zusammen. Spencer Trimingham behauptet, dass Scheich Minangkabau als der erste Indonesier im
Jahr 1840 (sic!) von dem Naqshbandiyya-Orden in Mekka aufgenommen wurde (1999: 124). Allerdings soll
über die Existenz des Naqshbandiyya-Ordens bereits von Scheich Yusuf Makassar aus Sulawesi (1629-1699)
in seinen Schriften berichtet worden sein, wobei den Untersuchungen von van Bruinessen zufolge der Orden
auf Java erst Mitte des 19. Jahrhunderts Fuß fasste. (van Bruinessen 1992: 34-46; 156-174)

[16] Wahyu Santoso Prabowo 1990 und Budi Sulistyowati 1989. Zu einer Beschreibung des Kostüms des ‚Bed-
haya Anglir Mendung' und ‚Serimpi Anglir Mendung' siehe Budi Sulistyowati 1989.

Gott" und deutet auf seine Religiosität als Anhänger von Naqshbandiyya (Zainuddin 2000: 79-83).[17]

[...]	[...]
Apratandha aja na ngoncati yuda	Alle leisteten einen Schwur, den Kriegsplatz nicht zu verlassen
nulya samya alok ,hi'	zusammen riefen sie ,hi'
sarta sareng mangkat,	In den Kriegsplatz fortschreitend
Pangran Dipati dharat	dem Pangeran Dipati (gemeint ist R. M.
anindhihi ing ajurit.	Said) folgend.
[...][18]	[...]

Die Religiosität von R. M. Said wird auch daraus ersichtlich, dass er nach seiner Thronbesteigung jeden Donnerstagabend eine Versammlung mit *gamelan*-Spiel, *suluk*-Gedichten und *dhikr* veranstaltete. In ,Serat Babad Nitik Mangkunegaran' steht auch, dass er fast jeden Freitag mit hunderten von *santri* (,islamische Priester') das Freitagsgebet verrichtete und an seinen Geburtstagen nach dem javanischen Kalender (d.h. einmal im Monat) gemeinsames Koranlesen – auch wiederum mit hunderten von *santri* – veranstaltete.

Im Jahre 1790 wurde der Tanz ,Bedhaya Anglir Mendung' als Geschenk von Mangkunegoro I. an Pakubuwono IV. präsentiert. Vermutlich wollte er das durch den langjährigen Krieg gestörte Verhältnis aufbessern. Danach wurde der Tanz nicht mehr in Pura Mangkunegoro aufgeführt, sondern im Kraton Pakubuwono. Auch wurde der Tanz im Kraton Pakubuwono nunmehr mit neun Tänzerinnen aufgeführt, wie es sonst beim *bedhaya*-Tanz üblich ist.

Später unter Pakubuwono VIII. wurde der Tanz in einen *serimpi* umgewandelt, d.h. er wurde nur von vier Tänzerinnen aufgeführt. In diesem Zusammenhang wurde auch die Choreographie verändert und er hieß fortan ,Serimpi Anglir Mendung'. Die Gedichte, die den Tanz begleiteten, wurden ebenfalls geändert, weil die ursprünglichen Gedichte ja die Niederlage der Pakubuwono-Dynastie beschrieben. Da der *serimpi* nicht so sakral wie der *bedhaya* ist, ist diese Änderung eine Degradierung des Tanzes ,Anglir Mendung' selbst. Diese Geste könnte man als eine Erniedrigung der Mangkunegoro-Dynastie durch Pakubuwono VIII. interpretieren.

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[17] Der Naqshbandiyya-Orden war aber als ein nüchterner Orden bekannt, der Musik und Tanz beim *dhikr* nicht erlaubt. In seinen Tagebüchern hat R. M. Said selbst nie darüber geschrieben, zu welchem Orden er sich hingezogen fühlte. Nur die häufige Veranstaltung des *dhikr* und gemeinsamen Koranlesens standen in seinen Tagebüchern. So ist es sicherlich richtig, dass er dem Sufismus zugeneigt war; da aber die Mitgliedschaft in dem Orden in der Regel nie öffentlich gemacht wird, ist es schwierig, im Nachhinein die Gruppenzugehörigkeit festzustellen.

[18] Aus ,Babad Lelampahan', Durma, 68: 321, zitiert in Zainuddin 2000: 80-81. Übersetzung ins Deutsche von der Autorin.

Nachdem der Tanz an die Pakubuwono-Dynastie verschenkt wurde, wurde er im Pura Mangkunegoro nie wieder aufgeführt und geriet dadurch in Vergessenheit. Nach dieser 200-jährigen Unterbrechung versucht das Pura Mangkunegoro nun jedoch, diesen Tanz nach alten Dokumenten wieder zu rekonstruieren. In dem Prozess der Wiederentdeckung wurde der Tanz zunächst mit drei Tänzerinnen aufgeführt. Im Jahr 1988 wurde er anlässlich der Ernennung Mangkunegoro I. zum Nationalhelden wieder komplett mit sieben Tänzerinnen im Pura Mangkunegoro aufgeführt.

Die Wiedereinführung des Tanzes im Pura Mangkunegoro erzeugte Unmut bei den Pakubuwono-Nachkommen. Sie betrachten den Tanz als geschenkten und allein ihnen gehörenden Tanz, der plötzlich wieder von dem Schenkenden beansprucht wurde. Dies sei auch dann verwerflich, wenn im Kraton Pakubuwono der ‚Anglir Mendung‘ – sei es als *serimpi,* sei es als *bedhaya* – nicht mehr aufgeführt werde. Aus diesem Grund gab es Spannungen zwischen den beiden Dynastien.[19]

Diese detaillierte Darstellung des Geschichtsablaufs des ‚Bedhaya Anglir Mendung‘ nach der Schenkung unterstreicht die Rolle der Tänze in der javanischen Kultur. Der Tanz wird als Gegenstand, meistens als sakraler Gegenstand oder sogar *pusaka* (‚geheiligtes Erbstück‘) betrachtet, den nur ein König bzw. eine Gottheit erschaffen, verschenken oder als Beute mitnehmen kann. So wurde der ‚Bedhaya Anglir Mendung‘ anfangs als Legitimation des neuen Reiches vorgeführt, dann als Versöhnungsgeschenk an den Verlierer des Bruderkrieges gegeben und zum Schluss sollte er als eine ‚wiederentdeckte Choreographie‘ zurückgewonnen werden.

Der Grund für die erneute Einführung im Pura Mangkunegoro war die Rückbesinnung der Nachkommen der Mangkunegoro-Dynastie auf die Tatsache, dass der Tanz schließlich als Legitimation der Herrschaft der Mangkunegoro eingeführt worden war, weshalb sie ihn jetzt zur Festigung ihrer Identität zurück haben wollen.

Jedes Mal vor der Aufführung des Tanzes – sowohl als Bedhaya als auch als Serimpi ‚Anglir Mendung‘ – müssen gewisse Rituale durchgeführt werden, die denen der Aufführung von ‚Bedhaya Ketawang‘ ähnlich sind. Unter anderem müssen Opfergaben für die Meeresgöttin bereitgestellt werden. Nach Beobachtung von Budi Sulistyowati, die an dem Prozess der Wiederentdeckung des ‚Bedhaya Anglir Mendung‘ im Pura Mangkunegara beteiligt war, regnet es nach jeder Aufführung des ‚Bedhaya Anglir Mendung‘. Regen wird im javanischen Kontext als Glück bringendes Element betrachtet. Der Regen nach der Aufführung gilt als die Bestätigung, dass der Tanz von der transzendenten Welt akzeptiert wird.

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[19] Interview mit GRAy. Kusmurtiah am 19.3.1999. Da sie die Tochter von Pakubuwono XII. ist, gehört sie zu denjenigen, die eine Rekonstruktion des Tanzes durch die Mangkunegoro-Dynastie verurteilen.

Der Tanz ‚Bedhaya Diradameta‘

Der Tanz ‚Bedhaya Diradameta‘[20] wurde ebenfalls von Mangkunegoro I. choreographiert. Seine Besonderheit ist, dass er ausschließlich von Männern – und zwar wieder von *sieben* Tänzern – aufgeführt wurde. Leider ist die ursprüngliche Choreographie in der heutigen Zeit nicht mehr bekannt, nur das Gedicht mit dem dazugehörigen *gendhing* (‚Musikstück‘) existiert noch. Der Tanz selbst wird in den Chroniken erwähnt. Der Gesang dieses Tanzes wurde wieder von der alten Melodie des ‚Anglir Mendung‘ bestimmt, wobei das Gedicht zum Tanz von der Eroberung der Gegend Rembang im Jahr 1756 erzählt.

Wie oben bereits erwähnt, kämpfte ab dem Jahr 1752 R. M. Said auch gegen seinen eigenen Schwiegervater, Mangkubumi. Mangkubumi selbst war nach dem lang anhaltenden Krieg geneigt, auf Friedensverhandlungen einzugehen. Somit wurde im Jahr 1755 der Giyanti-Vertrag von den Holländern, Pakubuwono III. und Mangkubumi unterzeichnet, mit dem Inhalt, dass Mangkubumi als Sultan von Yogyakarta ernannt und ihm ein eigenes Gebiet zugesprochen wurde. In diesem Vertrag wurde jedoch R. M. Said nicht berücksichtigt. So setzte er seinen Krieg fort, und zwar gegen alle Beteiligten. Er griff 1756 in der Gegend Rembang an, woraufhin seine Gegner eine große Anzahl von Opfern zu beklagen hatten. Nach diesem erfolgreichen Angriff choreographierte er den Tanz ‚Bedhaya Diradameta‘.

Anglir mendhung kang Mantri	Like a cloud the Mantri Jero corps
Lebet aus tata	Stands lined up
samya prawirèng jurit	All brave warriors
mangamuk rarampak	Attacking together
langkung sudirèng aprang	They are very courageous in battle
kang katrajang akèh mati	Many of those whom they attack die
lir sing lodra	Like a roaring lion
mangamuk golong pipis.	They attack in serried ranks.
Jeng Pangéran Dipati	Kangjeng Pangeran Adipati
Mangku Negara	Mangku Negara
(one line missing)	
mangamuk anyakra	He attacks with his discus
gandhéwanya lir kilat	His arrows flash like lightning
antuk pitulunging Widi	He receives God's help
mengsah kèh pejah	Many of his enemies die
larut tan mangga pulih.	Swept away, unable to recover.
Sirna gempang larut balané	Crushed, annihilated, swept away is His uncle's army
kang rama	
pinérak ing turanggi	Separated from their horses
kagebyur ing toya	All plunged into the water
sadaya kathah kang pejah	Many of them are killed
mangétan Mangku Negari	Mangku Negara goes eastwards

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[20] ‚Bedhaya Diradameta‘ heißt übersetzt soviel wie ‚ein Amok laufender Elefant‘.

| *kalangkung suka* | Extremely happy |
| *unggul dènira jurit.* | To have won the battle.[21] |

Auch nachdem R. M. Said im Rahmen der Friedensverhandlung in Salatiga zwischen den Holländern, Pakubuwono III., Hamengkubuwono I. und R. M. Said ein eigenes Gebiet zugesprochen wurde, hörte die Feindschaft zwischen Mangkubumi und R. M. Said nicht auf und spielte auch in der nächsten Phase weiterhin eine Rolle. Ende 1757 griff er das holländische Fort in Yogyakarta erfolgreich an. Nach diesem Sieg choreographierte er den Tanz ‚Bedhaya Sukapratama' (‚die mutigen *ksatria*') (vgl. Wahyu Santoso 1990: 46-49, Budi Sulistyowati 1989: 38). Die Choreographie dieses Tanzes ist auch im Pura Mangkunegoro nicht mehr bekannt, doch soll er früher ebenfalls von sieben Männern getanzt worden sein.

Die Begleitmusik zu den Tänzen (*gendhing*), die von Mangkunegoro I. kreiert wurde, blieb immer dieselbe, nämlich die, welche er auch für ‚Bedhaya Anglir Mendung' verwendete. Die Gedichte wurden nur jeweils in den Strophen geändert, die bestimmte Ereignisse schildern, in denen historische Daten von Bedeutung sind (siehe dazu Brakel-Papenhuijzen 1992: 159-182).

Der Tanz ‚Bedhaya Bedhah Madiun'

Der Tanz wurde von Mangkunegoro VII. anlässlich seiner 24-jährigen Thronbesteigung choreographiert. Die Zahl weist hin auf dreimal acht, *triwindhu*, wobei eine Periode von acht Jahren für die Javaner wie eine Einheit angesehen werden kann.

Mangkunegoro VII. (1916-1944) erinnerte an seinen Vorfahren Senapati bei der Eroberung von Madiun, östlich von Kartasura (*bedhah* = ‚Eroberung').

Senapati verfolgte eine Politik der Expansion. Er eroberte die Reiche in Ostjava eines nach dem anderen und schließlich gelang es ihm im javanischen Jahr 1551 (1629 n. Chr.), Ost- und Mitteljava in sein Reich einzugliedern.[22] Im Zuge dieser Eroberung kämpfte er auch gegen den König von Madiun, Rangga Jumena, und gewann.

Nach der javanischen Überlieferung und in der Chronik ‚Babad Tanah Jawi' wird die Geschichte folgendermaßen erzählt:

Rangga Jumena war ein Nachkomme von Raden Patah, dem Sultan von Demak. So sah er nicht ein, dass er sich Senapati − einem Bauernsohn − unterordnen sollte. Die beiden Truppen trafen sich; als Senapati gewann, hoffte Rangga Jumena, dass seine Tochter Retno Dumilah Senapati erobern könnte. Senapati hatte eine ähnliche Taktik und versuchte, das Herz von Retno Dumilah durch sein Aussehen zu erobern. Als Senapati in

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[21] Entnommen aus Brakel-Papenhuijzen 1992: 173-174.

[22] ‚Babad Tanah Jawi', Olthof 1987: 116, Strophe 50: 1.

den *kraton* ging, hielt Retno Dumilah einen Keris, mit dem sie ihn töten wollte. Sie war aber sofort von Senapati so beeindruckt, dass sie ihren Keris fallen ließ. Retno Dumilah setzte aber noch eine Bedingung vor die Kapitulation, nämlich dass Senapati seine *kasekten* (‚magische Kraft') beweisen müsse. Er musste zeigen, dass er nicht durch die drei Waffen Pistole, Keris und Messer getötet werden koenne. Erst dann wollt sie sich ihm hingeben. Er überstand die Prüfung, weil er durch sein *kasekten* die Waffen besiegen konnte. Retno Dumilah wurde *parameswari* von Senapati und zur *Ratu Kulon* (‚Königin des Ostens') ernannt. *Ratu Kulon* hatte einen höheren Status als *Ratu Wetan* (‚Königin des Westens') und ihr Sohn wurde der rechtmäßige Thronfolger. Diese Position konnte Retno Dumilah aber nicht lange halten; sie wurde zur *Ratu Wetan* degradiert. Ihre Position wurde von einer Tochter von Penjawi eingenommen, einem Kampfgefährten von Senapatis Vater. Damit wurde der Sohn von Retno Dumilah, Pangeran Pringgalaya, der ursprünglich als Thronfolger vorgesehen war, auch in der Thronfolge von seinem Halbbruder Pangeran Jolang ersetzt. Dieser wurde dann der Nachfolger von Senapati und nannte sich Sunan Anyakrawati, oder Panembahan Krapyak. Er war der Vater von Sultan Agung.[23]

Die romantische Geschichte zwischen Senapati und Retno Dumilah ist bei den Javanern beliebt und wird oft weitererzählt. So choreographierte Mangkunegoro VII. im Jahr 1940 diese Geschichte als *bedhaya*-Tanz.

Der Tanz ‚Bedhaya Sumreg'

Der Tanz ‚Bedhaya Sumreg" wurde anlässlich der Eroberung Kartasuras durch Pangeran Puger, dem späteren Pakubuwono I. (1704-1719), choreographiert.

Pangeran Puger konnte sich mit Hilfe der VOC gegen seinen eigenen Neffen durchsetzen, Amangkurat III. (1703-1708), der auf der Seite des Rebellen Suropati kämpfte. Er wurde von der VOC als der neue König des Reichs Mataram mit dem Namen Pakubuwono I. ernannt. Die Thronbesteigung erfolgte in Semarang, an der Nordküste Javas. Somit hatte das Reich Mataram zwei Könige; der eine für und der andere gegen die VOC.

Mit der Ernennung des zweiten Königs entbrannte der erste Javanische Krieg, der von 1704-1709 dauerte. Pakubuwono I. griff im Jahr 1705 die Hauptstadt Kartasura an, wo Amangkurat III. noch residierte, der aber mit all den *pusaka* fliehen konnte.

Als der Rebell Suropati im Jahr 1706 verstarb, erklärte sich Amangkurat III. im Jahre 1708 endlich bereit, doch mit der VOC zusammenzuarbeiten, unter der Bedingung,

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[23] ‚Babad Tanah Jawi', Olthof 1987: 100-110, Strophe 43-46; Moedjanto 2001: 140; 155-156. Der Grund der Degradierung Retno Dumilahs ist unklar, vermutlich weil Penjawi seine Treue zu Senapati deutlicher als sie bewiesen hatte.

dass ihm ein Gebiet unterstehen würde. Die VOC hielt aber ihr Wort nicht und vertrieb Amangkurat III. ins Exil nach Ceylon, wo er im Jahr 1734 verstarb. Die *pusaka* waren verschwunden, weil sie Amangkurat III. mit nach Ceylon genommen hatte. Einige *pusaka* wurden zurückgebracht, als seine Söhne im Jahr 1737 aus Ceylon zurückkamen, aber es ist bis zur heutigen Zeit nicht klar, ob wirklich alle *pusaka* bereits am Hofe sind.

Pakubuwono I. herrschte im *kraton* also ohne *pusaka*. So kreierte er als Usurpator einen Sakraltanz, um sich und seine Herrschaft zu legitimieren, wohl auch als Ersatz für die verlorenen *pusaka*. Nach der Thronbesteigung führte er den Tanz ‚Bedhaya Sumreg‘ auf.

Clara Brakel-Papenhuijzen ist auch von der historischen Realität der Ereignisse überzeugt, die diesem Tanz zugrunde liegen:

> Even though no date is mentioned, there can be no doubt about the historical reality
> of the battle in Bedhaya Sumreg (Brakel-Papenhuijzen 1992: 175).

Dieses Geschehen ist sowohl im ‚Babad Kartasura‘ (geschrieben im Jahr 1877) als auch im Gesang für den Tanz beschrieben:

Sumrik kang wadya lumaris	With an uproar the army departs
buwal saking ing Semarang	emerging from Semarang
asri tinon gegamané	their weapons looking splendid
akéh kang wadya warnanya	many types of people are in the army
Bugis lan Sembawa	both Buginese and Sumbawanese
syarané umyang gumuruh	their noise is deep and roaring
kadya ombaking samodra.	like the waves of the sea.
Wau prajuri linuwih	He is an excellent warrior
trahé etuping kusuma	of noble descent
putra Nayaganda mangké	a son of (the) Mataram (dynasty) who
jumeneng patitah ing Hyang	soon / by God’s preordination will be
atilar kapuranta	king / he has left. ...
ngelana ngadani pupuh	setting out to fight a battle to attack
nglurug nagri Kartasura.	the state of Kartasura.
Bisikanira narpati	The name of the king is
Suhunan Paku Buwana	Susuhunan Paku Buwana
sénapati ngalagané	Commander in battle
kèdhep dateng wadya bala	adored by his army
samya sih kumawula	all are his loving servants
nitih kuda gala gempung	he is mounted on a black champion
busanané abra muncar	horse dressed in splendid raiment.[24]

Für seinen Thron musste Pakubuwono I. viel an die VOC bezahlen und einen Teil seiner Gebiete abtreten. Die VOC konnte seither ihre Dominanz auf Java sichern. Damit begann der ‚Niedergang‘ des javanischen Reiches.

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[24] ‚Babad Kartasura‘, KITLV Or259, 385-386. Entnommen aus Brakel-Papenhuijzen 1992: 175-176.

‚Bedhaya Sumreg' wird als sakraler Tanz im Kraton Yogyakarta betrachtet. Pakubuwono I. selbst wurde in Yogyakarta hochgeachtet, da er nach der javanischen Überlieferung den *wahyu* (‚die göttliche Eingebung') zum König bekommen haben sollte. Außerdem genoss er als gut aussehender Mann mehr Respekt, um König zu werden, als der körperlich behinderte Amangkurat III.[25]

Clara Brakel-Papenhuijzen weist auf die Gemeinsamkeiten bei der Thronbesteigung von Pakubuwono I. (1704-1719) und Hamengkubuwono I. (1755-1792) hin. Beide gelangten durch eine geschickte Kriegsführung an die Macht und waren nicht die offiziellen Thronfolger. Dennoch waren beide Verwandte der herrschenden Könige (Brakel-Papenhuijzen 1992: 177-178, siehe auch Moedjanto 2001: 39). Dies könnte der Grund sein, warum Hamengkubuwono I. den Tanz ‚Bedhaya Sumreg' mit nach Yogyakarta genommen hatte. Der Tanz wurde vor der Teilung kreiert, so dass alle vier Dynastien das Recht gehabt hätten, ihn mitzunehmen. Aber Yogyakarta, in diesem Fall Hamengkubuwono I., führte ihn als erster auf, so dass er ihm zugesprochen wurde.

Pakubuwono I. hat diesen Tanz anlässlich seines Angriffs auf die Hauptstadt Kartasura sowie seiner Thronbesteigung kreiert. Auf der anderen Seite fungiert der Tanz auch als Legitimation seiner Herrschaft, da er ja als Usurpator ohne *pusaka* regierte. So hat folglich dieser Tanz zwei Funktionen, erstens als Wiedergabe eines historischen Ereignisses und zweitens als Legitimation der Herrschaft.

Der Tanz ‚Serimpi Sangupati'

Nach der offiziellen Information vom Kraton Pakubuwono hieß der ‚Serimpi Sangupati' ursprünglich ‚Sangapati' (Sang Apati = der Prinz) und wurde von Pakubuwono IV. (1788-1820) choreographiert.[26] Pakubuwono IX. (1861-1893) wandelte diesen Tanz anlässlich einer Verhandlung mit einem holländischen Kolonialbeamten um und benannte ihn nach Sangupati, was von *sangu pati* (*sangu* = ‚Mitbringsel', ‚Souvenir'; *pati* = ‚Tod') kommt.[27]

Der Tanz ‚Serimpi Sangupati' wird von vier Tänzerinnen aufgeführt. Sie tanzen mit einem Schnapsglas in einer Hand und einer Pistole in der anderen Hand. Sie tragen ein weißes Tuch als Schärpe (*sampur*).

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[25] Siehe Moedjanto 2001: 36-37. Amangkurat III. wurde stets als ein unfähiger Mann beschrieben (siehe ‚Babad Tanah Jawi', Olthof 1987: 262-277).

[26] Nach Information von GRAy. Kusmurtiah wurde das *gendhing* auch von Pakubuwono IV. inszeniert, nämlich als ‚Gendhing Tawes Pita', das später für ‚Serimpi Anglir Mendung' benutzt wurde.

[27] Nach offizieller Information vom Kraton Pakubuwono und von GRAy. Kusmurtiah (Interview am 19.3.1999).

Der historische Anlass war nach der offiziellen Information des Kraton Pakubuwono folgender:

Pakubuwono IX. wurde damals von den Holländern gezwungen, die Restgebiete der Pakubuwono-Dynastie an sie abzutreten, nach der offiziellen Version des Kraton Pakubuwono handelte es sich um die Nordküste Javas. Im Rahmen dieser Verhandlung ließ er den Tanz im *kraton* aufführen.

Das Alkoholtrinken symbolisiert den Willen zur Verhandlung mit den Holländern. Die geladene Pistole stand aber für die Bereitschaft zum Kampf, falls die Verhandlungen misslingen sollten. Die Tänzerinnen würden sich selbst und die Holländer mit in den Tod nehmen. Sie waren gewillt, in den Tod zu gehen, deswegen trugen sie als *sampur* (‚langer schmaler Schal‘) ein weißes Tuch, das *suci* (‚rein‘) und *ketulusan hati* (‚bereitwillige Aufopferung‘) symbolisiert.

Nach seinem Tod 1893 wurde Pakubuwono IX. von seinem Sohn Pakubuwono X. ersetzt, der dann diesem Tanz wieder seinen ursprünglichen Namen gab: ‚Serimpi Sangapati‘.

Nach meiner Überprüfung der historischen Ereignisse hatte die Pakubuwono-Dynastie alle Gebiete bereits Ende des 19. Jahrhunderts an die Holländer abgetreten, so dass die offizielle Erklärung des Kraton Pakubuwono, wonach es in der Verhandlung um ‚das Abtreten der Nordküste‘ ging, nicht stimmen kann. Die Nordküste selbst wurde bereits im Jahre 1746 zur Zeit von Pakubuwono II. an die Holländer übergeben.

Eine mögliche Erklärung für den historischen Rahmen ist die Unterzeichnung des Vertrags ‚kroonprinselijke verklaring‘ im Jahr 1860. Die Holländer verlangten von den Thronfolgern die schriftliche Zusage, dass sie alle vorher geschlossenen Verträge mit den Holländern anerkennen. Zu diesen Verträgen gehörte unter anderem auch die Abtretung der Nordküste im Jahr 1746. Falls die Thronfolger die Erklärung nicht unterschreiben wollten, würden sie nicht zum Sultan bzw. Sunan ernannt.[28]

Nach Vincent Houben konnte Pakubuwono IX. (1861) den Thron nur wegen der guten Beziehung zum holländischen General-Gouverneur und wegen seines persönlichen Wohlwollen im Rahmen dieses ‚Act of Alliance‘ erhalten (Houben 1994: 139). Es ist also möglich, dass die Aufführung des Tanzes im Rahmen dieser Unterzeichnung geschah.

Die Aufführung des Tanzes bezweckt das Wiedererleben dieses historischen Ereignisses. Die Nachkommen der Pakubuwono-Dynastie hatten damit auch die Gelegenheit,

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[28] Hamengkubuwono IX. (1912-1988) verweigerte die Unterzeichnung, damit deklarierte er seinen Thron als *tachta untuk rakyat* (‚Thron für das Volk‘). Seine Verweigerung erfolgte aber kurz vor der Revolution, die zu der Unabhängigkeit Indonesiens führte, so dass es in diesem Fall keine Konsequenzen nach sich zog (Hinweis von Vincent Houben).

diese Geschichte in ihrem Interesse umzuwandeln, zum Beispiel die Tat ihres Vorfahren heldenhafter zu gestalten.

Wichtig ist hier, dass der Tanz im Rahmen der Verhandlung mit den Holländern aufgeführt wurde. Der Verlust der Gebiete ist auch mit dem Verlust der Macht verbunden; die schmerzhafte Erfahrung muss demnach verarbeitet werden. Durch die Aufführung des Tanzes wird das Publikum daran erinnert und hat somit die Möglichkeit, über gesellschaftliche und politische Veränderungen nachzudenken.

Nach Nora Konstantina wurde der Tanz Sangapati von Pakubuwono X. inklusive Tänzerinnen, Gamelanspielern und Hofbediensteten an seine Tochter verschenkt, die den Paku Alam VII. von Yogyakarta heiratete. Das Ziel des Geschenks war, den Tanz weiterzugeben, damit er aufgeführt werden sollte. Nach ihrer Informantin, Ibu Sulomo, wurde der Tanz somit öfter bei Staatsempfängen und bei offiziellen Anlässen, wie Königshochzeiten, auch am Hof von Paku Alam aufgeführt (Nora Konstatina 1986: 8).

Während der japanischen Besatzung vom 1942-1945 wurden die Pistolen am Palast Pakubuwonos konfisziert. Seitdem wird der Tanz nach der Information von GRAy. Kusmurtiah ohne Pistolen aufgeführt. 1999 gab es Bestrebungen, den Tanz neu zu choreographieren und ihn wieder mit Pistolen aufzuführen.

Der Tanz ‚Bedhaya Sang Amurwo Bumi'

Dieser *bedhaya*-Tanz wurde auf Bitte des Sultan Hamengkubuwono X. aus Yogyakarta anlässlich seiner einjährigen Thronbesteigung im Jahr 1989 von Rama Sasminto choreographiert. Bei dieser Gelegenheit wurde sein verstorbener Vater, Hamengkubuwono IX. (1939-1988), zum Nationalhelden erklärt.[29]

In dieser *bedhaya*-Version wird die Geschichte von Ken Arok und Ken Dèdès dargestellt.[30] Die Geschichte Ken Aroks und Ken Dèdès wird oft als die Verkörperung der symbolischen Einheit zwischen Shivaismus und Buddhismus verstanden, die in der ostjavanischen Periode viele Anhänger gefunden hatte. Als ein Beweis dafür gilt die im Jahr 1818 in Candi Singosari gefundende Skulptur von Ken Dèdès aus dem 13. Jahrhundert aus der Kediri-Periode. Sie stellt Ken Dèdès als ‚Prajnaparamita' (buddhisti-

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[29] *Amurwo* kommt von dem Wort *purwa* (= der Beginn, der Osten; das Erste), so kann das Verb *amurwo* die Bedeutungen ‚einen neuen Weg einschlagen', ‚das erste Mal etwas tun', ‚mit einer Jungfrau Sex haben', oder ‚gen Osten gehen' enthalten; *Bumi* = die Erde. Somit kann der Tanz in diese Richtungen interpretiert werden, nämlich für den Thronfolger ‚der Beginn für etwas Neues', für den Vater als Nationalheld könnte er bedeuten ‚wie es der Anfang war' (der Vater veranlasste den Wechsel vom Königreich zur Republik), die sexuelle Vereinigung zwischen Ken Arok und Ken Dèdès symbolisiert den Beginn einer Periode. Eine andere mögliche Interpretation ist ‚gen Osten gehen', zum Anfang der Welt, weil der Osten mit Vishnu assoziiert wird. Die Sultane aus Yogyakarta sehen sich als Nachkommen Vishnus.

[30] Zur Geschichte Ken Dèdès und Ken Arok siehe Kubitscheck und Wessel 1981.

scher Heiliger) auf einem Lotus stehend dar, die Hände im *dharma cakra mudra* (‚Das Rad des Lebens drehend').[31]

Schlussbemerkung

Anders als in schriftlich fixierten Kulturen haben die oral orientierten Kulturen viele Möglichkeiten, ihre Vergangenheit wiederzugeben. Unter anderem können sie auch die Tänze als Medium verwenden. Die Tänze dienen dazu, sich an die Vergangenheit zu erinnern, aber auch das Geschehene zurückzuholen und gegebenenfalls zu verarbeiten. Durch die Aufführungen wird eine Brücke von der Gegenwart in die Vergangenheit und zugleich in die Zukunft gebaut.

Die Darbietung der hier besprochenen Tänze (inklusive Tanztheater, Tanzdramen, Tanzballett) spiegeln das historische Bewusstsein der Javaner wider. Die Aufführungen dienen zum einen dazu, die faktische Ebene – in diesem Sinne betrifft es den historischen Rahmen – von Generation zu Generation weiter zu vermitteln. Zweitens fungieren sie als ein Instrument zur Verarbeitung der Vergangenheit. Es gab in der Geschichte der Menschheit stets Erlebnisse, die Verlust und Schmerz bereiteten. Auch diese Erfahrungen können durch die Präsentation der Tänze verarbeitet werden. Das Beispiel mit dem Tanz ‚Sangupati' zeigt diesen Aspekt; der Tanz wurde anlässlich der Verhandlung zwischen Pakubuwono IX. und den Holländern choreographiert, weil Pakubuwono seinerzeit die Nordküste abtreten musste. Der historische Rahmen zeigt allerdings, dass die Nordküste zur Zeit von Pakubuwono IX. bereits abgetreten worden war. Diese Darstellung zeigt, dass es im Bezug zur Gegenwart nicht wichtig ist, wann die Nordküste abgetreten wurde, sondern ausschlaggebend ist die Tatsache, dass sie überhaupt abgetreten werden musste. Die erlangte Macht Senapatis und Ken Aroks – zwei Protagonisten der javanischen Geschichte – wird zwar in den Chroniken gepriesen, aber in den Tänzen oft als negativ aufgeführt. Die Aufführung der negativen Seiten der Helden liefert den nachfolgenden Generationen einen Diskussionsstoff, wie sie die Helden bewerten sollen. Kann man sie als einen Idealtyp von Machthaber betrachten? Die Tatsache, dass Suharto, der 1965 durch brutales Durchgreifen an die Macht gelangte, mit Ken Arok aus dem 13. Jahrhundert verglichen wird, zeigt, wie lebendig die Geschichte für die Javaner ist. Sartono Kartodirdjo erklärt folgendes:

> Regional History refers to a construct of collective experiences in the past of communities or societies as historical complexes with manifestations of various aspects of their lives (Sartono 1992: 20).

Der dritte Aspekt betrifft die Subjektivität der Geschichte. Die Geschehnisse in der Vergangenheit können nicht geändert werden, aber die Interpretation dieser Geschehn-

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[31] Im Nationalmuseum in Jakarta.

nisse ist immer subjektiv und kann jederzeit geändert und kontingenten Entwicklungen angepasst werden. Entsprechend schreibt David Henige:

> The past has happened and cannot change, but the interpretation and understanding of it continues to happen and will never stop changing (1982: 129).

Wenn Tänze aufgeführt werden, die den Sieg eines Beteiligten bei einem Krieg in der javanischen Geschichte rühmen, dann ist es eine Widerspiegelung der Subjektivität der Geschichte. Auf der anderen Seite hat die Gegenpartei auch die Möglichkeit, ihre Seite darzustellen. Die Kriege in der Vergangenheit werden immer wieder durch die Aufführung neu erlebt und das Publikum wird daran erinnert. Die Teilung des Reichs Mataram, die Mitte des 18. Jahrhunderts erfolgte, ist somit bei den Kulturträgern noch immer sehr lebendig. Sie haben die Möglichkeit, souveräner damit umzugehen oder aber – was leider sehr oft geschieht – die Konkurrenzkämpfe weiterzuführen. Walter Sorell formuliert es so:

> Das Wesentliche an der Geschichte ist nicht was war, sondern was wir glauben in dem Geschehen der Vergangenheit zu sehen. Und jedes Jahrhundert – wenn nicht jede Generation – sieht das Geschehen mit anderen Augen (1995: 11).

Als Träger der mündlich orientierten Kultur haben die Javaner ein visuelles Medium geschaffen, ihre Vergangenheit zu überliefern. Das visuelle Medium – in diesem Fall der Tanz – fungiert somit auch als ‚Erinnerungsfiguren'. In diesem Fall ist es nicht wichtig, ob die Ereignisse tatsächlich historisch belegt sind; wichtig für das ‚kulturelle Gedächtnis' ist nicht die faktische, sondern die erinnerte Geschichte. Das kulturelle Gedächtnis wird in den verbalen und nonverbalen Überlieferungen aufbewahrt. Darin schlagen sich auch fundamentale Veränderungen in der Gesellschaft nieder.

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The 'Renaissance' of Sino-Malay Literature

Mary Somers Heidhues

The year 2000 indeed opened new perspectives for Indonesia's ethnic Chinese minority. In that year, President Abdurrahman Wahid decreed the end of oppressive restrictions on the public display of Chinese culture and Chinese New Year became a public festival, later an official holiday. Under his predecessors, culture and community life had faced great limitations, as official policy claimed to promote the 'assimilation' of the minority. Chinese-language publications, Chinese-language schools and community organisations were forbidden, although a few of the latter survived, for example under the aegis of religious or burial societies.

In reality, like many other policies of the New Order, as Suharto's regime (1967-1998) liked to call itself, the restrictions on Chinese culture and community were not enforced across the board. Smuggled Chinese-language texts circulated more or less clandestinely (among those who could still read them), private tutors offered instruction in Mandarin, and public ceremonies again accompanied festivals like Cap Go Meh,[1] depending on the sympathy (or lack of it) of local authorities. Given the proximity of Indonesia to Singapore and Malaysia, where Chinese is widely spoken and cultivated (broadcasts could be received in many parts of the country), and the opening of diplomatic relations with and travel to China, there were opportunities to nurture Chinese traditions for those who were determined, and who had the financial resources, to do so. As Charles Coppel has pointed out, writers have tended to exaggerate the extent of repression of Chinese culture under Suharto and probably also exaggerated the extent of the revival of that culture under subsequent presidents (Coppel 2003).

The anti-Chinese riots of May 1998 in Jakarta and elsewhere were nevertheless a significant psychological turning point for Indonesia's ethnic Chinese. The outbursts of violence convinced Chinese Indonesians that the state was no longer a reliable protector, as many had thought, nor had their efforts at 'assimilation' saved the minority from ugly outbreaks. A desire to struggle openly to defend their own interests led to the establishment of various non-governmental organisations that proposed to defend the rights of the minority or to work against racialism in general.

With better access to 'Chineseness', the ability to celebrate Chinese festivals publicly, the publication of texts in and for Chinese, and the increased possibility of instruction

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[1] The fifteenth day of the Chinese year, the first full moon, was an occasion for public processions in bygone times, especially in certain areas like Sukabumi (West Java), Singkawang (West Kalimantan), and others. A few processions marked this feast in some cities in the last years of the New Order.

in Chinese language,[2] persons of Chinese descent largely can determine whether and how they will live their heritage in today's Indonesia. Spokesmen for the minority now hope to win recognition for Chinese culture as a part of a plural Indonesian culture, not a foreign element. This is often expressed in the desire to have Chinese recognised as a *suku*, that is, one of Indonesia's ethnic groups.

But what is Chinese culture? Just as the community is diverse, so are the answers. In particular, within Indonesia a special Chinese culture and distinct traditions have grown up. Will they also be a model for 'Chineseness'?

Chinese-Indonesian Cultures

Over the years, the dichotomy of *totok* and *peranakan* has dominated scholarly approaches to the Chinese minority in Indonesia. *Peranakan* can refer to persons of mixed Chinese and native descent Sometimes it is simply a differentiation between foreign-born and local-born. The most important basis for this division of the minority however is on the grounds of language use.

Education of course reinforced language use in the family or the marketplace. *Totok*, who clearly favoured Chinese-language schools, spoke, usually, a southern Chinese language. They may have been born in Indonesia, but they maintained a Chinese language through the Chinese schools that taught in Mandarin. *Totok* Chinese have used the new freedoms since 2000 to publish in Chinese. One device has been to publish poetry or other articles together with translations into Indonesian; perhaps in the hope of demonstrating how much even Chinese-language literary expression can be rooted in Indonesia.[3]

Peranakan however have looked to quite different traditions in defining their Chinese heritage. In the family and in daily life, *peranakan* typically used Indonesian or a regional Indonesian language. Thanks to the opening of the Western schools for Chinese children in the early twentieth century, toward the end of the colonial period, elite *peranakan* spoke Dutch, but Dutch has been dying out since independence and Dutch-language schools were closed down in the 1950s. A decade later, the government closed down the last Chinese-language schools, leaving Indonesian as the sole language of instruction in all schools and contributing to a certain '*peranakan*isation' of younger *totok*.

Being *peranakan*, however, involves more than simply use of Indonesian. A century or so ago, *peranakan* used not modern standard Indonesian but a language that has been

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[2] Movements are under way to reopen education in Mandarin, at least in private institutions, in some parts of the country.

[3] Wilson Tjandranegara has been especially active in translating poetry and other writing from Chinese into Indonesian or vice versa. See Allen 2003: 387.

dubbed Sino-Malay (*Melayu Tionghoa*). Although the epithet suggests that this was a dialect peculiar to persons of Chinese origin, in fact linguists agree that it differed little from the low or *pasar* (bazaar) Malay that was the *lingua franca* of peoples resident in urban areas all over the Archipelago. Chinese terms enriched the vocabulary, the syntax sometimes resembled that of Chinese more than of modern Indonesian, but even these deviations were not necessarily peculiar to ethnic Chinese (Oetomo 1991, Meyer 1991).

Under the auspices of the colonial government, Malay became standardised as 'high Malay', especially as it was used in the Riau Archipelago, and finally developed over the first decades of the twentieth century into standard, modern Indonesian. As a spoken and written language, low Malay, in its Chinese or other varieties, has now practically vanished.

Sino-Malay Literature

Between about 1870 and the beginning of the 1960s, the Chinese of Indonesia developed a rich corpus of both fiction and non-fiction – in addition to newspapers and periodicals – in Sino-Malay. Yet however much these writings flourished, after the 1940s they gradually disappeared (and the language began to resemble standard Indonesian more and more). Newspapers, even those intended for a predominantly ethnic Chinese audience, began to publish in standard Indonesian (some, usually humorous, columns preserved the old style, as did cartoons) and ethnic Chinese writers also changed their style. People tended to look down on Sino-Malay or *Melayu rendah* (low Malay) as antiquated or even vulgar. During the Sukarno era, when the government had already instituted some anti-Chinese measures, authorities already forbade the circulation of one kind of Sino-Malay literature, the so-called *cerita silat*, Chinese cloak-and-dagger stories (now mostly called Kung Fu). The language of these cheaply produced issues even propagated the older form (Djati 2006). Nevertheless, they seemed to be all the more popular, circulating under the table and being devoured in secret.[4] The rest of the Sino-Malay tradition seemed to have disappeared.

Nio Joe Lan, a prominent *peranakan* writer active in pre- and post-World War II times, spoke of *Sastera Indonesia Tionghoa* (Indonesian Chinese literature) in 1962 (Nio 1962).[5] After sketching the development of publications that spoke primarily to the *peranakan* Chinese, he notes:

> After Indonesia recovered its sovereignty on August 17, 1945, the history of Indonesian Chinese literature officially came to an end. Its creators and its supporters be-

[4] This was my experience in Jakarta in 1962-63.

[5] Nio's preface is dated 1958, and the discrepancy is probably because of difficulties, especially economic ones, in getting the manuscript into print. During the 1930s, Nio previously published about this theme, see Salmon 1981: 9.

> came Indonesians. And thus what followed that was produced by creators and en-
> joyed by readers was nothing other than Indonesian literature (Nio 1962: 4).

However, in Nio's final chapter (Achirnja sedjarah sastera Indonesia-Tionghoa, the end of the history of Chinese Indonesian literature), he asserts that by becoming Indonesian citizens the group of *peranakan* Chinese had 'disappeared' (157). Socially and even in a strictly legal sense, this was not the case.

In terms of language, Nio himself had long since adapted to standard modern Indonesian and his readers, who were now attending Indonesian schools and reading a press that used modern Indonesian expected as much. He even asserts, "the Chinese-Malay language is now relegated to a museum". Chinese-Malay literature had also been Indonesianised because it was now written exclusively in Indonesian. Nonetheless he sees the 'treasury' of Sino-Malay literature as part of the heritage of all Indonesians and deserving of attention and study (Nio 1962: 158-159).

Sino-Malay literature contributed importantly to the development of modern Indonesian literature for a number of reasons:

- These texts were widely read. A significant part of the literature consisted of serials, published in instalments or appearing in popular magazines. Lending libraries circulated these and other texts for a trivial sum, multiplying the numbers of readers they reached. Such institutions encouraged reading and supported literacy in general, not just among *peranakan*. The Javanese political and cultural activist, founder of the educational movement Taman Siswa, Ki Hadjar Dewantoro (1899-1959), for example, had a large personal collection of Sino-Malay novels (Kwartanada, undated).
- They provided an alternative to the efforts of the colonial office for popular literature, Balai Pustaka, founded only in 1918 (Jedamski 1992). In quantity it far surpassed the publications under the official auspices of Balai Pustaka, with over 3000 publications against some 400. Sino-Malay authors also dealt with a variety of subjects, in contrast to the more limited themes that appeared in publications the official institution supported. Sino-Malay literature included a wide range of translations from Chinese or Western literature as well as original works, some inspired by current events or contemporary discussions of values. In no way was it limited to writing situated in a Chinese or Chinese-Indonesian environment.
- In contrast to the 'official' literature, it used the *lingua franca* of all ethnic groups. The language of traditional Malay literature, which of course was also an antecedent of modern Indonesian, was a formal, courtly language that deviated from that used by the people. The officially-sponsored publications and the schools imitated a form of formal Riau Malay that differed from that spoken in the streets and marketplaces of the country. Nonetheless, this language became the basis of standard modern Indonesian.

By the 1970s, a number of scholars were beginning to realise the importance of this body of writings and its contribution to Indonesian literature and culture. Among Westerners, C. W. Watson drew scholarly attention to the corpus of Chinese/Malay literature quite early (Watson 1971). The late Pramoedya Ananta Toer took up the torch for this extensive corpus of early writing, calling it "sastra pra-Indonesia" (proto-Indo-

nesian literature), although he was silenced by the regime (Pramoedya 1982). Despite the repressive atmosphere of the Suharto era, attention to Sino-Malay literature continued to grow, both in Indonesia and abroad.

Author Myra Sidharta recalls how she began to investigate the subject around 1979. She and other collectors plied the second-hand bookstores or simply resorted to copying decaying editions tucked away in the major libraries. Over the years, the prices of used books in Sino-Malay jumped as dealers recognised the presence of a market for these largely forgotten works (Sidharta 2000). An important impetus was the publication in 1981 of Claudine Salmon's annotated bibliography of these publications, listing over three thousand works by authors and translators in Chinese Malay (Salmon 1981: 10). At the time, some of the authors were still alive, and the chance to meet and interview them added to the interest of the subject. Thus opened a new field of investigation, as others joined in. This took place despite the strictures of the New Order government of Suharto that attempted to both isolate and assimilate the Chinese minority. Some publications began to appear within Indonesia, including a volume dedicated to the author Kwee Tek Hoay and Leo Suryadina's *Sastra Peranakan Tionghoa Indonesia*.

Early Indonesian publications

The Kwee volume, *100 Tahun Kwee Tek Hoay: Dari Penjaja Tekstil sampai ke Pendekar Pena* (100 years of Kwee Tek Hoay: from peddler of textiles to skilled writer) (Sidharta 1989), coincided with the centenary of the birth of this most prolific writer and essayist, whose works were published from 1919 into the 1960s, although he died in 1951 (Salmon 1981, 209-218. Among the contributors to the volume are Claudine Salmon, Leo Suryadinata, Jakob Sumardjo, John Kwee, and Thomas Rieger. Kwee dealt with a broad range of subjects: education, women's rights, contemporary political and social questions, philosophy, and also religious traditions, including Buddhism and traditional Chinese religion. Kwee left an enormous body of writings in a variety of genres, essays, short stories, novels, drama and *syair* (traditional Malay narrative poetry).

A few years later, in 1990, Claudine Salmon directed a workshop in Paris on the subject of Sino-Malay literature, the results of which appeared in print two years later (Salmon 1992). In 1992, the University of Indonesia also held a seminar about Chinese-Malay literature, although the contributions were never published. This moved Leo Suryadinata to bring out *Sastra Peranakan Tionghoa Indonesia*, an edited collection of articles, in Jakarta (Suryadinata 1996). By this time, the number of scholars inside and outside Indonesia who were examining this topic, either because of an interest in the *peranakan* Chinese or because of an interest in early Indonesian literature, had grown considerably. Linguists like Dèdè Oetomo also contributed to the body of information. Soon it would be time

to test the response of the general public to these works. The change of government after 1998 offered a first chance.

New Publications: First Efforts

Among the first items to take advantage of the relaxed atmosphere after 2000 was the television adaptation of the novel by Gouw Peng Liang, *Lo Fen Koei*. Originally published in 1903 under the title *Tjerita jang betoel soeda kedjadian di poelo djawa dari halnja satoe toean tana dan pachter opium di Res. Benawan, bernama Lo Fen Koei* (a story that really happened on the island of Java involving a landlord and opium farmer in the Residency of Benawan named Lo Fen Koei) (Allen 2003: 389-90; Salmon 1981: 174-175). The complicated title was a favourite device of authors of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century to suggest that their material was as newsworthy as the daily press, and possibly derived from it, thus highly worth reading. Needless to say, rich Chinese were a favourite topic as well.

In 2001, a publisher in Yogyakarta reprinted Kwee Tak Hoay's tear-jerker *Boenga Roos dari Tjikembang* (Rose of Cikembang), which was subsequently performed as a stage play. This novel, which deals in part with intermarriage of Chinese men and Sundanese women, had been filmed in 1931 and 1976, indicating its popularity (Salmon 1981: 209; Allen 2003: 390. For the synopsis, see Sidharta 1989: 291-2).

Ca-Bau-Kan

Interest in Chinese and the history of Chinese in Indonesia had already produced other fruits. In 1999, the author Remy Silado (Yapi Tambayong) came out with a novel, *Ca-Bau-Kan: Hanya sebuah dosa* (Ca-Bau-Kan: Only one sin) (Silado 1999) about a woman who lived as a prostitute and *nyai* (mistress). The title is from a Hokkien word for woman, which in Jakarta is commonly used for prostitute.

The story takes place during the 1930s, the Japanese occupation, and the Indonesian Revolution. An ethnic Indonesian (*pribumi*) village girl, Tinung, left a widow at fourteen when her husband dies at sea, is forced to become a prostitute in Jakarta's red-light district. She becomes a mistress to first one, then another, Chinese-Indonesian man, both of whom curiously share the same name (Tan Peng Liang). During the Japanese Occupation she is impressed as a 'comfort woman' for Japanese troops. Finally the second Tan is able to give her a secure position as his wife and mother of his son in post-revolutionary Indonesia.

The preface to the novel suggests that it is a contribution to interethnic understanding:

> This novel tells about the life of the society of people of Chinese descent in Indonesia
> in the time between 1918 and 1951. One of the things it shows is the role of some

> members of society of Chinese origin in the history of the movement for Indonesian independence. In such a way this novel disproves the stereotypical idea that persons of Chinese descent had no part in the history of Indonesian independence.

Further, it announces the continuation of the theme:

> The Novel *Ca-Bau-Kan* is the beginning of a project of publishing a *Peranakan Chinese Literature Series* that we are presently preparing. This project is an effort of KPG [the publisher] to demonstrate the process of how Indonesian nationalism came about (Silado 1999: v).

The book written by an ethnic Indonesian author in standard Indonesian (except for some dialogue) reached a considerable level of popularity. The author admits that some Chinese-Malay accounts, in particular a *syair* (narrative poem) about a nasty, wealthy Chinese named Oey Se, inspired his tale (Marcus and Benedanto 2002, introduction). Unfortunately the novel reflects some of the worst stereotypes of Chinese Indonesians.[6] The principal figures are corrupt, greedy, criminal, and cruel, even to the woman they are supposed to love. There are veiled references to contemporary events, to trying to 'buy off' investigative journalists or to an art auction, something which among ethnic Chinese in recent years has been an occasion to make a display of wealth.[7] Even where the 'hero' smuggles arms to the Indonesian revolutionary forces, he appears to do so as much from a love of smuggling and other illicit activities as from a devotion to the nation, although he is clearly anti-colonial in his attitude.

The novel, the publication of which was supported by two foundations, was filmed (and made into a television series) in a way that illustrated the opulent life style of wealthy Chinese Indonesians. In fact, considerable effort was expended to achieve visual historicity, but not historical authenticity.[8] Understandably, many Chinese Indonesian readers and film viewers felt that the work tended to reinforce ethnic stereotypes, not to dismantle them (Cohen 2002).

In the end, this book seems to have been far more popular than the re-issues of pre-war *peranakan* literature – and perhaps more influential, as well. Unfortunately, it tended to reinforce existing clichés about the minority instead of challenging them. Sino-Malay stories were not free from stereotypes and often expressed at least veiled criticism of wealthy or corrupt Chinese, but they did not reach this level. In the case of this novel,

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[6] For that matter, Tinung is a stereotype as well. Unable to read or write, she is unfailingly timid, passive, and simple-minded, just as the Chinese businessmen are clever, scheming and devious.

[7] On the recent art auctions, see Feillard 2006. The depiction in *Ca-Bau-Kan* draws on the *syair* Oey Se and its account of an auction of the possessions of a departing Dutch official, something more typical of the colonial period. On such occasions, Chinese bid up the price of the items to show their gratitude to the departing official, but also to impress upon his successor that they would welcome his cooperation or favouritism.

[8] Allen (2003: 392) adds "[…] this continues to be a defining feature of the post-Suharto resurgence in Chinese consciousness – an emphasis on the decorative." The filming was done in part on the premises of the historic old archives building.

the relaxation of limits to discussion of ethnic Chinese affairs (including, of course, re-laxing the so-called SARA restrictions[9]) was hardly a victory for the ethnic Chinese.

Kesastraan Melayu Tionghoa

Now the time for new editions of old works appeared ripe. Among the first to make the effort was Gramedia, whose Kepustakaan Populer (Popular Library – the publisher of *Ca-Bau-Kan*), together with a foundation of the Indonesian press association, Yayas-an Adikarya IKAPI, and the Ford Foundation, brought out the first volumes of re-prints of old works. Four volumes appeared between early 2000 and October 2001. Since then, about one volume per year has appeared, making a total of nine so far (Mar-cus and Benedanto 2000-2002; Marcus and Hamiyati 2003-2005).

An ambitious concept characterised the publication project. Even the title of the volu-mes, *Kesastraan Melayu Tionghoa dan Kebangsaan Indonesia*, reflected the publishers' aim of emphasising the link between Sino-Malay literature and Indonesian nationhood. The project plans to introduce modern Indonesian readers to a significant cross-section of about 150 works of Sino-Malay authors (of over 3,000 in all!) in twenty-five volumes, although, since the editions are no longer subsidised, it is important to maintain enough sales to carry the project financially. This partly explains the slower production sched-ule.

The Choice of Representative Works

The first volume contains some of the oldest pieces of Malay writing by *peranakan* Chinese, beginning with the anonymous *Sair Kadatangan Sri Maharaha Siam di Betawi pada Tanggal 27 Maart 1871* (*syair* of the coming of the King of Siam to Batavia on 27 March 1871), composed in that year in honour of the visit of the King Chulalongkorn to the colony. The editors have modernised the spelling of words, but have not other-wise altered the texts. The *syair* or poem begins:

Bermula sair ini dikarang,	At first this poem is composed
Membri tahu sekalian orang,	To tell everyone
Barula ada jaman sekarang,	How just now
Raja Siam datang di tana seberang.	The King of Siam came to the Indies

While the *syair* or poem continues with the King's travels to Batavia and Semarang, readers who are not acquainted with Sino-Malay language and literature would find themselves puzzled. Nor do the editors, apart from a perfunctory preface, introduce

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[9] This refers to laws forbidding public discussion of matters that could encourage bad feeling about a specific ethnic group, religion, race or class (*suku, agama, ras, antargolongan*), something that tended to suppress realistic appraisals of interracial relations.

what is a now a lost way of telling a story in verse, since the form of *syair* has now practically disappeared. In fact, using a verse form for narration, especially in the nineteenth or early twentieth century, facilitated the recitation of the text to those – most of the population – who could not read.

Another *syair* follows, then comes the well-known *Kitab Eja A. B. C.* (Book of ABCs), a primer to teach children (and others?) to read Malay, by Lie Kim Hok, written in 1884. There follow works of fiction, dated 1903-1928, to complete the hefty 519-page first volume.

The positive reception of the first volume led the publishers to continue promptly with a second, including texts that appeared between 1917 and 1929. The book, which includes three pieces by Thio Tjin Boen (one in two parts, written 1917-1920) and three works by Kwee Tek Hoay (written 1925-1929), is also well over 500 pages long. Readers who were not old enough to have spoken Sino-Malay were experiencing difficulty with the language. While in the first volume the orthography had been modernised to conform to Indonesian spelling after 1972, in the second, this unfamiliarity necessitated adding a vocabulary of several pages to the text, explaining deviant forms of Malay, but also Dutch or Hokkien expressions, which appear frequently in some texts.

Kwee Tek Hoay's lengthy (and long-winded) work, *Drama di Boven Digul,* fills the entire third volume. The vocabulary had been expanded to ten pages, and in volume four, thirteen.

Volume four contains only works of Kwee Tek Hoay, including his well-regarded history of the beginning of the modern Chinese movement in Indonesia, *Asal Mulainya Timbul Pergerakan Tionghoa yang Modern di Indonesia* (1939).[10]

The fifth volume deviates from the previous publications in that it is devoted to four biographies of individual Chinese, two *peranakan* and two *totok*. According to Myra Sidharta, who collaborated with the publishers, this topic proved to sell especially well. Subsequent volumes, however, return to the previous format (in one case, the editors failed to find a complete copy of the chosen text and had to do without three pages of the original). The ninth volume is about women.[11]

Indonesia dalem Api dan Bara (Indonesia in Fire and Enbers)

Another publication has taken a different tack. During a stay in Indonesia in the early 1960s, the political scientist Benedict Anderson found a copy of a book published 'underground' in Malang in 1947. The text relates the experiences of the author, who uses the pseudonym Tjamboek Berdoeri (thorny whip). Its original title was *Lelatoe jang djadi*

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[10] This previously appeared in English translation as Kwee 1969.

[11] Unfortunately I have not seen this last volume.

Laoetan Api, a spark that became a sea of flame, referring to the conflagration that enveloped Europe and Asia in World War II.

In a number of cities, the Dutch began to organise their own people, but also ethnic Chinese and Indonesians, in a citywide defence corps (*stadswacht*). Neither the author nor the editors mention the actual impetus for the decision to give military training to a wide spectrum of the population: the occupation of the Netherlands by Germany and the consequent isolation of the colony (Lohanda 2004). The author's experience in paramilitary training takes up the first third of the account; for most of the time, the colonial power seems to have kept its people ignorant of the approach of the Japanese until they finally arrived. Then follow the experiences of the Chinese during the Japanese period and, finally, the *jaman bersiap*, the first months of the Indonesian Revolution. The book ends with the author's discovery of brutal and unnecessary killings of Chinese, as well as other violence against the minority.

Before the book could be reprinted, Anderson interested some young Indonesians in the question of the authorship of the text. Who was Tjamboek Berdoeri? The 'detectives' were able to show that the author was the pre-war journalist Kwee Thiam Tjing (1900-1974). Kwee, who in fact signed the preface to the original publication with his own name, wrote for various publications sympathetic to the pre-war Indonesian nationalist movement.

In one aside, Tjamboek Berdoeri at one point looks back to the battle of words between the Dutch and Indonesian football associations in Surabaya in the 1930s that led, among other things, to the establishment of the Partai Tionghoa Indonesia (Indonesian Chinese Party), a pro-Indonesian nationalist movement among the Chinese, especially in East Java. Kwee himself not only joined the PTI, he was imprisoned for several months for some of his writings. He was a personal friend of some early nationalist leaders as well.

The book is written in a style that mixes Sino-Malay with Dutch expressions, Hokkien and Javanese, as well as Japanese or Madurese (and sometimes other languages as well), in a lively (but for the reader of standard Indonesian, maddening) mixture that reflects the society in which he lived and its daily exchanges. While admixtures of Dutch and Hokkien are typical of many Sino-Malay texts, Kwee manages to display surprising linguistic facility, making the text untranslatable, either into modern Indonesian or another language. Thus, the editors determined to print the book as is, but (unlike the publishers of *Kesastraan Melayu Tionghoa dan Kebangsaan Indonesia*) they have added a considerable amount of explanatory material, a lengthy introduction by Anderson, an account of the search for the real author, and an afterword that discusses Kwee's family and the problem of violence in East Java during the Revolution.

The 240 pages of the original text begin with the organisation of the militia. Kwee, no friend of the colonial power, joined simply because he was out of work anyway. He advanced to sergeant before the approach of the Japanese led the authorities to demote the corps to 'auxiliary police' and finally to disarm them. Unarmed and without authority in the population, they were helpless to prevent violence and looting as the Dutch themselves withdrew before the enemy advance. Kwee shows how the Dutch reacted to their unconditional surrender to the Japanese and tried vainly to keep up their spirits.

This experience is hardly grounds for republication of the book. The following third of the text, all of which is told in the first person and deals with first-hand experiences, deals with the coming of the Japanese, which was preceded by a period of power vacuum. This intermediate period already emboldened Indonesians to assert their power, to fly the red-white nationalist flag, in the expectation that Japan would now support their aspirations. At the same time, bad elements made the Chinese targets for looting and even violence.[12] When the Japanese first arrived, they seemed to encourage plundering the property of the Chinese.

However, once they had established a modicum of law and order, the occupiers showed their disapproval of destructive behaviour, particularly anything that would threaten economic mobilisation (235-7).[13]

In general, in the second part, much of the story is already known from other accounts of Japanese rule: the treatment of the Dutch men euphemistically sent to work in camps called 'tea plantations', the women and children scrambling to survive until they too were finally interned. Kwee gives some attention to arbitrary arrests, beatings, and torture, to drastic imposts that deprived people of their economic resources, and, finally to the galloping inflation. Indonesians were recruited for the Peta, Chinese also for military training. Kwee's account is lively, he reports dialogues with all kinds of people, mostly in the original language, and his linguistic talents underline his humour. Even under the occupation there was a light side of things.

In this section, Kwee does not hesitate to criticise those who exploited the situation for personal advancement, including the leaders of the umbrella association for the Chinese, Hua Chiao Feng Kung Hui (later called Kakyo Shokai), who were instantly pressed – and pressed others – to raise money for Japan's war production. Kwee became a neighbourhood head (*kepala rumah tangga*) and was himself responsible for keeping some sort of order in his own *kampung*. With society exhausted and left rootless by

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[12] A comparable account is that of Tan Moh Goan (1949). This, among other things, describes looting and violence against Chinese in Central Java in 1942.

[13] References are to page numbers of the second edition. On Japanese policy, see especially Kwartanada, unpublished, 15-17, which shows that Lt. Gen. Imamura, the Japanese commander in Java, deliberately chose a 'soft' policy in dealing with the Chinese, in contrast to commanders in other areas, for example in Malaya and Singapore, who were responsible for harsh treatment and atrocities against Chinese there.

over three years of occupation and oppression, the transition that followed the Japanese surrender could hardly run smoothly, but no one was really prepared for what followed.

This is the subject of the third part of the book, which deals with Indonesian independence and the revolution, up to the return of the Dutch in July 1947, in the course of their first 'police action'. If Kwee found much to criticise (and little to praise) in the behaviour of persons from the various ethnic groups in the previous sections, here the account becomes highly dramatic and there is little room for humour.

The Allies, unable to re-occupy Java promptly, had insisted that Japan be responsible for order until they could arrive. In time, however, the Japanese turned over arms to – or let them be taken by – various Indonesian forces. These included the official Tentara Keamanan Rakyat, later Tentara Nasional Indonesia, but also irregulars of all colours, clothed in a rag-tag collection of military dress and now brandishing a collection of weapons ranging from hand grenades to bamboo spears. Understandably, most threats to person and property came from this group.

During the 1947 first "police action", as the Dutch advanced and the official Indonesian forces retreated, the military determined to carry out a policy of *bumi hangus* (scorched earth) to prevent the Dutch from restoring their economic power. In fact, however, destruction reached entire sections of the infrastructure, factories and many properties belonging to Chinese, including entire areas where Chinese settled, and public buildings as well.

After the withdrawal of the official troops, the author learned that in Malang hundreds of Chinese men and women, had been driven from their homes and were being held by irregulars under armed guard, ostensibly to be screened for *mata-mata musuh* (enemy spies). Able to move about the city, Kwee soon also discovered in Mergosono on the outskirts of Malang the grisly remains of over twenty men and women (some of them his own relatives) who had been mutilated and murdered – for no cause – by such troops and hastily buried. Such incidents were especially cruel in East Java, but by no means confined to that province.[14] Kwee's dismay turns to disgust as prominent Chinese organisations at first refuse to take action, even to grant the victims a proper burial.

Kwee is a master storyteller and, since he emphasises experience over hearsay, his book is a valuable addition to the sources on the early Revolution, showing a different side of

[14] In fact, such incidents were widespread. Chinese caught between the retreating Indonesian army and the advancing Dutch were prey to irregulars in many areas. The most well-known incident was that of Tangerang in 1946, one of the most drastic that of Nganjuk, also in East Java, in December 1948, where over 1500 men were massacred. They were herded into a storehouse and the building set afire. Later, the town became known as 'widows' town'. See Siauw 1981: 142-143. On the violence against Chinese in general, see Heidhues 1988.

events than that which official histories relate. The author also makes use of his multi-cultural background in constructing his tale. Sometimes he identifies a situation with *wayang*, sometimes with stories from the *Sam Kok* (Romance of Three Kingdoms), again he compares events to Surabaya's popular *ludruk* theater. Critical (and sometimes cynical) though he is, he avoids blaming or stereotyping any ethnic group, emphasising that good and bad, honest and dishonest, peacemaker and violent are found in all sectors of the population. Even the Chinese militia organised at the time of the violence to defend Chinese property, the Pao An Tui, and its recruits come in for their share of criticism (299-300). *Djamino* and *djoliteng* – his expression for evildoers, cheats, thieves and worse – are all over, thriving in conditions of unrest and disorder. However, the reader cannot help but understand why the Chinese welcomed the arrival of Dutch troops in the city.

Language

While the editors of *Kesastraan Melayu Tionghoa* confine themselves to modernising the spelling and adding, after the first volume, a vocabulary (and a few footnotes for unusual expressions), the publishers of Tjamboek Berdoeri chose to reproduce Kwee's language in its full variety and to follow even the original spelling. As a result, nearly every page requires explanatory footnotes.

In his lengthy introduction to the book (78 pages), Anderson describes how the publication came about and gives something of Kwee's biography, both before and after he wrote (as the new title calls it) *Indonesia dalem Api dan Bara*. Anderson is so enamoured of Kwee's style that he uses the text not only to criticise other histories of the Indonesian Revolution, but also to criticise the standardisation of modern Indonesian.

Unfortunately, Anderson's language, which apparently seeks to imitate Kwee's, is in a class by itself, resembling Sino-Malay in part, but adding asides in modern slang or other uses that are very different from Sino-Malay.

> Anderson's admiration for TB [Tjamboek Berdoeri] draws him also to write in Malay, yet the 1990s structure, style of expression and vocabulary merely raise questions: What kind of Malay is this? (Lohanda 2006: 140)

While those who criticise the *bahasa baku* (standard language) (Anderson 2005; Djati 2006) of modern Indonesian writing may indeed have a point, the attempt to emphasise a (largely lost) oral style over written ones and the frequent shifts may result in a language that is simply unintelligible.

Sino-Malay Literature – Does it Have a Future?

With that, the question of the future of this literature, outside a relatively limited circle of academics and those with nostalgia for the past, remains. Should *peranakan* Chinese culture look to the past or to the future?

Certainly the revival of many of these stories will enrich contemporary literature. Yet while Tjamboek Berdoeri attracted considerable interest, with more than one book launching and considerable favourable publicity, it is said to be selling poorly. Is the interest in Sino-Malay reissues sufficient to sustain further publications or is it a flash in the pan that will dwindle, especially as the older generation that once spoke and read this tongue passes? Should KPG continue with its yearly anthologies and reissues and actually complete the series as originally planned, we will know more in fifteen years.

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The Novel-Humming Ulama

Islamic Debates on Popular Literature in Late Colonial Indonesia[1]

Doris Jedamski

Inter-cultural encounter – whatever form it may take – is a process of (re)defining and (re)positioning the Self and the Other. Studies on this subject are manifold; indeed, so inflationary has been the use of the terms Self and Other over the last decades that the mere mention of the terms may provoke irritation. Yet, the concept of Self and Other – even though it may provoke generalisations lurking in dualisms such as coloniser/colonised, 'white'/'non-white', Western/non-Western, or East/West – seems almost indispensable when analysing the core of interaction that was integral to the decolonisation process in the Netherlands East Indies. Intricately constructed during the colonisation process, the sometimes contradictory layers constituting the Self and the Other called for deconstruction and redefinition on the brink of independence. New ways of (re)presentation of the Self were required and with the rise of Indonesian nationalism one of the simplest but most distinctive ways of establishing this new understanding was the application of the labels Indonesian and 'non-Indonesian' – categories that are still contested even today. In this context, the Dutch and other Westerners were naturally perceived as the Other. But the perception was steeped in ambiguity: on the one hand, the West was respected and admired for its scientific and technological achievements, for its advanced administration and organisation, for its sense of maintaining order, and for its contributions to 'world culture' (Shakespeare and Goethe were among the most frequently quoted authors not only by Sino-Malay writers and journalists, but also by the Sumatran Islamic intellectuals to be discussed in this article). On the other hand, the West was reviled and feared for the moral 'contamination' that came in tandem with Western progress and modernity and which was seen as a profound threat to 'traditional' values. In colonised and semi-colonised societies such binary perception of the West is not uncommon. Looking at some of Egypt's most prominent writers, El-Enany (forthcoming) gives an impressive case study elucidating the almost paradoxical

attitude of Islamic intellectuals towards the West in the period c.1820s-1970s. In the Egyptian case, this led to a seemingly irreconcilable division of the East and the West, which manifested itself in dichotomies such as mysticism vs. reason, soul vs. materialism, religious faith vs. science, or spirit vs. technology.[2] In colonial Indonesia, too, dualisms of this kind came to determine the view of the West in Islamic circles during the first decades of the 20th century. This produced an East-West binary that could be summed up as '*Kebatinan Timoer vs. intellect Barat*'.

> Western culture is in contradiction to Eastern culture. Western culture only considers the material world important, whereas Eastern culture is based on spiritualism. Objectively, we hold the opinion [that, D.J.] Western culture that finds nothing important other than everything worldly in fact endangers the world. [...] We are amazed, astonished at the perfection of Western knowledge, Western technology. We must imitate the supreme achievement of their intellect.[3]

While the Westerners served as the 'foreign Other' against which the (modern and nationalist) Self could be designed, tested and shielded, the Sumatran Islamic intellectuals drew a different kind of demarcation line to dissociate this newly constructed Self from the Chinese and *peranakan* Chinese, the personification of the 'Other within'.[4] Like the Westerners, these local Others were despised and feared for being culturally different as much as they were furtively admired for their achievements, particularly in the economic field and the sphere of literature. It was this paradoxical combination of anxiety and admiration that put the colonised Self (in this case the Sumatran Islamic intellectuals) in a quandary: The Other appeared to be malady and remedy in one.

During the first decades of the 20th century, modern media in the Netherlands East Indies such as the press and the novel played, as in most colonies, a crucial role in the negotiation of the Self and the Other, the quest for identity. The objective of this article is to reconstruct an example of this negotiation through the example of the Sumatran Islamic intellectual circles and some of their debates. Just like other young intellectuals elsewhere in the colony, these young men (and very few women) were searching for ef-

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[2] Recent developments and current discussions concerning the interrelation of the Islam and the West corroborate the assumption that this specific form of cultural negotiation dating from the almost postcolonial, modern world has found its grim continuation in the post-modern world.

[3] "*Keboedajaan Barat bertentangan dengan Keboedajaan Timoer. Keboedajaan Barat semata-mata mementingkan doenia, sedang keboedajaan Timoer adalah berdasarkan kebatinan. Setjara objectief kita berpendapatan: Keboedajaan Barat jang semata-mata mementingkan soal kedoeniawian itoe, membahajakan doenia. [...] Kita heran, ta'djoeb melihat pengetahoean, techniek Barat, jang sangat sempoerna itoe. Kita haroes meniroe ketinggian fikiran mereka.*" (Wahab 1939: 910).

[4] I borrow this term from Thongchai Winichakul (2000). In applying it in this context, I have been inspired by Rachel Harrison, who makes impressive use of the concept of the "Other Within" in her study of early Thai adaptations of Western detective literature (in Jedamski, ed., forthcoming). It is important to note here that Indonesian nationalism demanded a critical perspective not only on the "foreign Other" and the "Other within", but, just as crucially, also questioned the own traditional and ethnical roots. For some that was a painful experience, for others it was a liberating step. A case in point is Hamka's 'biography' and the attitude he displayed towards his Minangkabau background, see Hadler 1998.

fective ways of articulating their new notions as well as their concerns. Colonialism and Western modernity had confronted them with the predicament of tradition and religious dogma on the one hand, and nationalism and progress on the other. The young Islamic intellectuals (some were writers, journalists, publishers, teachers, religious and political activists all at once) were fascinated with the West. They embraced and feared the modernity it brought, debating it through the very media the West had introduced to them. The novel, for instance, a potentially powerful tool in the hands of the colonisers, opened up new forms of expression also to the colonised.[5] The novel responded to the dramatic social and political changes of the time, but it also communicated the little changes that were occurring in everyday life. It discussed issues of modernity, expressed the shifting of values and took part in their re-definition. The novel helped vocalise the tension between coloniser and colonised, just as much as it vocalised the conflicts (or concordance for that matter) between the different indigenous ethnic, social, political, and religious groups. Often, it reflected and fed the striving for a national identity. Inherent in this modern form of literature was the invitation to design and playfully try out new identities; it allowed a transcending of the reality of the colonial world, and a voicing of utopian thoughts and enthusiasms, as much as it expressed anxieties and fears. The group of young Islamic writers under discussion here were aware of the potentials of literature: "If capably composed the novel or *hikayat* can become a guide for society on the journey through life"[6] ([Hamka] 1940, I: 67). And taking this assertion one step further, Natsir (1940: 24; emphasis orig.) rhetorically asks: "Isn't it the *history of literature* that always *precedes* as a matter of several years the *history of world politics*?"[7] Taking the example of the rather inconspicuous 'Medan debate' on the novel in Sumatra in 1938-1940, this article aims to shed some more light on a non-violent, hardly sensational but undoubtedly underrated part of the Indonesian nationalist struggle.

Islam, Popular Culture, and Various Agendas in the Late Colonial Netherlands East Indies

With the strengthening of Islamic secularism, the question of defining the place of Islam in the modern world became a pressing issue. And however politicised the debate

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[5] *Peranakan* Chinese and Eurasian cultural intermediates introduced the genre of the novel to colonial Indonesia around 1870 by way of translations and adaptations of Western and Chinese novels. See also Jedamski 2005.

[6] "*Kalau orang pandai menjoesoennja, maka roman atau hikajat itoe bisa mendjadi penoentoen kepada masjarakat menempoeh djalan hidoepnja*". All translations from the Indonesian by the present author unless marked differently.

[7] "*Boekankah* **sedjarah perpoestakaan** *itoe jang selaloe berdjalan beberapa poeloeh thn.* **lebih doeloe** *daripada s***edjarah politiek doenia**?"

might have been at some point, situating Indonesian Islam within the modern world was never merely a matter of choosing 'left' or 'right'. Some intellectuals, holding on to traditions in the attempt to shut out the modern Western world, baulked at any questioning of their Islamic world. Others, especially young Muslim intellectuals, developed more intricate visions in their search for a modern identity, hesitantly opening up their world 'of the mosque' to the 'modern world of the West'; some even envisioned a fruitful synthesis of both worlds – albeit under the 'umbrella' of Islam.[8]

The assorted Islamic press media regularly discussed issues of modernisation, some of them embedded in broader discourses such as education, gender issues, Western capitalistic structures, individualism, or the economic competition (first and foremost with the Chinese). But also comparatively marginal matters and single incidents were sometimes widely discussed, for instance a billboard conspicuously placed on the front wall of one of Medan's new cinemas, which advertised an Indian film in a manner perceived as offensive to Islamic values.[9] Even a seemingly trivial everyday issue like the question whether or not a Muslim was allowed to use a toothbrush of pig's bristles found earnest attention.[10] More pivotal a discourse, however, was the one surrounding the interrelation of the religious, political, and cultural elite and the re-definition of their domain of responsibility and action. As part of this discourse, the role of language and literature and the possible involvement of Islamic writers and religious leaders in the new media were heavily debated during the 1930s:

> […] the discourse of literature, and of 'Indonesia', came to be associated with the struggles waged by the advocates of a modernist Islam against the persistence of traditionalist Islam and its institutionalisation in *adat*. (Foulcher 2000: 9).

Emerging from this discourse and signifying the clash between tradition and modernity, the dispute between '*ulama*' and 'intellectual' threatened to create a chasm that neither side had wished for: "very wide is the gap between *ulama* and intellectual, whereas – for the progress of religion and people – they should not be separated"[11] (Hamka 1941: 483). But by that time, being an intellectual had become synonymous with being modern, which in turn was taken to mean 'westernised' in its most negative sense. In tradi-

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[8] A Dutch colonial equivalent concept emerged during the first two decades of the twentieth century. "The associationist ideal of a marriage between East and West," as Foulcher (forthcoming) formulates it, "was the scheme for an evolutionary progress towards modernity, in the language of the times, a meeting of the best of West and East." [… It] "received some of its most lasting social impacts through the activities of the Netherlands Indies branch of the Theosophical Society […] A very significant number of Indonesians who played prominent roles in the modernizing nationalist movement of the late colonial period were themselves theosophists, or had some close association with the movement and its institutions".

[9] See Film dan Islam 1940: 301.

[10] See Pertemoean Kedoea dari Oelama dan Intellek 1939.

[11] "*amat renggang dan amat djaoeh djaraknja diantara oelama dengan intellectueel. Padahal semestinja – oentoek kemadjoean agama dan bangsa – kedoeanja tidak berpisah*".

tional circles, the label 'intellectual' evoked the image of a strolling dandy escorted by dubious *meisjes* (young girls), of someone spending his time in cafés or restaurants, on tennis or badminton courts instead of saying his daily prayers (Oesman 1937: 348). Intellectuals were accused of dancing around at parties (*dansa-dansi*) and of displaying loose sexual behaviour (ibid). In the eyes of orthodox Muslims the progressive intellectuals were *sesat* (led astray), while the latter accused the conservative Muslims of having lost contact with reality and of being *fanatiek*, fanatics.[12] In 1939, both sides started holding monthly meetings to settle the conflict. The Sumatran debate on the novel, which is the focus of this article, needs to be seen in the light of such 'conflict management', a conflict taking place outside the domain of literature that nevertheless left a clear mark on the literary production of the time.

An unsigned article by the renowned Haji Abdul Malik Karim Amrullah, (Hamka), dating from December 1938 and entitled *Mengarang Roman* (novel writing) already raises some of the issues that were to be central in the Medan debate on the novel in late 1939.[13] In his article Hamka strongly argues for the genre of the (popular) novel and expresses his conviction that it was time for Islamic intellectuals and *ulama* alike to get involved in the new genre. Hamka was therefore the first religious leader who openly made out a case for the novel – contributing a new perspective to the dispute between *ulama* and intellectual. But above all, his article conveyed Hamka's (rather defensive) response to some severe criticism evoked by a single scene in his famous (and later canonised) novel *Tenggelamnja Kapal Van der Wijk* (1939). A year later this item of critique would still be at the heart of the literary debate. The crux of the consternation occasioned by the novel emerges in the words of one of the contributors to the 1939 debate: "How can it be that a writer who is highly educated in religious matters allows a young woman to be sitting next to a *young man in a lonely spot – surely they would be shunned!*"[14] The scene in question even caused Hamka to be dubbed "*Kijahi I love You*" (An 'I love you' religious teacher; i.e. a religious teacher who writes romance novels) and "*Toekang Tjaboel*" (a 'craftsman' of pornography).[15]

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[12] See Hamka 1941: 483 and Oelama dan Intellect 1939: 22.

[13] The start of the debate could therefore just as well be dated December 1938, see Kratz (1986: 64). However, there were no direct responses to Hamka's early contribution, nor was there a conscious decision to conduct such a debate, as was the case a year later.

[14] See Hamid 1939: 960. There are uncertainties as to the authorship of this article entitled *Bandjir Roman*. Speculations have it that Hamka himself, while using the disguise of a pen-name, launched this attack, among others, at his own, celebrated novel. See also Hamka (1951) on these and similar speculations that he once in a while veiled his authorship using a pseudonym.

[15] Foulcher demonstrates in his illuminating observations on the reception of Hamka's novel *Tenggelamnja Kapal Van Der Wijk* that Hamid was "concerned with much more than simply a negative detail in the plot" (2000: 15). In his paper Foulcher discusses this debate in the broader context of other literature discourses of the time.

Endeavouring to bridge the rift between *ulama* and intellectual, Mohd. Dien Yatim reasons that the

> only difference [between the term ulama and intellectual, D.J.], apart from the fact that one is an Arab word and the other one of Western origin, is its usage in everyday life. People sense that 'intellectual' refers to worldly knowledge whereas 'ulama' is linked to the hereafter and the religion of Islam.[16]

This article, the 'official' opener of the 'Medan debate on the novel', emphasises the necessity to modernise Islam – or to be more precise, the propagation of Islam – and of deploying modern media in the process. Again touching upon the dispute between *ulama* and intellectuals, Yatim maintains that no *ulama* can by definition be reduced to being exclusively a preacher of the Qu'ran. Rather, Yatim defines the *ulama*'s and any Muslim's principal task to be the search for the very best methods and manners to attract as many people as possible and to inculcate the Islamic 'feel' in them (1939: 920). He contends that novels, and certainly also the much disputed *roman madjalah* (magazine novel) to be discussed later, provided the perfect means to achieve that goal, for they apparently reached far more readers than any other print media did (ibid: 920-921). The evidence for this can be found in

> the development of the *roman madjalah* surpassing the development of popular Islamic scientific journals. Why not ensnare the *publik* in this field [of the *roman majalah*] that is so incredibly popular, in a refined and subtle manner, in order to bring the *publik* closer to the beautiful Islamic feelings. […] Stories make people happy, angry, unhappy, sad, they give rise to imaginings of love, criminals, nationalism, heroes etc. Why should it not be possible to arouse, among other things, piety, compassion, devoutness through stories (ibid: 921)?[17]

Yatim argues that the position of the *ulama* as religious leader does not necessarily preclude his authoring of (popular) novels himself. Novel-writing *ulama* were still an uncommon phenomenon and as such they were the object of both approving and disapproving reactions. But the fact that a number of religious leaders had indeed approached the field of popular literature – and even the genre of detective novels (ibid: 920) – led Yatim to make the following ironical remark: "Hey, the ulama who recites the Qu'ran and the Hadits, […] he shall now be humming novels too, twisted around the words *ai lap joe*. Good heavens, modern times!"[18] Once again alluding to the on-going conflict between intellectuals and *ulama*, he accentuates his view that not all novels

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[16] "*Bedanja tjoema, selain jang satoe bahasa 'Arab jang lain bahasa Barat ialah pemakaian ma'na sehari2. Publiek merasa kalau intellect ilmoe doenia, 'Oelama soal achirat atau agama Islam*" (Yatim 1939: 920). The article was entitled *Angkatan Baroe: Menebarkan benih Islam diatas segala matjam lapangan* (New Generation: spreading the seed of Islam on all kinds of ground).

[17] "*Boekti dapat ditengok dalam kemadjoean madjallah2 roman meatasi kemadjoean madjallah2 wetenschap Islam populair. Kenapa dalam lapangan jang ditjandoei publik itoe tidak ditahan djerat, dengan tjara jang haloes tidak kentara, oentoek membawa publik kepada perasaan2 Islam jang indah2. […] Dengan tjerita dibikin gembira, marah, sedih, soesah dan timboel angan2 tjinta, pendjahat, nasional, pahlawan dsb. Kenapa tidak poela moengkin dengan tjerita ditimboelkan perasaan takwa, insaf, saleh dll.*"

were 'left' (politically), or about 'the fair sex' and *ai lap joe* (ibid). But, Yatim concludes, if a novel contained *tendenz* (purpose)[19] and *roh Islam* (spirit of Islam) neither intellectual nor *ulama* would have to fear disapproval regarding their literary products (ibid: 920). Yatim does encourage this development and reiterates his demand that the modern *ulama* must reach out to all appropriate fields of modernity to plant 'the seed of Islam' (*bibit Islam*). Other than the novel, he also suggests employing the modern media of radio, film, and theatre to serve *da'wah,* the propaganda of Islam. Yatim was not the only voice to stipulate that the propaganda of Islam should leave the prayer house in order to appropriate the new means of communication, the positive side of modernity. But this seemingly progressive, pro-Western attitude is, certainly in Yatim's case, motivated by his fundamentalist desire to spread Islam as the alternative to Western culture and values. In his opinion, the new generation has to avoid the errors of the older generation; the new generation has "to propagate Islam broadly and in the most appealing and most modern way possible" (*propaganda Islam jang seloeas-loeasnja dengan tjara jang amat menarik dan modern*, ibid: 921) – "because we all know that only Islamism can civilise this world" (*karena kita insaf bahwa hanja Islamisme jang dapat menyopankan doenia ini*, ibid 920).[20]

The young Sumatran Islamic authors and their novels represented a vital element in the decolonisation process, in particular the quest for a modern Islamic identity. This was a

[18] "*hai, 'Oelama jang memperkatakan Qoe'ran dan Hadist […], sekarang hendak bersenandoengkan roman poela, berbelit-belit dengan kata ai lap joe. Masjaällah, zaman modern!*" (emphasis orig.). The expression *ai lap joe* is a corruption of the English *I love you* and was used as a disparaging label for the popular novel, initially with the intention to discredit the Chinese and Sino-Malay *roman madjalah*.

[19] The German generic term *Tendenzroman* was coined during the 1880s and provided the concept of 'tendenz', which was probably adopted into the Malay literary debates via its Dutch language equivalent. Since then, the German term has entered many languages; often it is translated as 'novel of/with a purpose'. By definition, the *Tendenzroman* deals with social, religious, political, or moral issues while artistically concealing them – in this way it differs from the political novel that overtly centers on political, ideological, and social issues. During the Medan debate, *tendenz* (also *tendens*) is exemplified as, for instance, *djiwa patriot* (patriotic spirit), *keteguhan memegang agama* (firm religious faith), or *mengeritik adat*, criticising the traditional laws (Hamid 1939: 960). Not explicitly mentioned but present in a number of works of the authors of the Medan group is also the anti-colonial aspect. As 'tendens', the term is still commonly used in modern Indonesian.

[20] Yatim's standpoint reflects the position of the *Kaum Muda*, the young generation, opposing the *Kaum Toea*, the old generation, in Minangkabau at the beginning of the 20th century. In the Netherlands East Indies this opposition was the first and most significant manifestation of a new orientation of Islam facing Western modernity. On the example of the debate about dress – a topic still being debated in the 1930s and 1940s – Kaptein (forthcoming) depicts how it was in fact the *Kaum Muda*, the fundamentalists under the influence of Cairo, who were the ones opening up towards the West. This openness did not stand for a positive attitude towards the West but rather signified a mind-set circumscribed by a 'the end justify all means' approach. The end was – just like in Yatim's case – the spreading of Islam. There is a discussion of the most important controversies between the two groups in the biography of Haji Abdul Karim Amrullah, a leading figure of the *Kaum Muda* movement, compiled by his son Hamka, who adopted his father's stance. The debates of the 1930s, in particular the one concerning ulama and intellectual outlined above, echo the controversies of the earlier generation.

process that had gained momentum during the first decade of the 20th century with the establishment of secular Islamic schools and the foundation of modern Islamic organisations.[21] It was furthered by an intensified politicisation of the Islamic movement and the expansion of the social-political organisation Muhammadiyah during the late 1920s.[22] During the 1930s, beside the publishing section of Muhammadiyah, other Islamic publishers also brought out their own periodicals and started the production and distribution of 'modern literature'.[23] Islamic periodicals featured a constantly growing number of articles on literature and culture, and feuilletons presented an ever-broadening variety of Islamic prose and poetry. Book reviews also became a regular feature.

The most successful type of publication was undoubtedly the popular novel. It appeared mainly in the form of the *roman picisan*, a monthly or bi-monthly printed publication introduced by the *peranakan* Chinese as *roman madjalah* at the beginning of the 20th century. By the 1920s it had become a runaway success. The reader-oriented format of the *roman madjalah* offered short popular novels, usually around eighty pages plus an editorial, some photos of movie stars, landscapes, or foreign cities, occasionally a supplementary story or poems, and advertisements of all kinds. The main story would usually be a combination of crime, action, and romance (in the beginning often translations or appropriations of Western models). The *roman madjalah* was still flourishing in Java when the first Sumatran Malay variant of it, later also known as *roman picisan* (dime novel) appeared around 1934. However, the popular novels that were to grow into threatening competitors of the Sino-Malay variant and to be a nuisance to the Dutch colonials did not appear before 1938.[24]

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[21] Around 1909, the first modern, secular Islamic school was established in Padang. In 1912, both the "extended traders' cooperative" (Cribb 1992: 213) *Sarekat Islam* and the modern social movement *Muhammadyah* were founded; see also Penders 1977: 238-39. Hamka became affiliated with both the *Sarekat Islam* and Muhammadyah during his time in Java during the mid-1920s (Usman 1957: 78-79).

[22] In 1923 the political party Partij Sarekat Islam came into existence. In 1925, thirteen years after its foundation, Muhammadyah still counted no more than four thousand members, but the number later multiplied – probably as a result of the failed communist rebellions of 1927/28 and the drastic changes in the colonial policy regarding indigenous political activities and associations. In this climate, political activists and social and cultural associations joined in the efforts to recruit members on a mass scale. In 1929, the Muhammadyah registered 16,000 members and by 1938 the number had reached 250,000. The rather modest number of agencies grew from 29 in 1925 to 852 branches in 1938 (statistics see Penders 1977: 240).

[23] The leading Islamic publishers of the time were *Penjiaran Ilmoe* in Bukittinggi, *Poestaka Islam* and *Boekhandel & Uitgeverij Tjerdas* in Medan, *Boekhandel Indonesia* and *Boekhandel Daroessalam* in Atjeh.

[24] A wide distribution was achieved through an effective lending system and the pre-pay subscription mode. This made it possible for many of the Sino-Malay and Sumatran Malay novel magazines to outlast the stiff competition with Dutch private publishers and the Dutch colonial agency Balai Poestaka. The format reached high circulation figures in Java and Sumatra alike. Some of the Sino-Malay *roman madjalah* are known to have reached a circulation of 10,000 copies, and Joesoef Sou'yb speaks of 2,000 to 3,000 copies that sold during the first two months after the *Doenia Pengalaman* series first appeared in 1939; the number soon climbed to 18,000 copies per edition (Sou'yb 1984: 3).

By then, even the largest Islamic publisher and distributor in colonial Indonesia at the time, *Boekhandel Islamijah*, had adjusted its publishing policy to the predominant literary taste and was publishing popular literature based on Western models but informed by Islamic principles.[25] The Acehnese publisher T. A. Hasan, too, declared as his objective the publishing of novels that were "based on and dealing with Islam, since in Indonesian Islamic literature there are only a very few beautiful and appealing Islamic novels. Their number can be counted on the fingers of one hand"[26]. In contrast to other publishers, Hasan decided against publishing novels in the *roman picisan* format, even though that meant losing out on a steady readership guaranteed by the subscription system. Instead, he relied on the readers for support, pleading with them to buy the books, if possible right after publication. However, there was a preponderance of publishers that did not take that risk and who launched their novels as *roman picisan* in handy 'pocket size' (Sou'yb 1984: 1).

This new mode of literature production and distribution produced a demand in authors who could produce novels according to such tight prescriptions within a month or even a fortnight; some authors in fact produced four to five novels per month – and had to do so in order to make a living.[27] This large quantity of novels, until then unknown to the Sumatran book market, soon led to the accusation that publishers were swamping the market with cheap *ai lap joe* and crime novels. During the Medan debate the successful authors Sou'yb and Djaja became the target of severe criticism from fellow debaters who, pointing to the production of "Western-oriented novels of pure fantasy" accused them of a preoccupation with the profit motive and false nationalism.[28] A closer look at the text material under siege, however, reveals that

> [...] while such *roman picisan* may not deal directly with the issues of colonialism and imperialism as ideologies, they do manifest the concrete realities of politics through their fictional portrayals, with satirical twists, of spies and secret police, and of the nationalists' loves, friendships, and betrayals. 'Politics' in *roman picisan* means trickery and

[25] See also Hamka (1940, II: 89) who gives as one example Matu Mona's popular novel *Spionnage dienst* the second edition of which had been brought out by *Islamijah*.

[26] "*bahwa kami bertjita-tjita akan melandjoetkan menerbitkan boekoe-boekoe tjerita roman jg. bertendenzkan agama Islam, sebab memang sesoenggoehnja didalam perpoestakaan Islam Indonesia masih sangat sedikit boekoe roman Islam jang indah dan menarik hati, sedangkan djoemlahnjapoen masih dapat dihitoeng dengan djari sebelah tangan sadja*" (Hasan 1939: 4) .

[27] See Djaja (1955: 210) and also Hamka on the production modalities (1940, II: 88). Successful titles and those promising to sell well were sometimes published in proper book form as well as in the *roman picisan* format.

[28] Djambek 1940: 66, see also Hamid 1939. The latter introduced the image of the *bandjir roman* (flood of novels) to the discussion. The picture of a 'flood' of Malay (popular) novels was probably coined in an article that appeared in the Medan based periodical *Pewarta Deli* on 16.11.1938. In February 1939, the Balai Poestaka journal *Pedoman Pembatja* (Readers' Guide) picked up the criticism in an article entitled *Tanggoeng Djawab Penerbit* (Responsibility of the publisher; 1939: 3-5). Staying faithful to its policy of avoiding direct and open criticism and expressing critique only obliquely through publications in the indigenous press, Balai Poestaka exploited the above-mentioned article to express its discomfort with the increasing number of popular novels, conventionally linking quantity to quality.

> disguise, evasion of enemy tails, the transportation of secret documents, defamation and slander, separation and escape, and finally rescue (Oshikawa 1990: 20).

And a small group of *roman picisan* authors – one of them undisputedly Sou'yb – actually made outstanding use of the genre's inherent structural and narrative possibilities to convey their views on and visions of society. Some of these views and visions were nationalist, some had a socialist tint, but none was palpably Islamic. Sharing the assessment that the Islamic world needed reformation, the writers Yoesoef Sou'yb and Tamar Djaja nonetheless took a diverging position on the novel and its function in society. In their mind it was not exclusively the propagation of Islam that was the mission of the Indonesian writer but rather, the modernist and nationalist project. Here too, their first emphasis was on social justice. Possibly in part a gesture of defence, they both contended that their novels were not the product of fantasy but that they did depict reality – a reality in a society which, unfortunately, was far from being beautiful or pleasant all the time, but which sometimes could be shockingly violent. The authors' task and their aim, Sou'yb comments almost philosophically, were precisely to "narrate a society" (*men"dongeng"kan satu masjarakat*, 1939a: 981).

The almost programmatic titles of the *roman picisan* support the contention that it was not mere economic considerations or even the profit motive that inspired the publishers and authors to produce this kind of 'mass literature' in Malay. The titles, all expressions of the social commitment which underlay the genre of pulp fiction in its Malay variation, were carefully chosen and discussed with the readers.[29] A close analysis of the stories sustains the publishers' and authors' assertions that their purpose (and actually task and responsibility) was to contribute to the development of modern Indonesian literature and modern Indonesian society. In June 1939, one of the *roman picisan* editors even tagged their publishing activities as an "endeavour in the field of art that enriches our library and which makes our literature more valuable – it is an endeavour in one aspect of the glory and the rise of our people"[30]. Another quote quietly invalidates the argument of the profit motive that was used against the publishers, indicating a climate of solidarity and non-competitiveness among the Sumatran Islamic publishers. In December 1939, the readers of *Pedoman Masjarakat* found the following encouraging words addressed to the editor and staff of the newly published novel magazine *Loekisan Poedjangga*:

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[29] Examples are *Loekisan Poedjangga* (Painting by the poet; Medan, Tjerdas), edited by Yoesoef Sou'yb who published also in *Doenia Pengalaman* (World of experience; Medan, Poestaka Islam) edited by A.M. Pamoentjak and Aria Diningrat, as well as in *Roman Pergaoelan* (Novel of society; Bukittinggi, Penjiaran Ilmoe) edited by Tamar Djaja. During the Medan debate on the novel, Djaja points to the Malay meaning of the word 'roman', which is 'form/structure' and accordingly translates the title of *Roman Pergaoelan* as 'structure of society' ([Djaja] 1939: 1001).

[30] "*Oesaha ini, dalam lapangan kesenian, memperkaja perpoestakaan, mempertinggi kesoesasteraan kita, salah satoe oepaja dalam tjabang kemoeliaan dan kebangkitan bangsa*" (Sou'yb 1939: 4).

> As colleagues, perhaps as an expression of our own excitement [at this new develop-
> ment, D. J.], there is every reason to hope that both the publisher and the editors [of
> *Loekisan Poedjangga*, D. J.] will steadily maintain the noble aim of the journal, that is: to
> present stories that have a message/purpose (*tendenz*) and a goal that contributes to
> the awareness and education of our people. Welcome and … happy and successful
> working![31]

It was this kind of proclamation rather than the alleged triviality or economic orienta-
tion of the magazines that raised the anger of the Dutch colonial authorities in Batavia.
In a couple of articles planted in its own periodicals the colonial agency Balai Poestaka
voiced its annoyance:

> Our astonishment reached its climax when reading the "Foreword" of a recent detect-
> ive story written by one of the young authors. In that "Foreword" the impression is
> created that the book was written purely out of the desire to develop [high] literature
> and to participate in the birth of a new age, an age of awakening. After reading that
> foreword we almost felt like verbally abusing all young authors and praising the old
> generation to the skies. If such a detective story is perceived as a sample of [high] lit-
> erature that will further the people's progress … oh dear![32]

The literary activities of the Sumatran intellectuals had certainly been spurred by both
the Sino-Malay authors and those who, like Alisjahbana and Sanusi Pané, also published
articles on literary criticism in the periodicals brought out by the colonial institution,
Balai Poestaka, in Batavia throughout the 1930s. From 1932 onwards, Balai Poestaka
had even provided a regular column, *Memadjoekan Kesoesastraan* (advancing literature) for
literary criticism. A year later, Alisjahbana and Pané together with a small group of in-
tellectuals founded the 'independent' literary journal *Poedjangga Baroe* (new poet), an in-
digenous forum for literary debates held in the Western style.[33] Both Balai Poestaka and
the *Poedjangga Baroe* group as much provoked as stimulated the literary scene that
emerged in Sumatra around 1937.[34] In her study of the *roman picisan* Faizah Rivai (1963:

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[31] "*Sebagai kollega, barangkali dalam keadaan menoendjoekkan kegirangan itoe, tidak salahnja kita mengharapkan, soepaja
baik penerbit, maoepoen pemimpinnja, tetap mendjaga toedjoeannja jang soetji, jaitoe mehidangkan tjerita2 jang mengandoeng
tendenz dan toedjoean oentoek kesedaran dan pendidikan ra'jat. 'Selamat datang, dan … selamat bekerdja!'*" (Resensi Loe-
kisan Poedjangga 1939: 995)

[32] "*Keheranan kami sampai kepoentjaknja, waktoe membatja 'Pemboeka Kata' salah satoe boekoe tjeritera detectief jang ba-
roe terbit, jang dikarang oleh salah seorang pengarang moeda. Dalam 'Pemboeka Kata' itoe, digambarkannja seolah-olah boe-
koe itoe dikarangnja semata-mata karena hendak mengembangkan kesoesasteraan, karena hendak toeroet membangkitkan
zaman baroe, zaman kebangoenan. Hampir sadja kita hendak memaki-maki semoea pengarang moeda dan hampir kita soeka
melamboengkan angkatan toea, sehabis membatja kata pendahoeloean itoe. Kalau tjeritera detectief jang demikian dipandang
sebagai boeah kesoesasteraan jang akan memadjoekan bangsa, amboi!*" (Oedara Baroe di Medan 1939, I: 1824).

[33] On Poedjangga Baroe see Foulcher's enlightening study (1980).

[34] In his poem *Poedjangga Islam*, Rasjied (1937: 17) explicitly refers to *Madah Kelana* by Sanoesi Pané, one of the
most prominent representatives of the *Poedjangga Baroe* group. Rasjied almost desperately cries out for an Isla-
mic equivalent of 'Poedjangga Baroe'. In June 1937, an article on Sumatran literature entitled *Poedjangga Baroe*
apparently saw itself as a direct reaction to the literary group in Java (*Pedoman Masjarakat* 1937: 490), and in
his article *Kesoesastraan dalam Semangat Indonesia-Baroe* (1937: 957), the highly regarded Sumatran writer Matu
Mona explicitly praises *Poedjangga Baroe*.

74-76) shows convincingly the strong desire of the Sumatran Malay writers to attract the attention of *Poedjangga Baroe* authors like Armijn Pané. But soon Islamic voices demanded a more critical and Eastern-oriented approach to literature and culture than the one advocated by *Poedjangga Baroe*. *Poedjangga Baroe* authors were still acknowledged as young writers who "*membawa aliran baroe*" (brought about a new current; M. Amir 1940: 25). Western concepts and terms of literary theory such as *l'art pour l'art* or *Tendenzroman*, introduced by the *Poedjangga Baroe* group to colonial Indonesia, were adopted unquestioned and employed in the debates. But among Islamic writers, references to Western culture and literature came to be a way of drawing attention to indigenous culture and literature, demarcating and upgrading the Self against the Other:

> If someone like *Goethe* received his inspiration for the 'Westöstlichen Diwan' from the East and someone like *Dante* drew the inspiration for his 'Divina Comoedia' from the [Islamic] tale *mi'radj*, how good and appropriate it would be if Islamic writers were also to search for sources closer by – and more in tune with our way of life as Muslims![35]

As Kratz (1986: 64) has commented, it "seems that religion played a part in the conceptual discussion of modern Indonesian literature for the first time in the late 1930s". This can best be illustrated by the Medan debate on the novel.

Literary Debates and the National Self

On 17 December 1939, a unique gathering took place in the north Sumatran city of Medan: the *Konperensi Roman* (conference on the novel); "A seemingly insignificant event, but of great relevance and impact for the current process of developing the literature of the Indonesian people", as one observer commented in the Islamic periodical *Pedoman Masjarakat* (Compass of Society) three days later.[36] Approximately forty intellectuals had come together to discuss the genre of the novel and its possible effects on Indonesian culture' – something that was still in an embryonic state. The conference was chaired by Adi Negoro, and other famous writers – some of them also prominent religious and political figures – were among the speakers, for instance Matu Mona (Hasbullah Parinduri), Joesoef Sou'yb, Tamar Djaja, Si Oema, Damhoeri, and Hamka. There

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[35] "*Kalau seorang* Goethe *mengambil inspiratie dari Timoer oentoek 'Westöstlichen Diwan'nja, kalau seorang* Dante *mengambil inspiratie dari kissah* mi'radj *oentoek 'Divina Comoedia'nja alangkah baik dan pantas, sekiranja Poedjangga Moeslimin kita mentjari poela soember2 jang lebih dekat, dan jang lebih sesoeai dengan falsafah kehidoepan kita orang Islam!*" (Natsir 1940: 25).

[36] "*Satoe kedjadian jang nampaknja hanja perkara 'ketjil' sadja, akan tetapi amat besar erti dan pengaroehnja didalam kebangoenan kesoesasteraan bangsa Indonesia sekarang*" (Konperensi Roman 1939: 1007). In the course of the debate surrounding the conference it transpired, hardly surprisingly, that in the minds of the Sumatran writers 'Indonesian people' and 'Indonesian nation' read as 'Muslim community' and 'Muslim nation'.

are indications that it was actually Hamka who initiated the conference, though other sources suggest that the initiative came from Adi Negoro.[37] The true stimulus, however, had come from the Islamic school teachers in Medan, who had articulated serious accusations against writers and publishers of the so-called *roman picisan*. The teachers complained that students were neglecting their studies; instead of looking into their textbooks they would spend their nights reading dime novels, with the result that they appeared in class all tired and worn out.[38] The conference was meant to assemble all parties involved in the conflict in order to seek a solution, a consensus in accordance with the Islamic precepts (Sou'yb 1984: 10). The agenda of the meeting indeed focused on items exclusively related to the literary genre of the modern novel, in particular the popular novel. As Hamka stated later, they, the authors of novels, had been asked to desist from producing "scary stories, such as ghost stories", or stories about "maddening magic charms or doctors who steal corpses" and to refrain from employing explicit and violent illustrations, such as that of "a man holding a woman's arm after he had chopped it off with an axe". Any such attempt to attract people's attention without considering the general consequences was to be condemned.[39]

Despite the fact that the conference lasted from eight o'clock in the morning until midnight, only two items of an apparently long list of issues were able to be addressed: 'publication modes' and 'purpose' *tendenz* of the novel'.[40] Again and again the debate returned to the question of the potential benefit or – as some feared – potential harm that the steadily increasing number of novels could exert on the Indonesian people. One crucial result of this conference and the debate surrounding it was therefore the con-

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[37] See Sou'yb (1984: 10). Other participants were M. Yunan Nasution, Hasanoel Arifin, Loetan Gani, Joesoef Hoesin, M. A. Hanafiah Lb., A. W. Rata, Noerdin Soelan, M. Dien Jatim, Mr. Indo, M. Amir, Madong Lubis, T. Z. Anwar. The venue for the gathering was the KIS building of the *Perguruan Nasional* (National Teacher Training Institute). It is known that *Perspoto Abad XX* took pictures and that detailed conference minutes were taken, but both are now likely to be lost for good.

[38] See on this point Joesoef Sou'yb 1984: 9 and Syma Nare 1939: 1016. The latter asks the reader to take into consideration the possibility that maybe it was not the authors of the *roman picisan* who were to blame but the parents who were apparently neglecting their parental responsibilities.

[39] "*Ada jang meminta soepaja djika mengarang hikajat2 itoe, djangan memboeat tjeritera2 jang menakoetkan, sebagai tjeritera Hantoe. Dokter pentjoeri majat, Sidjoendai dan menjiarkan orang jang memegang tangan perempoean jang soedah dikeping-ke-pingnja dengan kapak, djangan hanja memikirkan oentoek menarik mata orang banjak sadja, padahal tidak dipikirkan aki-batnja kepada oemoen*" [Hamka] 1940, II: 88. Hamka is here alluding to the cover of S. Djarens' novel *Taboet* (November 1939), an adaptation of Le Queux's fictionalised rendition of the murderous activities of the infamous Henri Landru.

[40] "*fasal **penerbitan** dan **tendenz** roman,*" (Syma Nare 1939: 1015, emphasis orig.). See also the short report "Konperensi Roman" in *Pedoman Masjarakat* (1939: 1007).

sensus that the modern popular novel was compatible with the principles of Islam;[41] and

> the conclusion was drawn that the publication of INDONESIAN novels should not be impeded but increased. The novel is useful for refining the **language, encouraging people to read**, and the tendency (of its contents) has always the nature of PROPAGANDA, SUGGESTING, AND CRITICIZING. Hence, novels like those appearing in great numbers these days are of immense benefit for the Indonesian society, which is still in its initial phase.[42]

The *konperensi roman* was the climax of a broader debate on the modern media that had been taking its course in the reform-oriented journal *Pedoman Masjarakat* since 1938 under the lead of its editor Hamka, and which would loosely continue until the Japanese Occupation in 1942. It was during that debate that the journal set the tone for a culture and literature debate that now began to emphasise more strongly the responsibility that lay with authors and publishers. A catalyser for the debate had been the critical comments on the popular novels which did not only come from the Association of Islamic Teachers in Medan but which were raining down on the young writers from all sections of the Islamic community. Orthodox religious leaders were among their harshest critics. The conservative Muslims condemned in particular the *roman picisan* and accused the genre of sensationalism, excessive violence, permissiveness, and even pornography. Apart from accusations such as these, the progressive Islamic authors were also confronted with the firm conviction that modern literature generally did not fulfil any justifiable function, being a product of fantasy and in the main designed only to entertain. In the opinion of orthodox Muslims, this 'kind of literature' instigated trouble and was a source of harm, for it distracted and led into idleness. As early as October 1936, a certain Hoesein Moenaf formulated one such complaint in *Pedoman Masjarakat* when elaborating on his view of the purpose of language in society. In the last of the three parts of his essay, he goes as far as predicting the humiliating end of the rich and shining Western civilization brought about by the Western *roman tjaboel* (trash literature) for this dangerous literature "*memboetakan hati*" and "*menidoerkan semangat dan membimbangkan hati dari langkah kehidoepan jang moelia*" (blinds the heart, lulls the spirit and diverts one's heart from the path of a noble life; Moenaf 1936: 715).

In May 1938, Syma Nare made use of his column *Podjok Keramat* (sacred corner) to give vent to his anger about what he called "*boekoe-boekoe tjaboel*" (trashy books). Surprisingly,

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[41] "*Roman termasoek kesenian, kesenian ertinja keindahan, Allah soeka akan keindahan, asal sadja keindahan itoe tidak melanggar akan perintah agama*" (The novel is art, art means beauty, and Allah likes beauty, provided that this beauty does not breach any religious precepts; [Hamka] 1940, I: 66).

[42] "*didapatlah kesimpoelan, bahasa penerbitan roman INDONESIA, tidak mestinja dihalangi tetapi haroes ditambah. Roman berfaedah oentoek memperhaloes **bahasa, menagihkan orang membatja**, dan tendenz (isi)nja senantiasa bersifat PROPAGANDA, MEANDJOERAN, DAN MENGKERITIK. Maka roman sematjam jang banjak terbit sekarang, besar faedahnja bagi masjarakat Indonesia jang masih dalam pase permoelaan ini*" ([Djaja] 1939: 1-2, emphasis orig.).

he falls back on the colonial apparatus in his appeal for help. Trashy books, Nare maintains, not only undermine morality but also violate the (colonial) law, which, in paragraph 533, forbids the publication and distribution of texts that could stimulate the sensuality of the youth ("*de inhoud geschikt is om de zinnelijkheid van de jeugd te prikkelen*"). The author calls upon the press and the book market to close ranks with the colonial police force in the fight against 'trash literature', in order to prevent "this land from becoming the Hollywood of the East" ("*soepaja negeri ini kelak 'nggk djadi 'Hollywood of the East'*").[43]

By 1939, Medan had not become the 'Hollywood of the East' but the 'centre of pulp fiction' – and it was even exporting its popular novels to Java.[44] It was in that year that Hamka stated:

> Not long ago, only two years perhaps, one would have said that Medan was the centre of the Islamic movement and spirit. How much joy did that bring us! But now people say outright that Medan has become the centre of the novel.[45]

More negative response came from Java, this time from the journal *Adil* (Just), based in Solo.[46] It, too, launched an attack on the Sumatran *roman picisan*, focusing its criticism on the novel *Rahasia patoeng Attaturk* published by *Moestika Alhambra* in Medan. The bone of contention was not the novel itself but the cover page: the statue of a nude woman was taken as evidence for the drastic moral decline in Medan.[47] Ultimately, political celebrities like Muhammad Hatta and Sutan Sjahrir themselves intervened in this debate on the novel. Ironically, the Islamic circles condemned the Medan popular literature and its 'moral inadequacy' even more fiercely than the Dutch colonial authorities in Batavia who, as mentioned above, reacted in a paternalistic, complacent manner in the second half of 1939. Faced with such massive protest from all sides and after an intense discussion of the subject matter with his fellow authors, Hamka made an appeal for more critical self-reflection at the end of the debate:

> People have given us their advice. What is the point of taking it the wrong way? When *Pandji Poestaka* offers advice; it is appropriate for us to accuse it of speaking for the government! But should we not take seriously Drs. Mohammad Hatta's letters, ad-

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[43] All quotes in this paragraph are taken from Nare 1938: 400.

[44] The Javanese market was 'infiltrated' with help of the network provided by the Islamic sociocultural organisation *Muhammadyah*.

[45] "*Beloem lama, baroe 2 tahoen jang laloe, orang katakan poesat pergerakan dan semangat Islam terletak di Medan, alangkah besarnja ni'mat jang kita terima lantaran itoe. Tetapi sekarang hening perkataan itoe dari moeloet orang, melainkan bertoekar bahwa poesat 'roman' ialah di Medan!*" [Hamka] (1940, II: 88).

[46] This article is often cited in publications of the Sumatran press around 1938/39. Unfortunately, it has not yet been possible to obtain a copy of it; therefore I have to rely on secondary sources for information on its content.

[47] See Syma Nare 1939: 1016. Apparently there had been various complaints about scantily-dressed women on book covers. For Hamka later made the appeal to his fellow writers and publishers to desist from placing illustrations that showed, for instance, Balinese women with uncovered breast or nude women from Papua ([Hamka] 1940, II: 88).

dressed to his friends and criticizing the current form of the novel, as well as St. Sjahrir's review of a book about the life-story of a spy? Almost everyone, the leaders of our people (Drs. Mohd. Hatta, Sjahrir), the Islamic leaders (M. Natsir and Ghaffar Isma'il), teachers (Sa'doeddin Djambek) blames us, not the novels, but the stance that we have adopted. Hence, it is our responsibility now to respond and to fend off these accusations, or should we be examining ourselves carefully in order to find our short-comings?[48]

Hamka's voice weighed strongly in this climate of debate, for it belonged not only to one of the most respected religious leaders but also to one of the most successful writers of (popular) novels in Sumatra and beyond. During the Medan debate on the novel, which was actually a series of articles that appeared in *Pedoman Masjarakat* between 1938 and 1940,[49] Hamka was the guiding and coordinating force who encouraged the Sumatran Islamic intellectuals not only to do their best to answer to the negative critique they had provoked but also to define their own position in relation to a future nation of Indonesia. Seeking the dialogue with one another, the Islamic writers, publishers, (religious) teachers, and journalists exchanged their views on the relevance of film, radio and, most prominently, the novel in the context of the Islamic community in the Netherlands East Indies and beyond. Their debate seemingly revolved around two central questions. Firstly, should Islam allow or at least tolerate the publication of (popular) novels and, if so, what form should they take? Secondly, could (or even should) the religious leaders take part in shaping this new genre in order to use it as a vehicle to propagate Islam? But, as outlined earlier, this debate on the novel was, in turn, embedded in the still broader discourse on cultural identity and the construction of a modern Self, one of the most momentous projects of the time: "[d]ebating literature is clearing a path towards a form and style of our own, one that can be said to be our own creation"[50]. It is this search for a self-defined modern Self that almost inevitably brought into the debate on the novel also the 'Foreign Other', personified by the Balai Poestaka employees, and the 'Other Within', the Chinese and *peranakan* Chinese and their own literary production.

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[48] "*Dinasehati orang kita, apa goena kita salah terima? Pandji Poestaka menoenjoekkan djalan, boleh kita toedoeh bahwa soeara itoe berbaoe pemerintah! Tetapi soerat2 Drs. Moehammad Hatta kepada teman-temannja mengeritik roman model se-karang, lalu resensi St.Sjahrir atas satoe boekoe riwajat spion, tidakkah semoeanja itoe patoet kita perhatikan? Hampir se-moeanja serentak, pemimpin2 bangsa (Drs. Mohd. Hatta, Sjarir), pemimpin Islam (M. Natsir dan Ghaffar Isma'il), pendi-dik (Sa'doeddin Djambek) menjalahkan kita, boekan menjalahkan roman, tetapi menjalahkan sikap jang telah kita laloei. Maka mendjawab atau menangkis segala serangan itoekah sekarang kewadjiban kita, atau menilik diri sendiri dimanakah kekoerangannja?*" [Hamka] 1940, II: 88. A few lines further below, Hamka strongly suggests that they all should express their gratitude to all sides that have forwarded critical comments, including the Dutch-colonial journal *Pandji Poestaka*.

[49] On 31.01.1940, Hamka formally closed the discussion with a two-part conclusion. The debate retained some regional relevance until after independence, as the repeated republication of almost all the contributions in a booklet by Rashid proves; the eighth edition appeared in 1951.

[50] "*Membitjaranja tentang kesoesastraan adalah kita masa ini sedang merintis djalan mentjari-tjari roepa dan bentoek kita sendiri, jang boleh dikatakan **tjiptaan** kita*" (Matu Mona, 1937: 957, emphasis orig.).

The paternalistic arrogance of Balai Poestaka met with surprisingly little opposition, even as the impact of the West was seen more and more negatively. A possible explanation could be Balai Poestaka's successful policy of incorporating indigenous authors, preferably those who were also politically active. Indeed, some of the young Islamic Sumatran writers in question published novels with the colonial agency – and proudly so! That was in all probability because Balai Poestaka guaranteed good production conditions, decent payments, and wide distribution channels for their publications. But the Sumatran Islamic intellectuals also admired the colonial agency Balai Poestaka for its language policy and its book publication and distribution activities. The fact that Balai Poestaka had published some works of Islamic authors despite its policy of rejecting anything remotely connected with religion filled them with pride and contentment ([Hamka] 1938: 1033).

Yet, it is bewildering how willingly critical comments and advice coming from the Dutch colonial power were received and even heeded in Medan. In his contribution to the debate on the novel, Riphat S. almost apologetically writes:

> We feel ashamed towards the outside world, the world that continuously follows our activities in the literary arena, such as happened recently when Balai Poestaka felt compelled to throw biting criticism in the face of our writers and publishers in Medan, criticism that under close inspection is at least in some respects appropriate (1940: 47).[51]

Another contributor, Sa'doe'ddin Djambek, lines up with the Dutch in criticising the practice of placing patriotic and philosophical terminology in advertisements for popular novels. He finds that such terminology is too readily applied, in particular when taking into account that the much vaunted literary product was put together under the hastiest of circumstances (1940: 64). Many authors explicitly argue along the line of the criticism put forward by the Dutch, when urging for a reduction in the instances of passion and crime in their literature. And almost all of them generally concede that the quality of their *roman picisan* is still to be improved.

The Islamic writers were apparently also in agreement with the Dutch on another aspect as well: their 'reservations' about the Chinese.[52] While the Dutch were subdued but rather unambiguous in their dislike of the Chinese and Sino-Malay literature, the Sumatran Malay authors expressed strong feelings of competitiveness, aversion, and admiration, all at the same time. Most of them were well acquainted with Sino-Malay literature, some even learnt their skill or improved their writing by way of working for Sino-Malay

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[51] "*Maloe kita kepada doenia loear, kepada doenia jang senantiasa menoeroeti sepak-terdjang kita dalam gelanggang karang-mengarang, seperti kedjadian baroe2 ini sampai Balai Poestakapoen terpaksa melemparkan critiek2 jang pedas2 kepada pengarang dan penerbit kita di Medan, critiek mana bila diperhatikan benar2 memang dalam beberapa hal ada pada tempatnja*".

[52] A couple of Balai Poestaka book publications, but primarily advertisements, illustrations, and cartoons reveal the prejudiced and degrading attitude towards the Chinese fostered by at least a number of high-ranked Balai Poestaka employees – both Dutch and Indonesian.

publishers.[53] Some of the Islamic periodicals of the time regularly (and in most cases favourably) reviewed Sino-Malay novels.

> When observing the progress we have made in our writing here in Medan we earnestly hope that we will be able to reach the same standard as the Sino-Malay writers. We should not feel reluctant to admit their superiority. Not only did they begin before we did, their knowledge of literature is also greater than ours (Riphat S. 1940: 48).[54]

Tamar Djaja, among others, does not share this admiration, even though he circumvents the discussion of the literary value of Sino-Malay literature. Instead he attacks the *peranakan* Chinese on the linguistic plane,[55] maintaining that they, the Islamic Sumatran writers, have supplanted the predominant but 'ugly' Sino-Malay variant of Malay and successfully replaced it with their own beautiful, rich, and well-structured variant – which, in addition, he describes as being close to the one championed by the Dutch (1939: 1001). Their own Malay, Djaja asserts, is more standardised and orderly – albeit less 'spicy' – than the Sino-Malay variant, but the public has grown fond exactly of this "fine, smooth, sweet" (*halus lemak manis*) Balai Poestaka Malay, strongly resembling the Minang Malay of most of the Sumatran Islamic writers. The Medan authors celebrated their 'triumph' over the *peranakan* Chinese not only in linguistic terms but ultimately also in terms of conquered literary territory:

> One victory that we have achieved, according to Hasanoel Arifien in this meeting of writers, is to move the literary world away from the Chinese Malay writers into our hands. Twenty years ago, the world of the Chinese novel had already been set in motion; they were faster than we were, said Riphat. It was twenty years ago that Chinese writers such as Lie Kim Hok were already translating works by Alexander Dumas, Victor Hugo and others into Sino-Malay. Then Balai Poestaka appeared, and now, finally, young writers from all over Indonsia have emerged into the arena, especially in Medan![56] ([Hamka] 1940, I: 67)

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[53] Hamka and Joesoef Sou'yb are known to have read Sino-Malay novels (Riphat S. 1940: 47). Sou'yb also translated and wrote for the Sino-Malay *Liberty*.

[54] "*Menilik kemadjoean kita dalam soal karang-mengarang di Medan adalah harapan besar kita bisa mendapat peil kedoekoekan sama tinggi dengan jang ditempati oleh pengarang2 Melajoe-Tionghoa dewasa ini. Kita tidak oesah merasa segan boeat mengakoei kelebihan mereka itoe. Selain mereka lebih doeloe berdjalan dari kita, poen djoega ilmoe kesoesasteraan mereka lebih tinggi*".

[55] As early as January 1936, Hamka was lamenting the fact that the Malay language had been corrupted by Arabic, with the result that "the language now used in the prayer-house was as strange as the Sino-Malay language used by the press nowadays" (*bahasa jang dipakai disoerau itoe, bahasa jang gandjil sendiri sebagaimana gandjilnja bahasa Tionghoa-Melajoe didengar Pers pada hari ini*; 32). Pleading for a standardisation of the Indonesian (!) language and its spelling, Or. Mandank, too, complains about the *kekatjauan* (chaos) of the language, berating the *peranakan* Chinese for the fact that the spelling in *bahasa Melayoe* was most likely "not much more precise and definite than the spelling in Chinese Indonesian" (*tiadalah djaoeh lebih tetap dan berketentoean dari pada edjaan didalam bahasa Indonesia-Tionghoa*; 1936: 452). He unambiguously refers to *bahasa Melajoe* as the future national language, albeit still in progress; and he excludes the *peranakan* Chinese from this part of the nation building process by treating their variant of Malay as a language subordinated to arbitrary individual usage beyond standardisation. The latter he defines as an essential element of the national language – and, in fact, of a national culture (ibid).

Competing in the field of literature and language apparently stood for contending for the right to define Indonesia's 'national' cultural identity. Sumatran Malay intellectuals undoubtedly anticipated the future national identity as being Islamic Malay (the term Malay was already broadly used as synonym for Muslim). Representing the 'Other Within', the Chinese and Chinese Malay were quite openly excluded from the national project[57] – in total disregard of the fact that both groups were faced with the same eminent issues. The *peranakan* Chinese and the Islamic Malay literary and journalistic publications quite clearly point to very similar discourses; both groups made an apparent distinction between positive modernity ('progress', technology, education) and negative modernity (westernisation, alienation, mimic identities, decadence). Both sides were deeply concerned about the integrity of their people, primarily their women and children, under Western influence, and both sides warned about Western capitalistic structures corrupting the integrity of their society. But both groups also aspired to a role in the imagined 'global community' (the keyword in this context is 'civilising'; and both used the same term for it: *menyopankan manusia*). Yet, modernity did not unite them; neither did nationalism.

Conclusion

In the end all participants in the Medan debate agreed that the novel, in particular the popular novel, had come to stay, and that Islam therefore should not ban but embrace, improve and make use of it.

> Story-telling cannot be prevented, so if in our community anyone's urge to write, be it an ulama, a writer, or just any random person who feels the wish to write, is thwarted, then the world of the novel will be populated with characters that either do not pursue the same aim as we do or who are of an immoral nature. As a result our people will be led astray – and will be the ones to suffer.[58]

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[56] "*Satoe kemenangan jang telah diperdapat, menoeroet toean Hasanoel Arifien didalam pertemoean pengarang itoe tempo hari, ialah pindahnja doenia kesoesteraan daripada pengarang2 Tionghoa Melajoe ketangan pengarang2 kita. 20 tahoen jang laloe doenia roman Tionghoa telah bangoen, dia lebih dahoeloe dari kita, kata toean Riphat. 20 Tahoen jang telah laloe karangan2 Alexander Dumas, karangan Victor Hugo dan lain2 telah diterdjemahkan kedalam bahasa Melajoe Tionghoa oleh pengarang Tionghoa sebagai Lim Kim Hok. Kemoedian itoe tampillah Balai Poestaka, dan achir2 ini timboel dalam kalangan pengarang2 moeda diseloeroeh Indonesia, teroetama di Medan!*"

[57] Data and research are not yet sufficiently available to give a reliable assessment of how the minority of Chinese Moslem was perceived at the time. It seems, however, that, by converting to Islam, Chinese decreased their 'Otherness' and appeared more acceptable and respectable also to the circle of Moslem intellectuals.

[58] "*Kalau karangan Oelama, atau karangan poedjangga, atau karangan orang jang hendak 'memoedjangga' dalam kalangan kita distop, padahal hikajat itoe tidak dapat distop, tentoelah doenia roman akan dimasoeki oleh orang jang tidak setoedjoean dengan kita, atau orang rendah boedi pekertinja sehingga ra'jat kita mendjadi sesat, roeginjapoen poenanglah kepada kepada ra'jat*" ([Hamka] 1940, I: 67).

From 1940 onwards and evidently as a result of the Medan debate on the novel, the majority of Sumatran Islamic novels decided in favour of a more 'Islamic' appearance and content. Some of the writers, however, seem to have adopted the 'new image' to camouflage their formula of crime and passion, which had proven successful – possibly out of disagreement with the 'new policy' and a 'consensus' that they only half-heartedly supported?

In summary, the Medan debate appears to have self-reflectively revolved around the literary activities of the Sumatran Islamic writers. However, the overview of the debate presented in this article has shown that the core of the debate exceeded the boundaries of a mere literary dispute and that more was at stake than just the acceptance or condemnation of a new genre in the modern media landscape. The debate on the novel, embedded in broader discourses, significantly contributed to the national project and the delineation of a decolonised modern Self, one that was distinct from the Other but at the same time emulating its achievements in certain key respects.

The very existence of the *roman picisan* has to be seen in close correlation with the modernisation processes of the late colonial period and the nationalist movement that was one expression of them. Authors perceived themselves to be part of the elite that would be guiding the Indonesian people, not with *tabligh* (sermons) and not with prayers like the *ulama*, but with their novels (Hamid 1939: 960-61). The image of the "novel-humming *ulama*" as a sign of the modern age, coined ironically by a contributor to the Medan debate in 1939, encapsulates the dilemma that the Islamic community faced at the time: religious dogma and conservatism versus modernisation and nationalism. Western notions of 'nation' and 'nationhood' prescribed a national culture, a national literature, a national language. Ironically, it was also a Western medium that provided one of the most powerful vehicles in the struggle for literary and linguistic hegemony: the novel. This contested genre allowed the young Islamic writers in Sumatra – and elsewhere in the Netherlands East Indies – to render their 'narration of a nation'. Their novels created meaning and identity in the modern world.

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V

Beyond Indonesia

(Dis-)Connected History

The Indonesia-Malaysia Relationship

Frederik Holst

The development of relations between Indonesia and Malaysia has gone through a number of stages oscillating from a common feeling of belonging and mutual cooperation to outright hostility or indifference. Analysing those relations therefore requires dissecting a conglomerate of different perspectives, especially those of locality and time. They need to be examined to understand why and how these two nations that laid their foundations on the same cultural *Nusantara* (archipelago) heritage have developed such differing relations towards each other in the past. The present of this relationship is inextricably connected to this past, but there have also been – and still are – tendencies to eradicate or disconnect these linkages for a number of reasons.

This article will look at certain key events in the Indonesia-Malaysia relationship that were defining for the development of these two countries and show how and why political actors proceeded in a way that alienated the two peoples continuously.

Research in this field certainly needs to be given more consideration, especially because history has been 'interpreted' by both governments according to their political interests, focussing more on separating rather than connecting viewpoints. In-depth work has been done on conflicts between the two states like *konfrontasi* (confrontation) in the 1960s (Poulgrain 1998, Mackie 1974) and similarly on the influence of Indonesia's *reformasi* (reformation) movement on Malaysia's corresponding developments (Weiss 2006: 192-239, Heryanto and Mandal 2003). But more encompassing views on this special relationship which also take pre-independence into account are scarcely found. Noor (2002, 2005) has been offering interesting perspectives on why this chapter of history for example has been blacked out in Malaysia's 'official' history, whereas Liow (2005) has contributed a comprehensive analysis of the politics of Indonesia-Malaysia relations up to present times.

Pre-Independence

Historical linkages between what are now Indonesia and Malaysia stretch back several hundred years[1] in which the kingdoms of Srivijaya and Majapahit, the Sultanate of Malacca, the Minangkabau and the Bugis controlled the archipelago. Culture, religion and trade were further strengthening ties between the people of *Nusantara*. With the installation of colonial regimes by the Portuguese, the Dutch and later the British, boundaries and systems of control were created that effectively weakened intra-regional cooperation. Any kind of rebellion or resistance – be it political or economical – was met with retaliation, as could be seen in the Java War, the Aceh War and the Mat Salleh Rebellion in Borneo. Although local leaders like Diponegoro and Mat Salleh enjoyed widespread support locally, their influence on a larger scale remained constrained.

Apart from military and economic force, the British and the Dutch used treaties as a means for securing colonial spheres of influence and consolidating power, thus further tearing apart grown structures: The Anglo-Dutch Treaty of 1824 effectively divided the Malay world into two parts by ending Dutch influence in Malaya, leaving all options open for the British, while the Dutch regained Java after losing it in the course of the Anglo-Dutch Java War in 1811.

In the Burney Treaty of 1826 the British East India Company acknowledged Siam's claim over the Malay states of Kedah, Pattani, Kelantan and Terengganu in order to secure their position in Penang and unhindered trade with Kelantan and Terengganu. In 1909, the Anglo-Siamese Treaty led to another dissection by bringing Perlis, Kedah, Kelantan and Terengganu also under British control while leaving Northern Malaya, comprising Pattani, Narathiwat (Menara), Songkhla (Singgora), Satun (Setul) and Yala (Jala), to Siam. Local rulers of those states were not represented in these negotiations and present-day state boundaries were formed largely due to these colonial treaties.

Resistance against the colonialists was further weakened by embedding local rulers into the colonial administration. Although different in their enforcement, systems of indirect control were established by both the British and the Dutch and used effectively to rule their colonial territories. The aristocratic class, for example the Sultans in Malaya or the *priyayi* in Java, still held nominal power to a certain extent but despite their traditional prestige they were seen more and more as vassals, especially in Indonesia (Kubitscheck and Wessel 1981: 120). The British system of installing a 'resident' with the local sultans, starting from 1874 with the Pangkor-Treaty, still left the sultans with enough grandeur to ensure their loyalty towards the British, so that no real challenge occurred.

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[1] Yamin (1958) cites the colours red and white as one example for a common cultural heritage which were revered by inhabitants of the archipelago since around 4,000-6,000 B.C. These colours can still be found in the flags of Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore.

In both systems, the 'dirty work' on the ground level was left to locals, so that they themselves had to sort out any disaffection.

The development of nationalistic movements was also hindered by these circumstances. Although groups like Budi Utomo (1908), Sarekat Islam (1911), Partai Nasionalis Indonesia (PNI, founded 1927 by Sukarno) or Kesatuan Melayu Muda (1938) among others were active before World War II, it was the victory of the Japanese over European colonial powers that signified a turning point in the struggle for independence. And it was then that in both colonies a future independent state comprising Malaya and Indonesia came into perspective. Despite their fighting against colonial powers, most of the future leaders in Indonesia and Malaysia had received a western-style education (Wessel 2005: 7; Noor 2004: 31), either overseas or at home, for example at the British-led Sultan Idris Training College (SITC) in Malaysia (Roff 1967: 144).

In Indonesia, the Japanese organised a committee for the preparation for Indonesian Independence, the Badan Penyelidik Usaha Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia (BPUPKI), which included future leaders of independent Indonesia, like Sukarno, Hatta and Yamin.

Although it was not clear from the beginning whether an attempt would be made to include Malaya into the future Indonesian republic, a strong commitment developed during the negotiations in July 1945: in the second session on 11 July 1945, a majority of 45^2 out of 66 members voted for a territorial definition that would include the Malay Peninsular in the newly formed nation (Yamin 1959: 214) if the people of Malaya would be willing to join. For Sukarno security reasons played a major role and he argued that Indonesia would not be safe if the whole Straits of Malacca were not under the complete control of Indonesia (Sekretariat Negara 1995: 151). Yamin, one of the strongest supporters of a 'Greater Indonesia', stated that the territory should be determined according to pre-colonial boundaries, for example the kingdom of Majapahit (ibid: 55f), and cited also geopolitical reasons for the inclusion of Malaya (ibid: 136). Hatta, however, was more cautious on this issue. He would have rather seen the people of Malaya independent within a Greater East Asia, but would not have opposed it if there were a united free will to join (ibid: 147).

In Malaya, young Malay radicals of the Kesatuan Melayu Muda (KMM, Young Malay's Union) such as Ibrahim Yaakob, Ahmad Boestamam and Burhanuddin al-Helmy, who had close ties to Indonesian nationalists even to the extent of being members of the PNI (McIntyre 1973: 78), were also aiming to unite the Pan-Malay peoples. In July 1945, Kesatuan Rakyat Indonesia Semenanjung (KERIS, Union of the Indonesian and

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[2] In a number of sources (Jackie et al. 1974) only the 39 members who voted for a territorial definition consisting of the Dutch East Indies, Malaya, Northern Borneo, East Timor and West Papua are mentioned, but with regard to the inclusion of Malaya the six votes for 'Dutch East Indies and Malaya only' should also be taken into account.

Peninsular Peoples) under the leadership of Burhanuddin was founded, and an independent *Nusantara Raya*[3] (Greater Indonesia) seemed to come closer to reality (Noor 2004: 38f), but on 12 August 1945 the Japanese Commander-in-Chief for Southeast-Asia rejected the territorial claims made by the BPUPKI (Dahm 1969: 301). At the subsequent meeting of Ibrahim, Sukarno and Hatta in Taiping plans for a united mother country were still discussed, but the sudden surrender of the Japanese and the return of the British, together with the unilateral declaration of independence of Indonesia on 17 August, forced the Malay nationalists to proceed with their struggle for independence on their own (Cheah 1979: 117).

The Partai Kebangsaan Melayu Malaya (PKMM, Malayan Malay National Party) was founded on the same day that Indonesia declared its independence. Led by Mokhtaruddin Lasso (a former member of the Malayan Communist Party, MCP) and al-Helmy, the party strove for immediate independence from British rule and still envisaged the formation of *Nusantara Raya.*

The First Pan-Malayan Malay Congress on 1-4 March 1946, in which PKMM took part as one of the largest groups, led to the formation of the United Malays Nationalist Organisation (UMNO) on 11 May 1946 which "quickly developed a reputation as a conservative-traditionalist organisation that was feudalistic in character" (Noor 2004: 50). After ideological and personal differences, the left-wing nationalists of PKMM left UMNO during the second UMNO General Assembly (29-30 June 1946) and UMNO soon assumed a dominant position as the main negotiating partner of the British (Noor 2002: 98). The sultans also sided with UMNO rather than the PKMM which had close links with the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) through Boestamam and Yaakob (who was in exile in Indonesia by that time), fearing that they might lose their power in a leftist political environment.

With the departure of PKMM no further attempts for a unified independence were made. The aristocratic-traditional elite of UMNO saw the concepts of *Nusantara Raya* as a challenge to their position and "the subservience of Malay interests to those of a proclaimed egalitarian Indonesia-inspired nationalism, which they felt was a cover for Javanese hegemony" (Liow 2005: 68). The end of the war and UMNO's rise thus dashed all hopes of a pan-Malayan state.

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[3] The terms *Melayu Raya, Malaya Raya, Indonesia Raya* and *Nusantara Raya* all refer roughly to the area of the Southeast Asian Archipelago. Although *Melayu Raya* and *Indonesia Raya* are more commonly used, it is argued by some scholars that it might connote a dominance of one group within the area, thus, in this article, the more neutral – although less commonly found – term *Nusantara Raya* will be used.

Dissent and Conflict

While Indonesia finally gained independence after five years on the battlefield against the Dutch, UMNO negotiated Malaya's independence over the years which was 'delivered on a silver platter' by the British on 31 August 1957 and this turned out to exemplify the position taken in world politics. The directions of the two governments during the Cold War seemed to differ more and more: Indonesia's dominant role in the Bandung Asian-African Conference in 1955 and the developing Non-Aligned Movement strengthened its position in the anti-colonial struggle and it was perceived as a role model by other countries striving for independence. In this context, on the one side, Malaya's subtle support for the South-East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) and its defence agreements with the British were seen as a form of collaboration with its former colonial masters. On the other side, Malaya, heavily fighting communist groups like the MCP during the so-called Emergency, regarded Indonesia's non-aligned stand as bowing to communism and feared to end up in a position where it had to submit to Indonesian dominance.

Despite this, an Indonesia-Malaya Treaty of Friendship was signed on 17 April 1959, the only one of its kind ever ratified by Kuala Lumpur (Liow 2005: 86) and for a short time an even greater entity, the *Maphilindo* confederation, consisting of Malaya, the Philippines and Indonesia, was discussed during the Manila talks in 1963. But just a few months later both countries reached an all-time low in their relationship with each other, during the intermittent war of *konfrontasi*.

The plan to create a new federation of Malaysia incorporating the British colonies in Borneo and Singapore was first brought up officially by Tunku Abdul Rahman, Prime Minister of Malaya, on 27 May 1961. The inclusion of Sabah and Sarawak was important for the UMNO-dominated government under the Tunku to maintain a nationwide *bumiputra* (Malays and other indigenous people) majority, since a union of Malaya and Singapore alone would have resulted in giving the Chinese the upper-hand.

At first, Indonesia was not alarmed by the proposed merger, but Sukarno, portraying himself as a leader of the 'newly emerging forces', saw the new formation as a project of 'neo-colonialist forces' which had to be opposed.

During the Brunei revolt in 1962, the relationship between Malaya and Indonesia were already tense. Indonesia was accused by Malaysia of being involved in the rebellion and as a result Indonesian Foreign Minister Subandrio announced "a policy of confrontation" against Malaysia. The Manila talks led to a short-term lowering of tensions, but when Malaysia was finally formed on 16 September 1963, while a referendum in Northern Borneo as agreed during the Manila talks was still to be held, the stage for a larger-scale confrontation was set. The next day Malaysia broke off diplomatic ties with Indonesia and the Philippines for not recognising Sabah and Sarawak as part of its territ-

ory and a month later Sukarno coined the term *ganjang Malaysia*. Often translated in an outright hostile way as 'crush Malaysia', Poulgrain (1998: 9) points out that "the word *ganjang* implied a degree of hostility, yet the inherent oral emphasis [of *ganjang* meaning 'to devour'] was indicative more of characteristic presidential banter than any *ultima ratio regnum*: Sukarno was willing to embark on a political argument, an oral exercise but not a war".

The reasons, motivations and aims of the different parties involved in this conflict are manifold and still highly controversial: Mackie (1974: 10) does not hide his sympathies for Malaysia and assumes that Sukarno was seeking territorial gains and a cause to detract from internal political tensions. Noor (2005: 274-277) also notes the role of internal tensions in Indonesia that led Sukarno to proceed with *konfrontasi*. But it should be acknowledged that especially the former colonial powers had their own agenda, too: in the eyes of the British Foreign Office, for example, Sukarno was seen as a strong ally of the Soviet Union, compared even with Hitler in his striving to become a major power in the Pacific by seizing the whole of Melanesia including Malaya, the Philippines and the remaining half of New Guinea, thus action needed to be taken against him (Edwards and Pemberton 1992: 258).

Poulgrain (1998: 4-6) argues controversially that the British preparedness for the upcoming conflict suggests that it was not the "outcome of a calculated strategy" by Indonesia, but that genuine interests of the British in the region were the establishment of new leaderships "amenable to continued British investment" and that "the political environment […] did not include Sukarno as leader of neighbouring Indonesia". He even comes to the conclusion that *konfrontasi* was "a joint program set by British and American intelligence, at times overriding lesser-ranking individuals in the Colonial Office".

In the end, it was Malaysia who benefited most from the outcome of the crisis: firstly, the nation was formed as the Tunku and the British had wished (except for Brunei that remained with the British) with the side-effect that due to the external pressures the culturally distant states of East and West Malaysia closed ranks. Secondly, the governments made it clear that loyalty could only be shown to one or the other country, but not to an ideology that was aiming at overcoming these boundaries. This not only effectively sidelined leftists as well as supporters of *Nusantara Raya* like Ibrahim Yaakob who saw the conflict as a last means for the struggle to achieve a united country, fighting against colonial powers. It also set the stage for another round-up of opposition politicians and activists (Noor 2002: 61, 109) which further strengthened the position of the UMNO-led government.

And thirdly, the 1965 *coup d'état* in Indonesia not only put an end to Sukarno's rule and subsequently to *konfrontasi* in 1966, it also marked a turning point in the perspective in the respective relations: although relations between both countries shifted back to a

more cooperative level, Malaysia was no longer the *adik* to *abang* (younger brother/older brother) Indonesia.

From Brothers to 'Illegals'

Present-day relations are often described as positively 'special' and close co-operations exist – on a bilateral level as well as within ASEAN. However there is no doubt that both countries focus on their own interests when conflicting issues occur.

One very significant development between Indonesia and Malaysia centres around labour migration from Indonesia to Malaysia. This primarily economic matter not only has an impact on the political and cultural sphere as well, it also demonstrates how Malaysia sees itself in a dominant position nowadays towards Indonesia.

Despite recessions in the 1980s and 1990s, Malaysia managed to achieve sizeable economic growth rates. The subsequent rising standards of living and cost of labour led to increased labour migration, both legal and *sans-papiers*[4], mainly in the construction, plantation and domestic service sectors. Ramasamy (2004: 273-4) states that "two million workers constitute about 23 percent of the total workforce in Malaysia, mostly from Indonesia and the Philippines. […] Not all the estimated two million migrants have legal status, nearly two-thirds are illegal migrants". Although this actually describes an interdependence between the economies of the two countries, it was most often used as a sign of dominance on Malaysia's side: As long as unemployment in Malaysia was not a major problem and the middle-class was expanding, it was made clear to the Indonesians and their government who was giving the instructions, sometimes in a more accommodating or generous way as in Mahathir's so-called Prosper-thy-Neighbour Policy[5], but sometimes also threatening.[6] However, when the employment situation worsened in Malaysia, especially through thousands of unemployed graduates (although these would never have wanted to work in the same sectors as migrant workers did), the government felt compelled to appear as if it were acting against this.

The consequences have been several larger and smaller actions against the *sans-papiers*. The first major crackdown occurred in 2002: before major changes to immigration laws which included whipping and jail sentences upon conviction came into force in August 2002[7], a four-month amnesty led to the repatriation of nearly half-a-million people.

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[4] The term 'illegals' is avoided in this text unless used in quotations because of its derogative connotation. Instead, the less discriminating French term *sans-papiers* is used, meaning without documents.

[5] Prosper thy neighbour policy in action. In: *New Sunday Times* 02.11.1997; PM: Help each other become prosperous. In: *Business Times* 04.11.1997.

[6] See for example: Jakarta must play by the rules for mutual benefit (V. K. Chin). In: *The Star* 18.02.2005.

[7] 18,000 illegal immigrants whipped in M'sia. In: *MalaysiaKini* 16.08.2004.

Two hundred thousand Indonesian workers were stranded in camps near the border after their deportation and this led to serious criticism against President Megawati who was travelling overseas during that time. In order not to face such a situation again, the Indonesian government even asked Malaysia for a postponement of a subsequent deportation measure in 2004 during the Presidential elections when Megawati was hoping for re-election and Indonesia was 'grateful' that Malaysia agreed.[8]

Although many Malaysian companies, especially in the construction and plantation sectors, were virtually unable to continue their businesses in 2002 and the government had to fast-track hundreds of thousands of applications from migrant workers[9], the government pushed for action: the 2004 operation, codenamed *Ops Tegas* (lit. operation strict), aimed at "eliminating all foreigners working illegally in Malaysia"[10] according to Home Minister Azmi Khalid. A total number of more than half-a-million enforcement officers from police, Immigration and RELA (Ikatan Relawan Rakyat, People's Volunteer Corps) were involved in the operation.[11]

Whether the approximately 1.2 million *sans-papiers* workers in the country were really the prime concern of this policy remains doubtful. The amnesty had been extended several times[12] and it was made clear that "the Home Ministry will facilitate the quick return of legalised Indonesian workers so that Malaysian employers and businesses will not suffer"[13]. Whatever the reason given for the need to deport these people, it is unlikely that the circumstances had changed after their expected return a few weeks later.

The political mileage that the Malaysian government hoped to gain from this exercise might have been one of the driving forces behind *Ops Tegas*. The way in which the mainstream media used to stir up sentiments against foreign workers from neighbouring countries in a context that forbade anything that could incite 'racial hatred' within the Malaysian society was compelling. According to the Representative of the UNHCR in Malaysia, Volker Türk, the media campaign led to significant numbers of people leaving the country before authorities started their deportation exercise.[14]

The language in which the *sans-papiers* as well as the government agencies were described comes close to propaganda of its worst kind. In July 2004, when the govern-

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[8] M'sia told not to deport workers during Indon polls. In: *MalaysiaKini* 28.07.2004.

[9] Gov't approves recruitment of 369,000 foreign workers. In: *MalaysiaKini* 28.10.2002.

[10] Gov't plans huge new crackdown on illegal workers. In: *MalaysiaKini* 12.07.2004.

[11] A proper crackdown. In: *New Straits Times* 01.03.2005.

[12] First amnesty period: 29.10.-14.11.2004; first extension 31.12.2004; second extension 31.01.2005; third extension 28.02.2005.

[13] Quick return. In: *The Star* 17.02.2005.

[14] Interview with UNCHR's Representative in Malaysia, Volker Türk, 12.09.2006.

ment came up with the decision, *sans-papiers* were made responsible for all sorts of social evils:

> The government would definitely go hard on the illegal immigrants because they were causing a threat to the nation's security with many being involved in crime, setting up illegal settlements and stealing water […] the police were also highly stretched with the presence of illegal immigrants and with the crimes they committed […] many of them violating the country's laws and posing a danger to the locals […] doctors in government hospitals who were already overloaded with work were now faced with the pressure of having to treat illegal immigrants.[15]

The plight of local marginalised groups like the *orang asli* (indigenous people) or small farmers was suddenly highlighted and their deplorable situation was apparently caused by foreign workers as well[16] and a rise in dengue and TB cases in mid-2004 was also attributed to foreigners[17], to the extent that they themselves were being described as "cancer"[18].

But it was not just the negative impact on society that those foreigners and therefore especially Indonesians were accused of, which is startling, but also the terms used in reference to their expulsion were no less: words like "*flush out* illegal Indonesians immigrants"[19] connoted a toilet flush, a "hunt for illegals"[20] in which "no one will be spared"[21] degraded the *sans-papiers* to animals that one could hunt down, a "nationwide *sweep* of illegals"[22] resembled the sweeping of dirt from the floor, violent language like "*leading the assault* on the estimated 1.2 million illegal foreign workers in the country"[23] declared those workers to be enemies that needed to be fought in military style, as in "*D-Day* for the remaining 400,000 illegal immigrants in the country"[24].

By declaring that all this was not only done in the interest of the (Malaysian) people, but because of their own will, the government conveniently absolved itself from any moral responsibility: "Malaysians [are given, F. H.] the opportunity to *participate in solving the problems arising from the presence of illegal immigrants* in the state. '*Now they have the chance to go to the ground and arrest the illegal immigrants themselves*'"[25]. For those not wanting to particip-

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[15] Illegals: Cabinet to act. In: *New Straits Times* 24.07.2004.

[16] Orang Asli feeling the pinch as foreign workers cash in. In: *New Straits Times* 28.07.2004.

[17] Chua: Illegals contributing to rise in TB and dengue cases. In: *The Sunday Star* 05.09.2004.

[18] Illegals problem in Sabah like 'cancer'. In: *MalaysiaKini* 03.08.2006.

[19] Deportation put on hold. In: *New Straits Times* 19.08.2004.

[20] Hunt for illegals. In: *The Star* 30.01.2005.

[21] Ibid.

[22] Ibid.

[23] Illegals beware, Ishak's on your trail. In: *The Sunday Star* 05.09.2004.

[24] Feb 28 – it's final. In: *The Star* 15.02.2005.

[25] Rela, RT in op against illegals. In: *The Star* 17.01.2005.

ate directly, a hotline would be set up for the public to "receive information […] on the hideouts of illegal foreign workers"[26].

However, it was not only the government that was making use of this language, commentaries in the government-owned newspapers did 'their part', too: when New Sunday Times commentator Chow Kum Hor spoke about "*flush[ing] out* the *hordes* of illegal immigrants"[27] or V. K. Chin from The Star was unhappy about the prolonged amnesty period because "for months, government leaders and enforcement agencies have had been telling the people that *no mercy* would be shown against offenders. *Naturally*, the people have felt that the authorities had let them down as they were keen that the number of illegals be kept to a minimum. *They do not feel comfortable with so many foreigners around*"[28], showed that it went beyond the unquestioned printing of government statements that was common in the Malaysian media.

One might try to dismiss this as just another way to divert attention from crises faced within the Malaysian society. In Malaysia's multi-layered spheres of political influence this could have been true to a certain extent. Besides, 'othering' foreigners, especially migrant workers, is nothing unique to Malaysia and, contrary to some European countries, Malaysians are not perceived as being outwardly xenophobic. Possible reasons could have been an economic slowdown (Ramasamy 2004: 286), the aforementioned rapidly rising number of unemployed graduates, or the need for 'Mr. Nice', Prime Minister Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, to 'show some steel'.

It is in this context that one needs to put 'solutions' like the one offered by a Member of Parliament of the ruling Barisan Nasional government to "implant a microchip in illegal immigrants or make them wear an unremovable bracelet to prevent them from returning to Malaysia"[29].

There have also been times when foreigners were welcomed, however as a useful tool for internal politics in Malaysia: in the first two decades after independence, an influx of migrants mainly from Indonesia and the Philippines was regarded as beneficial to maintain a Malay majority in the country (Ramasamy 2004: 284). This later became obsolete when the birth rates of non-Malays and Malays turned very much in favour of the latter.

The current policy against migrant workers does show some effect on the Malaysian public: a major indicator of this is the fact that thousands of ordinary people have participated in the raids as members of RELA after being given the power to do so. There

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[26] Hunt for illegals. In: *The Star* 30.01.2005.

[27] Amnesty may not prevent future influx of illegals. In: *New Sunday Times* 31.10.2004.

[28] Let's see if softer approach will work on illegal workers (V. K. Chin). In: *The Star* 04.02.2005.

[29] MP suggests microchip implants for illegals. In: *MalaysiaKini* 30.08.2006.

have been numerous reports of cases of violence[30] and extortion[31] and civil rights groups have repeatedly highlighted these cases.[32]

As serious as the government-concerted actions against migrant workers is the impact on the perception of foreigners, especially Indonesians, in everyday life and the perspective on the cultural ties between the two countries.

Indonesian women have been the first choice as domestic workers among upper middle-class Malaysians. It was seen as an advantage that there is hardly a gap when it comes to culture and (official) language. This no longer seems to be the case as the Women, Family and Community Minister Shahrizat Abdul Jalil is planning to conduct a study on the "impact of Indonesian maids on the children they care for, including whether they change the youngsters' 'cultural values'"[33]. Home Affairs Minister Mohamad Radzi Sheikh Ahmad adds that Malaysians "are now very dependent on their Indonesian maids and leave everything to them, to the extent that our children are now speaking like Indonesians"[34].

'Indonesian culture' is therefore being perceived almost as a threat in its difference from 'Malay/Malaysian culture'. Malay is no longer seen as a cultural group encompassing the whole archipelago, but rather is exclusive to Malays in Malaysia. The definition of a Malay in the Federal Constitution still has a wide scope in defining a Malay as someone who speaks Malay, follows Malay customs and professes Islam. And although the limitation to a Malay being a Muslim by definition had already excluded for example Hindu Malays in Bali, it would still apply for a large majority of Indonesians. However, an Indonesian who claims to be Malay would face a disbelieving raise of eyebrows from his Malaysian counterpart.

The low importance of history in school also plays a role in the progressing disconnection. Especially in Malaysia, history is taught through the eyes of the government and, when asked why historical facts and persons are omitted in the syllabus, the Education Ministry replied that "students were not interested in history, they had difficulties understanding facts […]. We [the Ministry] decided to *consolidate the facts* to make the subject *less boring*"[35]. So it does not come as a surprise that university students from Indonesia and Malaysia asked at random in personal communication about *Melayu/Indonesia*

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[30] Rela rampage: Eyewitnesses tell of madness, brutality. In: *MalaysiaKini* 01.03.2006; Demand to see ID of Rela officers during crackdown. In: *MalaysiaKini* 01.03.2005.

[31] Rela members to face background vetting. In: *New Straits Times* 21.12.2004.

[32] Migrant crackdown could lead to torture, executions: AI. In: *MalaysiaKini* 15.02.2005; Tenaganita slams plans to arm Rela members in migrant crackdown. In: *MalaysiaKini* 25.01.2005.

[33] Study on impact of Indon maids on kids. In: *MalaysiaKini* 30.08.2006.

[34] Ibid.

[35] MP: History books do not reflect nation's past. In: *New Straits Times* 30.08.2006.

Raya hardly have any knowledge about this. Those who claimed to know a bit about it gave answers like: "Indonesia started a war against us [Malaysia] because we did not want to join Indonesia", or "because the Malays did not want to join, Indonesia had to go on by itself"[36].

This lack of understanding of the common cultural heritage – for which the students cannot be held responsible – will make it difficult to reverse the trend of alienation, even more so as long as it remains in the interest of the governments, especially in Malaysia.

Conclusion

The people in the *Nusantara* archipelago share a long and deep common history on many levels such as language, culture, customs and religion. The concept of Pan-Malayanism included an understanding that went beyond ethno-nationalism by regarding the Indon-Malay people as having the same broad racial and cultural identity, who would be willing to de-racialise also the divisions between Malays and non-Malays through a broader definition of Malay culture encompassing the different cultural groups of the Archipelago (Noor 2002: 90). Political and economic interests, however, have led to an adverse impact on these relationships that is disconnecting histories: the territorial boundaries set by the colonial powers and their economic exploitation destroyed century-old migration and trading lines within the archipelago that also provided for cultural exchange. The different ways of achieving independence in Indonesia and Malaya combined with the fact that both governments preferred different alignments in world politics have further ended hopes for a common future after the end of colonial rule.

The events in 1965 in Indonesia also changed the power balance between the two states and Malaysia took on a more distinctive role in international politics, to the extent that it is no longer Indonesia which is seen as a strong voice by developing countries but rather Malaysia. Mahathir Mohammad's outspoken criticism of the West and his priority on South-South relations for example through the 'Langkawi Dialogues' with African countries since the 1980s were important factors in that changing perception. Chairing the Non-Alignment-Movement (NAM) and also the Organisation of Islamic Countries (OIC) gave further credentials to Malaysia's role.

The relationship between Indonesia and Malaysia has always been described as 'special' and usually in a positive connotation. As has been outlined in this article, this did not prevent the governments (in this case of Malaysia) from abusing the relationship for political gains. This has led to continuous alienation and increasing prejudices between the people of Indonesia and Malaysia. The stereotype of the 'Indonesian troublemaker'

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[36] Interviewing Malaysian and Indonesian students, 28.08.2006.

is often recalled when the political need arises: demonstrations and the Malaysian *reformasi* movement are linked to the developments in Indonesia which are often described in a negative manner. Migrant workers in Malaysia, most of whom originate from Indonesia, are being blamed for all sorts of social ills, but also Indonesian university students face the prejudice when they are called 'troublemakers', for example when returning later to their hostels than their Malaysian counterparts.[37]

The relations between both countries are nowadays largely defined by rivalry, thereby neglecting the fact that it was the common feeling of belonging to the same cultural group that fuelled the aspirations of the struggle for independence of people like Ibrahim Yaakob, Ahmad Boestamam and Burhanuddin al-Helmy, who are now 'forgotten' in official history.

Pointing at this blind spot in historical perception or highlighting UMNO's late emergence and not giving it all credit for independence still causes an uproar among the ruling elite.[38]

The different interpretations of common history are emphasising the disconnection from a common background which leads to the effect that the term 'Malay' as a symbol for a unifying belonging is no longer applicable to the people in both countries in the same way.

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[37] Interviewing Indonesian students, 19.08.2006.

[38] Press statement of Democratic Action Party (DAP) International Secretary Ronnie Liu, http://www.dap-malaysia.org/english/2005/Aug05/bul/bul2803.htm (03.09.2005).

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Managing Heterogeneity within a 'Transnational Community of Co-Responsibility'

Exploratory Snapshots of Acehnese Diasporic Life Experiences in Sydney[1]

Antje Missbach

> If there are six Acehnese, there might be about ten different opinions. (Acehnese interviewee, 2006)

Since communication and transportation facilities have improved significantly and have become more widespread and cheaper, the maintenance of 'ethnic ties' is made easier, too. Such developments do not only foster intimate family ties but also relations beyond extended kinship. Costs of establishing new ethno-national diasporas and even the re-awakening of dormant diasporas are low compared to earlier times. According to Sheffer (2003), nowadays "even poorer groups of migrants can form effective diasporic communities". Diasporism plays a central role in contemporary domestic and international politics and is a decisive factor influencing transnational politics as it is a crucial part of the debate about the re-emergence of ethnicity.

Common origins serve as a cohesive factor. People outside their original homeland who consider themselves a group might establish a 'transnational community of co-responsibility'[2] (Werbner 2000) as a strategy to maintain a distinct identity and to promote their own and their group's well-being. However, this does not necessarily result in collective socio-political and cultural activism. Different or even competing understandings of the group, its purposes, aims and capabilities might prevent homogeneous decision-making and action. Friction and power struggles can be detected even within very small groups.

This paper focuses on cohesive factors for membership among the Acehnese diaspora in Sydney by describing the 'disjunctive connections' within that group. By 'disjunctive connections' I mean the balancing between factors that might help to unite the group and its aims and factors that might prevent their 'speaking with one voice'. After retracing briefly the ongoing search for a common conception of what diaspora means and

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[1] I would like to thank Edward Aspinall, Katrin Bosshard, Ben Kerkvliet, Anne Looker, Heather Rae, Nicholas Tapp and Paul Zeccola for their constructive comments.

[2] According to Werbner (2000) 'transnational communities of co-responsibility' feel mutual responsibility because they do not only share ideas about a common past, but also about a common future. They are voluntary social formation that produce and reproduce themselves socially, culturally and politically in relation to on-going developments in their homeland, various host countries and their fellow co-ethnics residing there.

examining the heuristic potential of various definitions, I will discuss what makes the Acehnese abroad a diaspora. Therefore I present some exploratory, but diverse findings about arrival, social survival strategies, incipient networking, and relations with the homeland. Finally, I will touch upon politicisation and activism as well as internal splits and in the end I will comment on different attitudes towards returning to Aceh.

The Acehnese diaspora which is rather small, offers a comprehensible micro-case for studying diasporic policy-making. Since many Acehnese live undocumented in different host countries, there are no precise numbers available, but estimates range from 40,000 to 60,000 people worldwide[3]. Acehnese groups are spread throughout Europe, Southeast Asia, North America and Australia. Most reside in Malaysia which is in Aceh's immediate vicinity. Given the relatively short period of Acehnese residence abroad when compared to the existence of the historic diasporas such as the Greeks, Jews or Armenians, the Acehnese form an 'incipient diaspora' (Sheffer 2003) – meaning a diaspora that is about to emerge.

What makes the Acehnese diaspora so interesting for study is the fact that many left Aceh while there was a violent conflict between the Indonesian security forces and the separatist movement *Gerakan Aceh Merdeka* (Free Aceh Movement, GAM)[4]. Not everybody left because of the war, although during the last decade the majority of migrants were driven out by war-related causes. Being in the diaspora, all Acehnese started gathering together after a certain time. Their ethnicity became a strong reason for assembling and is almost inescapable. All at once, collective decisions needed to be taken to cope with the expectations from the homeland. Since the war in Aceh grew to be even more intense in 2003, every Acehnese became involved even if he or she had left a long time ago or had never felt the urge to choose a side within the conflict. Being a group of co-ethnics abroad meant they needed structures and modes to manage the inter-diaspora and homeland communication and to transfer financial help. Unquestionably, there are many other diasporas that provide different kinds of support[5] for homeland conflicts, such as Tamils for the ongoing war in Sri Lanka or Croats during the Balkan wars, but the Acehnese diaspora is very small and basically lacks the resources and manpower. Nevertheless, the Acehnese try within their scope of opportunities to support the homeland as much as they can.

Although the Acehnese in Australia have never played *the* main role in homeland politics within the Acehnese diaspora, they are representative and even emblematic of developments within other Acehnese diasporas. At the present time, there are about 150

[3] Estimation by Ariffadillah (private conversation, June 2005).

[4] The official name of the resistance movement is Acheh-Sumatra National Liberation Front (ASNLF) but throughout the literature it is widely referred to only as GAM.

[5] Support as used here has a rather neutral meaning, it can include fiscal help, shipment of arms or ammunition and so forth, but it can also mean engaging in peace-finding procedures.

Acehnese living in Sydney and nearby. A few years ago, the number used to be about a third more. Most of them were sent back by the Australian authorities due to their lack of adequate papers and case for asylum.

I approached the Acehnese community in Sydney for the first time in May 2006 on the occasion of Maulid (anniversary of the Prophet Muhammad). This religious celebration was organised by the Australian Acheh Society (AAS) and the Ashabul Kahfi Islamic Centre[6]. The festivity took place in a community hall in Lakemba, a western suburb of Sydney with a high population coming from the Middle East. Roughly 100 children and adults participated. The atmosphere during the four-hour event appeared very light-hearted, cheerful and noisy. Children were running around and the host had to demand quietness several times to make himself heard. During all the activities such as Quran readings, preaching and musical presentations, the presenters used a mix of different languages (English, Acehnese, Arabic, and Indonesian). Men and women sat and ate separately.

I was the only unveiled female present though not the only non-Acehnese. People perceived me at first with a certain precautionary distance. The distance did not disappear completely after I was introduced to some women and men, but it was also not particularly intense. Most people I talked to were fairly open and did not refuse to be asked questions. I arranged a few interview appointments. These semi-structured interviews were carried out in the following days, mostly in the homes of the interviewees or at a place they proposed. Sporadic visits and more specific interviews followed in the next weeks and months.

Contested Characteristics of Diaspora

Academic interest in all kinds of diasporas has increased during recent decades, not only because of the increasing number of diasporas due to enlarged migration flows, but also due to the greater role they are acknowledged as playing in global politics (Sheffer 1995, 2003; Anderson 1998).

In its etymological origin *diaspora* is a composition of *speiro* (Greek, to sow) and the preposition *dia* (over). Previously, the term was primarily reserved for the historic diasporas of Greeks, Armenians and Jews. The latter formed the definitional archetype for a long time. The connotations deriving from their experiences were mainly negative, such as expulsion, suffering, betrayal, victimisation, persecution etc. (Vertovec 1999, Tölölyan 1996). Nowadays, the undertones of diaspora have become more positive. Indeed, some authors view diaspora as a tool for ethnic minorities to demonstrate their cultural power and to emancipate them from the oppressive cultural normativity of the host

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[6] http://ashabulkahfi.muslimvillage.net/ReportSports1.htm (21.6.2006)

community. However, for the sake of the heuristic effectiveness of this term it might be helpful to retrace briefly its usage, especially paying attention to the broader as well as the narrower conceptions of the diaspora.

Wolter Connor (1986) defined diaspora unostentatiously as "that segment of a people living outside the homeland". However, such a broad definition does not help us to make distinctions between similar, but different forms of dispersed people, like expatriates, expellees, refugees, and alien residents, ethnic or racial minorities. As Safran (1999: 260) puts it: "[…] to include all ethnic, racial, or religious minorities and all immigrants beyond even 'transnational' communities renders the concept virtually useless". Members of a diaspora definitely have a lot in common with other immigrants, but it is important to recognise that not all migrant groups become a diaspora. Some do not maintain a distinct identity as a group, but prefer to assimilate or acculturate into the host society. Diasporas by contrast are committed to preserving their collective identity and maintain active relations with the homeland and other co-ethnics spread abroad (Tölölyan 1996).

Due to widespread definitional desiderata William Safran (1991) came forward with six crucial criteria, which were mostly accepted by Robin Cohen (1996), although he also complemented them with three more decisive factors. Cohen's often applied, though contested definition points to: firstly, a diaspora is (traumatically) force to disperse or secondly, is a (voluntary) expansion of a religious or ethnic group of people in order to find work, pursue trade or even engage in colonial expansion. Thirdly there must be a collective memory (language, cuisine, folklore music or 'myths of homeland') that is transmitted from one generation to another. Fourthly, due to the collective idealisation of origins, there is a strong will to survive as a minority. The fifth factor is the institutionalisation of a return movement, sixth is a rather stable group consciousness, and seventh an uneasy relationship with the host state due to the externally-oriented collective memory. The final two criteria are solidarity with co-ethnics and, finally, distinct creative capabilities are developed.

There is rarely a single diaspora that can fulfil all of these nine criteria at all times. Even the Jewish Diaspora which is considered the 'archetype', does not fully correspond to this ideal type.

By taking into account that almost every single point can be disproved empirically by referring to other acknowledged diasporas, Safran (1999) later criticised Cohen's typology. He proposed instead a negative definition. According to him, a minority community that has dispersed from its original place of residence but is marked by one of the following features is *not* considered a diaspora: Firstly, a weak will to survive as a minority, meaning almost no usage of the homeland language and no collective heritage (just family recollection), secondly, an unclear focus on homeland and its specific loca-

tion, and lastly, no wish to return and only a few impediments to adaptation to the host country. It seems as his suggestion was not well received within academic circles since it is rarely referred to. By hook or by crook, most theorists – although aware of the rigidity of the ideal-typical definitions – still rely on Safran's/Cohen's original main points.

A diaspora does not develop automatically from the very instant when migrants enter a host country. It has to evolve over time. How long does it take a diaspora consciousness to develop? Generally, on the one hand it depends heavily on whether the migrants perceive themselves as sojourners or as settlers. On the other hand it depends on the host society and its degree of openness towards newcomers and willingness to receive them as permanent citizens. Diasporas are not static entities. On the contrary, they constantly change and transform themselves because their composition varies when some people leave and others arrive. Some conditions can awaken dormant feelings of diasporicity after a long time (Shuval 2000). Although diasporic solidarity does not exist automatically, it can evolve from activities that promote a sense of common interests and linked fortunes.

As an alternative to merely applying those criteria and arguing over semantic intricacies, I propose to concentrate on some more functionalist criteria to describe diaspora affiliation. What makes these 'voluntary social formations' Werbner (2000) abroad so special, is that diasporas work as transnational communication units aiming to participate in both local and trans-local policy-making procedures, such as elections. It is the establishment of a functional triangular relationship between the host country, the diaspora and the homeland which distinguished a diaspora from other groups. To my mind, it is the interconnectedness between the various people involved that can generate fairly stable social structures for pertaining a specific ethnic identity and a feeling of commonness that are prerequisites for forming a 'community of co-responsibility'. Migrants form an incipient diaspora when they recognise themselves as a group with common interests and form networks in order to achieve them. Interests may focus on immigrant politics, in order to ease the initial adjustment as well as on homeland politics. Therefore diasporans join *Landsmannschaften*[7] or establish such. New arrivals can regularly get in contact with their co-ethnics through institutionalising, they have access to homeland literature and cultural artefacts (cassettes, videos, DVDs, recordings), they can continue to speak their mother tongue and meet political, social and spiritual leaders of the community, who, according to Sheffer (1995), often act as intermediaries between the homeland and the host country. To quote Sheffer (2003) once more: "[…] diaspora solidarity is not based solely on ties to homelands, but rather only fully develops in host countries and reflects the diasporans situation and need there."

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[7] Verbatim for 'group of fellow countrymen', in German the term is mainly used for refugees from the former German Eastern territories who fled to Western Germany in the end of the Second World War. These groups are known for their highly conservative – to some extent even revisionist – political views.

However, creating networking structures and translocal 'togetherness' can also produce certain attitudinal and functional interdependencies between the homeland, the host society and from other members of the diaspora towards individual diasporans. By maintaining a more or less regular exchange of material and intellectual values, people can be bound together over long distances and time periods. They set up their daily priorities according to the ongoing abroad while producing and delivering inputs of their own for other diasporic communities elsewhere and the homeland. The latter is not necessarily an existing nation-state, but it can be a specific region or an occupied area. The economic, fiscal, social, political and cultural exchanges are not always mutual and they do not necessarily have to be balanced (Sheffer 2003). Diasporic inputs are generally enlarged and homeland connections are strengthened when the homeland is perceived as endangered or even involved in a conflict.

Within political science there is a special interest of the potential role in diaspora in intensifying or mitigating conflict in the homeland (Shain/Barth 2003). Collier and Hoeffler stated that "case study evidence supports the role of diasporas in secession and the revival of violence" (2002) and that conflicts in areas where one conflict party has access to funding from a diaspora situated in the USA are more likely to persist even after a formal ceasefire has been reached (2000).[8]

Political scientists, however, tend to focus solely on diasporic elites and their impacts on homeland politics, dealing with diasporas in terms of narrow, committed groups and neglecting the variety of standpoints that can be found within the different layers of such 'imagined communities'. They tend to treat diasporas as 'undifferentiated wholes' (Wald/Williams n.d.). Social anthropologists pay more attention to the social composition of a diaspora, to intra-group frictions and to centrifugal factors generally. For me it is important to see, how to overcome such disjunctive issues in order to form a stable 'support unit' abroad. Concerning the Acehnese in Sydney this implies questions like, how did they form a political organisation and how did they overcome political discrepancies among themselves? Last but not least, can these institutions last long if they were created by 'emergency activism'?

Are the Acehnese a Diaspora at all?

Before assessing the internal stability and capacity for action in relation to the transnational politics of the Acehnese in Sydney, it has to be clarified first of all why the Acehnese are perceived as a diaspora and how diaspora concepts can assist in explaining my observations.

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[8] Also see: Angoustures, Aline and Valerie Pascal (1999) Diaspora und Konfliktfinanzierung. In: Jean, Francoise and Jean Christophe Rufin, eds., *Ökonomie der Bürgerkriege*. Hamburg, Hamburger Edition, 401-439.

I argue that the Acehnese – not only in Australia but also in other countries – are in the process of becoming a diaspora in the sense of a 'community of co-responsibility'. Within a rather short period of time, they have started to establish basic local institutions that serve their interests as a group in each particular host country and that provide them with transnational connections.

In order to provide evidence for my assertion I will point out briefly the political and historical background of Aceh itself. Although not all Acehnese left because of the war, I regard most of the Acehnese abroad as a conflict-generated diaspora.

The war in Aceh between GAM and the Indonesian security forces lasted almost 30 years, even though not always involving the same intensity of violence. At the end of 1976, an independence movement under the leadership of Hasan di Tiro, a well-known descendent of a very prominent family in Aceh, started an armed struggle against the Indonesian government. The struggle began because of ongoing socio-political, economical and cultural mistreatment by Jakarta.[9] The small number of GAM-guerrillas carried out 'hit and run'-operations for roughly one-and-a-half years. They did not pose a major challenge to the Indonesian military, which coped rather easily with their attacks. However, Hasan di Tiro and his closest associates left Aceh to save their lives. He fled via Malaysia to Sweden, where he was granted political asylum.

In the late 1980s, and also again in the late 1990s, the resistance led by GAM flared up again following an increasing degree of involvement of younger men. Due to the widespread violence and the atmosphere of omnipresent threats many Acehnese decided to leave their homes. They went to other Indonesian regions, or even abroad. Civilians and also guerrilla fighters crossed the Straits and went to Malaysia, living either with relatives or friends or in refugee camps. Their aim was to escape Indonesian persecution and the deprivations of the war temporarily or permanently. From Malaysia some individuals made their way to Europe, the USA, Canada or Australia with the help of the UNHCR.

In the beginning, the activities carried out by GAM-leaders abroad were only small-scale, since the self-proclaimed government in exile lacked financial and organisational resources, as well as Acehnese and international support.[10] But as more and more Acehnese left their home country, more rudimentary organisational patterns started to evolve abroad. Next to promoting welfare and solidarity, some Acehnese abroad had political motivations, especially those who previously were politically active, either for

[9] For detailed discussion on the causes of the war see Kell 1995, Reid 2005 and others.

[10] There is one exception though: In the 1980s a few hundred GAM fighters went to Libya to be trained there. When they returned in 1989 new confrontations with the Indonesian army started. Although GAM was defeated again eventually, the guerrillas received more support within Aceh. By the end of the 1990s GAM had managed to transform itself from a very small armed group into a stronger movement. For more details see Missbach (in Wessel 2005).

GAM's irredentist aim or in non-partisan ways, like campaigning for human rights. Homeland politics were transplanted into host countries and even intensified. Contacts between Acehnese in the different dwelling places were nourished by all kinds of modern communication. There was much travelling to and fro especially in the post-Suharto period after 1998.

Although since the 1990s the triumvirate of GAM in Sweden, consisting of Hasan di Tiro, Malik Mahmud and Zaini Abdullah, had tried to exercise strict control over military branches in Aceh itself and the civilian diaspora Acehnese, their power was not unchallenged. Rumours kept surfacing that within GAM itself there were frictions about shape of the future independent state of Aceh or even the succession of Hasan di Tiro. Although attempts were made to hide the discord, in 1999 it became obvious that some to Hasan di Tiro's followers like Husaini Hasan were 'expelled' due to the internal quarrels (Klinken 1999). *Majelis Pemerintahan Gerakan Aceh Merdeka* (Governing Council of GAM, MP-GAM) led by Teuku Don Zulfahri,[11] alias Don Malindo, residing in Malaysia attracted opponents to the Stockholm decision-makers. Outsiders were confused. Even the Indonesian government under Abdurrahman Wahid was confronted with unpleasant mix-ups when approaching their interlocutors for peace talks.[12] MP-GAM has not played a major role.

Recurring to Australia and the Acehnese there; generally speaking, there are two types of immigrants. Before 1999 most of the Acehnese came here in order to study, to work and make a better living. When the situation in Aceh became worse, more and more people poured into Australia. That second wave included many more politically-minded Acehnese. At the zenith, there were about 250 Acehnese in Sydney as informants told me.

The Moment of Arriving

The persons I interviewed all had diverse motives for coming to Australia. One person who arrived in the early 1980s told me that he had been roaming for four years as a sailor before he decided to settle down in Australia. Another man and his wife I talked to had come for education. Both had received scholarships from Australian donors to conduct their Masters or PhD studies. Though there are a number of Acehnese students in Australia, most Acehnese came for 'political' reasons. One of my interviewees arrived in 1993 after the activities of his religious group were banned for not accepting the *asas tunggal* ('sole basis')[13]. Most arrivals reached Australia in the late 1990s and again

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[11] Zulfahri was killed 1.6.2001 in Malaysia. His murderer(s) remain(s) unknown until today.

[12] Missbach 2005: 107.

[13] The five principles of the state ideology *Pancasila* became the sole basis of political and mass organisations.

after the introduction of Martial Law in Aceh in May 2003. Generally, the majority of the arrivals were men. Later on, they were followed by family members or friends.

Some of my interviewees had lost close family members; others could not bear the intimidation against them. Their properties and income bases had been destroyed. Two informants told me that their *ruko*[14] were burned down after the Indonesian military found out that they were supplying GAM fighters with food and medical equipment. One showed me the scars on his legs resulting from being beaten up. He could not flee immediately but had to hide in different places in Aceh until recovering before he could make his way via Jakarta to Sydney to claim political asylum. Some informants had severe traumatic experiences. An older man had been in prison twice in Aceh for supporting GAM and spreading rebellious thought, the first term (1977-81) for four years without even having a trial at all. The second imprisonment (1990-98) was cut from 13 to eight years under an amnesty granted by President Habibie who took over from Suharto in May 1998. After his release he founded a group to help other victims of imprisonment who had suffered from torture and he campaigned again in Aceh and abroad. When he got the chance to visit Australia for a speaking tour, he decided to stay. I also spoke with young people who used to fight against the Indonesian military in the third main phase of conflict (1999-2005). As GAM lost ground during the anti-insurgency operations in 2003 and 2004, they had fled.

Many Acehnese went to Jakarta first to arrange their documents. They pretended there not to be Acehnese. As a result, it has been difficult to get asylum in Australia because Indonesia in general, and especially Jakarta, are not considered danger zones. I was told that if they have a passport issued in Jakarta, they do not possess any proof of political endangerment.

Some of the Acehnese who came to Australia could rely on personal contacts they had established previously. The interviewee who fought for GAM told me that, since he had established very good contacts with parts of the Acehnese community in Sydney before his departure; he was taken care of by them and even warmly welcomed at the airport. Others received help from academics and universities or other institutions (e.g. Australian Federation of Islamic Councils). But not all were that fortunate; especially Acehnese who came here in the 1980s, could not rely on networks or solidarity from their peers.

It can be seen that the dispersal of the Acehnese was caused partly voluntarily, but mainly by force. This experience does not distinguish them from 'ordinary' war refugees. What makes them a diaspora is the intra-state and trans-state networking they engaged in during the initial days after arrival. Therefore I will present some particular cases about how arrivees coped with the 'new life'.

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[14] Acronym for: *rumah toko*, meaning a two level house with a shop on the ground floor.

All of my Acehnese interviewees came first to Australia alone, leaving their families be-hind. When arriving on a tourist visa, but intending to request political asylum, they had to wait patiently until they were granted limited or permanent permission to stay. Dur-ing those months they had to rely on solidarity and financial support from friends, rel-atives and charity organisations since they could not work and were not supported with government funds. Legal help was in some cases provided from Australian individuals and from non-governmental organisations and church communities. The diversity of these people is shown not only in the different motives they had for leaving but also in the different life paths they took up after their arrival.

Coping with the New Life

Major challenges to newly arrived migrants are to overcome isolation, to learn the new language of the host country, to earn a living and to build up reliable social networks. For the first Acehnese in Australia it was more difficult, because they could not rely on co-ethnics, but had to rely on other forms of networks.

By way of illustration I depict the story of a man who came to Australia in the early 1980s. He explained that he did not know anyone at all. Back home he was given an ad-dress of some Acehnese in Perth. When he made his way to their house he learned that they had left a few years earlier. Full of disappointment, he left and went to a fruit mar-ket where he saw a person with a somehow "familiar physical appearance". He started speaking to him in Indonesian, telling him that he had no job and no money. It turned out that the man was originally from Malaysia and ultimately the person helped him. The interviewee appealed to a 'greater ethnic solidarity network' because at the time no other Acehnese was detectable. After he had been living and working in Australia for several years he eventually met other Acehnese. In 1993 he went back to Aceh for the first time and got married to an Acehnese woman who followed him to Sydney.

Another interviewee, a PhD-student, said that he "did not know of any Acehnese after living here for more than one year". The first two Acehnese he met when he was read-ing a poster about an Aceh-related discussion forum organised by Amnesty Interna-tional at university. The people he met turned out to be driving forces in raising political awareness about the concerns of the Acehnese. Since he went to that event he got to know a lot more co-ethnics with whom he built up more regular contacts afterwards. Suddenly he was drawn into politics. I will provide more details about the political activities below.

Nowadays, some Acehnese men share houses. Those places also serve as primary meet-ing places for newcomers. The house I visited did not offer much comfort, but it seemed comfortable to the people living there. They all spoke the same language; they

had a garden where they planted chillies and sweet potatoes and they shared a circle of Acehnese friends whom they met regularly for social and sporting activities. One of my informants commented enthusiastically: "Soccer unified everyone". When there has been still more Acehnese in Sydney, there had existed two Acehnese soccer teams both trained by the same coach. Every year there was a tournament between Indonesian soccer teams in Sydney organised by the Indonesian Embassy. In August 2001, one of the two Acehnese teams won. The winners raised the flag of GAM at the pitch to express their pride. I see this as a symbolic act of admiring their homeland and highlight their ethnical heritage. Indonesian spectators disliked this gesture, but the Acehnese still remember the anecdote vividly. I kept hearing this story again and again.

Along with volleyball or soccer teams and individual relationships fostered by regular visits, birthday celebrations, shared funeral prayers and the like, a greater circle of the Acehnese in Sydney has developed over time. Associates meet on an occasional basis for religious events (*Ramadan, Lebaran, Idul Fitri*). Other meeting points are a Quran-school (founded in 1996) and the Ashabul Kahfi Islamic Centre (since 1998) led by an Acehnese *ulama* (religious leader). His religious teachings and the language courses he runs are not only attended by Acehnese children but also by families from other ethnic backgrounds. The school also teaches other languages and computer skills. The courses are mainly taught in Arabic and Malay.

As everywhere all over the globe, daily life consists not primarily of political discussions and meetings, but of daily routines, earning a living, leisure and entertainment. Certainly, one could argue that such informal social gatherings as described above are typical for all kinds of immigrants. But in the next sections I will demonstrate how these social networks have been mobilised by elites and activists for political purposes. I will focus especially on political engagement, since most frictions within the Acehnese diaspora in Sydney result from different standpoints.

First however, I want to point to some crucial findings concerning the preservation of homeland connections. Without the collective feelings fostered by these connections people would be less likely to become involved in collective activities, donate their time and money and demand attention for the Aceh case from Australian society.

Staying in Touch and Meeting Homeland Expectations

As outlined in the first part of this paper, a major characteristic of diasporas in contrast to immigrants, is the upholding of a constant and intense homeland connection. Due to new technologies and cheaper communications such connections are much more easily maintained nowadays. My interviewees all possessed mobile phones and used these to call directly or to send short text messages back to Aceh and also to other

Acehnese living abroad. I was informed that before mobile phones were cheaply available, most Acehnese did not have close contact with their relatives in Aceh, because they did not dare to phone them or even send letters in order to avoid intimidation towards their relatives by pro-Indonesian security forces. The internet was usually referred to when I asked informants about how to keep contact with Aceh, including mailing lists, regional and national online newspapers (e.g. acehkita.com, *Tempo, Serambi* and others), and also Indonesian television, although "it is just all about lies" as one interviewee commented. Acehnese who were not in political danger and who could afford it, occasionally travelled back to visit their families, others had no direct contact for several years. One of my informants had travelled a lot in recent years to many different places all around the world. I noticed regions that are also known for hosting a bigger number of Acehnese, such as Texas, Philadelphia, Sweden, and Norway featured in his itinerary, but when I requested more details about the causes and activities he refused to provide more information. To compensate I was given an also very interesting story about his adventurous journey back to Aceh during the Martial Law era with the help of fake documents. He commented several times that he was lucky because his children were able to speak Acehnese properly, else they would have been in severe trouble.

A more emotional tie that I could observe was music. In one informants house I listened to and watched a music karaoke DVD by *Rande*[15] – quite a popular group in Aceh. The videos were filmed in the woods; the actors were fast moving all the time and acted in a 'hide and run' style – just like guerrillas. I got the impression someone was being chased, but succeeded in not being trapped due to 'sportive ingenuity'. The DVD had a strange effect on me and my informants. In the beginning they tried to explain a lot and translate the texts of the songs, but they soon stopped. It seemed to me that the images evoked many of their personal memories back in Aceh and demanded so much attention so that I became almost forgotten.

All of the Acehnese I talked to faced high expectations from relatives and friends in Aceh to support them financially. Especially after the tsunami, many did everything they could to help their people in Aceh. On a collective basis, there were street music

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[15] My informants made the criticisms that this album was not very traditional anymore, because they themselves prefer "*yang murni*". The leader of the band seems an interesting case, especially for students of ethnic identity reclaim: "Rafly himself has dramatically changed his image and sound since the late 1980s, when he was one of Indonesia's biggest rock stars. He described himself at that time as 'having long hair, wearing tight jeans and jumping around on stage'. However, he began to feel that there was not anything in his music for the Achenese people. After one long day praying in a mosque, he felt that he had to rediscover his roots and devote his music to bringing Achenese traditional music, the essence of his soul, to the young people of Acheh. 'We need to teach our children traditional music, because we have our soul in Achenese music', he said. 'In traditional music we have a message for the children – about who they are, about being Achenese." http://asnaonline.org/activities.htm (17.5.2006)

events to collect money for the tsunami victims. On an individual basis, Acehnese worked longer and harder, even if they did not possess a valid working permit and therefore faced a high risk of being detained. Some Acehnese got caught and had to spend up to ten months in the Villawood detention centre near Sydney.

Acehnese back home expect financial support, not only for a wider kinship-circle, but also for educational or religious institutions (e.g. *pesantren*). One of my interviewees said the reason he and his family were living in a relatively small apartment was that he supports his parents and his brother's family in Aceh. When I asked him whether he also helps non-relatives, he answered that he also provides financial help to newcomers in Australia: "That's why, you see, I don't have a big house because I support my people."

As a matter of fact, GAM also expected contributions from the diaspora during the conflict in Aceh (Schulze 2003). It is very difficult to measure how much they could received from different diasporas, and whether this was always given voluntarily or whether there was pressure exerted on individuals. Some of my interviewees said quite frankly that they had donated to GAM, but did not give any precise details; others commented that they were in doubt about what had actually happened to the money that was collected at several gatherings since there was no accountability. I was told complaints about individual money collectors who were suspected of unfair financial gain on some occasions.

Besides money, the Acehnese diaspora was also expected to lobby on behalf of Acehnese victims and to raise awareness of the events in Aceh, especially under Martial Law (May 2003-August 2005). According to information I gathered from internet resources about public demonstrations, rallies and discussion forums, it can be concluded that the more turbulence arose in Aceh, the more the public outcry against Indonesian politics was articulated in the diaspora in Australia. The individual commitment or engagement varies though and depends on internal and external as well as personal and collective factors.

Becoming Politically Active

According to Sheffer (2003) there are different functions of diaspora organisations relating to politics; he differentiates between domestic in the host country, regional, transstate, the entire diaspora and homeland politics. In addition he identified three main categories of diaspora activism: maintenance, defence, and promotion of its interests. Each aspect is performed by functional agencies within specialised communal organisations. Although the Acehnese diaspora is far too small to develop such specialised tasksharing, there are obvious homeland and migrant political activities to be found in Sydney.

A primarily political group was formed – Australian Aceh Association (AAA) in 1999 "with advice from Dr. Husaini Hasan in Sweden", as one of my key-informants put it. The following quotation is an excerpt from a speech Husaini Hasan delivered when he came to Australia, where one of his children lives.

> To The People of Australia
>
> Many peoples frightfully flee from their home, because of frightened to be taken away by midnight by the Indonesian army. I plead to the people of Australia to be frank and fair and see us as we are; the Achehnese, the Sundanese, the Javanese, the Balinese, the Bugis, the Timorese, the Moluccans and the West Papuans. We want our rights for self determination, to be free from the yoke of the Republic of Indonesia, and to be the masters in our own lands. Please be human and do not let the Indonesian army continue their massacre from Sabang to Merauke every day.
>
> Please stop the extremely human right abuses that still going on in front of you now. You as the closest witness in this area can tell the peoples in the world that we do not go to other countries and terrorize them. It is the Indonesian soldiers who come and terrorize us, rob our natural resources etc, and kill us in our own home.
>
> (Husaini Hasan, 1999, no precise date)[16]

AAA frequently held rallies together with other human rights groups (Action in Solidarity with Asia and the Pacific, "Indonesian solidarity") in Australia's major cities. Well-known activists from Aceh like Cut Nur Asikin and Kautsar were invited and went on speaking tours raising awareness about the ongoing violence in their homeland. Demands made to the Australian government included:

- Urge the Indonesian government to pull back from all-out war in Aceh, withdraw the troops and institute real negotiations and dialogue with the full spectrum of Acehnese political groups;
- End all military and security ties with Indonesia, including abandoning plans to resume ties with the discredited Kopassus, and;
- Initiate a special humanitarian assistance program directed to the people of Aceh.[17]

According to a former secretary of AAA the group perceived itself as "part of the struggle" – meaning actively supporting secession from Indonesia. GAM itself had appointed two representatives who worked in Australia on the organisation's behalf. Trouble arose because both of them also held leading positions in AAA. Personal loyalties clashed, non-transparent decisions on money fuelled resentment, and members of AAA were excluded from decision-making processes. My informant explained:

> It [AAA] was reorganised in April 2001 and resumed a larger role to cover social and cultural issues, as well as the awareness on the ongoing conflict in Acheh. However, AAA became stagnant since from 2002, when some of its prominent members were arrested due to their immigration status. (19.6.2006)

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[16] http://acehnet.tripod.com/asnlf.htm (12.6.2006).

[17] http://lists.cat.org.au/pipermail/sydney/2003-May/002074.html (16.5.2006).

It was a 'major setback' when several leading figures were arrested due to their expired work permits. AAA obtained a negative reputation from that, but later when deciding on a successor-organisation frictions also arose on how politically involved the Acehnese in Sydney should be.

When AAA ceased to exist, a new organisation was founded – Australian Acheh Society (AAS, founded on 25 December 2004, just a day before the devastating tsunami). It established a new paradigm of political abstemiousness. From now on the main focus was on cultural matters. The decision was made collectively by the original members of the new organisation. In the beginning only a few supported the new group actively, but now as I was told by the chairman almost everyone is associated more or less closely with this new organisation. According to the head of the new group, AAS serves social and cultural purposes. This interviewee, who fills an important position within the new group, explained "we want to promote the 'soft parts' of Aceh" and that they were going to "try other avenues, like providing information about study opportunities for people back home in Aceh as well". The reason for doing so is to "reduce political talk and keep unity among the Acehnese".

However, there still was, I found, considerable interest in continuing political engagement. The two 'official' GAM representatives, together with a political refugee who arrived in 2003, founded the Acehnese Community of Australia (ACA). One of the founders claimed that ACA involved about 60 people. At the time there were not many activities due to his excessive work load in his private life. The second of the ACA founders is in Aceh at present, and the other completely refused to meet me. It seemed to me that this second group had split. One of the three was asked by GAM to join the negotiations for the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) in Helsinki. Another informant explained that the other two were not only disappointed in the outcome of the peace negotiations gained by GAM and the Indonesian government, but also in the fact that their own man "did not tell them", but pretended that he would leave Australia for different reasons. Mutual antipathies grew. As a negotiator who went to Finland to support the GAM side, he was labelled a traitor or compromiser by his colleagues back in Australia. Former activists were driven to the fringe of the diaspora by social isolation. Understandably, since these frictions were not over yet, most of the interviewees did not want to go into too much detail. I heard about boycotts of certain activities and a few harsh denunciations of individuals and groups.

Generally speaking, stances towards GAM are very wide-ranging. Some interviewees complained about the dominant exercise of power by GAM leaders from Sweden that did not include the Acehnese civil society at home and abroad. Some interviewees said they had formerly actively supported GAM and that they were now very disappointed. Others expressed open mistrust, scrutinising GAM leaders' openness and honesty and even challenging GAM's intellectual and organisational abilities. Especially after the In-

donesian government and the leadership of GAM have reached a political consensus and a more solid peace process then ever before has been drawn up, various individuals and groups from outside Aceh have made criticism.

Generally suspicion towards the peace settlement was high. One informant said that he had not fought for so long for "such a result", meaning the 'poor concession' achieved by GAM at the Helsinki Meetings in August 2005. He claimed that GAM had "submitted to the colonialists" and indicated that he was still willing to go for the original aim – an independent Aceh. However, that is not a completely surprising reaction. With regard to other diasporas Shain (2002) noticed that diaspora hardliners often care less about the homeland's present and future than about the dead of the past. According to Anderson (1998) 'long-distance nationalism' is a common phenomenon experienced by people far away from the daily threats and dangers of warfare. Concerning the Acehnese in Sydney it would be too early to evaluate whether these discontented former GAM-fighters will be able to come forward with their own agenda for continuing the struggle for independence or whether they will simply espouse belligerent rhetoric.

It is of course a complex task to measure whether these critical voices can really challenge GAM's domination in future decision-making. However such critical standpoints illustrate, firstly, that political elites situated in the West can unilaterally dominate homeland politics and exploit conditions for their own esteem. Secondly, it shows that such behaviour by these leaders is not taken for granted, but, on the contrary, is challenged by 'non-beneficiaries'. Thirdly, I suggest that the tensions within the Acehnese diaspora in Sydney might even reflect the wider spectrum of different opinions to be found nowadays back in Aceh.

Observing Current Homeland Politics

Since the signing of MoU in August 2005 the situation in Aceh is very peaceful. The violence has declined rapidly and an internationally staffed Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) is responsible for observing security and order. However, my Acehnese interviewees were rather suspicious. It was hard for them to believe that the peace deal would last. If I asked where their doubts derived from they mostly brought up examples of former cheating by both parties in the conflict. Moreover, they pointed to the TNI-trained militias[18] that represented a certain risk to the new peace. A lack of faith concerning the delay in passing the new Aceh Government Bill (RUU PA) was apparent. Often mentioned were also hidden GAM motives for still keeping to their

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[18] According to fact finding by SIRA there were a lot of militias trained by the Indonesian military in Aceh. For the full report see: http://www.acheh-eye.org/data_files/english_format/ngo/ngo_ eoa/ngo_eoa_ 2004 _07_00.html (1.6.2006) and also International Crisis Group (2005) *Aceh: So far, so good.*

former goal. Their mistrust was sometimes backed by incidents of new clashes in Aceh which were reported in the online media. It seemed to me that the inherent logic of war and war-economy sometimes overshadowed the belief in lasting reconciliation. One informant almost fatalistically commented that he does not understand enough about politics and "what is done by whom about what" and said that he "cannot influence anything at all" and therefore will "just remain praying".

Their perception about the political situation in Aceh bears strong implications about whether Acehnese abroad wish to return or to stay abroad. Although this desire for return is one of the theoretically most contested in diaspora theories, I still consider it productive to discuss some of the specific reasons why members of the Acehnese diaspora do or do not want to return home.

(No) Wish to Return

The generally wide spectrum of views about homeland politics is also reflected in people's outlook about the future and their wish to stay abroad or return home. Many Acehnese in Aceh expect that people who left will now return and support the peace process.

> They [leaders of the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) living overseas] should go home soon as good leaders have to be present among their people. (Zainuddin Hamid, *antara* 19.8.2005)

There are some Acehnese from Sydney who have already gone back. It seemed to me that most of my Acehnese interviewees appeared rather reluctant to return immediately. In an interview, Malik Mahmud, the "prime-minister" of GAM, did not push for a hastened return of the Acehnese abroad. This is perhaps strongly connected with his private affairs and his own destiny – and he explained as follows:

> Kanis Dursin (Reporter): "What is your message for GAM members who remain overseas?"
>
> Malik Mahmud: "They can stay outside. Many GAM members staying outside the country have children. They are now being educated overseas. That is an advantage. I think in the future Aceh needs young, better-educated Acehnese. Now we have families in all the Scandinavian countries – other parts of Europe, also America and some in Australia. In ten years' time, they will produce well-educated Acehnese. You know education overseas has a different, better environment and I hope that they will go back to Aceh one day." (*The Jakarta Post* 28.5.2006)

Most of the students who came to Australia with a scholarship will return, because that is a condition of their scholarship. Most of them look forward to returning. The hope to "go back to Aceh and make some change" and to "raise the level of education in Aceh and the network for educational matters outside university". When I asked one of these optimists about the potential risks he said that he would "try to make it work". They remained staunchly optimistic, even when I suggested potential worst case scen-

arios such as an outbreak of vertical violence due to unjust distribution of resources or mutual revenge-taking after the dissolution of the Aceh Monitoring Mission. In fact, most interviewees expressed their longing to return but at the same time pointed out that their private affairs – be it career, children's study, business or other duties – prevented their immediate departure. Most interviewees left the date uncertain or open: "I will go there, but don't know when".

Others made it clear that they would not return in the foreseeable future, or that they would go only for a holiday or a temporary visit since they prefer to live in Australia. Some are currently waiting to get their Australian citizenship first, because then "they can always come back [to Australia] if necessary". Some expressed their wish to try to make a safe living in Australia ("*hidup lebih tenteram*"), because returning is difficult, even if the situation is perceived to be much safer then ever before, as there are hardly any jobs available. One person who already had Australian citizenship said that he could help his relatives back in Aceh much more if he stayed and kept working in Australia. At the other end of the spectrum there were a few that stated that they would not return unless there was an independent state of Aceh (*merdeka*) and that they would continue the struggle ("*melanjutkan perjuangan*") until that was realised.

However, discussions about whether or when to return remain a steady topic among the Acehnese. Maybe Shuval (2000) is right, when he claims that myths of return serve to strengthen ethnic solidarity, but in many cases have little practical implication. They play an important part of knitting together the diasporic community, because everyone has to relate to this often discussed point by formulating his or her own stance towards it. Whether returning Acehnese are going to have deep social, political and economical effects on Aceh in the future, will be seen in time.

Preliminary Conclusion

> However, the ties that bind can also rend.
> (Winland 1995)

My exploratory interviews revealed that the Acehnese diaspora in Sydney presents substantial variations among its nominal members. These variations appear due to different structures and circumstances of individual life experiences. Although the Acehnese community is rather small in Australia, the range of perceptions they hold concerning homeland, political activism and social engagement is fairly broad, especially. The involvement across borders indicates the stability of the triangular relationship that I have mentioned as being one of the most important characteristics of a diaspora. Within the particular case of the Acehnese in Sydney this involvement across borders focuses mainly on how they generally view GAM and GAM's current political manoeuvring

within Aceh and abroad. When it comes to collaborating with GAM, their hegemonic stance is contested by those who feel they are not getting a fair share in terms of public recognition. Tensions might even become so intense that they alienate members and erode cohesion. Acehnese in Sydney provide clear examples of how homeland politics affect migrant survival and advocacy strategies, such as the strengthening of temporary diaspora cohesion in the host country.

Nevertheless, considering these existing differences or tensions within this particular 'group of co-responsibility' is a prerequisite to understanding their diaspora-politics completely. Without paying attention to these subtle aspects, the diasporic multi-level-relations of disjunction and cohesion cannot be satisfyingly elucidated and explaining diasporic political impacts on international politics will remain incomplete.

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